From World War I, through our Vietnam experience, and up to our recent past, the idea of interdiction has remained fairly consistent and is reflected in the latest version of Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 September 1997, which defines interdiction as “operations to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.”[3] An amended definition of air interdiction has evolved in the USAF as an outcome of the combat experience of Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in 1999; that evolution is reflected in AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, 27 August 1999, which expands the scope to include both lethal and nonlethal systems, stating that “air interdiction… is employed to destroy, disrupt, divert, or delay the enemy’s surface military potential before it can effectively engage friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its objectives [emphasis added].”[4] The phrase “or otherwise achieve its objectives” acknowledges that airpower, as demonstrated over Kosovo, can be used in the “direct attack” of an army without the presence or foreseeable presence of friendly ground forces. The attack of fielded enemy ground forces by airpower is an old concept, but the idea that airpower can achieve military objectives in lieu of ground action is a new and highly controversial idea.
This appendix will first review the USAF’s post-Vietnam experience in the direct attack of enemy fielded forces as envisioned in the AirLand Battle doctrine developed during the 1980s, and as experienced by the USAF in attacking the Iraqi Republican Guard in the Gulf War. It will then examine the events leading to the use of A-10 AFACs over Kosovo in directly attacking the Serbian Third Army. Finally, this appendix will give a brief history of A-10 operations in Operation Allie Force, which the reader can use along with the chronology, at the front, to provide context to this book’s various stories.
As with the Korean War, many of the lessons learned about air interdiction in Vietnam were lost, including the evolution of the Misty FAC’s Fast-FAC mission. The focus of the US military turned once again towards Europe and the continuing threat of invasion by the Soviet Union. From the late ’70s and through the ’80s, the US Army and Air Force worked to develop systems such as the Apache, air tactical missile systems (ATACMS), A-10, and JSTARS in preparation to defeat the Red Army. Air-Land Battle doctrine provided the joint vision for integrating air and land operations. Air interdiction was an essential element of AirLand Battle and a NATO term, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), was adopted to emphasize the interdiction of second-echelon ground forces moving towards, but not yet engaged with, friendly ground forces.[5] The high-threat environment of Central Europe and the plethora of targets that would arise from a massive land battle limited the potential effectiveness of Fast FACs. The detection of rear-echelon forces would be the responsibility of such systems as JSTARS—not a difficult task, considering the wave of Soviet armor anticipated to thunder down the Fulda Gap. NATO aircrews studied X-ray, Yankee, and Zulu folders containing imagery and maps of the routes the Red Army would need to use.[6] They likewise flew missions over West Germany, up to the inter-German border, to become familiar with the terrain over which they would have to fight.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 and the end of the Cold War left the United States victorious but lacking a Soviet threat on which to base its military force structure and Air-Land Battle doctrine. As the United States began to dismantle its forces in Europe, the focus shifted abruptly to Southwest Asia and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.
On 17 January 1991, the United States and coalition forces launched the Gulf War air offensive. Waves of aircraft flooded into Kuwait and Iraq, attacking key integrated air defense system nodes; airfields; command and control systems; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) sites; and electric plants.[7] Daybreak of the first day witnessed the commencement of attacks against Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait. Among the centers of gravity identified by Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the US joint forces commander, were the seven elite Republican Guard divisions held in reserve along the Iraq-Kuwait border.[8] While aerial attack continued against key strategic targets in Iraq, 75 percent of strike missions focused on the Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait.[9]
US casualties in a ground invasion were predicted to be as high as 15,000.[10] Concern over this possibility prompted Secretary of Defense Richard B. “Dick” Cheney, Gen Colin L. Powell, and Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf to develop a strategy emphasizing the use of airpower before a ground battle to significantly reduce the size of the Iraqi army, its capability to maneuver, and its will to fight. This air-first strategy proved highly successful, with friendly casualty rates below even the most optimistic estimates and friendly ground forces achieving objectives ahead of schedule and against only limited Iraqi resistance. However, this aerial achievement was not accomplished without major modifications to existing tactics.
The Gulf War air offensive consisted of three phases, conducted nearly simultaneously. Phases one and two were directed against strategic and air-superiority target sets including leadership, command and control facilities, NBC facilities, airfields, aircraft, and the IADS. Phase three targeted Iraqi fielded forces, calling for 50 percent attrition of Iraq’s 5,000 pieces of dug-in armor and artillery prior to any ground offensive.[11] In this phase, Schwarzkopf was most concerned with the three heavy divisions of the seven Republican Guard divisions along the Kuwait-Iraq border.[12] These units were widely dispersed and well dug in with thousands of earthen berms protecting their T-72 tanks.[13] Their defenses included AAA, infrared SA-13 SAMs, and radar-guided SA-6 SAMs.
Phase three required the unprecedented success of airpower against a fielded army.[14] A briefing by Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, air-planning chief, to Schwarzkopf in December 1990 estimated that the Republican Guard would suffer 50 percent attrition in only five days, assuming 600 sorties a day.[15] Air planners divided Kuwait and Iraq into a grid pattern of 30 by 30 NM squares known as “kill boxes.” Strike aircraft were assigned individual kill boxes to perform armed reconnaissance in locating and destroying Iraqi forces.[16] The task of attacking the elite Republican Guard fell to F-16s and B-52s, while A-10s were employed against the regular Iraqi divisions dug in along the Kuwait-Saudi border.[17]
By the fifth day of phase three, coalition air attacks against the Republican Guard were still far short of the 50 percent destruction expected by Schwarzkopf.[18] Postwar analysis indicated that the Republican Guard’s heavy-division armor actually suffered only 24–34 percent attrition during the entire 38 days of the air campaign.[19] Glosson’s five-day estimate proved overly optimistic for two reasons. First, the number of sorties flown against the Republican Guard fell well short of 600 per day. A combination of initial overemphasis on phase one strategic operations, a reluctance to employ A-10s deep into the battlespace, and unanticipated Scud-hunting missions reduced the number of sorties available to attack the Republican Guard. For the first five days, total strikes against Republican Guard units were constant at around 100 missions per day. By the end of the 10th day, a cumulative sortie count against the Republican Guard totaled 728 missions.[20] Second, air attacks were not as effective as war-gaming analysis had predicted.[21] The aircrews of US aircraft used medium-altitude tactics to reduce the threat from Iraqi air defenses. While this greatly improved survivability, US pilots had trained with low-altitude tactics appropriate to a war in central Europe and were relatively unfamiliar with medium-altitude tactics. Unforeseen difficulties with target identification, poor weather, and inaccuracies in delivering ballistic weapons from medium altitude all reduced effectiveness.
Increasing the number of sorties against the Republican Guard solved the first issue. However, the tactical problem of how to best destroy a dug in army remained. In response, the joint air operations center (JAOC) incorporated three changes to improve the efficiency of the operational air forces. The first tactic involved directing the unique firepower of the A-10 against exposed and vulnerable Republican Guard forces. On 27 February, Glosson instructed A-10 commanders to prepare an attack on the Republican Guard Tawakalna armored division.[22] Facing such a heavily defended force, A-10s flew 48 aircraft in six waves of eight-ship formations, instead of their usual two-ship tactics. Three days of such wing-sized attacks were mounted against the division. The Iraqis responded by stepping up their deception efforts and by digging their forces even deeper into the desert sand. Although the US Army was unable to assess the effectiveness of allied attacks, the Tawakalna division’s degraded air defenses and increased use of decoys were considered positive indicators.[23]
The second innovation was the F-111F’s introduction of “tank plinking.” Targets could be located and attacked from medium altitude with infrared targeting pods and laser-guided bombs.[24] The pods could clearly distinguish the infrared image of the warm Iraqi armor against the cold desert background.[25] This method provided the additional advantage of using targeting-pod video to verify successful attacks and boost BDA estimates.
The final tactical innovation reintroduced the Fast FAC mission. F-16CG (Block 40s) from Hill AFB, Utah, began flying as “Killer Scouts.”[26] This innovation mirrored the Misty FAC hunter-killer tactics during Vietnam but was renamed to avoid confusion with hunter-killer SEAD tactics currently used by F-4G Wild Weasels and F-16s. Killer Scouts took off early and reconnoitered their assigned kill boxes. They were allocated sufficient air-refueling tankers to remain on station for long periods to become familiar with the territory and increase their situational awareness. Like the Misty FACs, the Killer Scouts carried a minimum munitions load to reduce drag and increase endurance. When they identified Iraqi positions, they usually brought in F-16 strikers for the attack. Along with identifying viable target areas for attack, they also assisted in the collection of BDA. To do that, the Killer Scouts relied primarily on their own eyes, aided somewhat by binoculars. Unfortunately, operating at medium altitude made it difficult to accurately determine the number of targets destroyed. The Killer Scout role had its limitations, but this innovation led to the more efficient use of F-16s against Iraqi fielded forces.
Following the Gulf War, the USAF remained deployed in Southwest Asia, maintained two no-fly zones over Iraq, and responded to sporadic infringements by Saddam Hussein’s remaining forces. Elsewhere, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs’ ethnic cleansing of Muslims in April of 1992 led to the US military’s involvement with the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia. Meanwhile famine in war-torn Somalia brought a US military presence to Mogadishu from December 1992 until its hasty withdrawal in May of 1994. In September of 1995, US airpower was again needed. This time Operation Deliberate Force, an 11-day campaign, helped force Serbia to accept the Dayton Peace Accords.[27] By the late ’90s, NATO was convinced that airpower was an effective tool to coerce Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president, and that it might be needed to solve the growing unrest in Kosovo.
Tensions between Belgrade and Kosovo increased during the late 1980s. Slobodan Milosevic used protests by minority Serbs residing in the ethnically Albanian-dominated province as the foundation for his Serbian nationalist platform and his subsequent rise to the Serbian presidency in 1987.[28] By 1989, Belgrade had revoked Kosovo’s status as an autonomous region and placed restrictions on land ownership and government jobs for Kosovo Albanians.[29] During the 1990s, Kosovar dissension spawned a series of both violent and nonviolent protest.[30] Opposition became violent in 1997 with the formation of a small group of lightly armed guerrilla fighters known as the KLA. In response to KLA ambushes of Serbian police in early 1998, Serbian forces conducted brutal retaliatory attacks against suspected KLA positions.[31] KLA support swelled within Kosovo and led to an escalation of KLA activity. In July of 1998, Serbian forces conducted a village-by-village search for KLA members, displacing over 200,000 Kosovars in the process.[32] The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis captured the attention of the international community.
In response to the KLA and Serbian exchanges, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 in March 1998 and Resolution 1199 in September 1998. The resolutions condemned Serbia’s excessive use of force, established an arms embargo, and called for an immediate cease-fire and the introduction of international monitors.[33] The latter demand was met in the cease-fire negotiated between US envoys and Belgrade in October 1998.[34]
However, the massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians at Racak on 19 January 1999 quickly brought the cease-fire to an end.[35] Under threat of NATO air strikes, Serbian and Kosovar representatives were summoned to Rambouillet, France, to negotiate a peace agreement.[36] The compromise included the key items of a NATO-led implementation force; the recognition of the international borders of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, made up of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo; and an interim three-year agreement, after which a final settlement of Kosovo could be arranged.[37] The Kosovar delegation initially refused to agree unless reference was made to a future referendum to decide the fate of Kosovo. Under the threat of the withdrawal of international support, including financial and military aid to the KLA, the Kosovar delegates reluctantly signed on 18 March 1999.[38] The Serbs, unwilling to accept a NATO-led military force within Kosovo, remained recalcitrant. In the face of diplomatic impasse, NATO air strikes were ordered to commence on 24 March.
Initial planning for NATO air strikes against Serbia began as early as June of 1998.[39] Targeting for the strikes focused on fixed command and control and military facilities in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. These targets were selected for a variety of reasons, one being the low risk of collateral damage.[40] The strikes were intended as the punishment portion of NATO’s coercive carrot-and-stick strategy. The air plan in no way resembled a decisive air campaign, with the initial target list including only 100 targets.[41] Of these, only 50 were eventually approved, sufficient for only two or three nights of strikes.[42] Additionally, the desire to maintain consensus among the 19 NATO countries was reflected in the constrained nature of the strikes.
In February 1999, in the midst of the Rambouillet talks, Gen Wesley Clark, SACEUR, became concerned over the prospect of increased ethnic-cleansing operations by the Serbian army within Kosovo once NATO air operations commenced. Two of NATO’s stated military objectives involved dealing directly with the Serbian fielded forces: to deter further Serbian action against the Kosovars and to reduce the ability of the Serbian military to continue offensive operations against them.[43] Gen Wesley Clark ordered Lt Gen Mike Short, his CFACC, to increase the scope of air planning to include direct attacks on the Serbian fielded forces in Kosovo.
Concealed within the verdant, cloud-covered valley of Kosovo were 40,000 soldiers of the Serbian Third Army equipped with hundreds of tanks, APCs, and artillery pieces interspersed among over a million Kosovars. In addition, a wall of mobile, radar-guided SAMs, MANPADS, and AAA (as well as a squadron of MiG-21 fighters) protected the Third Army against NATO air forces.[44]
In developing air plans against the Serbian Third Army, US planners assumed air superiority and relied on SEAD and electronic jamming assets to confuse and degrade the Serbian IADS. Assuming strike aircraft could safely enter Kosovo, two tactical problems still remained: how to locate and identify the targets and how to attack them successfully while limiting collateral damage. A-10 AFACs trained in visual reconnaissance and ASC were selected for the task.[45] A-10 AFACs would search out targets identified by either JSTARS (in real-time) or by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets during premission planning. Once targets were identified, the A-10 AFACs would control strikes using available NATO aircraft.
Beginning at 1900 Zulu on 24 March 1999, NATO air forces struck Serbian targets.[46] These attacks focused on the Serbian IADS, military command and control nodes, and airfields and aircraft.[47] NATO commenced the war with 214 dedicated combat aircraft, 112 of which were from the United States.[48] Initial NATO strikes were met with minimal resistance from Serbian SAMs and fighters. Rather, the primary response took place within Kosovo and was directed at the Kosovar population.
With the breakdown of the Rambouillet peace talks and subsequent withdrawal of international observers on 19 March 1999, Serb ground forces commenced the systematic expulsion of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians, code-named Operation Horseshoe.[49] Ethnic-cleansing operations were stepped up once NATO bombing began, leaving several hundred thousand displaced refugees seeking safety in Albania and Macedonia or fleeing to the foothills within Kosovo.
Responding to the rapidly deteriorating situation within Kosovo, General Clark ordered General Short to commence attacks on Serbian fielded forces on 30 March. Poor weather delayed the first successful A-10 strikes until 6 April.[50] During OAF, A-10 AFACs flew over 1,000 missions and controlled many other strikers in the attacks on Serb forces in the KEZ. Their attacks ended on 9 June 1999, when a peace agreement was reached.
A-10s first flew over the Balkans in 1993 when NATO aircraft began conducting air operations over Bosnia. Except for occasional relief provided by other Air Force, Reserve, and Guard A-10 units, the 81st FS maintained a continual presence at Aviano until 1997. The A-10s were the only NVG fighter aircraft capable of providing both day and night CAS and AFAC coverage for UN and NATO ground forces. F-16CG squadrons of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano were eventually trained to use NVGs and assumed most of the AFAC duties over Bosnia. With the continual presence of A-10s in the Balkans no longer required, the 81st needed only to conduct yearly deployments to Aviano to remain familiar with Balkan operations and provide AFAC coverage when the 31st FW was deployed elsewhere.
In January 1999, the 81st deployed six A-10s to replace an Aviano F-16CG squadron that had departed on a stateside deployment. The number of A-10s committed to Balkan operations continued to increase throughout OAF. With tensions rising in Kosovo following the Racak massacre, A-10s were ordered to remain at Aviano, and the squadron increased the number of aircraft to 15 by the commencement of NATO air strikes on 24 March. As the 81st deployed to Gioia del Colle AB in southern Italy, it reached 23 aircraft and leveled at that number. On 21 May, an additional 18 Air Force Reserve aircraft became operational at Trapani, Sicily, to bring the total to 41 A-10s supporting OAF.
A-10s were initially tasked with providing CSAR for NATO aircrews; A-10 pilots from the 81st FS, using Sandy call signs, were the mission commanders for the dramatic rescue of an F-117 pilot shot down near Belgrade on the fourth night of strikes. A-10s provided on-scene command, tracked the survivor’s location, coordinated the rescue effort, and provided cover for rescue helicopters during the ingress, survivor pickup, and egress of enemy territory.
Sandy was the call sign for A-1E Skyraiders that performed on-scene command of CSARs during Vietnam. A-10s have continued to use the Sandy call sign to signify the type of mission being conducted. A-10 Sandys provided CSAR coverage for all NATO aircraft flying over Kosovo and Serbia, both day and night, throughout OAF.
On 26 March, the CAOC notified the 81st to commence AFAC missions on 30 March. Although all NATO air strikes to this point had taken place at night, a shortage of EA-6B jammers and F-16CJ SEAD aircraft prevented adding any AFAC day missions since all conventional fighter and bomber aircraft operating in Serbia or Kosovo were required to have jamming and SEAD support. NATO’s limiting factor was EA-6B and F-16CJ airframes—not aircrews; the solution was to doubleturn SEAD aircraft to support AFAC missions during the day and strike missions at night. Launching from Aviano, A-10s flew sorties of six to seven hours down the Adriatic, across Albania and up into Kosovo. Low-level clouds over Kosovo prevented aerial attacks until 6 April, when A-10 AFACs located and struck a Serbian truck park; that strike was followed by two more successful days of attacking convoys of Serbian tanks and APCs.
The excessive en route time from Aviano to Kosovo reduced the A-10’s time on station and prevented an air frame from flying two daylight missions per day. Fifteen days into the war, the CAOC ordered the 81st FS to redeploy to Gioia. On 11 April 1999, the jets from Aviano were joined in the move by an additional three aircraft from Spangdahlem. At Gioia, the sortie-duration times were reduced, on-station times were increased, and the jets could fly two daylight missions per day. A detachment from the 74th FS at Pope arrived in late April with five aircraft, nine pilots, and 65 maintenance personnel to augment 81st FS operations. A British GR-7 Harrier squadron, an Italian Tornado squadron, and an Italian F-104 Starfighter squadron were also located at Gioia. The Harriers flew as strike aircraft for A-10 AFACs on a daily basis, and the proximity of operations made for a close working relationship.
A-10 AFAC operations at Gioia commenced within 24 hours of arrival. With the growing success of strikes against their Third Army, the Serbs increased their active air defenses. A-10 AFACs began reporting barrage-fired AAA and SAM launches. On 2 May, an A-10 AFAC was struck by an SA-14 infrared-guided SAM and was forced to recover at Skopje AB, Macedonia. On 11 May, another A-10 AFAC was struck beneath the cockpit by a mobile SAM; fortunately, that missile failed to detonate, and the jet was able to recover to Gioia.
AFAC operations over Kosovo grew to cover most of the day and half of the night. A-10s covered two four-hour daylight windows, all the while maintaining four aircraft on CSAR alert during night operations. F-16CG AFACs provided some day coverage and also flew during a two- to three-hour night window. The US Navy provided day AFAC coverage as well with F-14s flying off the USS Theodore Roosevelt. Even more AFACs were needed to provide full coverage—24 hours a day, seven days a week—over Kosovo. The Air National Guard then stepped in to create the 104th EOG, a rainbowed group of 18 aircraft from units in Michigan, Massachusetts, and Idaho. By 19 May, the 104th had deployed to Trapani AB in western Sicily. The lengthy trip from Trapani to the KEZ precluded the 104th from being able to double-turn for day missions, but it was able to cover a midday AFAC window and then turn for late-night missions. Additionally, the 104th deployed three of its aircraft to Taszar, Hungary, in May to perform CSAR alert, thus improving the CSAR response time in the event of a shootdown over northern Serbia. The final aircraft to join the AFAC mission was the US Marine F/A-18D. A full squadron joined the 104th CSAR detachment at Taszar, and these aircraft were flying over Kosovo by late May.
Late May proved the most successful period for air attacks against Serb ground forces. Several factors influenced that success and combined to provide a greater opportunity for NATO air attacks. Those factors included an increased force structure, improved weather conditions, and a KLA offensive in western Kosovo that forced the Serbian Third Army out of its hiding places. NATO increased the number of AFACs and strikers for near-continuous daylight operations until combat operations ceased on 10 June 1999. A-10s continued to provide airborne and ground CAS alert until the end of June as NATO occupation ground forces entered Kosovo.
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 September 1997, 50.
AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland, 27 August 1999, 31.
Lt Gen Tony McPeak, “TACAIR Missions and the Fire Support Coordination Line,” Air University Review, September–October 1985, 70.
X-ray, Yankee, and Zulu are the military pronunciations for the letters X, Y, and Z, respectively.
Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1993), 12.
H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography (New York: Bantam, 1992), 371.
Keaney and Cohen, 65.
Gen Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 498.
Keaney and Cohen, 48–51.
Lt Col William F. Andrews, Airpower against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF’s Duel with the Republican Army (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 14.
National Training Center Handbook 100-91, The Iraqi Army: Organization and Tactics, 1991, 25–31.
Keaney and Cohen, 51.
Ibid., 49.
Keaney and Cohen, vol. 5, A Statistical Compendium and Chronology, pt. 1, 463–539.
Andrews, 29. Air Force assets were not the only air assets attacking fielded forces. Carrier-based strikers, including F/A-18s, also attacked fielded forces; however, they did not begin to attack the Republican Guard in earnest until a week after the air war had started.
Lt Col Christopher P. Weggeman, F-16 pilot with 388th TFW flying the Killer Scout mission against the Republican Guard, E-mail interview with author, 28 November 2000. The Army was concerned not only with armor but also support assets such as artillery, mechanized infantry vehicles, support vehicles, ammunition supplies, and POL storage.
Keaney and Cohen, 106.
Keaney and Cohen, A Statistical Compendium, pt. 1, 463–539. The majority of these missions, 569, were delivered by F-16s employing nonprecision, free-falling general-purpose bombs as well as older-generation cluster bomb units (Mk-20 Rockeye, CBU-52, and CBU-58). Battlefield effectiveness was below expectations, which led to concern over the high consumption rates of the more modern, armor-piercing CBU-87 during the first two weeks. “CENTAF TACC/NCO Log, January-February 1991” (U), 30 January 1991, 21. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
Weggeman interview.
William L. Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993), 123–24.
Andrews, 44.
Keaney and Cohen, Summary Report, 21; Andrews, 54; and Fred L. Frostic, Air Campaign against the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, Rand Report MR-357-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994). F-111Fs developed the tank-plinking tactic using their Pave Tack laser designator. Lessons learned during a Desert Shield exercise had shown the potential for identifying and targeting armor from medium altitude. On 5 February, two F-111Fs successfully dropped two GBU-12s on revetted positions. Within three days, 50 sorties a night were devoted to tank plinking. Navy A-6Es began dropping a limited number of LGBs, as did F-15E crews. The F-15Es were limited by the number of LANTIRN pods and quickly developed buddy lasing techniques.
Andrews, 56.
AFDD 2-1.3, 102. Counterland doctrine now incorporates the Killer Scout mission.
Col Robert C. Owen, ed., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2000), xvii.
Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 341.
Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 62.
For purposes of this discussion, the term Kosovars refers to Kosovar Albanians.
William Buckley, ed., Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2000), 100. For purposes of this discussion, the terms Serbia and Serbian will be used to refer to those forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslav. Likewise Macedonia will be used to refer to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Judah, 171.
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160, 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 November 2001, available from <a l:href="http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1160.htm">http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1160.htm</a>; UNSCR 1199, 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 November 2001, available from <a l:href="http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1199.htm">http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1199.htm</a>.
Dick Leurdijk and Dick Zandee, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Pub. Co., 2001), 34; and US Department of State, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo (Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, May 1999), 6, on-line, Internet, 10 December 2002, available from <a l:href="http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_toc.html">http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_toc.html</a>. Though 2,000 observers of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had agreed to participate, OSCE was never able to get that many into country before their withdrawal in March 1999.
Albert Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (New York: United Nations University Press, 2000), 35.
Judah, 195. The Serbs were threatened by the air strikes if they did not come to an agreement, and the Kosovars were threatened that NATO would leave them to the mercy of the Serbs if they did not sign.
Ibid., 206.
Ministry of Defence (MOD), Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2000), 9.
Paul Strickland, “USAF Aerospace-Power Doctrine: Decisive or Coercive?” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 3 (fall 2000): 16.
MOD, Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis, 34.
Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 176.
Strickland, 21.
HQ/USAFE Initial Report, The Air War over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force (Ramstein AB, Germany: USAFE Studies and Analysis, 25 April 2000), 9.
R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, “Anatomy of a Purge,” Washington Post, 11 April 1999, A1.
Unpublished war diary of Maj Phil M. Haun. F-16CG (Block 40) AFACs with LANTIRN targeting pods were also used primarily as night AFACs. AFAC duties eventually expanded to include US Navy F-14s and Marine F/A-18D Hornets.
HQ/USAFE Initial Report, 15.
MOD, Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis, 34.
HQ/USAFE Initial Report, 16. By the end of the war the number of USAF aircraft alone would rise to over 500.
US State Department, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, 6.
Steven Lee Myers, “Serb Forces under Attack as Weather Clears,” New York Times, 6 April 1999. By this time over 400,000 Kosovar Albanians had crossed the border into Albania and Macedonia.