11903.fb2 ГУЛаг Палестины - читать онлайн бесплатно полную версию книги . Страница 271

ГУЛаг Палестины - читать онлайн бесплатно полную версию книги . Страница 271

Title Page

I. Background

II. News Distortion

A. Evidentiary standard

B. Licensee's policy on distortion

C. Nature of particular evidence

1. Extrinsic evidence

(a) Outtakes of the interview with Rabbi Bleich

(b) The viewer letters

(c) The refusal to consult Professor Luciuk

2. Evidence of factual inaccuracies

D. Misrepresentation

III. Conclusion

I. Background

Section 309(a) of the Communications Act provides that the

Federal Communications Commission may grant a broadcast

license only when it determines that doing so would serve the

"public interest, convenience, and necessity." 47 U.S.C.

s 309(a). Under s 309(d) of the Act any interested person

may petition the FCC to deny or to set for hearing any

application for a broadcast license or to revoke an existing

broadcaster's license. The petition must contain

specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that ... a

grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent

with [the public interest, convenience, and necessity].

Such allegations of fact shall ... be supported by affida

vit of a person ... with personal knowledge thereof.

Id. The FCC must hold a hearing if it finds that the

application presents a "substantial and material question of

fact" or if it is otherwise unable to conclude that granting the

application would serve the public interest. See s 309(e).

As the Commission interprets it, s 309 erects a two-step

barrier to a hearing: (1) a petition must contain specific

allegations of fact that, taken as true, make out a prima facie

case that grant of the application would not serve the public

interest; and (2) the allegations, taken together with any

opposing evidence before the Commission, must still raise a

substantial and material question of fact as to whether grant

of the application would serve the public interest. See Astro

line Communications Co. v. FCC, 857 F.2d 1556, 1561 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) (describing two-step test). At the first step, "[t]he

Commission's inquiry ... is much like that performed by a

trial judge considering a motion for a directed verdict: if all

the supporting facts alleged in the affidavits were true, could

a reasonable factfinder conclude that the ultimate fact in

dispute had been established." Gencom, Inc. v. FCC, 832

F.2d 171, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1987). At the second step, a substan

tial and material question is raised when "the totality of the

evidence arouses a sufficient doubt on the [question whether

grant of the application would serve the public interest] that