Plowshares into Swords
Two months later – Tel Aviv
Scott Rosen sat in a small cafe eating a bowl of soup, waiting for his friend Joel Felsberg. Soon Joel entered and sat down without speaking.
"You look upset," Scott offered, in what seemed to Joel to be a rather irritating tone.
"I hate these damned Russians – always stopping you on the street and wanting to see your papers." Joel was exaggerating: most people went days without being stopped. "They're never going to leave, you know."
"Yeah, I know," Scott answered with uncharacteristic resignation, as he sipped his soup. "But everything is not so gloomy," he added, with equally uncharacteristic good cheer. "I heard the resistance hijacked a supply truck, stole all the supplies, and then loaded it with dynamite and sent it into a Russian camp by remote control. They say it killed nearly a thousand Russians."
Joel ordered his lunch before responding. "I've heard that story twenty times in the last three weeks and it gets more full of bullshit with every telling," Joel responded.
"You don't believe it?"
"Yeah, I believe it. But I believe it the way I heard it the first time: the resistance hijacked a truck and drove it into a Russian camp where it ran into a water tower, accomplishing next to nothing."
"Well, at least there is a resistance."
"Yeah, and they're out-gunned and completely disorganized. If Ben Gurion had used their tactics we'd still be a British protectorate! Damn it, Scott," Joel continued, after stirring his coffee, "we're still occupied! I don't care how many water towers we run into or supply trucks we hijack! We were a free, independent state and now we are not!"
"What do you think the resistance should do differently?" Scott asked, as if Joel's opinion made a difference.
"Hell, I don't know." Joel shook his head. "Nothing I guess. That's the whole problem: there's nothing we can do. Even if we got rid of the Russians, as soon as they were gone we'd be attacked by the Arabs, and we'd have nothing to fight them with."
"Yes, but… "
"Damn it, Scott, you're pissin' me off. Is that why you brought me here: so I could wallow in my anger and frustration?"
Joel Felsberg and Scott Rosen were zealous in their love for their country. Either could easily be brought to a fever pitch when it came to Israel, but strangely, on this occasion only Joel's blood pressure had risen. An unusual calm accompanied Scott's speech, but Joel didn't notice it. Neither had he noticed that since his arrival no one had entered or left the cafe, nor that the cafe owner had turned the sign to read 'CLOSED.' Likewise, the two men standing watch outside the cafe had escaped Joel's notice entirely.
Suddenly Scott became animated. "We must drive the Russians from Israel and bloody their noses so badly they'll never come back!" he said.
"Big talk. Big talk," Joel responded. "I suppose you think the resistance will accomplish that with their puny disruptions to the Russian supply lines. And just how do you propose we deal with the Arabs when and if the Russians leave?"
Scott studied his soup. "If only we had used our nukes on the Russians instead of just waving them around as a threat to the Libyans."
"You're a fool, Rosen! By the time we knew we were being invaded, the Russians were all over the place. The only way we could have nuked them was to launch on our own soil," Joel said, growing even more angry.
Scott Rosen did not allow his friend's anger to distract him. He had a mission to accomplish and all was working exactly according to plan. "Yeah, I guess that's true." Scott's voice seemed resigned to the hopelessness of the situation, but he continued. "Too bad we can't get control of the nukes now. With the Russians all concentrated in the hills, we could wipe out ninety percent of them with just a few well-placed missiles and the resistance could take out the other ten percent in the cities."
"You really are a fool," Joel said. "What about Moscow? You think they're just gonna sit back and let that happen without responding? What's to stop them from striking back against our cities?"
This was the question that Scott had been waiting for. Suddenly his mood grew much more serious. The gravity of what he was about to say was clear even to Joel. "Our strategic defense," he whispered finally.
Joel stared coldly at Scott, studying his expression. Twice his mouth was poised as if he were about to speak; he was going to accuse Rosen again of being a fool, but he held back. It appeared that Rosen was serious and when it came to strategic defense, Scott Rosen deserved to be heard. Next to his late father, Joshua Rosen, Scott knew more about Israeli strategic defense than anyone. Finally Joel responded, "You're talking impossibilities. Even if a plan like that could work, there's no way in the world our puny, disorganized resistance could get control of the Strategic Defense Control Facility."
"We don't need to go anywhere near the Control Facility," Scott said, confidently.
Suddenly Joel became aware of his surroundings. When he had thought that he and Rosen were just griping he didn't care who heard them. There was nothing unusual about two Israeli men complaining about the Russians. Everyone in Israel was complaining. Indeed, it might have been considered unusual for them to be talking about anything else. But now they had crossed the line: they were no longer just complaining. The wrong person listening to their conversation might easily have mistaken this for a conspiracy. He looked around quickly to make sure no one had overheard them.
Scott didn't interrupt him to mention that he had nothing to worry about; each of the seven people in the cafe had been handpicked for the occasion.
"You mean a remote?" Joel asked finally, under his breath. Scott signaled with his eyes in the affirmative. Joel had heard talk about a remote, an off-site test facility for the Strategic Defense Control Facility (SDCF), but he had written it off as speculation by people who didn't know any better. If there was an Off-Site Test Facility (OSTF) it would have been evident in the communications configuration needed for such an operation. True, the communications links could have been intentionally mislabeled to conceal its existence, but Joel had worked at the SDCF for over five years and had run numerous configuration scenarios on the facility's computers. If there was an Off-Site Test Facility, it would have turned up in the simulations.
Joel was intimately familiar with the concept of an OSTF. Early in his career, before leaving the U.S., he had been a low-level software analyst for Ford Aerospace, assigned to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). He remembered those long walks down the cold tunnels in Cheyenne Mountain to test software upgrades. He had been there in the mountain back in 1979 when for 15 terrifying minutes it appeared that the Soviet Union had launched a full scale nuclear attack on the United States. American Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers were launched and nuclear missiles were put on alert, awaiting the President's order. As it turned out, the alert was caused by a test scenario inadvertently being fed into the on-line NORAD computer network. As a result of that false alarm the U.S. Congress immediately authorized the construction of the NORAD Off-Site Test Facility in downtown Colorado Springs.
Prior to the establishment of the Colorado Springs OSTF, the standard operating procedure for testing software upgrades had involved taking NORAD's backup systems for the critical missile warning computers off-line while the tests were run. It was risky business, at best. What if there had been a failure in the primary system? In the fifteen minutes it would take to get the backup system out of test mode and back on-line, it could be all over. The OSTF was definitely the way to go. Besides, as far as Joel was concerned, downtown Colorado Springs was a much easier commute than Cheyenne Mountain in the middle of the night. The OSTF included a complete duplicate of all the systems at Cheyenne Mountain. All testing of new software was performed there. Only after the software passed testing were the cryptographically check-summed object modules electronically downloaded to the operational center at NORAD. And there was one other benefit to the OSTF: in the event of a total failure of the NORAD systems, the OSTF could take over the actual operation. Computers, communications, and cryptographic equipment were all in place. All that was needed was loading of the proper cryptographic key material into the cryptos.
When Joel went to work at the Israeli Strategic Defense Control Facility, he tried for two years to convince his superiors of the need to develop the same type of system for Israel, but to no avail. At one point he considered resigning to protest their refusal to even talk about it, but his wife convinced him to be patient and wait until those in charge were more sympathetic to the idea. Actually, that was one of the most irritating parts: the head of the Israeli SDCF was Dr. Arnold Brown, one of the men who had played a crucial role in developing the OSTF concept for NORAD. It never made any sense to Joel that Brown would refuse to consider providing the same capabilities for Israel.
Joel's initial response to Scott Rosen's suggestion that the Strategic Defense Control Facility had an OSTF was that Scott was simply believing more rumors like the one about the hijacked supply truck. Still, there were some things to which Scott, with his compartmentalized clearances, might have had access that Joel could have been totally unaware of. And the look on Scott's face said he was serious.
"Scott," Joel said as he leaned across the table, "is this a game? Are you putting me on?" Scott's eyes answered the question. "But, Scott, I worked at SDCF for over five years. I ran configuration scenarios on the facility's computers a thousand times. If there was an Off-Site Test Facility why didn't it turn up in the simulations?"
"It was there. Its functions were masked to hide its true purpose, but it was there."
Joel's eyes asked, "Where?"
"SF-14," Scott answered.
There was no way of knowing whether Scott was telling the truth. Sensor Facility 14, as far as Joel had known, was a non-operational and entirely redundant infrared tracking station for terminal-phase acquisition and discrimination of ballistic reentry vehicles. Perhaps by coincidence – and then again, perhaps not – SF-14 was one of only two remote facilities that Joel had never actually visited. Now that he thought about it, he couldn't remember ever seeing anyone's name on the duty roster for a site check of SF-14. This would certainly explain Dr. Brown's lack of interest in considering an Off-Site Test Facility. After all, why talk about building something that was already folly operational?
If Scott Rosen knew what he was talking about then Joel wanted to know, but if this was just more wishful thinking then he wanted to be done with it, and the sooner the better. "Okay," he said, abruptly, "take me there." To Joel's surprise Scott didn't come back with some flimsy excuse but instead got to his feet and started to leave the cafe with Joel in tow. "What about the check?" Joel asked Scott.
"It's on the house," answered the cafe owner.
Scott drove straight into the eastern business section of Tel Aviv and parked in the basement parking lot of a tall but otherwise nondescript office building that appeared to have only minor damage from the recent war. Joel followed as Scott walked toward the elevators and then paused to look up at a security camera near the ceiling. In a moment a red light on the camera blinked and Scott pushed the call button for the elevator. As the elevator door closed behind them, Scott flipped the emergency 'stop' switch, and, on the numbered buttons of the elevator, punched in a seven digit code. Despite already being in the basement, the elevator lurched downward, taking them, Joel guessed, several floors farther beneath the building.
The elevator door opened to a small room about twelve feet square where two armed guards waited. Badges were out of the question under the circumstances, so they were operating strictly on a recognition basis. Joel would soon learn this was not that difficult a task: very few people were involved in this operation. As Scott introduced him to the guards who were obviously studying every aspect of his appearance, Joel noticed his photograph laying on the desk beside an array of security monitors, one of which was focused on the elevator in the garage where they had entered.
Scott then opened the cipher lock of an armored door that was the only exit from the room other than the elevator. Before them lay a small sea of computers and defense tracking equipment on a raised floor, filling a room about 8500 square feet. An array of symmetric multiprocessors made up the heart of the operation, with integrated routers/ATM switches feeding real-time input via broadband fiberlinks. Joel had seen this hardware configuration before, at the Strategic Defense Control Facility in the mountains near Mizpe Ramon in southern Israel. There was much less room here than in the mountain, but at first glance this seemed to be an exact duplicate of the core of the SDCF.
Scattered around the facility were a handful of men and women busily working at Sun workstations. A few slowed their pace just long enough to look up and acknowledge Scott's and Joel's presence with friendly smiles before going back to their work. While Joel looked around in disbelief, a short well-built man entered from another room and approached them. Scott abruptly ended the brief tour to greet the man.
"Good afternoon, Colonel," Scott said, formally. "Allow me to introduce Mr. Joel Felsberg; Joel, this is Colonel White."
"Welcome to the team," White said. "Glad you could join us."
"Uh… thank you, sir," he said, unaware that he had.
"You're coming in at a crucial time. Scott has told me all about you and I've seen your record. I'm sure we can count on you to help us make this thing happen.
"Scott," he continued, "introduce Joel to the rest of the team and get him briefed on what his role is. We'll talk later." With that the Colonel left.
"Uh, yeah, that's a good idea, Scott. Get me briefed on what my role is," Joel repeated. And then more to the point, "What the hell is going on down here?!"
Scott smiled. "Welcome to SF-14," he said.
In the facility's briefing room, Scott poured coffee and proceeded to present an overview of the project and a discussion of the highly classified maximum capabilities of each of the four phases of the Israeli strategic defense. After nearly an hour, he finally got around to explaining where Joel fit into all of this.
"The reason you're here," Scott explained, "is that two nights ago Dr. Claude Remey, our software guru, very stupidly got in the way of his neighbors' domestic quarrel. As a result, he's now lying unconscious in a hospital with a stab wound three quarters of an inch from his heart. You've been brought on to finish the project he was working on."
Joel knew Remey. They had worked together on a couple of projects but had never gotten along well. Still, Joel was sorry to hear of his injury.
"What you see here is a fully operations-capable backup facility to the Strategic Defense Control Facility. It is not simply a 'test' facility. Dr. Arnold Brown, who was in charge of its development, determined from the outset that knowledge of its existence should be limited to as few individuals as possible. It was felt that, should Israel ever be invaded, this facility should be maintained at all costs.
"Colonel White, actually, Lieutenant Colonel White, whom you just met, was part of a chain of officers, decreasing in rank from General to Captain, charged with operation of the facility in case of an invasion. The purpose of the chain was to prevent any invading force from disrupting the operation of this facility by systematically arresting all high-ranking officers. As it turns out, each of Colonel White's superiors were arrested in the first days after the invasion and the responsibility fell to him.
"The initial plan for this facility, in an invasion where the SDCF was lost, included three scenarios. First, should the opportunity present itself, this facility could be used to launch on the invader's flank, thus cutting off his supply lines and weakening the forward forces. Second, should there be an attempt by an invading force to use our own nuclear capabilities against us, this facility could frustrate that attempt by overriding the controls at the SDCF. And third, should there be any attempt to remove a warhead from a silo, this facility has the capability to neutralize the nuclear device. Had either the second or the third scenario occurred, the established procedure would have been to initiate the destruction of each threatening, or threatened, missile by remotely setting off small explosives in the silos that would disable both the silo and the warhead, without, of course, detonating the nuclear device.
"What actually happened with the Russian invasion was something that had not even been considered. As I alluded in the cafe – oh, by the way, the cafe is one of several safe houses around the city – the Russians have presented us with a totally unexpected opportunity. By concentrating their forces away from populated areas," Scott paused to point out the Russian troop locations marked on a large wall map, "they have literally made themselves sitting ducks to the capabilities of this facility.
"The first phase of our plan, then, is to neutralize the Strategic Defense Control Facility and launch six neutron-tipped, short-range Gideon missiles – one against each of the Russians' positions.
"There are three very important reasons we've chosen the neutron-tipped Gideons. The most obvious is that since we will be launching on targets within our own borders, it is absolutely imperative that we limit the area of destruction. We'll come back to that in a minute.
"The second reason is that the Gideon-class warhead produces the most rapidly dissipating radiation pattern of any of our warheads. Our forces will be able to reenter the initial kill radius within six to eight hours after impact. Ground Zero will be entirely habitable in three weeks.
"Third, if the launch is successful, and our strategic defense successfully defends Israel against a Russian retaliatory nuclear strike – that's phase two of the plan – we will very quickly face a second threat from both Arab and Russian conventional forces. We hope to limit the immediate response of the Arabs by: one, creating a communications blackout, thus maintaining the highest possible level of confusion for our enemies; and two, by planning the strike during the Hajj." Scott was referring to the annual pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. The rites of the Hajj include circling the Ka 'bah in Mecca and going seven times between the mountains of Safa and Manva as Abraham's concubine, Hagar, is believed to have done during her search for water. This can take several days and is followed by group prayer on the plain of Arafa. During the Hajj, Muslims are forbidden by the Koran to harm any living being, including their enemies.
Scott spread out a handful of photographs on the table. "As you can see, our satellite reconnaissance of the Russian encampments reveals extraordinarily large caches of weaponry – both Russian-made and captured Israeli weapons."
Joel was surprised by what the photos showed. Dozens of huge temporary warehouses had been constructed, with tanks, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers parked nearby in neat rows. It looked like a massive car lot. "What are they doing out there?!" Joel asked.
"We suspect that the Russians are storing up military equipment for a conventional attack on Saudi Arabia and Egypt. After that, we have to assume they will go after each of the other oil-rich countries in the area. We have only limited intelligence reports to support that assumption, but it's obvious that they don't need that kind of armament simply to keep Israel under thumb."
"Shit, they're planning on using Israel as home base to go after the Arab oil fields and the Suez Canal," Joel said.
"That's what it looks like," Scott said without emotion. "As you know," he continued, getting back to the subject at hand, "the neutron bomb was developed to destroy personnel, not materiel. It kills primarily by an immediate burst of radiation, not by heat or the sheer power of the blast, as in the case of other nuclear weapons. The third reason, then, for selecting the Gideons is to eliminate the Russian personnel while preserving the weaponry. As you said earlier, even if we get rid of the Russians we don't have any weapons to defend ourselves from the Arabs. The Russian stockpiles will provide us with the weapons we need. To further reduce the damage to materiel, we are actually targeting a point four hundred meters outside of the perimeter of the Russian camps. Targeting is being coordinated by Ron Samuel, who will be briefing you on that part of the project when we're finished. With a little luck, he'll be able to finish his work in the next few days and then he can help you with your project.
"Now let's get back to the first reason I mentioned for selecting the Gideon. The initial kill radius for the Gideon class warhead is only one kilometer, with a secondary radius extending another three kilometers. In most cases those limits will allow us to hit the Russians and entirely avoid initial or secondary kill of our own population. However, there are two places where because of adjacent villages and kibbutzim, that will not be possible. In those cases, and in the case of nearby farmers at the other sites, an evacuation team will be given approximately eight hours to effect evacuation of all civilian residents before the launch. The plan is for this to occur under cover of darkness; and to avoid tipping our hand, the evacuation team will not be given the word to begin evacuation until after we have secured control of operations from the SDCF.
"Neutralizing the Strategic Defense Control Facility and transferring operations to this facility is the easy part, relatively speaking; that's what this facility was set up to do. The hard part is to make the Russians believe that they are still fully in control long enough for us to evacuate our people and launch the six Gideons.
"That's where you come in. We need you to give us those eight hours. Your job is to create the illusion, through a software dump to the SDCF computers, that their systems are operational.
"After we transfer control to this facility, it will take approximately twenty minutes for us to download the retargeting data into the missiles. If the Russians realize what's happened, they will first attempt to regain control, and second, very quickly disperse their troops in the mountains. Should that happen, we will have no choice but to launch immediately, killing over a thousand Israeli civilians and evacuation team members."
Joel mulled over what he had been told. It was a lot to digest so quickly. "What about the Russians in the cities?" he asked.
"Immediately after the launch, teams of Israeli commandos will take over all radio and television stations from the Russians. Where they are unsuccessful, other teams will destroy those stations' antennas. It is critical to our success that the Israeli people be rallied to attack the Russians in the cities, but it is equally important that we keep the rest of the world, especially the Arabs, confused about exactly what is going on. If we make things too clear for our own citizens, it will be equally clear to the Arabs, who – Hajj or not – may seize the opportunity to strike while we are still disorganized and before we can take control of the Russian weapons caches. Rather than broadcasting reports that would be picked up by the Arabs, the radio and television will play a continuous loop of a single message, the words of the prophet Joel, from Joel 3:10." Scott paused. He may have been a scientist but, like his father, he was a zealot first, though for a different religious cause. He was hoping his friend at least might have studied enough scripture to be familiar with the writings of the prophet whose name he bore. But, if Joel was familiar with the verse he gave no indication of it to Scott. Scott gave a sigh of noticeable disappointment and then continued, "Beat your plowshares into swords and your pruning hooks into spears."
"That's kind of obscure, don't you think?" asked Joel, unaware that the idea had been Scott's. Scott started to argue but held back. "I suppose so," he admitted, "but that's the signal that has been passed to the resistance forces. Hopefully, others will join in when they see the fighting start in the streets."
Over the next two hours Joel was given concise briefings by each of the eight people in the operations room concerning their individual parts of the project.
Three weeks later – New York
The phone rang three times before Ambassador Hansen could rouse himself from his sleep to answer it. "Hello," he said, as he checked his alarm clock. It was just after eleven.
"Mr. Ambassador," said Decker Hawthorne, "I'm sorry to disturb you, but I've just heard that about thirty minutes ago, at 5:30 a.m. Israeli time, there were an undisclosed number of nuclear explosions in Israel." The sleep suddenly rushed from Hansen's brain as his eyes opened wide.
"The Russians?" Hansen asked.
"The reports are very sketchy so far. It's not clear who's responsible, and there have been no official statements from the Russians."
"Decker, is there any chance there's been a mistake?"
"No, sir. I don't think so. The detonations were detected by U. S., U.K., and Chinese satellites."
"Okay, hold on a second while I switch on the telly." A moment later Decker heard the sound of Ambassador Hansen's television through the phone. "Okay, I'm back," Hansen said, but he and Decker stayed silent as each listened to the report just being read.
"CNN has just learned that the United States has scrambled Strategic Air Command bombers. The State Department has emphasized that this is only a precautionary measure and that SAC has been ordered to remain in U.S. air space pending further orders."
"What the hell is going on?!" Hansen asked.
"I don't know, sir," Decker answered, stating the obvious.
"Do you have the Russian Ambassador's phone number?"
"I have Ambassador Kruszkegin's number right here, sir," Decker said and then relayed it to Hansen.
"Okay," Hansen said. "I'll call Kruszkegin. You call Jackie, Peter and Jack and have everyone get to the office ASAP."
The phone rang only once at Ambassador Kruszkegin's residence before it was answered by an official sounding "Hello."
"This is Ambassador Jon Hansen," he said. "I would like to speak with Ambassador Kruszkegin immediately on a matter of utmost importance."
"I'm sorry, Ambassador Hansen," the voice answered. "Ambassador Kruszkegin is in a meeting right now and cannot be disturbed."
"I'll take it," Hansen heard Kruszkegin say in the background. Obviously the person who answered the phone had lied.
Ambassador Kruszkegin stood by the phone wearing a finely woven black and gold silk dressing gown, his warm Italian slippers protecting his feet from the cold marble floor. "Good evening, Jon," he began. Jon Hansen liked Kruszkegin as a person and respected him as an adversary. For his part, Kruszkegin was fond of referring to Hansen as "a man who has failed to notice that Britain no longer rules the world." Kruszkegin had found that, when possible, it was more productive to cooperate with Hansen than not to.
"Jon," he continued, anticipating Hansen's question, "I honestly do not know what is happening in Israel. I've just spoken with the Foreign Minister in Moscow and he swears that we have not launched an attack. I believe they are just as confused as we are."
Hansen was surprised that Kruszkegin had even taken his call; the straight answer was even more unexpected. Hansen knew the Russian well enough to have a pretty good idea when he was lying and when he was telling the truth. Right now he seemed to be telling the truth; at least as far as he knew the truth. "Thank you, Yuri," Hansen said. Kruszkegin's straightforward answer left little else to be said.
British Mission, New York (1:57 a.m.)
Ambassador Hansen's senior staff members watched the news reports on television as they awaited his arrival. "Does anyone know what's going on?" Hansen asked as he walked in the door just before 2:00 a.m. New York time.
"The Russians claim that they had nothing to do with it," began Jack Redmond, Hansen's legislative assistant. "They say that the attack was against the Russian troops in Israel's mountains."
This was a new twist on the story. "How the hell could that happen?" Hansen asked, incredulously. Redmond shook his head.
In the brief silence, Hansen's attention turned to the reporter on television. "There is speculation at the State Department," the reporter said, "that the attack on Israel could be the result of some internal power struggle inside the Russian government. The battle for power and control of policy has been heated, to say the least. Hard-liners like Foreign Minister Cherov and Defense Minister Khromchenkov want to lead Russia back to communism and world power, while others like President Perelyakin favor a more moderate approach. The Russian invasion of Israel still has many analysts unsure of who's in charge."
Jack Redmond shrugged his broad shoulders as Hansen looked at him for his comment. "It's possible," he said. "But it doesn't really answer the big questions. We know that no cities were hit; apparently the missiles fell in the wilderness areas of the country. That would seem to support Russia's assertion that it was their troops that were hit, but I can't imagine any kind of political situation so bad that one group of Russians would bomb another."
"Okay, let's assume for a moment that the Russians are telling the truth: that they're not responsible for the bombing," Hansen said. Which country with the capability to launch a nuclear attack would actually do it?"
No one had an answer.
"Mr. Ambassador," Decker interjected, "whoever launched the attack, the Israelis have apparently taken advantage of the confusion. There are reports of fighting between Russians and Israelis in every major city, and Israeli resistance fighters apparently have taken over all of the television and radio stations."
Hansen ran his hand over his head and thought for a second. "Is it possible," he asked, "that this whole thing could be the work of the Israelis?"
Tel Aviv (10:30 a.m. Israel, 3:30 a.m. New York)
Deep beneath the streets of Tel Aviv the mood was bright and hopeful. Phase one of the plan had been a complete success: the Russians had been totally unaware of the transfer of control from the Strategic Defense Control Facility to the Off-Site Facility; the evacuation of civilians had taken place with only a few slight delays; the Gideons had been launched (much to the surprise of Russian security teams guarding the missile silos); and all of the designated targets had been hit. It was now five hours since the launch.
In the streets of Israel, citizens were attacking the occupying Russians troops. In the mountains near Mizpe Ramon, an Israeli squadron had surprised the security force outside the Strategic Defense Control Facility, and was now preparing to wait out the surrender of those inside. It would be useless to try to force them out; the facility, with its three-foot thick steel walls and doors, was impervious to anything, with the possible exception of a direct hit by a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. When the Russians invaded four months earlier, those in control of the facility had surrendered it only after they were ordered to do so by the Israeli Defense Minister. Though the facility had been completely overridden by the Off-Site Facility and was therefore useless to the Russians, it would likely be a long wait before the occupants surrendered.
Any celebration would have to wait, however: phase two required the full attention of Colonel White and his team at the Off-Site Facility. While the Israelis would soon be able to secure the weaponry warehoused at the Russian camps, those in Colonel White's team had the immediate responsibility of directing Israel's strategic defense against a possible retaliatory nuclear strike from the Russians.
Scott Rosen estimated that Israel's strategic defense could eliminate ninety-seven percent or more of anything the Russians might send at them in a full scale attack. The throw-weight of the Russian nuclear arsenal had been substantially reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but a full scale attack would still mean that several soft targets – that is, cities – could be hit. If the attack were of a lesser scale – a "limited" response – the strategic defense could probably destroy all incoming warheads. The most likely scenario was that the Russians would choose a strong but limited response in order to reduce the possibility of a response from the West. What everyone hoped for, however, was that the Russians – realizing that Israel was once again in control of its own strategic defense – would see that a nuclear attack would ultimately prove futile, and therefore they would not launch at all. There was no way to be certain how the Russians would respond and each person in Colonel White's team understood that every warhead that got through meant the deaths of tens of thousands of their countrymen.
This was not a game of siting targets and pulling triggers; the strategic defense was fully automated. It had to be. Destroying the maximum number of approaching missiles required a nearly instantaneous response to launch. There was no room for 'man-in-the-loop.' Once the order was given to place the Battle Management/Command, Control and Communications (BM/C3) computers on 'threat' status, the role of humans was reduced to support and repair. Some argued that it was dangerous to turn the control of the system over to the system itself, but as Joshua Rosen and his colleagues had successfully countered, it was the best way to ensure survival.
The strategic defense was now initiated for immediate response to any sign of launch from Russia, her allies, or from the sea.