“If we do nothing, it will be interpreted as weakness. Confidence in our treaty obligations in Europe would be seriously under—”
“I agree, Comrade,” said the premier. “But our Far Eastern Fleet has already put to sea. Is that not message enough?”
“No,” answered the defense minister, a stocky Georgian leaning back in one of the leather-backed chairs in the premier’s extraordinarily long, rectangular office, trying to compose himself. It was no use; he was leaning forward again, his impatience and anxiety evidenced by his nicotine-stained fingers fiddling unconsciously with a thick glass ashtray. He looked across at his comrade from the ministry of the interior, then left at the premier in his seat at the top of the T-shaped conference table, and spread his hands on the green baize in a gesture of accommodation. “What I wish to point out, Comrade Premier, is that sending our Eastern Fleet out of Vladivostok is standard procedure whenever the American Seventh Fleet enters the Sea of Japan. The Americans know this. Our Warsaw allies know this. It does not send a strong enough message, in my opinion.” His fingers tapped hard on the table. “We need to take a step which will send a strong message that the Sea of Japan cannot be used as an American lake, as — as an operational area from which to bombard North Korea. As it was last time.” The defense minister turned and pointed at the Pacific Rim map. “It would be the same as if we sailed into California waters. Can you imagine?”
“I understand this, Comrade,” put in Premier Suzlov, “but I think a strong enough message is being sent to everyone with the deployment of our Eastern Fleet. The public in the Warsaw Pact countries don’t know it is standard practice. They will see it as a very strong measure on our part. So will the American public. The important thing, Comrades, is that we know the Pentagon understands it is normal procedure.”
“But the Pentagon suspects us of being in collusion with North Korea,” answered the defense minister, undeterred.
Suzlov looked about the table for an informal poll. “Our dear comrades in Pyongyang have made a grave error by invading South Korea. They did not consult us. Nor inform us of the time—”
“They never consult us,” grumbled the marshall of the air force. “They are a law unto themselves.”
“Law?” skoffed Admiral Doldich.’”They have no law. They are ruled by an overfed ego in a Mao suit. He has placed us in a very dangerous position, Comrades. If we do not support him, we are seen as deserting a socialist brother, an ally. If we do support him, we risk widening the conflict. We have enough trouble now with every republic from here to Turkey clamoring for semiautonomy.”
“Which means autonomy,” chimed in the minister for defense. “This is precisely why, Comrade Premier, I urge a tougher stand here. Comrade Doldich is quite correct that everyone in our fifteen republics is watching us. If we falter, if Moscow fails, appears weak-kneed on this, it will only fuel divisive elements from Estonia to Mongolia. To make matters worse, Beijing is being foolish again about their borders.” The minister meant Damansky Island and the far eastern border along Outer Mongolia, which fronted the Soviet Union’s back door and laid claim to more than a million Soviet troops permanently stationed there. Particular knowledge of this area lay with Kiril Marchenko, a colonel in the service of the STAVKA, the general headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command, one of the specialist advisers invited on occasion to Politburo meetings. It was to him that Suzlov now turned for his opinion. The STAVKA suspected that Doldich’s dispatch of the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet had less to do with sending messages to the U.S. Seventh Fleet and more to do with Doldich wanting to have the fleet “at sea” rather than risk having it bottled up, the fate of the German surface fleet in both world wars. But it had been STAVKA’s intelligence reports suggesting the USSR show its muscle to China that had caught the premier’s attention. He favored giving a clear signal to Beijing that, despite the post-Gorbachev rapprochement between the two countries, Moscow would not yield to “unrealistic” demands for more territory on the far eastern border. If China became obstreperous, which it seemed to be doing, as it had done in the sixties and seventies, then the Russian navy was there, ready to pulverize anything that moved against the vital Soviet security zone between the Manchurian border and the USSR’s huge year-round ice-free port of Vladivostok.
Marchenko was about to begin speaking when the defense minister put up his hand, his rows of “Afghanistan service” ribbons catching the early morning light from the wood-paneled beige walls and the portrait of Lenin directly behind him. “If I can return for a moment to the matter of our European allies. If we do not take stronger measures, if we do not come quickly to the aid of our North Korean comrades…” He held up his hand like a traffic cop to stop oncoming objections until he was finished. “Despite their rashness, if we, as the leaders of the socialist world, do not come to their aid, our Warsaw Pact comrades have every reason to doubt our commitment to them in the future — to socialist solidarity all over the world. And if, God forbid, there is ever an attack against our Soviet Motherland and we need them to aid us, and quickly, then our reactions now to our comrades in North Korea will decide the issue.” No one stirred or even raised an eyebrow at the defense minister’s use of “God forbid”—Gorbachev had used it all the time during his years in office. “The question for them, Comrades,” continued the minister, “will be, why should we fight to protect the Soviet Union’s borders? Why should we be the buffer zone in Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union does not move to aid one of our brother socialist countries in North Korea?”
Colonel Marchenko made eye contact with the most powerful man in the Soviet Union, though he knew that as colonel he was not entitled to speak at such a high-level meeting unless specifically invited to do so. STAVKA not only supported the premier’s position regarding the Eastern Fleet and China but also shared the defense minister’s concern. Marchenko’s intelligence sources had painted an even more frightening picture of the spread of underground dissident movements within the republics. Gorbachev and his precious perestroika had lifted the lid from the can of worms. Encouraged by his call for reforms, the underground, indeed everybody, from the decadent rock and roll stars—”Bye-bye, Miss American Pie”—to literary professors quoting the leftist traitor Orwell, had started yelling about freedom. Freedom for what? Marchenko wanted to know. Freedom to be degenerate — sex, drugs, and mayhem in the streets? The KGB had over three million files on “latent dissidents” who had surfaced in the Gorbachev years, in addition to those already known as “dubious characters,” all of them just waiting and watching like delinquents for the first sign of the parents’ discipline weakening. But even this was as nothing compared to the threat posed by the clique of “delinquent generals” on overcrowded Taiwan. Agents who often sent in conflicting assessments were as one in their reports that the Taiwan clique were positively drooling at the prospect of a Soviet-U.S. conflict and/or Chinese preoccupation in a Sino-Soviet conflict over Far Eastern borders. And the present North/South Korean War was a prime time, one that would not come again, for Taiwan’s American-equipped navy, vastly superior to Mainland China’s, to retake some of the offshore islands.
“Yes, Colonel?” said the premier encouragingly, struck by the officer’s fearlessness in the presence of so much top brass.
“Mr. Premier,” began Marchenko, “I suggest that the Far Eastern Fleet be authorized to carry out AIRTAC exercises in the South China Sea, supported by amphibious elements from our base at Cam Rahn Bay. This would be enough of a departure from normal Far Eastern Fleet maneuvers to give a clear signal to the Americans but still be part of the usual exercises so that it should not unduly alarm Washington. It would also be far enough south of Korea not to be viewed by the Americans as Moscow interfering with Korea. It would also mean our fleet would be strategically positioned between the offshore China islands and Taiwan to signal the opportunist generals in Taipei, very clearly, that we will not tolerate an attack upon Mainland Chinese territory which would further destabilize our Far Eastern border situation. This would also put us in Beijing’s favor and may reduce tensions on the Far Eastern border itself.”
Premier Suzlov nodded, pondering the suggestion. “A double play?” he said, using an American baseball expression he had picked up years before during his stint as KGB head of station in Washington. Suzlov turned to the Politburo. “Well—?” his gaze resting on the ranking minister of defense. “Ilya?”
“Yes,” said the Georgian, “but we must still be seen supporting Pyongyang. Not to do so will only encourage the Americans to become further involved. They already have reservists en route from Japan. The problem will only—”
“A volunteer force,” cut in Marchenko. “From all socialist countries. We could fly them out from Berlin.” The STAVKA colonel realized this time he’d not only spoken out of turn but jumped the gun, butting in on the defense minister’s response. But, as the British said, “In for a penny, in for a pound.” “Dobrovol’tsy”— “Volunteers,” he continued, “from all socialist countries would absolve Moscow of any direct intervention, yet we would all be aiding our North Korean comrades.” Suzlov looked quickly about the room as Marchenko added, “Socialist solidarity.” It was heartfelt for the colonel, no mere slogan. He hated America — a “mongrel mix of races,” he called it, his father, an adviser in North Vietnam, killed by the American Division outside Khe Sahn.
The defense minister turned toward Suzlov, unable to decide whether the upstart colonel deserved a damned quick put-down or a promotion. Never would have happened before Gorbachev, of course. Gorbachev was the one who had encouraged this kind of “spontaneous” exhibitionism the colonel was indulging in. Still, the defense minister saw the colonel’s point was supporting his. “Where,” the defense minister asked Marchenko, “would you get these volunteers from?”
“Cuba. East Germany—” Marchenko paused. “We were still able to get volunteers for SPETSNAZ for Afghanistan—”
“Afghanistan was a mistake,” said the air marshal. It was the party line; it had also cost the air marshal many pilots and put pay once and for all to the idea, as the Americans had learned in Vietnam, that air superiority alone could decide a war. Unless you dropped atomic bombs.
“Yes,” agreed Premier Suzlov, “but the colonel is correct. We did get volunteers despite the unpopularity of the war. And for SPETSNAZ.” He was referring to the toughest, most hazardous duty of all, the special forces.
“And,” said the colonel, pausing, a little more cautious, “we could offer some kind of inducement. Recognition by the state.” He meant bonuses, of course. Cash, coupons for the specialty stores normally open only to the Party.
Suzlov saw the heads nodding. Lenin would have understood perfectly. He was no fool, this colonel.