1. Khartoum is instructed to inform the Sudanese authorities of the details of “Operation Golgotha,” and to brief the head of the Sudanese Special Branch on the activities, membership, and plans of the Anointed Liberation Front.
2. No operation is authorized that involves any risk to the life of Prince Kalash el Khatar. Khartoum may suggest the infiltration of Prince Kalash into the ALF to Special Branch and to the Amir of Khatar. Any decision to utilize Prince Kalash in this manner must, however, be made by the Amir and by the appropriate Sudanese officials. Khartoum may assure all parties of its cooperation, but it may not assume operational responsibility, which belongs to the Sudanese. Not only the appearance but also the reality of noninterference in the internal affairs of Sudan must be preserved.
3. Surveillance and reporting by Christopher with regard to the activities of the party traveling with Prince Kalash will be continued. Christopher will be handled by [his case officer from Geneva], who is assigned to temporary duty in Khartoum for the duration of Christopher’s activity within Sudan. Control of all U.S. aspects of this operation remains the responsibility of Khartoum.
4. In addition to his reporting function, Christopher is authorized to involve himself in covert action against all opposition elements, short of the use of violence. Khartoum will fully brief Christopher on all operational aspects of which he does not already have knowledge.
5. Khartoum’s briefing of Christopher should include the information that Headquarters has tentatively concluded that Tadeusz Miernik and Ilona Bentley are agents of the Soviet intelligence service. We believe Miernik is probably an asset of the Polish intelligence service on loan to the Soviets as principal agent in charge of their operations with regard to the ALF. Bentley is believed to be a Soviet agent assigned to monitor the performance of Miernik. These conclusions are based on evaluation of information from a variety of sources, [7] all of which tend to confirm that Miernik is the key to Soviet control and exploitation of the ALF in its terrorist phase. (The role of Zofia Miernik cannot at this time be determined. It is possible that she was employed as a courier to supply funds to Miernik, although her use in this role would not conform to normal Soviet funding techniques. It is somewhat less possible that she was defected as a payment to Miernik in order to assure his optimum operational performance. The entire scenario of double defection of a brother and sister is typical of the elaborate cover mechanisms of the Poles, and the anomalies in the Miernik situation may well be explained by the involvement of the Polish intelligence service in what is essentially a Soviet operation.)
6. Headquarters is hopeful that Christopher will be able to remove any doubts that Miernik and Bentley are under Soviet discipline. Khartoum may use its discretion to invent an operational device that will permit Christopher to confirm that these two operatives are, in fact, what we suspect them to be.
7. Our objective is the neutralization of Miernik and maximum embarrassment of the Soviets through public exposure of their role in the operations of the ALF. The prerequisite for attainment of our objective is the neutralization of the ALF. Headquarters is confident that the Sudanese security forces, aided by the information we are able to provide to them, will be able to deal effectively with the threat presented by the ALF.
8. Headquarters, in consideration of British sensitivity to operations in one of their former colonial areas, has instructed London to brief its liaisons with the British intelligence services on “Golgotha” and the situation concerning Miernik and Bentley. It is considered that the British may have information that is not at this time available to us. The pooling of information and of operational resources can work to mutual advantage. Christopher’s cover will be protected.
<a l:href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> The sources referred to here are Christopher’s reporting, particularly his discovery that Miernik was communicating with a third person through use of a book code; the reports by a Polish agent that a Pole was being sent into Africa under Soviet control; and the account by the Czech frontier guards officer relating the peculiar circumstances surrounding the border crossing by Zofia Miernik. Other scraps of information, seemingly minor, also aided in fastening suspicion on Miernik. In regard to Bentley, her correspondence with Soviet letter-drops under a cover name and her meeting in Cairo with a Russian intelligence officer were sufficient to remove any but the most marginal doubts about her role. Miernik’s presence in Vienna, and in West Germany at the time of the cyanide murders in Munich and Berlin, was given some weight, but we regarded it as unlikely that he had been used as an assassin.