the person should not be removed from Canada". This latter ground of appeal grants the Immigration Appeal Board discretion to quash
a deportation order notwithstanding the fact that the individual falls within one of the categories in s. 27(1) such that the deportation
order was properly made under s. 32(2). It thus allows for clemency from deportation on compassionate grounds.
Section 82.1 sets out the conditions which may give rise to an investigation by the Review Committee and the procedure to be
followed in such an investigation. In general terms the Solicitor General and the Minister of Employment and Immigration may make a
report to the Review Committee in respect of a permanent resident who has launched an appeal pursuant to s. 72(1)(b) where they are
of the opinion, based on security or criminal intelligence reports, that that person is likely to engage in organized crime, espionage, acts
of violence that might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada, or subversion by force of any government. In the case of the
respondent the joint report was based on s. 19(1)(d)(ii):
19. (1) . . .
(d) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe will
. . .
(ii) engage in activity that is part of a pattern of criminal activity planned and organized by a number of persons acting in concert in
furtherance of the commission of any offence that may be punishable under any Act of Parliament by way of indictment;
When the Review Committee receives such a joint report, it must conduct an investigation into the grounds on which it is based and
report to the Governor in Council. Where, after considering the report of the Review Committee, the Governor in Council is satisfied that
the person does fall within one of the categories in s. 82.1(2) (the categories pursuant to which the Ministers can make a joint report to
the Review Committee), he or she may direct the issuance of a certificate under s. 83. The effect of this certificate is to direct the
Immigration Appeal Board to dismiss any appeal made pursuant to s. 72(1)(b). In other words, the individual's appeal will be limited to
questions of fact or law or mixed fact or law.
Substantive Ground
The respondent submits that the impugned legislation is inconsistent with s. 7 of the Charter because it creates a process whereby
he is deprived, contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, of his right to appeal against deportation on the ground set out in
s. 72(1)(b). The necessary implication of this position is that it is a principle of fundamental justice that a permanent resident who is the
subject of deportation proceedings be afforded an appeal on all of the circumstances of the case. Otherwise it cannot be a violation of
principles of fundamental justice for Parliament to limit the availability of such an appeal. In my view s. 7 does not mandate the
provision of a compassionate appeal from a decision which, as I have already concluded, comports with principles of fundamental
justice.
Before a deportation order can be issued against a permanent resident, an inquiry must be conducted by an adjudicator to determine
whether the permanent resident does fall into one of the classes in s. 27(1). Section 72(1)(a) provides for an appeal from such a
deportation order on any question of law or fact or mixed law and fact. The decision of the Board is subject to appeal to the Federal
Court of Appeal on a question of law if leave is granted by that Court (s. 84 of the Act (now s. 83)). These rights of appeal offer ample
protection to an individual from an erroneous decision by the adjudicator. The question is whether principles of fundamental justice
require more than this. In order to answer this question it is necessary to consider the "nature, source, rationale and essential role" of the
right to appeal from deportation orders under the Act and the evolution of that right: Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra.
The Immigration Act, S.C. 1910, c. 27, did not provide any specific grounds of appeal. A person ordered deported could only resort to
the Minister who, under s. 19, had the authority to overturn a deportation order on unspecified grounds. The Immigration Act,
R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, provided for an immigration appeal board; however, appeals against deportation orders remained under the control
of the Minister. The appeal board heard only those appeals directed to it by the Minister and the Minister retained the power to confirm
or quash the appeal board's decision or substitute his decision as he deemed just and proper. The 1966 White Paper on Immigration
criticized the broad overriding power of the Minister with respect to appeals, and recommended that a reconstituted Immigration Appeal
Board have authority to deal conclusively with appeals against deportation orders except in "security cases". In 1967, the Immigration
Appeal Board Act, S.C. 1966-67, c. 90, established an independent Immigration Appeal Board. Section 11 provided for appeals on any
questions of law or fact or mixed law and fact. Section 15, for the first time, conferred upon the Board the power to stay or quash a
deportation order made against a permanent resident on the basis of all the circumstances of the case. However s. 21 provided that that
new power was still subject to the discretion of the Minister and the Solicitor General who could certify their opinion, based on security
or criminal intelligence reports, that it would be contrary to the national interest to permit such relief. In Prata v. Minister of Manpower
and Immigration, supra, Martland J. stated at p. 381:
The effect of s. 21 is to reserve to the Crown, notwithstanding the powers conferred upon the Board by the Act, the right, similar to the