of order, does not justify this kind of action. I have no choice but to employ
my own men." (Leo Heiman, Ukrainians and the Jews, in Walter Dushnyck,
Ukrainians and Jews: A Symposium, The Ukrainian Congress Committee of American,
New York, 1966, p. 60)
In reading the above Einsatzgruppe report, many question come to mind. Just how would a pogrom
mob be organized? - Might it be staffed entirely by criminals held in custody by the Germans?
What weapons would be given the pogromists? Would it be safe to give incarcerated criminals
weapons and then to release them on their own recognisance? Obviously, they would tend to
escape and then, being armed, would be particularly dangerous to recapture. Wouldn't armed
Germans have to accompany the pogromists in order to steer them to the proper targets, to keep
them from getting out of control, and to make sure that weapons were returned? - In which case,
how much of the killing would be done by the supervising Germans? What was the ethnic
composition of these pogromists? Above I cited Raul Hilberg stating "Only the ethnic Germans in
the area were busily working for the Einsatzgruppe," which brings us to the realization that a
pogrom within Ukraine is not necessarily a pogrom perpetrated by Ukrainians, and so brings us
also to the question of how many of the pogromists were Germans, Russians, Poles, or Jews?
Raul Hilberg discusses two motives for the Nazis to incite pogroms in Ukraine, the second of
which will be of particular relevance when we discuss further below the origin of the historical
documentary footage broadcast by 60 Minutes:
Why did the Einsatzgruppen endeavor to start pogroms in the occupied areas?
The reasons which prompted the killing units to activate anti-Jewish outbursts
were partly administrative, partly psychological. The administrative principle
was very simple: every Jew killed in a pogrom was one less burden for the
Einsatzgruppen. A pogrom brought them, as they expressed it, that much closer
to the "cleanup goal".... The psychological consideration was more
interesting. The Einsatzgruppen wanted the population to take a part and a
major part at that - of the responsibility for the killing operations. "It was
not less important, for future purposes," wrote Brigadefuhrer Dr. Stahlecker,
"to establish as an unquestionable fact that the liberated population had
resorted to the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy,
on its own initiative and without instructions from German authorities." In
short, the pogroms were to become the defensive weapon with which to confront
an accuser, or an element of blackmail that could be used against the local
population. (Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 1961, p. 203)
Two of the conclusions that Raul Hilberg draws concerning pogroms in Ukraine flatly contradict
the Wiesenthal-Safer story of a massive pre-German pogrom in Lviv:
First, truly spontaneous pogroms, free from Einsatzgruppen influence, did not
take place; all outbreaks were either organized or inspired by the
Einsatzgruppen. Second, all pogroms were implemented within a short time after
the arrival of the killing units. They were not self-perpetuating, nor could
new ones be started after things had settled down. (Raul Hilberg, The
Destruction of the European Jews, 1985, p. 312)
Raul Hilberg describes what may have been the chief - or the only Lviv pogrom quite
differently - it occurred after the arrival of the Germans, and it did not involve the killing
of 5,000-6,000 Jews:
The Galician capital of Lvov was the scene of a mass seizure by local
inhabitants. In "reprisal" for the deportation of Ukrainians by the Soviets,
1000 members of the Jewish intelligentsia were driven together and handed over
to the Security Police. (Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews,