personally took part in the extortion and drug related activities of the organization. The information made available to respondent and
the criminal records of respondent and his associates were before the Committee when he appeared and was asked to respond.
Counsel for respondent objected to the fairness and constitutionality of the proceeding.
The Review Committee reported to the Governor in Council, pursuant to s. 82.1(6)(a), that respondent was a person there are
reasonable grounds to believe will engage in organized crime as described in s. 19(1)(d)(ii). The Governor in Council adopted the
conclusion of the Review Committee and directed the appellant Minister to issue a certificate under s. 83(1) with respect to respondent's
appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board from the deportation order. This certificate was issued, with the result that respondent's appeal
would have to be dismissed in so far as it was brought pursuant to s. 72(1)(b).
The hearing of the appeal was adjourned when respondent gave notice that he intended to raise constitutional questions before the
Board and three questions were referred to the Federal Court of Appeal for determination. The court found that: (1) ss. 27(1)(d)(ii) and
32(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976, did not infringe ss. 7, 12 or 15 of the Charter; (2) ss. 82.1 and 83 did not infringe ss. 12 or 15 of the
Charter but the question as to whether they contravened s. 7 was not a question that the Board could refer to the Court pursuant to
s. 28(4) of the Federal Court Act; and (3) the Board would, in relying upon the certificate, violate respondent's rights under s. 7 and this
violation was not justified under s. 1.
The constitutional questions stated in this Court queried whether: (1) ss. 82.1 and 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976 infringed s. 7 of the
Charter, and if so, whether that infringement was justified under s. 1; (2) whether reliance upon the certificate authorized by s. 83 of the
Act filed in respondent's case infringed s. 7 because the process followed by the Security Intelligence Review Committed did not meet
the requirements of s. 7.
The respondent in the main appeal was granted leave to cross-appeal, and the constitutional questions stated there queried whether
ss. 27(1)(d)(ii) and 32(2) of the Act infringed ss. 7, 12 and 15 of the Charter in that they required the deportation of persons convicted of
an offence carrying a maximum punishment of five years or more, without reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender,
and if so, whether that infringement was justified under s. 1.
Held: The appeal should be allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed. With respect to the main appeal, assuming without deciding
that s. 7 is applicable, ss. 82.1 and 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976, do not infringe or deny the rights guaranteed by s. 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and reliance upon the certificate authorized by s. 83 of the Immigration Act, 1976, did not result in an
infringement of s. 7 having regard to the process followed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee. With respect to the
cross-appeal, the requirement that persons convicted of an offence carrying a maximum punishment of five years or more be deported,
without reference to the circumstances of the offence or the offender, does not offend s. 15, or ss. 7 or 12 assuming without deciding that
these sections applied.
The Court must look to the principles and policies underlying immigration law in determining the scope of principles of fundamental
justice as they apply here. The most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to
enter or remain in the country. The common law recognizes no such right and the Charter recognizes the distinction between citizens
and non-citizens. While permanent residents are given the right to move to, take up residence in, and pursue the gaining of a livelihood
in any province in s. 6(2), only citizens are accorded the right "to enter, remain in and leave Canada" in s. 6(1). Parliament therefore has
the right to adopt an immigration policy and to enact legislation prescribing the conditions under which non-citizens will be permitted to
enter and remain in Canada. It has done so in the Immigration Act.
A permanent resident has a right to remain in Canada only if he or she has not been convicted of a more serious offence -- one for
which a term of imprisonment of five years or more may be imposed. This condition represents a legitimate, non-arbitrary choice by
Parliament of a situation in which it is not in the public interest to allow a non-citizen to remain in the country. All persons falling within
the class of permanent residents described in s. 27(1)(d)(ii) have deliberately violated an essential condition under which they were
permitted to remain in Canada. Fundamental justice is not breached by deportation: it is the only way to give practical effect to the
termination of a permanent resident's right to remain in Canada. Compliance with fundamental justice does not require that other
aggravating or mitigating circumstances be considered.
The deportation authorized by ss. 27(1)(d)(ii) and 32(2) was not cruel and unusual. The standards of decency are not outraged by the
deportation of a permanent resident who has deliberately violated an essential condition of his or her being permitted to remain in
Canada by committing a serious criminal offence. Rather, those standards would be outraged if individuals granted conditional entry
into Canada were permitted to violate those conditions deliberately and without consequence.
A deportation scheme applicable to permanent residents, but not to citizens, does not infringe s. 15 of the Charter. Section 6 of the
Charter specifically provides for differential treatment of citizens and permanent residents in this regard. While permanent residents are