11903.fb2 ГУЛаг Палестины - читать онлайн бесплатно полную версию книги . Страница 247

ГУЛаг Палестины - читать онлайн бесплатно полную версию книги . Страница 247

the attitudes became more positive. The failure of Ukraine to rank high on anti-Jewish

responses in this survey should have been noted by 60 Minutes, as should the improvement in

attitudes from 1990 to 1992. Instead of applauding the reality of favorable Ukrainian attitudes

toward Jews, and the reality that they are getting even better, 60 Minutes seemed bent on

encouraging their deterioration.

And, if 60 Minutes had wanted personal testimony concerning Ukrainian attitudes toward Jews to

bolster the dry facts coming from the opinion poll, then it could have consulted any number of

Ukrainian Jews who would have been happy to correct 60 Minutes' biases. The above-mentioned

Iosep Zissels, for example, would have offered observations such as that "There was a time when

the leaders of Pamiat [or "Pamyat" - the Russian anti-Semitic organization] would travel from

Russia to recruit supporters in Ukraine. They didn't find any. We are well aware of this fact"

(Ukrainian Weekly, January 26, 1992, p. 4)

CONTENTS:

Preface

The Galicia Division

Quality of Translation

Ukrainian Homogeneity

Were Ukrainians Nazis?

Simon Wiesenthal

What Happened in Lviv?

Nazi Propaganda Film

Collective Guilt

Paralysis of the Comparative

Function

60 Minutes' Cheap Shots

Ukrainian Anti-Semitism

Jewish Ukrainophobia

Mailbag

A Sense of Responsibility

What 60 Minutes Should Do

PostScript

Jewish Ukrainophobia

Is there any? Of course there is. Jewish Ukrainophobia is universal. Ukraine has some, just

as does the United States or Canada or Israel. But is there more Jewish Ukrainophobia in

Ukraine than elsewhere? Don't ask 60 Minutes - to ask such a question is to violate rules of

political correctness.

One thing missing from the above discussion of Ukrainian anti-Semitism, then, is any mention of

the reciprocal attitude of Jewish Ukrainophobia (or more generally of Jewish phobic responses

toward Gentiles or peoples of any other creed). But perhaps we would be able to evaluate

statistics on the rate of Ukrainian anti-Semitism more intelligently if we were able to put them

side by side with statistics on Jewish Ukrainophobia. If Ukrainian anti-Semitism shows a

declining trend over some interval, would this fact not be enriched by a comparison with the

trend of Jewish Ukrainophobia over the same interval? In a discussion of Ukrainian-Jewish

relations, how is it conceivable that the attitudes of Ukrainians toward Jews is deemed relevant

and susceptible to quantification, but the attitudes of Jews toward Ukrainians is not? Here, as

in several other instances above, we see a curious paralysis of the comparative function, a

puzzling Ukrainian passivity in allowing the Jewish side to set the agenda for discussion and to

limit its parameters. Ukrainian motes are put under the microscope and measured and analyzed,

but Jewish beams are not.

CONTENTS: