11903.fb2 ГУЛаг Палестины - читать онлайн бесплатно полную версию книги . Страница 283

ГУЛаг Палестины - читать онлайн бесплатно полную версию книги . Страница 283

circumstantial evidence about such intent. See Crawford-El

v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 818 (1996) ("[T]he distinction between

direct and circumstantial evidence has no direct correlation

with the strength of the plaintiff's case"); CPBF v. FCC, 752

F.2d at 679 ("Intent [may] be inferred from the subsidiary

fact of [a broadcaster's] statements to third parties"). Sec

ond, evidence that sheds light upon one's intent is relevant

whether it was prepared before or after the incident under

investigation; consider, for example, a letter written after but

recounting words or actions before an event.

Upon remand, therefore, the Commission may wish to

consider separately two types of letters. First, there may be

letters that convey direct information about the producers'

state of mind while the show was in production. For exam

ple, Cardinal Lubachivsky charged that the producers misled

him as to the nature of the show. Second, there are letters

that point out factual inaccuracies in the show. For example,

Rabbi Lincoln, a viewer, wrote in about the mistranslation of

"zhyd." Although letters of this type may not have indepen

dent significance, they may yet be probative in determining

whether an error was obvious or egregious, and if so whether

it bespeaks an intent to distort the facts. See Part II.C.2

below.

CONTENTS:

Title Page

I. Background

II. News Distortion

A. Evidentiary standard

B. Licensee's policy on distortion

C. Nature of particular evidence

1. Extrinsic evidence

(a) Outtakes of the interview with Rabbi Bleich

(b) The viewer letters

(c) The refusal to consult Professor Luciuk

2. Evidence of factual inaccuracies

D. Misrepresentation

III. Conclusion

(c) The refusal to consult Professor Luciuk

Serafyn asserted that CBS's refusal to consult Professor

Luciuk demonstrated its intent to distort the news because

only someone with no intention to broadcast the truth would

refuse to use the services of an expert. The Commission

found that evidence of the broadcaster's decision was extrin

sic to the program but that it "falls far short of demonstrating

intent to distort the ... program" because the "[d]etermina

tion[ ] as to which experts to utilize is a decision solely within

the province of the broadcaster." WGPR, 10 FCC Rcd at

8148. Once again, the agency's reasoning is too loose.

Serafyn raises no question about the broadcaster's discretion

to decide whom, if anyone, to employ; it is only because the