1. Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945, Wiesbaden, 1973, 596–7.
2. See Hermann Weber, ‘Die KPD in der Illegalität’, in Richard Löwenthal and Patrik von zur Mühlen (eds.), Widerstand und Verweigerung in Deutschland 1933 bis 1945, Berlin/Bonn, 1984, 83–101, here 93.
3. Weber, 83.
4. It had, in effect, to be a ‘resistance of servants of the state’ (‘Widerstand der Staatsdiener’). Hans Mommsen, ‘Der Widerstand gegen Hitler und die deutsche Gesellschaft’, in Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich, (1985), 1986, 9.
5. See Carl Dirks and Karl-Heinz Janßen, Der Krieg der Generäle. Hitler als Werkzeug der Wehrmacht, Berlin, 1999, ch.1.
6. Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Regierung Hitler. Teil I, 1933/34, Karl-Heinz Minuth, Boppard am Rhein, 1989, i.50; trans. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series C (1933–1937). The Third Reich: First Phase, London, 1957–66 (=DGFP), C, 1, 37, No.16.
7. Hans Müller (ed.), Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus, Munich, 1965, 88–9, Kundgebung der Fuldaer Bischofskonferenz vom 28.3.1933. And see Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Der deutsche Katholizismus in Jahre 1933. Eine kritische Betrachtung’, Hochland, 53 (1960–61), 215–39; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre 1933. Stellungnahme zu einer Diskussion’, Hochland, 54 (1961–2), 217–45; and Hans Buchheim, ‘Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahr 1933’, Hochland, 53 (1960–61), 497–515.
8. Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, London, 1964, 206.
9. Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1914–1940, 7 vols., Frankfurt am Main, 1980 (=DBS), iii. 308, 2 April 1936, report for March 1936. See also Bernd Stöver, Volksgemeinschaft im Dritten Reich. Die Konsensbereitschaft der Deutschen aus der Sicht sozialistischer Exilberichte, Düsseldorf, 1993, 182–3, 303.
10. In 1933, the first 100,000 ‘Volksempfänger were put on the market. By the end of 1939, three and a half million had been sold, and almost three-quarters of German households possessed a wireless set. (Z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, Oxford, (1964), 1973, 49.)
11. See Hermann Weiß, ‘Ideologie der Freizeit im Dritten Reich. Die NS-Gemeinschaft “Kraft durch Freude”’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 33 (1993), 289–303.
12. Ulrich Herbert, ‘Good Times, Bad Times: Memories of the Third Reich’, in Richard Bessel (ed.), Life in the Third Reich, Oxford, 1987, 97–110.
13. DBS, iii.308, 2 April 1936, report for March 1936.
14. See, on this point, Martin Broszat, ‘Soziale Motivation und Führer-Bindung des Nationalsozialismus’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte (VfZ), 18 (1970), 392–409.
15. See Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1961.
16. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 2 vols., Vienna/Munich, 1918–22 (English translation published in New York, 1926). And see Michael Biddis, ‘History as Destiny: Gobineau, H. S. Chamberlain, and Spengler’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Series, 7 (1997), 73–100, here especially 87–97.
17. See, for example, George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology. Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich, (1964), London, 1966, Part III; Detlev J. K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik. Krisen-jahre der Klassischen Moderne, Frankfurt am Main, 1987, especially ch.9; and Michael H. Kater, Different Drummers: Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany, New York/Oxford, 1992.
18. See the strains of such a mentality in Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, 3rd edn, Munich, 1992; and the cultural framework for such thought in Peter Gay, Weimar Culture. The Outsider as Insider, (1968), London, 1988, ch.4.
19. For a reassessment of the scale of antisemitic violence during the Weimar Republic, see Dirk Walter, Antisemitische Kriminalität und Gewalt. Judenfeindschaft in der Weimarer Republik, Bonn, 1999. Donald L. Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany, Baton Rouge, 1980, ch.III, emphasizes, rather, the exceptionality of violence, but the prevalence (if uneven in manifestation) of anti-Jewish prejudice. Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the ‘Jewish Question’, Princeton, 1984, ch.1–2, also plays down the extent of anti-Jewish violence and the role of antisemitism in the rise of Nazism. Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, New York, 1997, ch. 1–3, in a highly contentious interpretation, sees ‘eliminatory’ antisemitism as ubiquitous in Germany already in the nineteenth century and the Weimar Republic as a logical continuation and accentuation of pre-existing proto-genocidal traits widespread in German society.
20. For Hitler’s first written statement on antisemitism, in September 1919, see Eberhard Jäckel and Axel Kuhn (eds.), Hitler. Samtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905–1924, Stuttgart, 1980, 88–90.
21. See Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, New York/Oxford, 1986.
22. See Dirks and Janßen, ch.1; and Karl-Heinz Janßen, ‘Politische und militärische Zielvorstel-lungen der Wehrmachtführung’, in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds.), Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität, Munich, 1999, 75–84.
1. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany, vol.i, Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–36, Chicago/London, 1970, (= Weinberg I), ch.11.
2. DGFP, C, V, 355–63, No.242; Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923–45. Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas, Bonn, 1953, 329–30, 332–4 (where Schmidt misdates the flight to London to present the plan to the end of April, not March); Domarus, 617–18.
3. Weinberg I, 254–7.
4. DGFP, C, V, 514, No.312; Schmidt, 334–5.
5. See Weinberg I, 272–3.
6. Thomas Jones, A Diary with Letters, 1931–19 50, Oxford, 1954, 191 (30 April 1936).
7. Domarus, 621 and n.121.
8. Heinz Höhne, Die Zeit der Illusionen. Hitler und die Anfänge des 3. Reiches 1933 bis 1936, Düsseldorf/Vienna/New York, 1991, 347; Richard D. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, London, 1972, 93–4, 142–3.
9. Höhne, 345.
10. Albert Speer, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1969, 94, where the architect’s name is mistakenly given as Otto March (the father of Werner).
11. Arnd Krüger, Die Olympischen Spiele 1936 und die Weltmeinung, Berlin, 1972, 63; Mandell, 39, 125 (where it is pointed out that the stadium was only a twentieth of the enormous sporting complex, of a size equivalent to that of the city of Berlin itself in the late seventeenth century), 292.
12. Mandell, 141–50.
13. See Leni Riefenstahl, A Memoir, New York, 1993, 190–206. For a description of the film, Olympiade, see David Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933–1945, Oxford, 1983, 112–21.
14. Mandell, 227–9; Riefenstahl, 193.
15. Baldur von Schirach, Ich glaubte an Hitler, Hamburg, 1967, 217–18.
16. Chips. The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, ed. Robert Rhodes James, London, 1967, 110–11. See also Joachim von Ribbentrop, The Ribbentrop Memoirs, London, 1954, 63–4; William E. Dodd and Martha Dodd (eds.), Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, 1933–1938, London, 1941, 346; Schmidt, 337–8; Mandell, 156–8.
17. Mandell, 206–7; Höhne, 352.
18. Höhne, 352. The racial, as well as nationalist, overtones had been obvious in German reactions to the unexpected victory of the heavyweight boxing hero Max Schmeling over the presumed invincible ‘Black Bomber’, Joe Louis, in New York on 18 June 1936. Goebbels, listening to the fight at 3.00a.m., noted in his diary: in the 12th round, Schmeling knocks out the negro. Wonderful. A dramatic, exciting fight. Schmeling has fought and won for Germany. The white man over the black man, and the white man was a German.’ (Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Sämtliche Fragmente, Teil I, Aufzeichnungen 1924–1941, 4 Bde., ed. Elke Fröhlich, Munich etc., 1987 (TBJG), vol.2, 630 (20 June 1936); and see Mandell, 117–21.
19. Krüger, 200.
20. Krüger, 201; Mandell, 138–9.
21. Krüger, 196.
22. Höhne, 351–2. The US Ambassador Dodd was not among them. He thought the propaganda had pleased the Germans, but had ‘had a bad influence on foreigners’. (Dodd, 349. Most eyewitnesses appear to have had a far more favourable impression.)
23. William Shirer, Berlin Diary, 1934–1941, Sphere Books edn, London, 1970, 58 (16 August 1936).
24. Viktor Klemperer, Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten. Tagebücher 1933–1941, 2 vols., ed. Walter Nowojski and Hadwig Klemperer, Darmstadt, 1998, i.293 (13 August 1936).
25. Melita Maschmann, Fazit. Mein Weg in die Hitler-Jugend, 5th paperback edn, Munich, 1983, 30–31.
26. Dieter Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan, Stuttgart, 1968, 35.
27. Petzina, 37.
28. Hjalmar Schacht, Abrechung mit Hitler, Berlin/Frankfurt am Main, 1949, 61–2; and see Höhne, 375.
29. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, 6 vols, so far published, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Stuttgart, 1979 (=DRZW), i.431–3.
30. Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv, Oldenburg, Best.131 Nr.303, Fol.131V.
31. See Höhne, 373.
32. Petzina, 46.
33. Stefan Martens, Herman Goring. ‘Erster Paladin des Führers’ und ‘Zweiter Mann im Reich’, Paderborn, 1985, 68–9; Petzina, 35–40; Höhne, 377–8.
34. Petzina, 39.
35. Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof. Nürn-berg, 14. November 1945–1 Oktober 1946, 42 vols. (=1MG) ix.319; Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich, Bloomington, 1964, 544; Petzina, 40; Martens, 69.
36. IMG, ix.319; Petzina, 35–40; Martens, 69; Alfred Kube, Pour le mérite und Hakenkreuz. Hermann Goring im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1986, 140–41.
37. Carl Vincent Krogmann, Es ging um Deutschlands Zukunft 1932–1939, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1976, 272.
38. TBJG, I/2, 607 (3 May 1936).
39. See TBJG, I/2, 701 (20 October 1936): ‘Die Energie bringt er mit, ob auch die wirtschaftl. Kenntnis und Erfahrung? Wer weiß! Immerhin wind er viel Wind machen.’ After the war, Goring himself acknowledged that it had been his task, in confronting the raw-materials difficulties, to deploy his energy ‘not as an expert, but as a driving-force {Treiber)’ (IMG, ix.319).
40. Höhne, 379; Petzina, 44–5; Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology. IG Farben in the Nazi Era, Cambridge, 1987, 150ff.; DRZW, i.278ff.
41. Höhne, 380; Berenice Carroll, Design for Total War. Arms and Economics in the Third Reich, The Hague/Paris, 1968, ch.7.
42. Cit. Kube, 152.
43. Kube, 152–3; Höhne, 380.
44. See Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Ökonomie und Klassenstruktur des deutschen Faschismus, Frankfurt am Main, 1973, 139–41, for Göring’s reminders to Hitler in autumn 1935 about his coming war against the Soviet Union.
45. Marquess of Londonderry (Charles S. H. Vane-Tempest-Stewart), Ourselves and Germany, London, 1938, 94–103. Lord Londonderry’s personal papers in the Public Record Office, Belfast, contain a description of his visit to Germany (D3099/2/19/8, 9A-9B), but deal only in the briefest terms with his interview with Hitler. The account which formed the basis for his printed comments appears to be missing from the file. In the audience he granted Londonderry, Hitler was, of course, trying to impress upon his guest the need for Britain to develop close links with Germany. (As the Londonderry papers show, the German leadership greatly overestimated his influence at the time within Britain.) But this does not meant that Hitler’s feelings about Bolshevism were not genuine. In fact, Londonderry was little moved by them, pointing out that the Bolshevik danger was seen as far less important in Britain. He was more interested in the colonial question. On the Londonderry visit, see also Schmidt, 338–42.
46. TBJG, I/2.622 (9 June 1936).
47. TBJG, I/2.644 (17 July 1936).
48. Nicholas Mosley, Beyond the Pale: Sir Oswald Mosley, 19 33–1980, London, 1983, 72. On the Mitford sisters, see Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, London, 1981, 340–41; and Richard Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right. British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 1933–9, London, 1980, 171ff.
49. TBJG, I/2, 646 (22 July 1936). Goebbels found the Mitfords ‘boring as ever’ (I/2, 646 (21 July 1936)).
50. See Paul Preston, Franco. A Biography, London, 1993, 159; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, National-sozialistische Außenpolitik 1933–1938, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1968, 422–4.
51. Höhne, 356–7.
52. Preston, I28ff.
53. Preston, 140–58.
54. Kube, 163–6. And see Weinberg I, 289–90.
55. Kube, 164.
56. Hans-Henning Abendroth, ‘Deutschlands Rolle im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg’, in Manfred Funke (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte. Materialien zur Außenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Dusseldorf, 1978, 471–88, here 472–3; Preston, 158–9.
57. Abendroth, 474.
58. DGFP, D, III, 10–11, No.10, Memorandum of the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office, Dr Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, 25 July 1936. According to Kube, 164, Bohle and Heß tried to take up the matter with the Foreign Office, and almost certainly, too, with Göring.
59. Abendroth, 474.
60. DGFP, D, III, 6–7, N0.4; Abendroth, 474–5.
61. Implied in the account of Kube, 164–5.
62. Abendroth, 475.
63. Kube, 165, n.11.
64. See Abendroth, 476–9.
65. Suggested by Martens, 66.
66. Preston, 159.
67. Abendroth, 475, citing a communication to him from Bernhardt. Kube, 165 claims that Hitler’s decision was in support of Göring’s ‘economic concept’. Wolfgang Schieder, ‘Spanischer Bürgerkrieg und Vierjahresplan’, in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik, Darmstadt, 1978, 325–59, also emphasizes Göring’s role and the centrality of economic motives. Martens, 66, on the other hand, argues convincingly — along Abendroth’s lines — that Hitler took the decision alone, and that Göring was at first hesitant, indeed shocked at hearing of the decision. Serious economic involvement in Spain only dated from October 1936, when the first substantial military supplies also began. Göring claimed at Nuremberg that he had pressed Hitler, who was still thinking it over, to provide the support, both to combat the spread of Communism and to give him the opportunity to try out the Luftwaffe (IMG, ix.317; and see Kube, 165 n.12). But by the time Göring pressed for action, Hitler was no longer thinking it over; his mind was already made up. Göring’s intentional or unintentional misrepresentation at Nuremberg was presumably aimed, as elswhere in his testimony, at bolstering his self-importance. Alternatively, as Preston suggests (814 n.64), Göring may have conflated two separate meetings with Hitler. Even so, Göring’s claim that he was influential in shaping Hitler’s original decision to intervene stands in contradiction to other evidence on the taking of the decision.
68. Abendroth, 475.
69. Ribbentrop, 59–60.
70. Ribbentrop, 60.
71. Abendroth, 476; Preston, 159–61; see also Schieder, ‘Spanischer Biirgerkrieg’, 342.ÍÍ.; and the careful analysis (concluding that economic considerations were secondary to ideological in the initial decision by Hitler to involve Germany in support for Franco) by Christian Leitz, ‘Nazi Germany’s Intervention in the Spanish Civil War and the Foundation of HISMA/ROWAK’, in Paul Preston and Ann L. Mackenzie (eds.), The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939, Edinburgh, 1996, 53–85.
72. TBJG, I/2, 648 (27 July 1936), dealing as always with the events of the previous day.
73. Martens, 66.
74. TBJG, I/2, 671 (23 September 1936); Höhne, 363. The Republican side in the Civil War also attracted external support, particularly from the Soviet Union and from the International Brigades volunteer forces organized by the Comintern and individual Communist parties, in which some 60,000 men fought the nationalist insurgents. British and French statesmen were concerned at Soviet involvement in Spain, fearing, as Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary put it in September 1937, that as a consequence ‘Communism would get its clutches into Western Europe’. Cit. Denis Smyth, ‘“We Are With You”: Solidarity and Self-interest in Soviet Policy towards Republican Spain, 1936–1939’, in Preston and Mackenzie, 87–105, here 105.
75. This is implied by Kube, 164–5, though the argument, so far as Hitler’s motivation is concerned, seems overstretched.
76. Domarus, 638; TBJG, I/2, 675 (9 September 1936).
77. TBJG, I/2, 743 (2 December 1936).
78. TBJG, I/2, 726 (15 November 1936).
79. Kube, 153–4. Goring informed Hitler verbally of the finalized raw-material plans on 15 August (Petzina, 49).
80. Petzina, 47–8; Richard J. Overy, Goering: the Iron Man, London, 1984, 45–6; Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, Stuttgart, 1956, 80–82. For a sketch of Goerdeler, see Hermann Weiß (ed.), Biographisches Lexikon zum Dritten Reich, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, 153–5.
81. In his official biography of Göring, Erich Gritzbach, Hermann Göring. Werk und Mensch, Munich, 1938, 160, remarked that ‘after days of quiet work at the Berghof, on 2 September the Führer gives the Minister President [Göring] detailed directives about the reconstruction of the National Socialist economy which will determine the life of Germany for the present and the future’. Hitler’s memorandum was read out to government ministers at a meeting on 4 September (IMG, xxxvi-489ff., Doc.EC-416).
82. Wilhelm Treue, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan 1936’, VfZ, 3 (1955), 184–210, here 184; DGFP, C, V, 853 n.1, N0.490.
83. Petzina, 48, 52. According to Hans Kehrl, Krisenmanager im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1973, 86, Göring was forbidden to pass on the document or even to read it out to his closest staff. Overy, Goering, 46, has a third copy given to Fritz Todt, engaged in building the Autobahnen. The evidence for this is unclear. Speer’s note attached to his copy of the memorandum (Treue, 184) remarked that there were only three copies, one of which he had received in 1944. If Todt had received a copy, it might have been expected to have remained in the files of his ministry, which Speer took over in 1942.
84. Treue, ‘Denkschrift’, 204–5; Engl. transi. in DGFP, C, V, 853–6, Doc. 490; and Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Nazism, 1919–1945. A Documentary Reader, vol.2, Exeter, 1984, 281–9.
85. Petzina, 51; Hayes, 155–65, especially 164.
86. Kube, 154–5 and n.22.
87. Treue, 206–7, 209–10; Engl. transl. in DGFP, C, V, 856–8, 860–61, Doc.490.
88. Kube, 156.
89. Kube, 156–7.
90. Kube, 156.
91. TBJG, I/2, 727 (15 November 1936).
92. Kube, 157.
93. Kube, 158, citing post-war testimony of Lammers and Friedrich Gramsch, State Secretary to Göring in the office of the Four-Year Plan.
94. Reden des Führers am Parteitag der Ehre 1936, Munich, 1936, 48–52; Domarus, 637–8; Kube, 155 and n.24.
95. Kube, 156–7.
96. A warning against equating the Four-Year Plan with the Stalinist Five-Year Plans is, however, appropriate, as noted by Hans Mommsen, ‘Reflections on the Position of Hitler and Goring in the Third Reich’, in Thomas Childers and Jane Caplan (eds.), Reevaluating the Third Reich, New York/London, 1993, 86–97, here 92.
97. Kube, 157–8.
98. See Griffiths, 206–7, 218–19, 268–9. Among the prominent British visitors who met Hitler during 1936 were Lord Londonderry (former Air Minister), David Lloyd George (highly respected former Prime Minister), and Thomas Jones (former senior civil servant and Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, and a close associate of the current Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin).
99. Wolfgang Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik, 1933–1940. Außenpolitische Konzeptionen und Entscheidungsprozesse im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1980, 155, for the mandate. Hitler told Ribbentrop towards the end of July that he wanted him to become the next ambassador in London (See TBJG, I/2, 646 (22 July 1936)). Disappointed not to have been made State Secretary in the Foreign Office, Ribbentrop delayed making the appointment public until 11 August (Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop, London, 1994, 97–9). Ribbentrop’s own misleading version in his post-war testimony at Nuremberg was that he had personally asked Hitler to withdraw an earlier appointment as State Secretary in the Foreign Office, and to send him as Ambassador to London (IMG, x.267; and Ribbentrop, 60–61).
100. Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge, London, 1948 (= CP), 44. Mussolini was sure that Ribbentrop would achieve nothing (CP, 46).
101. See the memoirs of Ribbentrop’s secretary during his time in London, Reinhard Spitzy, So haben wir das Reich verspielt. Bekenntnisse eines Illegalen, Munich, 1986, 101–3; Weinberg I, 275; Bloch, 100, 110, 111–34 (and note to 111 attributing the appellation to cartoonist David Low); Michalka, Ribbentrop, 157–8, for Ribbentrop’s lengthy absences.
102. Josef Henke, ‘Hitlers England-Konzeption — Formulierung und Realisierungsversuche’, in Funke, 584–603, here 592; Speer, 86; Fritz Wiedemann, Der Mann, der Feldherr werden wollte, Velbert/Kettwig, 1964, 152, 156 and 153–6 for the Duke of Windsor’s visit to the Berghof on 22 October 1937. According to Wiedemann (p.156) Hitler thought the Duke the most intelligent prince he had met, and that it was no wonder, because he was so pro-German, that he had been forced to abdicate.
103. Bloch, 122–3. Awkwardly for the readiness of Hitler and Ribbentrop to portray Winston Churchill as the arch-warmonger and leading exponent of anti-German sentiment in Britain, Churchill had been a staunch supporter of the King throughout the abdication crisis.
104. Cit. Jonathan Wright and Paul Stafford, ‘Hitler, Britain, and the Hoßbach Memorandum’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 42 (1987), 94, from BA, ZSlg., 101. Nr. 31 (Dertinger report). The deteriorating relations between Britain and Germany during the second half of 1936 and in 1937 are thoroughly examined by Josef Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 1935–1939, Boppard am Rhein, 1973, 49–107 and — emphasizing the significance of the colonial question — Klaus Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und koloniale Frage 1919–1945, Munich, 1969, 491 — 548. See also Dietrich Aigner, Das Ringen um England, Munich/Esslingen, 1969, 302–20.
105. Weinberg I, 264.
106. DGFP, C, V, 756–60, N0.446.
107. Weinberg I, 268–71. On the background to the Agreement, see Jürgen Geyl, Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss, 1931–1938, London/New York/Toronto, 1963, ch.V.
108. Geyl, 133–4.
109. Höhne, 364. Mussolini’s decision to intervene in Spain was independent of Hitler’s. The initial limited aid followed a similar pattern, though Italian involvement soon escalated to a level far greater than that of Germany. See Paul Preston, ‘Mussolini’s Spanish Adventure: From Limited Risk to War’, in Preston and Mackenzie, 21–51.
110. 110. See Preston, Franco, 243–4. 111. Treue, 205.
111. CP, 44, 47; Höhne, 364; Pierre Milza, Mussolini, Paris, 1999, 695–7.
112. Manfred Funke, ‘Die deutsch-italienischen Beziehungen — Antibolschewismus und außen-politische Interessenkonkurrenz als Strukturprinzip der “Achse”’, in Funke, 823–46, here 834–5; Höhne, 364. Mussolini had expressed his own approval of the agreement between Austria and Germany — one he had suggested to Schuschnigg — at his meeting with Frank on 23 September (CP, 45).
113. CP, 56.
114. CP, 59.
115. CP, 57.
116. CP, 56–60; Jens Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini. Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom 1933–1936, Tübingen, 1973, 491; Höhne, 364–5.
117. CP, 60; Petersen, 492; Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis. A History of the Relations between Hitler and Mussolini, New York/London, 1949, 68.
118. Treue, 205.
119. CP, 58.
120. Despite his racial disparagement of the Japanese as merely capable of ‘bearing’, not ‘creating’, culture, Hitler had encouraged Ribbentrop in 1933, according to the latter’s testimony at Nuremberg (IMG, x.271), to explore closer relations with Japan, predominantly on ideological grounds. See John Fox, Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1931–1938. A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology, Oxford, 1982, 175–6; and Theo Sommer, Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935–1940. Vom Antikominternpakt zum Dreimächtepakt, Tübingen, 1962, 21–2; and, for Hitler’s race-views on Japan, MK, 319. The first soundings to Japan were made in January 1935 (Bernd Martin, ‘Die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen während des Dritten Reiches’, in Funke, 454–70, here 460).
121. For the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, see Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ‘Zur Struktur der NS-Außenpolitik 1933–1945’, in Funke, 137–85, here 162–4.
122. Fox, 182–3, suggests this was only in autumn 1935.
123. Martin, 459; Fox, 185; Hartmut Bloß, ‘Deutsche Chinapolitik im Dritten Reich’, in Funke, 407–29, here especially 409–11.
124. Martin, 460; Fox, 177.
125. Fox, 180–81.
126. Martin, 461–2 and n.34, 40; Weinberg I, 344–5; Fox, 199–204. The planned coup d’état by junior officers followed elections in February 1936 with an outcome which did not satisfy the army, engaged in conflict with the navy over allocation of resources and strategic planning for expansion. The conflict lasted into the summer before a compromise gave equal weight to the navy’s pressure for expansion to the south and the army’s strong preference for a continental policy looking to expand northwards. Eventually, adventurist elements in the government were able to advance towards a pact, but the disruption following the army revolt held matters up for some time.
127. Höhne, 368; Martin, 464 n.54 for Italy’s joining on 6 November 1937.
128. See Weinberg I, 347.
129. Domarus, 668.
130. IMG, xxv.404, 409, Doc. 386-PS.
131. Die kirchliche Lage in Bayern nach den Regierungspräsidentenberichten 1933–1943, vol.i, ed. Helmut Witetschek, Mainz, 1966, 193.
132. Domarus, 668; Nicolaus von Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–1945, Mainz, 1980, 15.
133. Schmidt, 348.
134. Schmidt, 342–6. See also the extensive account of Lloyd George’s visit by Thomas Jones, who accompanied him on his trip to Germany and noted how impressed he was with Hitler (Jones, 241–52). Just over a year later, Lloyd George wrote to a friend: i have never doubted the fundamental greatness of Herr Hitler… I have never withdrawn one particle of the admiration which I personally felt for him… I only wish we had a man of his supreme quality at the head of affairs in our country today.’ Cit. Martin Gilbert, Britain and Germany between the Wars, London, 1964, 102. And see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.1: The Gathering Storm, London 1948, 224–5: ‘No one was more completely misled than Mr Lloyd George, whose rapturous accounts of his conversations make odd reading today. There is no doubt that Hitler had a power of fascinating men…’
135. Schmidt, 350; TBJG, I/3, 119, 142 (21 April 1937,12 May 1937). See Lansbury’s comment in a private letter written on 11 May 1937: ‘…A soft word, a tiny recognition of Hitler’s position by diplomats, would make all the difference… He will not go to war unless pushed into it by others.
136. He knows how a European war will end.’ Cit. Gilbert, 102. Lansbury had roundly condemned Hitler in the book he had published the previous year (George Lansbury, My England, London, n.d. (1936), 193–6).
137. Schmidt, 349–50.
138. André François-Poncet, Souvenirs d’une ambassade à Berlin, Septembre 1931-Octobre 1938, Paris, 1946, 262.
139. Cit. Ludwig Volk, ‘Kardinal Faulhabers Stellung zur Weimarer Republik und zum NS-Staat’, Stimmen der Zeit, 177 (1966), 173–95, here 187.
140. Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942, ed. Percy Ernst Schramm, Stuttgart, 1963, 478 (26 July 1942).
141. August Kubizek, Adolf Hitler, mein Jugendfreund, 5th edn, Graz/Stuttgart, 1989, 275.
142. Christa Schroeder, Er war mein Chef. Aus dem Nachlaß der Sekretärin von Adolf Hitler, ed. Anton Joachimsthaler, Munich/Vienna (1985), 4th edn, 1989, 47, 60.
143. Schroeder, 54, 58.
144. Below, 20.
145. Schroeder, 269.
146. Schroeder, 55–6.
147. See Schroeder, 269 and 78: ‘Before dictation I didn’t exist for him, and I doubt that he often saw me sitting at the typewriter.’
148. Below, 31. Hermann Döring, who referred to himself as ‘manager’ (Verwalter) of the Berghof, spoke of Hitler as ‘extremely strict’ (‘unwahrscheinlich streng’) about cleanliness and organization, and the atmosphere as tense when he was present, with everyone alert to his rapid changes of mood (BBC Archives, London, ‘The Nazis: A Warning from History’, transcript of roll 242, pp.22, 27–9).
149. Schroeder, 269.
150. Schroeder, 78, 81.
151. Schroeder, 38–9, 58, 289–90, n.18.
152. Schroeder, 326 n.99.
153. Schroeder, 55. See Willi Schneider, ‘Hitler aus nächster Nähe’, 7 Tage. Illustrierte Wochenschrift aus dem Zeitgeschehen, Nr.42, 17 October 1952– Nr.1, 2 January 1953, here Nr.42, 8, for Hitler’s high expectations and Kannenberg’s nervousness.
154. Below, 10, 28; Schroeder, 269.
155. Schroeder, 37–46; Below, 29–30.
156. Below, 18, 29–32.
157. Schroeder, 48.
158. Below, 29, 31. The Reich Chancellery had been renovated by Troost and Speer after 1933. The Neue Reichskanzlei was begun by Speer in 1938 and completed on 7 January 1939.
159. Below, 29, 31–2; Schroeder, 47.
160. Below, 20.
161. Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with the Truth, London, 1995, 113.
162. Below, 32.
163. Below, 28–9, 32.
164. Schroeder, 79.
165. Below, 32–3.
166. TBJG, I/3, 378 (22 December 1937).
167. Below, 33.
168. Below, 33–4.
169. Domarus, 606.
170. Below, 22–3; see Schroeder, 170–96. And for Hitler’s dislike of Berlin, see Tb Irving, 268 (25 July 1938).
171. Schroeder, 317 n.326.
172. Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler was my Friend, London, 1955, 162–3.
173. Schroeder, 167.
174. Sereny, 109.
175. See Sereny, 110. Enthused by Resi Iffland as Brünnhilde in the Bayreuth performance of Wagner’s Götterdämmerung, Hitler had told Goebbels that summer of ‘his preference for large wome’ (TBJG, I/3, 221 (1 August 1937)).
176. Nerin E. Gun, Eva Braun-Hitler. Leben und Schicksal, Velbert/Kettwig, 1968, 74–8; Werner Maser, Adolf Hitler. Legende, Mythos, Wirklichkeit, 3rd paperback edn, Munich, 1973, 325–69; John Toland, Adolf Hitler, London, 1976, 375–7.
177. Gun, 78–9; Maser, 362–3, 368–9, 369m; Toland, 377–8.
178. Domarus, 677; Speer, 87–93, especially 90.
179. In August 1938, after a lengthy conversation with Hitler about his marital problems with Magda, Goebbels would note in his diary: ‘The Führer is like a father to me’ (TBJG, I/6, 44 (16 August 1938).
180. TBJG, I/3, 266 (14 September 1937).
181. See Sereny, 109, 138–9, 156; and Joachim C. Fest, Speer. Eine Biographie, Berlin, 1999, 459ff.
182. TBJG, I/3, 221 (1 August 1937).
183. Sereny, ch.5.
184. See Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitlers Zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928, Stuttgart, 1961, 129–30 for his views on the USA. In his view, only a strong, racially purified Germany, built up on the principles of National Socialism, could combat the USA in the contest for world hegemony that would inevitably occur in the distant future. See also Milan Hauner, ‘Did Hitler want a World Dominion?’, JCH, 13 (1978), 15–32, especially 24.
185. See TBJG, I/3, 104, 115, 119, 236, 261, 316, 321, 325 (10 April 1937, 17 April 1937, 20 April 1937, 15 August 1937, 10 September 1937, 28 October 1937, 2 November 1937, 4 November 1937). See in general on Hitler’s monumental building plans, and their connection with his Utopian goals of domination, Jochen Thies, Architect der Weltherrschaft. Die ‘Endziele’ Hitlers, Dusseldorf, 1976; and Jochen Thies, ‘Hitlers European Building Programme’, JCH, 13 (1978), 413–31.
186. TBJG, I/3, 119 (20 April 1937). Hitler had revealed his schemes for the rebuilding, including the gigantic hall, a few days earlier (TBJG, I/3, 115 (17 April 1937)).
187. TBJG, I/3, 236, 316 (15 August 1937, 28 October 1937).
188. TBJG, I/3, 261 (10 September 1937).
189. David Irving, The Secret Diaries of Hitler’s Doctor, paperback edn, London, 1990, 31.
190. Irving, Doctor, 34.
191. Irving, Doctor, 35.
192. Irving, Doctor, 30, 36.
193. Irving, Doctor, 38.
194. TBJG, I/3, 177, 224 (18 June 1937, 3 August 1937).
195. Irving, Doctor, 38.
196. Irving, Doctor, 18.
197. Domarus, 745.
198. Domarus, 661–768; Milan Hauner, Hitler. A Chronology of his Life and Time, London, 1983, 116–23.
199. Domarus, 667. Following his speech, the Reichstag, without formalities, unanimously renewed the Enabling Act for a further four years (Domarus, 676). In this same speech, Hitler advanced the German demand for colonies (Domarus, 673). The colonial question would be raised on a number of occasions during 1937 (see, for example, TBJG, I/3, 46 (16 February 1937)), but largely for tactical reasons. (See Domarus, 759.) Hitler told Goebbels that he had consciously included colonial demands in his proclamation to the Reich Party Rally in order to demonstrate greater assertiveness to the outside world (TBJG, I/3, 258 (8 September 1937). His unchanged interest was not in the reacquisition of colonial territory in Africa, but in a continental empire in eastern Europe. See Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich, 501–2; Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871–1945, Stuttgart, 1995, 640; and Hauner, Hitler, 120 for Hitler’s reported comments in The Times, 13 September 1937, on the colonial question.
200. Domarus, 690.
201. Domarus, 705–6.
202. Domarus, 765. For Hitler’s plans for Berlin, see Speer, 87–90; Thies, Architekt, 95–8. The metaphor of a ‘thousand-year Reich’ was a play on the chiliastic religious traditions of the coming heavenly Reich associated with millenarian mystics such as Joachim di Fiore. Wolfgang Benz, Hermann Graml, and Hermann Weiß (eds.), Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus, Stuttgart, 1997, 435, 757; Cornelia Schmitz-Berning, Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus, Berlin, 1998, 607.
203. Domarus, 715–32, here 717.
204. For Hitler’s use of the term in this speech, see Domarus, 730.
205. Domarus, 728, 731.
206. Schroeder, 78–9.
207. TBJG, I/3, 45 (16 February 1937).
208. See Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria, 1933– 1945, Oxford, 1983, 216.
209. On the struggle over denominational schools, see, especially, Franz Sonnenberger, ‘Der neue “Kulturkampf”. Die Gemeinschaftsschule und ihre historischen Voraussetzungen’, in Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich, and Anton Grossmann (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit, vol.3, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt, Munich/Vienna, 1981, 235–327; see also Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 209ff.
210. Kershaw, Popular Opinion, ch.5; John Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933–1945, London, 1968, 206—13; Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler’s Power, Princeton, 1969, especially ch.5 and 8; Elke Fröhlich, ‘Der Pfarrer von Mömbris’, in Martin Broszat and Elke Fröhlich (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit, vol.6, Die Herausforderung des Einzelnen. Geschichten über Widerstand und Verfolgung, Munich/Vienna, 1983, 52—75.
211. For the trials and the orchestrated campaign of defamation against the Catholic clergy, see Hans Günter Hockerts, Die Sittlichkeitsprozesse gegen katholische Ordensangehörige und Priester 1936/1937, Mainz, 1971. The trials and publicity were often counter-productive in strongly Catholic regions. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 196.
212. TBJG, I/3, 5 (5 January 1937), 10 (14 January 1937), 37—8 (9 February 1937).
213. See Conway, 206—7, where the reasons for Hitler’s decision are regarded as unclear. Goebbels’s diary entries indicate that he, not Hitler, took the initiative, and that Hitler eagerly seized upon the suggestion for elections as a way out of the problem, to end the damaging discord. It proved a miscalculation. See Conway, 206–13.
214. TBJG, I/3, 55 (23 February 1937). Hitler indicated again to Goebbels in June that he was considering the separation of Church and State. Goebbels added that the clergy would do well not to provoke the Führer any further (TBJG, I/3, 181 (22 June 1937)). However, Hitler was concerned that in the event of a separation of church and state Protestantism would then be destroyed and provide no counter-weight against the Vatican (TBJG, I/3, 359 (7 December 1937). See Hans Günter Hockerts, ‘Die nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik im neuen Licht der Goebbels-Tagebücher’, APZ, 30 July 1983, B30, 23–8, here 29.
215. TBJG, I/3, 77 (13 March 1937).
216. TBJG, I/3, 97, 105 (2 April 1937, 10 April 1937).
217. TBJG, I/3, 129, 143, 156–7, 162 (1 May 1937, 12 May 1937, 29 May 1937, 2 June 1937).
218. TBJG, I/3, 119 (21 April 1937).
219. Conway, 209. ‘We’ve got the swine and won’t let him go again,’ noted Goebbels (TBJG, I/3, 195 (4 July 1937); see also 194, 196, 198 (3 July 1937, 6 July 1937, 10 July 1937)). Hitler’s order for the detention of Niemöller (Conway, 209) was almost certainly sanction for actions requested by the Gestapo. Niemöller’s fundamental opposition to Nazism had undergone a pronounced course of development since his initial enthusiasm in 1933. For most Protestant clergy, opposition on church matters was compatible with conformity — often enthusiastic approval — in other areas of Nazi policy. See the contributions by Günther van Norden, ‘Widerstand in den Kirchen’, and Helmut Gollwitzer, ‘Aus der Bekennenden Kirche’, in Löwenthal and Mühlen, Widerstand und Verweigerung 111–28, 129–39; the critical assessment by Shelley Baranowski, The Confessing Church, Conservative Elites, and the Nazi State, Lewiston/Queenston, 1986; and, for the penetration of the thinking even of prominent Protestant theologians by Nazi ideas, Robert P. Ericksen, Theologians under Hitler, New Haven/London, 1985.
220. TBJG, I/3, 258 (8 September 1937).
221. In the event, the exclusion was carried out by police decrees since a law would have drawn too much public attention. TBJG, I/3, 354 (3 December 1937).
222. TBJG, I/3, 351 (30 November 1937).
223. Hildegard von Kotze and Helmut Krausnick (eds.), ‘Es spricht der Führer’. 7 exemplarische Hitler-Reden, Gütersloh, 1966, 147–8.
224. David Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3 (1988), 1–20, here 15.
225. Domarus, 727–30; Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1972, 173; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews. The Years of Persecution, 1933–39, London, 1997, 184–5.
226. Otto Dov Kulka, ‘“Public Opinion” in National Socialist Germany and the “Jewish Question”’, Zion, 40 (1975), 186–290 (text in Hebrew, abstract in English, documentation in German), 272–3. And see Michael Wildt, Die Judenpolitik des SD 1935 bis 1938. Eine Dokumentation, Munich, 1995; and Lutz Hachmeister, Der Gegenforscher. Die Karriere des SS-Führers Alfred Six, Munich, 1998, ch.V. The SD had originally been established under the direction of Reinhard Heydrich in 1931 to carry out surveillance on the Nazi Party’s political opponents. Much of this was undertaken by the Gestapo after 1933, when the SD’s main role increasingly centred upon the gathering of information and production of reports on ideological ‘enemies’ (such as the Churches), the ‘Jewish Question’, and soundings of opinion.
227. Kulka, 274. See also BA, R58/991, Fols.71a-c, Vermerk of SD Abt. II 112, 7 April 1937. The SD’s work was assisted by volunteers, such as the expert in Hebrew — a long-standing party member — who, while in Leipzig, had on his own initiative put together a register of all ‘full–, three-quarter, half–, and quarter-Jews’ in the area and now proposed to do the same for Upper Silesia, then for the whole of Silesia. He also offered to teach Hebrew to SD members. It was recommended that the SD should make use of his offer. BA, R58/991, Fol.46. See also Friedländer, 197ff.
228. The numbers of Jews emigrating from Germany had, in fact, not fluctuated massively since the first massive wave of emigration in 1933, despite the varying intensity of Nazi persecution. In 1937, there was even a decline compared with the rate of the previous year. By the Nazis’ own standards, emigration pressure had not been adequate; more than two-thirds of the Jewish population of 1933 still remained in Germany. According to the statistics of the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden, the organization established in 1933 to coordinate and represent Jewish interests in the ever-worsening conditions, 37,000 Jews fled the country in 1933, 23,000 in 1934, 21,000 in 1935, 25,000 in 1936, and 23,000 in 1937. Werner Rosenstock, ‘Exodus 1933–1939. A Survey of Jewish Emigration from Germany’, LBYB, 1 (1956), 373–90, here 377; Herbert A. Strauss, ‘Jewish Emigration from Germany. Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (I)’, LBYB, 25 (1980), 313–61, here 326, 330–32.
229. Adam, 172–4.
230. Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy toward German Jews, 1933–1939, Urbana/Chicago/London, 1970, 159–60.
231. Hermann Graml, Reichskristallnacht. Antisemitismus und Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1988, 167.
232. Adam, 174ff.
233. See Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung, Munich, 1969, 432–3.
234. TBJG, I/3, 26 (28 January 1937). He spoke again in late February of his expectation that the showdown would follow in five or six years’ time (TBJG, I/3, 55 (23 February 1937)).
235. TBJG, I/3, 25–6 (28 January 1937). Frick came back to his notions of Reich Reform, but, despite Blomberg’s support, found no favour with Hitler. Frick had raised the issue in connection with a law of 26 January 1937 to regulate the regional government and administration of Greater Hamburg, which he saw as a step to more comprehensive Reich Reform (Günter Neliba, Wilhelm Frick. Der Legalist des Unrechtsstaates: Eine politische Biographie, Paderborn etc., 1992, 149).
236. TBJG, I/3, 158–9 (31 May 1937); Domarus, 696–7. According to Goebbels, Hitler was sorely disappointed in Raeder and Blomberg, who would have been satisfied with diplomatic protests (TBJG, I/3, 162 (2 June 1937)). Naval intelligence, which only reported the incident to Hitler at lunchtime on 30 May, though the news had come in on the Saturday evening, was seen as having failed miserably. Goebbels thought that Raeder would not be long in office (TBJG, I/3, 158 (31 May 1937), 162 (2 June 1937)). The American journalist William Shirer was informed that Hitler had been ‘screaming with rage all day’ and wanted to declare war on Spain (Shirer, 63). Goebbels — possibly echoing Hitler’s own opinion — expressed the view soon afterwards that Blomberg was weak and ‘a puppet in the hands of his officers’. Hitler’s own anger at Wehrmacht officers wanting to intervene in police matters, ‘where they understood not the slightest thing’, was also mentioned in the same entry (TBJG, I/3, 181 (22 June 1937)). By September, Göring, too, was expressing anger at the Wehrmacht leadership, which Goebbels saw on the way to becoming a ‘state within a state’ (TBJG, I/3, 257 (8 September 1937)). See also Goebbels’s comments along the same lines, TBJG, I/3, 316, 322 (28 October 1937, 2 November 1937), after Hitler, in a rage, had criticized monarchical tendencies in the Wehrmacht.
237. TBJG, I/3, 211 (24 July 1937).
238. TBJG, I/3, 221 (1 August 1937).
239. TBJG, I/3, 370 (15 December 1937), for the view that the Russian threat was at least partially removed through the Japanese victory over China.
240. TBJG, I/3, 198 (10 July 1937).
241. TBJG, I/3, 378 (22 December 1937); see also 385 (28 December 1937).
242. TBJG, I/3, 351 (30 November 1937).
243. See Wright and Stafford, ‘Hitler, Britain, and the Hoßbach Memorandum’, 100 and 120 n.167.
244. TBJG, I/3, 200 (13 July 1937). See also Goebbels’s own comments (p.252) on 3 September 1937.
245. TBJG, I/3, 177 (18 June 1937). Goebbels was still sceptical after the effusive expressions of mutual friendship following Mussolini’s state visit in September (TBJG, I/3, 283 (29 October 1937), 285 (1 October 1937)).
246. Schneider, Nr.42, 8, where the elaborate organization of the receptions for Mussolini in Munich and Berlin is also described.
247. Domarus, 737; Hauner, Hitler, 121.
248. TBJG, I/3, 281 (28 September 1937). See also 282–3 (29 November 1937), 2.84–5 (1 October 1937).
249. Joseph Goebbels. Tagebücher 1924–1945, 5 vols., ed. Ralf Georg Reuth, Munich, 1992 (Tb Reuth), iii.1100, n.88. See Norbert Schausberger, ‘Österreich und die nationalsozialistische Anschluß-Politik’, in Funke, 728–56, here 744–8.
250. Schausberger, ‘Österreich’, 746.
251. Schausberger, ‘Österreich’, 744; Geyl, 157.
252. TBJG, I/3, 201 (13 July 1937).
253. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).
254. TBJG, I/3, 266 (14 September 1937). In October, Hitler hinted to the Aga Khan that Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, and the Corridor figured in German revisionism (Schmidt, 382).
255. TBJG, I/3, 369 (15 December 1937).
256. Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany. Starting World War II, 1937–1939, Chicago/London, 1980 (= Weinberg II), 289, and 287, where it is pointed out that foreign visitors were also starting to expect action against Austria in the near future. The economic gains from the seizure of assets in Austria were an attractive proposition with the German armaments economy under strain (Schausberger, in Funke, 744–8; and the fuller account in Norbert Schausberger, Der Griff nach Österreich. Der Anschluß, Vienna/Munich, 1978, ch.6).
257. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).
258. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).
259. Wright/Stafford, 102.
260. TBJG, I/3, 307 (20 October 1937). ‘This temporary state must disappear,’ (Dieser Saisonstaat muß weg) he had entered in his diary the previous day (306 (19 October 1937)).
261. TBJG, I/3, 327 (6 November 1937).
262. Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1939, Düsseldorf, 1973, 446–7.
263. Kube, 195. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, in his Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940, (1969), 2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1988, 243; and General Ludwig Beck. Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938, Boppard am Rhein, 1980, 249, has Hitler summoning the meeting.
264. Friedrich Hoßbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, Wolfenbüttel/Hanover, 1949, 219; Wright/Stafford, 82, for the second part of the meeting dealing with rearmament questions. Following the discussion of the raw materials issue, new allocations to the navy were agreed. Instead of 45,000 tons of steel, the navy would receive its full complement of 75,000 tons. (Dülffer, Marine, 447; Hoßbach, 219; Weinberg II, 41; Wright/Stafford, 123 n.200 on Hitler speaking from notes.)
265. Walter Bußmann, ‘Zur Entstehung und Überlieferung der “Hoßbach-Niederschrift”’, VfZ, 16 (1968), 373–84, here 377; Wright/Stafford, 82.
266. IMG, xxv, 402–13, Doc. 386-PS. Hoßbach, 217–20, relates how he made the notes on the meeting. And see Müller, Heer, 243ff.; Müller, Beck, 249ff.; Dülffer, Marine, 448–51; Hermann Gakenholz, ‘Reichskanzlei 5. November 1937’, in Richard Dietrich and Gerhard Oestreich (eds.), Forschungen zu Staat und Verfassung. Festgabe für Fritz Hartung, Berlin, 1958, 459–74. Bußmann, Wright/Stafford, and Bradley F. Smith, ‘Die Überlieferung der Hoßbach-Niederschrift im Lichte neuer Quellen’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 329–36, have removed any doubts about the authenticity of the document.
267. See Wright/Stafford, 84.
268. See Weinberg II, 39 n.74 for the generally understood notion that Austria would be taken over from the outside, and Papen’s comments to a Hungarian minister in Vienna in May that both Austria and Czechoslovakia would disappear. Hitler’s view that little was to be gained at that time by a rapprochement with Britain, and his strong preference for close ties with Italy, figured in the confidential reports on press briefings by Georg Dertinger and Dr Hans Joachim Kausch. See Wright/Stafford, 91–5.
269. Wright/Stafford, 82–4.
270. Hoßbach, 219; Müller, Heer, 244; Wright/Stafford, 85.
271. Bussmann, 378.
272. Weinberg II, 39.
273. Müller, Beck, 501.
274. IMG, xxv. 412–13; Müller, Heer, 244; Wright/Stafford, 99; Gackenholz, 469–72. Hoßbach, 219, recalled that the meeting became heated in the exchanges between Blomberg and Fritsch on the one hand and Göring on the other, with Hitler saying little. According to Müller, 244 (though without source for the assertion), the discussion with Göring concerned above all the technical questions of armaments issues. In Hoßbach’s record of the meeting, Göring’s only intervention was to suggest cutting down Germany’s military involvement in Spain in the light of Hitler’s comments (IMG, XXV.413).
275. Wright/Stafford, 99.
276. Wright/Stafford, 103.
277. IMG, xiv, 44–5; Erich Raeder, Mein Leben von 1935 bis Spandau 1955, Tübingen/Neckar, 1957, 149–50; Müller, Heer, 245; Dülffer, 450 n.56. But Raeder’s testimony at Nuremberg and his memoirs are often unreliable (Dülffer, Marine, 450 n.56; Weinberg II, 40; Wright/Stafford, 101, 107; Gackenholz, 470). Göring, Raeder claimed, had told him before the meeting that Hitler’s remarks were solely aimed at stirring the army to speed up rearmament. (Göring also declared at Nuremberg that this was the purpose of the meeting (Wright/Stafford, 77).) He was expecting, therefore, some exaggeration for effect.
278. Müller, Heer, 246 n.193.
279. Müller, Beck, 254.
280. Müller, Beck, 498–501 (text), 254–61 (commentary).
281. Gackenholz, 471; Müller, Heer, 246.
282. Müller, Heer, 247 (Neufassung des Aufmarschplanes ‘Grün’, 21 December 1937). Blomberg stated after the war that he and Fritsch had wanted to express their doubts about the possibility of implementing Hitler’s plans in the light of the opposition of Britain and France, but added that those present at the meeting agreed when leaving the room that Hitler’s remarks were not to be taken seriously (IMG, xl, 406). This was probably an indirect reference to an exchange of views with Raeder, who was of the same opinion.
283. Karl-Heinz Janßen and Fritz Tobias, Der Sturz der Generäle. Hitler und die Blomberg–Fritsch-Krise 1938, Munich, 1994, 38; Speer, 83.
284. Janßen/Tobias, 35. For the film Hitlerjunge Quex, see Welch, 59—74.
285. Janßen/Tobias, 59–60.
286. Janßen/Tobias, 34–5.
287. Janßen/Tobias, 16. At the end of 1944, Blomberg was to send Hitler a letter expressing his disgust and shame at the military plot against him (TBJG, II/14, 333 (2 December 1944)).
288. Janßen/Tobias, 30.
289. Janßen/Tobias, 38–41.
290. Janßen/Tobias, 27–8.
291. Janßen/Tobias, 56–7 (where it is convincingly argued that the call did not come from the Gestapo, as often presumed).
292. Janßen/Tobias, 45–7, 51.
293. Janßen/Tobias, 27, 51–2.
294. Wiedemann, 112.
295. TBJG, I/3, 414 (26 January 1938).
296. Hoßbach, 124.
297. TBJG, I/3, 415–16 (27 January 1938).
298. Janßen/Tobias, 54–5; TBJG, I/3,419 (29 January 1938).
299. Janßen/Tobias, 86–8, 91, 93–7.
300. Hoßbach, 127; Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende (single vol. edn), Zürich, n.d. (1954?), 258; Janßen/Tobias, 90. This speaks directly against the well-versed argument that Fritsch’s dismissal was a consequence of his objections to Hitler’s remarks at the meeting on 5 November 1937, noted by Hoßbach. For this interpretation, see Peter Graf Kielmansegg, ‘Die militärisch-politische Tragweite der Hoßbach-Besprechung’, VfZ, 8 (1960), 268–75.
301. Janßen/Tobias, 86–7.
302. Gerhard Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel, ed. Hildegard von Kotze, Stuttgart, 1974, 20–21. Engel’s notes, though having the appearance of contemporary diary entries, were, in fact, compiled after the war, taken both from memory and, he claimed, from notes made at the time but subsequently lost. Since Engel was in Hitler’s immediate entourage for a period of five years, his notes remain of value though should not be taken as an authentic diary record.
303. Hoßbach, 125–7; Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, (single vol. edn), 258–61; Janßen/Tobias, 99.
304. Hoßbach, 126–7; Wiedemann, 117–18.
305. Hoßbach, 127; Janßen/Tobias, 100.
306. Wiedemann, 117–18. See TBJG, 1/3, 417 (28 January 1938): ‘He was thus able to prepare himself. Who knows here what’s true and false! In any case, the situation is impossible. It’s being further investigated. But after that Fritsch will also have to go.’
307. Hoßbach, 127–8; Janßen/Tobias, 101–2.
308. Jaßen/Tobias, 102–3.
309. Hoßbach, 128–9; Below, 65; Generalfeldmarschall Keitel. Verbrecher oder Offizier? Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW, ed. Walter Görlitz, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt am Main, 1961 (=Keitel), 104ff.
310. Janßen/Tobias, 91. Schmidt had been in custody since 1935, and was sentenced in December 1936 to seven years’ imprisonment for numerous cases of blackmail and infringement of the laws on homosexuality. His criminal record stretched back to 1929. Janßen/Tobias, 91–2 and 277 n.33.
311. Janßen/Tobias, 104–5.
312. See the account of the extraordinary meeting in Hoßbach, 129–30; also Janßen/Tobias, 106.
313. Janßen/Tobias, 108.
314. Goebbels wrote: ‘Here is word against word: that of a homosexual blackmailer against that of the head of the army. And the Führer does not trust Fritsch any longer’ (TBJG, I/3, 421 (30 January 1938)).
315. Janßen/Tobias, 109–16, especially 113–14.
316. TBJG, I/3, 421 (30 January 1938).
317. Janßen/Tobias, 120–21. A second HJ boy was also looked after by Fritsch for a month (Janßen/Tobias, 101).
318. Janßen/Tobias, 122–3.
319. TBJG, I/3, 417 (28 January 1938).
320. The idea of separate ministries for the branches of the armed forces possibly came initially from Raeder (Janßen/Tobias, 126). As late as 31 January, Hitler and Goebbels were still discussing possible successors to Fritsch, with the Propaganda Minister favouring Beck {TBJG, I/3, 423 (1 February 1938)).
321. Janßen/Tobias, 125–6. See Hoßbach, 132 n.i (the post-war comments by Fritsch’s defender, Graf v.d. Goltz, of a conversation he had had in June 1945 with Blomberg); see also Keitel, 105 n.184; Below, 67.
322. Janßen/Tobias, 128–32. The sarcastic comment about Himmler was made after the war while in British internment by Field-Marshal Ewald von Kleist.
323. Janßen/Tobias, 126–7.
324. IMG, xxviii.358, Doc. 1780-PS, Jodl-Tagebuch; Keitel, 106–9; Janßen/Tobias, 127. Keitel and Jodl worked out the organizational structure (Janßen/Tobias, 136). Blomberg’s recommendation of Keitel had scarcely been enthusiastic. Hitler had asked who was in charge of Blomberg’s staff. Blomberg mentioned Keitel’s name, but dismissed the possibility of using him. ‘He’s nothing but the man who runs my office,’ he said. ‘That’s exactly the man I am looking for,’ Hitler replied (Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–1945, London, 1964, 13).
325. Janßen/Tobias, 136.
326. Müller, Heer, 636.
327. Janßen/Tobias, 140.
328. TBJG, I/3, 424 (1 February 1938). Hitler had hinted to Keitel and Brauchitsch that the reshuffle was aimed at heading off the negative impression that could be prompted abroad at the departure of Blomberg and Fritsch (Keitel, 112).
329. TBJG, I/3, 423–4 (1 February 1938).
330. IMG, xxviii.362, Doc. 1780-PS, Jodl-Tagebuch (31 January 1938): ‘Führer will die Scheinwerfer von der Wehrmacht ablenken, Europa in Atem halten… Schußnig [sic] soll nicht Mut fassen sondern zittern.’
331. Janßen/Tobias, 150; Domarus, 783, has sixty military posts, including fourteen generals, as well as Blomberg and Fritsch. General Liebmann remarked of the senior army officers removed, that there could be no doubt that they were all figures who in some way were ‘uncomfortable’ (‘unbequem’) for the Party {IfZ, ED 1, Fol.416, Liebmann memoirs).
332. Janßen/Tobias, 199–200. Brauchitsch told the generals that he had accepted the post ‘only unwillingly and with considerable reservations’ (‘nur widerstrebend und unter erheblichen Bedenken’) (IfZ, ED 1, Fol.416, Liebmann memoirs).
333. TBJG, I/3, 424 (1 February 1938).
334. Lothar Gruchmann, ‘Die “Reichsregierung” im Führerstaat. Stellung und Funktion des Kabinetts im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem’, in Günther Doeker and Winfried Steffani (eds.), Klassenjustiz und Pluralismus, Hamburg, 1973, 187–223, here 200–201.
335. Janßen/Tobias, 154.
336. TBJG, I/3, 431 (5 February 1938); Domarus, 783. Hitler told his generals on 5 February that, for prestige reasons both at home and abroad, he could not possibly disclose the real reason for Blomberg’s dismissal (IfZ, ED 1, Fol.415, Liebmann memoirs).
337. Janßen/Tobias, 79. Hitler’s view of Blomberg, as disclosed to his generals in early February 1938, was less favourable. He described him as a weak character (‘einen schwachen Charakter’) who in every critical situation, especially during the occupation of the Rhineland, had lost his nerve (IfZ, ED 1, Fol.415, Liebmann memoirs).
338. Janßen/Tobias, 182.
339. Janßen/Tobias, 148.
340. Janßen/Tobias, 247–9.
341. Domarus, 728.
342. DBS, v.9–22; and see Ian Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’. Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford, (1987), paperback edn, 1989, 129–30.
343. TBJG, I/3, 434 (6 February 1938).
344. Towards the end of 1944, in the wake of the bomb-plot against him, Hitler would once more refer to the Fritsch case. He was, according to Goebbels, more convinced than ever that Fritsch had been the head of the generals’ conspiracy — in its early stages — ‘and that the indictment against him for homosexuality was in the last resort correct’ (TBJG, II/14, 333 (2 December 1944)).
345. IfZ, ED 1, Fol.416, Liebmann memoirs: ‘Der Eindruck dieser Eröffnungen — sowohl der über Blomberg, wie der über Fritsch, war geradezu niederschmetternd, besonders deshalb, weil Hitler beide Sachen so dargestellt batte, dass über die tatsächliche Schuld kaum noch ein Zweifel bestehen konnte. Wir alle hatten das Gefühl, dass das Heer — im Gegensatz zur Marine, Luftwaffe und Partei — einen vernichtenden Schlag erlitten hatte.’ See also Janßen/Tobias, 153 and 294 n.31 for the date of 5 February and not, as Liebmann, Fol.416, has it, the 4th.
346. TBJG, I/3, 434 (6 February 1938). In speaking to the generals, Hitler had mentioned that during the Rhineland crisis, when Blomberg’s nerve had deserted him, of all his advisers only the ‘thick-skulled Swabian Neurath’ had been in favour of holding out. (‘Von alien seinen Beratern sei damais nur der “dickschädelige Schwabe Neurath” für Durchhalten gewesen.’) (IfZ, ED 1, Liebmann memoirs, Fol.415.) Neurath was able to be so sanguine about the plans to remilitarize the Rhineland because the Foreign Office had received accurate intelligence indicating that the French would not resort to military action in such an event (Zach Shore, ‘Hitler, Intelligence, and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine’, JCH, 34 (1999), 5–18).
347. TBJG, I/3, 434 (6 February 1938).
348. Domarus, 792.-804, here especially 796–7, 799–800.
349. Domarus, 797. See Janßen/Tobias, 157.
1. Plainly implied in numerous speeches in the later 1920s, emphasizing Germany’s ‘lack of space’ (Raumnot) equivalent to the needs of its population, man’s eternal struggle for existence and survival of the fittest, and analogies with the eastern colonization during the Middle Ages or the attainment and defence of the British Empire. See e.g. Hitler. Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen: Februar 1925 bis Januar 1933, ed. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 5 vols, in 12 parts, Munich/London/New York/Paris, 1992–8 (=RSA), II/2, 447 (6 August 1927), 546 (16 November 1927), 554 (21 November 1927), 733 (3 March 1928), 778 (17 April 1928).
2. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf[= MK], 876–88oth reprint, Munich, 1943, 742; trans. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, London, 1969, trans, by Ralph Manheim, with an introduction by D. C. Watt (= MK Watt), 597.
3. One country with no illusions about Hitler was the Soviet Union. At his meeting with the United States’ Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph E. Davies, on 4 February 1937, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim M. Litvinov, had commented ‘that Hitler’s policy had not changed from that which he had announced in his book Mein Kampf; that he was dominated by a lust for conquest and for the domination of Europe; that he could not understand why Great Britain could not see that once Hitler dominated Europe he would swallow the British Isles also’. In Davies’s view, Litvinov ‘seemed to be very much stirred about this and apprehensive lest there should be some composition of differences between France, England, and Germany’ (Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow, New York, 1941, 59–60).
4. See Dirks and Janßen, 58–72, for a summary of the Wehrmacht’s aims in the rearmament programme.
5. Werner Maser, Adolf Hitler. Legende-Mythos-Wirklichkeit, 3rd paperback edn, Munich/Esslingen, (1971), 1976, 374, 455–6; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Hitler’s Private Testament of May 2, 1938’, in JMH, 27 (1955), 415–19, here 415. In 1942, Hitler referred to his testament four years earlier and his fears at the time that he had cancer (Picker, 222 (29 March 1942)).
6. IMG, xxviii.367, Doc. 1780-PS (Jodl-Tagebuch).
7. See Gerhard Botz, Der 13. März 38 und die Anschluß-Bewegung. Selbstaufgabe, Okkupation und Selbstfindung Österreichs 1918–1945, 5–14; Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis. A History of Austrian National Socialism, London/Basingstoke, 1981, 4–10.
8. Walther Hofer (ed.), Der Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente 1933–1945, Frankfurt am Main (1957), 1974, 28.
9. MK, 1; MK Watt, 3.
10. See Kube, 233, where it is suggested that this arose from internal rivalries in the Austrian party, and was also an indication that Göring had received no equivalent commission from Hitler to operate in Austrian affairs and was acting quasi-independently.
11. Weinberg II, 278–9.
12. Weinberg II, 122; Martens, 122.
13. Borthwick Institute, York, Papers of 1st Earl of Halifax, 410.3.6, ‘Conversation with Herr Hitler — 19th November 1937’, Fols.13, 16; 410.3.3 (vi), ‘Lord Halifax’s Diary. Visit of the Lord President to Germany, 17th to 21st November, 1937’, Fol.9; Confidential Memo., Fol.4. Hitler, Halifax noted in his diary (Fol. 12), struck him ‘as very sincere, and as believing everything he said’. Halifax’s notes made in the train en route from Berlin to Calais on 21 November (Fol.1) stated: ‘Unless I am wholly deceived, the Germans, speaking generally, from Hitler to the man in the street, do want friendly relations with Great Britain. There are no doubt many who don’t: and the leading men may be deliberately throwing dust in our eyes. But I don’t think so…’ See also The Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days, London, 1957, 187.
14. Weinberg II, 288.
15. Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 (= ADAP) D, I, N0.80, 106; DGFP, D, I, 80, 129–31; TBJG, 1/3, 369 (15 December 1937); Weinberg II, 287–8; Kube, 241.
16. Weinberg II, 289.
17. Kube, 216.
18. See Kube, 212–14.
19. See Kube, 235–6 for Göring’s emphasis on political and military, not just economic motives for Anschluß.
20. Stefan Martens, ‘Die Rolle Hermann Görings in der deutschen Außenpolitik’, in Franz Knipping and Klaus-Jürgen Müller (eds.), Machtbewußtsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Paderborn, 1984, 75–92, here 80; Kube, 216, 224ff.
21. Kube, 225–7, 229–30, Schmidt, 352–3.
22. Kube, 232, 236–7.
23. Franz von Papen, Memoirs, London, 1952, 401.
24. Papen, 401; and see Kube, 238–9.
25. Kube, 240. Halifax had been ‘immensely entertained’ at meeting Göring, whose personality he found ‘frankly attractive’, like a combination of ‘film star, great landowner… Prime Minister, party-manager, head gamekeeper…’ (Borthwick Institute, Halifax Papers, 410.3.3 (vi), Fol.21, Diary of Halifax’s visit to Germany; an abbreviated version of his meeting with Göring is in Halifax, 190–91).
26. Martens, Göring, 122.
27. TBJG, 1/3.369 (15 December 1937). ‘Papen unfolds a plan to bring down Schuschnigg,’ Goebbels recorded. ‘The cat doesn’t leave the mouse alone. But that’s good. Schuschnigg is getting too strong and cheeky (frech)’.
28. Papen, 408–9; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, John Toland Collection, Tape 53, Side B (Toland interview with Kurt Schuschnigg, 11 September 1971). Kurt Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, London, 1947, 18, dates Papen’s approach to early 1938. But in his subsequent interview, he makes clear that the invitation to Berchtesgaden, passed on by Papen in January, followed an earlier approach.
29. Papen, 409–10.
30. Papen, 412; Weinberg II, 289–91. On 26 January, Papen told Schmidt that Hitler would like Schuschnigg to come to Berchtesgaden on 15 February (Papen, 410). When, precisely, the date for the meeting was altered is unclear. But Papen was sent to Vienna to confirm it on 5 February, the day after he had been dismissed as ambassador to Vienna. Papen claimed he had again recommended the meeting, after initially suggesting one at the time that the Austrian police confiscated the papers of Gauleiter Tavs — revealing the plans for actions to provoke German intervention — at the raid on the Vienna party headquarters (Papen, 408–9). The raid took place on 25 January (Pauley, 195–6; Weinberg II, 288). Papen had then issued an invitation to Schuschnigg, endorsed by Hitler, on 27 January (Pauley, 195). This was the invitation to the rearranged meeting, which Papen implausibly claimed Hitler had forgotten and had to be reminded of (Papen, 408). The original invitation, again at Papen’s suggestion and with Hitler’s approval, had been agreed to by the Austrian chancellor on 8 January (Weinberg II, 289).
31. Pauley, 196; Weinberg II, 288.
32. Weinberg II, 278, 290; Papen, 413.
33. Weinberg II, 290.
34. Keppler’s report to Hitler, describing the terms agreed on 2 February between Schuschnigg and Seyß-Inquart, is in ‘Anschluß’ 1938. Eine Dokumentation, ed. Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, Vienna, 1988, 149–50. See also Papen, 411–12, 420; Weinberg II, 292.
35. Papen, 418, 420.
36. Papen, 413. However, according to his later testimony, Schuschnigg, aware that the Blomberg–Fritsch affair had created serious tension between Hitler and the army, had mistakenly taken the news that three generals would be in attendance as an indication that they would be exerting a restraining influence (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, John Toland Collection, Tape 53, Side B (Toland interview with Kurt Schuschnigg, 11 September 1971)).
37. Below, 84.
38. Papen, 413. Below, 84 for Hitler’s tension at the visit.
39. Kurt Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem in Rot-Weiß-Rot, Zurich, 1946, 38.
40. Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 40–2.
41. Papen, 414–17. For the terms, see DGFP, D, I, No.294–5, 513–17; see also Gehl, 174.
42. Papen, 420. Schuschnigg was given three days to comply (Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 49; Papen, 420; Below, 85). Hitler had retired to the Obersalzberg to prepare his speech (Below, 83).
43. Below, 85; Papen, 415.
44. Keitel, 177; Papen, 417.
45. Papen, 418–19; Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 49.
46. Papen, 420; Domarus, 790; Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 51–2.
47. Keitel, 178 and n.26. Jodl and Canaris were involved with Keitel in setting up the manoeuvres. See IMG, xxviii.367 (D0C.1780–PS, Jodl-Tagebuch), entry for 13 February 1938.
48. Keitel, 178.
49. Below, 85.
50. Tb Reuth, 1208 (16 February 1938).
51. Below, 85; Tb Reuth, 1209 (16 February 1938).
52. Der unbekannte Dr Goebbels. Die geheimen Tagebücher 1938, ed. David Irving (= Tb Irving), London, 1995, 53 (17 February 1938); Der Spiegel (= Tb Spiegel), 31/1992, 102.
53. Below, 86.
54. Domarus, 803.
55. ADAP, D, I, Dok.328, p.450; Kube, 243; Pauley, 198.
56. Papen, 403–4; Pauley, 194–201; also Weinberg II, 288–90.
57. Domarus, 801. The speech had been toned down somewhat from its draft (Pauley, 203).
58. Pauley, 202–4.
59. Papen, 422–3; John Toland, Adolf Hitler, London, 1977, 438–9.
60. Weinberg II, 294.
61. Domarus, 804.
62. Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission. Berlin, 1937–1939, London, 1940, 116–17.
63. Pauley, 205. Hitler had demanded a plebiscite in his meeting with Henderson on 3 March — though, of course, only on his terms (Henderson, 116–17).
64. Pauley, 206; Dieter Wagner and Gerhard Tomkowitz, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. The Nazi Annexation of Austria, 1938, London, 1971, 15–19, 25–6. The relevant section of Schuschnigg’s speech, proclaiming the referendum, is printed in ‘Anschluß’ 1938, 221–2. See also Galeazzo Ciano, Tagebücher 1937/38, Hamburg, 1949, 121–3, entries for 9–10 March 1938.
65. Below, 89; see also Domarus, 818, for Hitler’s post facto comments to Ward Price, a journalist on the Daily Mail who had interviewed him a number of times in earlier years, in Linz on 12 March, that he had acted because of Schuschnigg’s betrayal, which he had at first not believed. Hitler told the Reichstag on 18 March that he thought the rumours of the referendum were ‘fantastic’ and ‘incredible’ (Domarus, 829).
66. Tb Irving, 97 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 102–3.
67. Tb Irving, 97–8 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 103, 105.
68. Helmut Michels, Ideologie und Propaganda. Die Rolle von Joseph Goebbels in der nationalsozialistischen Außenpolitik bis 1939, Frankfurt am Main etc., 1992, 380.
69. Tb Irving, 98 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105; see also David Irving, Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich, London, 1996, 242–3; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 68–9.
70. Kube, 244.
71. Janßen/Tobias, 175–6.
72. Tb Irving, 99 (11 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105.
73. IMG, x.566; Keitel, 178 and n.27; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 51–5.
74. Tb Irving, 99–100 (11 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105; Tb Reuth, 1212–13 (11 March 1938); Irving, Goebbels, 243.
75. Tb Reuth, 1213 (11 March 1938).
76. Tb Irving, 101 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 106.
77. Papen, 427; Kube, 244 n.87. The dramatic events of 11 March are meticulously described in Ulrich Eichstädt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler. Geschichte des Anschlusses Österreichs 1933–1938, Wiesbaden, 1955, 378–422.
78. ADAP, D. I, 468–70, no.352 (quotation, 469).
79. IMG, xxxiv, 336–7, Doc.102–C; Domarus, 809.
80. Papen, 428.
81. IMG, ix. 333; trans. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 12 vols., Nuremberg, 1946–9, xii.735.
82. IMG, ix. 333. See Papen, 438: ‘The course of events in the Reich Chancellery on March 11, 1938, revealed the extent to which Goering had become the dominating personality among those who advocated the “total” solution.’
83. IMG, xvi.131–2; Tb Irving, 101–2 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92,106; Toland, 444; Pauley, 208.
84. IMG, xxxi.355–6, 358, 361, Doc. 2949–PS; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, ed. Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Washington, 1946–8, v.629–31, 635; Tb Irving, 101–3 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 106–7. Goebbels does not mention the demand to withdraw the plebiscite, and has Göring reporting that all demands were met, then posing a further — and almost identical — ultimatum for half an hour later. His own entry appears garbled.
85. Pauley, 208.
86. NCA, v.970, 982, D0C.3254–PS; see also IMG, xvi.199 (testimony of Michael Skubl, pointing out Seyß’s embarrassed stance, and the impression he gave of being led rather than leading).
87. Tb Irving, 103 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
88. See Below, 89, who was told on returning to the Reich Chancellery on the early evening of 11 March that the next day ‘Austria will be coordinated’.
89. DBFP, Series 3,1, 13, Doc. 25.
90. Geyl, 189.
91. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
92. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
93. Below, 89–90.
94. Shirer, Berlin Diary 82–3.
95. Pauley, 211. The Nazi Party in Austria had by this time around 164,000 members, more than twice as many as in 1933, when the NSDAP had been outlawed. With the Party proscribed, and in the absence of free elections, the level of its overall support in the population on the eve of the Anschluß can only be estimated. But in 1932, in regional elections, the NSDAP had already won around a fifth of the vote. See Gerhard Botz, ‘Austria’, in Detlef Mühlberger (ed.), The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements, London/New York/Sydney, 1987, 242–80, here 251. Assuming more than a doubling by 1938, in line with the level of increase in Party membership, it could be guessed that Nazi supporters (of differing levels of commitment) formed at least two-fifths of the population by the time the Anschluß crisis broke. Gerhard Botz’s estimate of 25–35 Per cent of the population who were enthusiasts for the Anschluß in 1938 may be too low (Gerhard Botz, Der 13.März 38 und die Anschluß-Bewegung. Selbstaufgabe, Okkupation und Selbstfindung Österreichs 1918– 1945, Vienna, 1978, 27).
96. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938); Pauley, 213; text in Domarus, 81 n.120.
97. TWC, xii.729.
98. Pauley, 213; Kube, 246; Tb Irving, 103 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Eichstädt, 411.
99. Keitel, 178; Papen, 430. Jodl had found Brauchitsch on the night of 11 March ‘in a completely desolate mood’ (‘in einer vollkommen desolaten Stimmung’), fearing international repercussions (IMG, xv.442; Keitel, 178, n.27).
100. IMG, xxxi.369, Doc. 2949–PS; Domarus, 813; and see Tb Spiegel, 107, for Goebbels’s reaction.
101. Domarus, 811.
102. Shirer, 83.
103. Pauley, 214; Toland, 450.
104. Keitel, 179.
105. Tb Irving, 104 (13 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Domarus, 814 (‘Freundschaftsbesuch’ in DNB-Meldung, 12 March 1938). The official version had German troops crossing the border at 8a.m. (Domarus, 814).
106. Domarus, 814, has Hitler landing at 10a.m.; Keitel, 179 has a 6a.m. departure from Berlin; Below, 91, has Hitler leaving at 8 and landing at 10.
107. Below, 91; Keitel, 179. For Bock, see the sketches by Horst Mühleisen, ‘Fedor von Bock — Soldat ohne Fortune’, in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.), Die Militärelite des Dritten Ketches, Berlin/Frankfurt am Main, 1995, 6–82, and Samuel W. Mitcham Jr, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock’, in Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.), Hitlers militärische Elite. Von den Anfängen des Regimes bis Kriegsbeginn, Darmstadt, 1998, 37–44; and Generalfeldmarshall Fedor von Bock. The War Diary, 1939–1945, ed. Klaus Gerbet, Atglen PA, 1996, 16–17.
108. Tb Irving, 104 (13 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107. See Papen, 438, for Hitler’s orders for draft legislation to be prepared to make him head of both states in personal union.
109. Domarus, 816–17.
110. Below, 91; Tb Irving, 106 (13 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Domarus, 817; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 194–5.
111. Below, 91.
112. Below, 92.
113. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, New York (1952), Da Capo Press edn, 1996, 50–56, here 56.
114. Domarus, 817–18 and n.139; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 198–201.
115. Tb Irving, 107 (14 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107. Gerhard Botz, Nationalsozialismus in Wien. Machtübernahme und Herrschaftssicherung 1938/39, 3rd edn, Buchloe, 1988, 71, suggests that delays in getting the troops to Vienna and the wish to be sure of reactions abroad were responsible for the postponement of Hitler’s arrival in Vienna. But Guderian, who was in charge of the motorized units to enter Austria, later corrected the widely read, but misleading, account of military inefficiency and tank breakdowns, allegedly prompting fury from Hitler, as the reason (Guderian, 54–5; Churchill, i.242 (who probably derived his information from a usually well informed British witness of events in Vienna, G. E. R. Gedye, Fallen Bastions. The Central European Tragedy, London, 1939, 315–16. Gedye had been the Daily Telegraph’s correspondent in Austria for twelve years)).
116. See Schroeder, 85; Below, 92.
117. Below, 92.
118. Domarus, 819.
119. As suggested by David Irving, Führer und Reichskanzler. Adolf Hitler 1933–1945, Munich/Berlin, 1989, 91.
120. Schuschnigg was by this time, while nominally free, in effect under house arrest. See Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, 59–60.
121. Franz Jetzinger, Hitlers Jugend, Vienna, 1956, 131–3, 136 (photo); Domarus, 821; Below, 93, for the visit to Leonding.
122. Domarus, 821; there is no record of any prior telephone conversation with Mussolini (see Keitel, 179, n.32), though it is likely that the telegram followed such a call, to ensure the Duce’s approval for the final step of full Anschluß.
123. Domarus, 822.
124. Below, 92; Domarus, 820–21 for the law. A first draft had already been drawn up before Stuckart left Berlin (Erwin A. Schmidl, März 38. Der deutsche Einmarsch in Österreich, Vienna, 1987, 214).
125. Kube, 248 and n.118. Stuckart flew at midday on 13 March to Vienna to discuss the draft with Keppler and representatives of the Austrian government (Schmidl, 214).
126. ‘Anschluß’ 1938, 330–31.
127. Tb Irving, 107, 108–9 (14–15 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107, 110, entry for 14 March (dealing with events of the previous day) has ‘The Anschluß is practically there. The Führer is staying in Linz on Sunday’ (‘Der Anschluß ist praktisch da. Der Führer bleibt Sonntag in Linz’). The entry for 15 March (reporting on ‘yesterday’) has: ‘Anschluß completed. Election on 10 April… The Austrian armed forces under the Führer’s command’ (‘Anschluß vollzogen. Am 10.April Wahl… Die österreichische Wehrmacht dem Führer unterstellt’). This suggests that the signing of the Anschluß legislation took place in the evening of 13 March.
128. Account of the decision for the Anschluß based on Below, 92; Leonidas E. Hill (ed.), Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 1974, 124 (26 March 1938); Domarus, 820–21; Schmidl, 214–15; ‘Anschluß’ 1938, 328ff; Irving, Führer, 91.
129. Kube, 248–9; David Irving, Göring. A Biography, London, 1989, 210–11. The frequently cited version — see, for example, Toland, 452; Irving, Führer, 91; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 211 — of Göring sending an intermediary to Linz with the suggestion of moving to full Anschluß and Hitler agreeing, rests on a single piece of doubtful testimony, and reflects Göring’s embellishment of his own role. (See Kube, 248 n.117.) Papen, influenced by Göring’s Nuremberg testimony, also stated that Hitler moved to Anschluß at Göring’s insistence (Papen, 438).
130. Domarus, 821; Below, 92; Pauley, 219–20.
131. Below, 92–3; Domarus, 822; Gedye, 318; Botz, Wien, 72.
132. Botz, Wien, 119.
133. Domarus, 822.
134. Gedye, 318.
135. Below, 93; Schroeder, 85; Domarus, 822; Gedye, 318–19; Botz, Wien, 73.
136. Keitel, 180.
137. Botz, Wien, 69–71.
138. Botz, Wien, 73–4.
139. Botz, Wien, 55–8.
140. Domarus, 823; Botz, Wien, 75.
141. Domarus, 824; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 226–9.
142. Papen, 432–3. Papen says the meeting lasted an hour. Botz, Wien, 76, 120, 523 n.19, claims it was no longer than a quarter of an hour. Hitler’s tight schedule would not have allowed for Papen’s lengthier audience.
143. Papen, 433; Botz, Wien, 120.
144. Botz, Wien, 123; Lewy, 212.
145. Domarus, 825; Botz, Wien, 122.
146. Domarus, 825–6; Botz, Wien, 76, 523 n.19.
147. Domarus, 830.
148. Domarus, 832–50.
149. BA, R55/445, ‘Wahlparole Nr.8’, 1 April 1938.
150. Domarus, 850.
151. BA, R55/445, ‘Rundspruch Nr.69. Tagesparole vom 11. April 1938, betr. die Kommentierung des Wahlergebnisses’. [‘Ein solches, beinahe 100 prozentiges Wahlergebnis ist gleichzeitig ein Ruhmesblatt für alle Wahlpropagandisten.’]
152. See Botz, Der 13.März 38, 2.4–6, and, especially, Botz, Wien, ch.II; Ernst Hanisch, National sozialistische Herrschaft in der Provinz. Salzburg im Dritten Reich, Salzburg, 1983, 52–71, for the vote in Austria; also Helmut Auerbach, ‘Volksstimmung und veröffentlichte Meinung’, in Knipping and Müller, 273–93, here 279. One example, cited by Auerbach (279 n.33), of ballot-rigging was the case in the Konstanz area where thirty-two voting slips containing ‘Nein’ votes had been counted as ‘Ja’. (See Jörg Schadt (ed.), Verfolgung und Widerstand unter dem Nationalsozialismus in Baden. Die Lageberichte der Gestapo und des Generalstaatsanwalts Karlsruhe 1933–1940, Stuttgart, 1976, 270.)
153. Tb Irving, 123 (20 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 110.
154. Papen, 438.
155. Botz, Wien, 57.
156. Gerhard Botz, ‘Die Ausgliederung der Juden aus der Gesellschaft. Das Ende des Wiener Judentums unter der NS-Herrschaft (1938–1943)’, in Gerhard Botz, Ivar Oxaal, and Michael Pollak (eds.), Eine zerstörte Kultur. Judisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, Buchloe, 1990, 285–312, here 289–90; Gedye, 307–9.
157. Gedye, 295.
158. Carl Zuckmayer, Als wärs ein Stück von mir. Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main (1966), 1971, 61.
159. George Clare, Last Waltz in Vienna. The Destruction of a Family, 1842–1941, Pan Books edn, London, 1982, 177–8.
160. Botz, Wien, 55; Gedye, 300–302; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 160–61.
161. Gedye, 305, 307, 313.
162. See Hans Safrian, Eichmann und seine Gehilfen, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, ch.1, especially 36ff.; Wildt, 52–4.
163. Janßen/Tobias, 190–94, quotation 194.
164. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’. 130–31; and see Auerbach in Knipping and Müller, 278.
165. See Karl Stadler, Österreich 1938–1945 im Spiegel der NS-Akten, Vienna/Munich, 1966, ch.2; Botz, Wien, 355–64, 475–82; Tim Kirk, Nazism and the Working Class in Austria. Industrial Unrest and Political Dissent in the National Community, Cambridge, 1996, ch.2.
166. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 124–32.
167. The German minority had indeed suffered some forms of economic and bureaucratic discrimination at the hands of the Czechs, though seldom of a serious nature before the Nazi takeover of power in Germany had given a new edge to ethnic tensions — mainly stirred up by the Sudeten Germans. Even then, Nazi propaganda within and outside the Sudetenland contrived to exaggerate the alleged maltreatment of the German population. See Ronald M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem 1933–1938. Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy, Folkestone, 1975, 8–9, 214ff.; and, especially, the contemporary observations on the nature and degree of the discrimination against the German minority — described as ‘easily the most privileged in the whole of Europe’ — in Gedye, 396: ‘At no time politically persecuted, always arrogantly conscious of the backing of Germany’s sixty-six millions, its real grounds of complaint were limited to certain economic disabilities — which were in part politically necessary because of German disloyalty to the Republic — and to petty officiousness practised by some of the local Czech officials… Their minor grievances had been continually exaggerated, inflated, and trumpeted abroad by the German propaganda machine because they were an instrument to forward the German plans for hegemony in Eastern Europe.’
168. Helmut Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940, ed. Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch, Stuttgart, 1970, 111–12 (4 September 1938).
169. Wiedemann, 171.
170. IMG, xxxiv.732–47, Doc.175–C.
171. IMG, xxxiv.745–7. See also ADAP, D, VII, 547ff The term ‘living space’ was not understood by Beck and the army leadership in the same way that Hitler deployed it. But the vagueness of the concept meant such dangerous overlaps were possible. See Müller, Heer, 250 and n.215.
172. See Timothy W. Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft. Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939, Opladen, 1975, ch.XII.
173. Müller, Beck, 521; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘The Structure and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition in Germany up to 1940’, in H. W. Koch (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich, London, 1985, 132–78, here 159.
174. See Kube, Ch.VII.
175. See Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the Bitter End, Cambridge, Mass., 1947, 275–326; Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten… Die Wilhelmstraße in Frieden und Krieg. Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und Eindrücke 1918–1945, Stuttgart, 1950, 232–57; Müller, in Koch, Aspects, 156ff.; Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler. An Assessment, London, 1970, 56–63; and, especially, Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War, Minneapolis, 1968, ch.1; and Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand-Staatsstreich-Attentat. Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, (1969), 4th edn, Munich/Zurich, 1985, ch.IV.
176. For Beck, see above all Müller, Beck, ch.6. Müller’s interpretation of Beck gave rise to strong criticism from Peter Hoffmann, ‘Generaloberst Ludwig Becks militärpolitisches Denken’, HZ, 234 (1982), 101–21, who saw in Müller’s treatment an undue emphasis on opportunism at the expense of stress on ethical motivation; and a sharp riposte from Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘Militärpolitik nicht Militäropposition!’, HZ, 235 (1982), 355–71. For Canaris, see Heinz Höhne, Canaris — Patriot im Zwielicht, Munich, 1976.
177. On Weizsäcker, see Rainer A. Blasius, Für Großdeutschland — gegen den großen Krieg. Staatssekretär Ernst Freiherr von Weizsäcker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39, Cologne/Vienna, 1981; and Rainer A. Blasius, ‘Weizsäcker kontra Ribbentrop: “München” statt des großen Krieges’, in Knipping and Müller, 93–118. As with Beck, Weizsäcker’s motives have been differently interpreted. Leonidas E. Hill, the editor of Weizsäcker’s papers, underlines the State Secretary’s emphasis on a peaceful evolution to Germany’s position as a world power (Leonidas E. Hill, ‘Alternative Politik des Auswärtigen Amtes bis zum 1. September 1939’, in Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Wider stand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich/Zurich, 1985, 664–90, here 669–78). Blasius, in contrast, stresses Weizsäcker’s affinity with Hitler’s expansionist aims, though growing opposition to a war which he is certain will bring catastrophe on Germany.
178. See Ritter, ch.10; Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler. The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938–1945, Oxford, 1992, 86–101; Patricia Meehan, The Unnecessary War. Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler, London, 1992, 86–7, 102–3, 122ff.
179. A term used by the Regierungspräsident of Niederbayern and the Oberpfalz in his report of 8 September 1938, GStA, MA 106673. The SD’s annual report for 1938 also spoke of a ‘war psychosis’ (Meldungen aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938–45, 17 vols, ed. Heinz Boberach, Herrsching, 1984 (=MadR), ii.72–3).
180. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’ 132–9; and Auerbach, in Knipping and Müller, 28off.
181. Bloch, 175.
182. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 136; ADAP, D, II, No. 374, 473; Blasius, in Knipping, 101.
183. Henderson thought another crisis like that on 21 May would push him over the edge (DBFP, Series 3, II, Appendix 1, 649, 651, 653, and Doc.823, 284).
184. Tb Irving, 123 (20 March 1938).
185. IMG, xxviii.372.
186. Weinberg II, 318; see also 366–70; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘The May Crisis, 1938’, JMH, 29 (1957), 213–25, especially 225; and Donald Cameron Watt, ‘Hitler’s visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis: A Study in Hitler’s Response to External Stimuli’, JCH, 9 (1974), 23–32 (and Weinberg’s criticism of Watt’s interpretation, in Weinberg II, 366 n.210).
187. See, for this term — derived from the analysis of Nazi rule by Franz Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, London, 1942 (see his comments on 296, 382–3) — Peter Hüttenberger, ‘Nationalsozialistische Polykratie’, GG, 2 (1976), 417–42.
188. Müller, Heer, 327; Müller, Beck, 350–51.
189. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1933–1945, Paderborn, 1979, 43–4.
190. Even reports from oppositional sources made plain that, while opinion was divided on the likelihood and the outcome of war, extensive nazified sections of the population remained firmly behind Hitler. (See DBS, v.684–90, report for July 1938, drawn up on 24 August 1938.)
191. Weinberg II, 328, 363–4.
192. Weinberg II, 341, 352ff.
193. Weinberg II, 322–3.
194. Weinberg II, 343.
195. Weinberg II, 348; quotation from Lord Halifax to Henderson, 19 March 1938.
196. Weinberg II, 325. For the exaggeration of grievances in German propaganda, see Gedye, 396.
197. Tb Irving, 91 (7 March 1938); and see Irving, Goebbels, 242.
198. Weinberg II, 334.
199. IMG, xxviii.372. The British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had himself ‘likened Germany to a boa constrictor that had eaten a good meal and was trying to digest the meal before taking anything else’ (cit. Weinberg II, 302).
200. ADAP, D, II, 157, No.106; and see Smelser, 217ff
201. DGFP, D, II, 242, N0.135.
202. DGFP, D, II, 198, N0.197; Weinberg II, 335.
203. Weinberg II, 321; and see Michels, 382, for Goebbels’s propaganda during the Sudeten crisis.
204. See his views as recorded in Hoßbach’s memorandum of the meeting on 5 November 1937 (DGFP, D, I, 29–39, especially 32–4, No.19; Weinberg II, 317, 336).
205. See Hitler’s ‘Denkschrift zur Frage unserer Festungsanlagen’ of 1 July 1938 in Otto-Wilhelm Förster, Das Befestigungswesen, Neckargemünd, 1960, Anlage 13, 123–48; also John D. Heyl, ‘The Construction of the Westwall, 1938: An Exemplar for National Socialist Policymaking’, Central European History, 14 (1981), 63–78; and Weinberg II, 318.
206. See Weinberg II, 337.
207. Keitel, 182. Keitel dates the meeting to 20 April. But for the correct date of 21 April see IMG, xxv.415–18, Doc.388–PS; Domarus, 851 (and 851–2 for Schmundt’s notes); and Weinberg II, 337–8 and n.91.
208. Domarus, 851–2; Weinberg II, 338.
209. Keitel, 183; DGFP, D, II.300–303, here 300, No.175.
210. Müller, Beck, 510 (full text pp.502–12); Müller, Heer, 301ff.
211. Keitel, 184; Müller, Heer, 305.
212. Keitel, 184–5; Below, 105–6; Weinberg II, 318, 371; and see Franz W. Seidler, Fritz Todt. Baumeister des Dritten Reiches, Munich, 1986, ch.4. I am grateful to Steven F. Sage for sharing some insights into Todt and his work, which will be re-evaluated in his forthcoming study, and letting me see an unpublished paper he had compiled on Todt. The army’s planning for the Westwall had looked to the construction of large, well-provisioned underground fortresses mirroring the French Maginot Line. This clashed with Hitler’s conception of a far greater number of relatively simple fortified gun-sites and anti-tank structures, aimed heavily at deterrent effect. (See Heyl, 64–5.)
213. See Below, 106.
214. Monologe, 344 (16 August 1942).
215. Schmidt, 390; Bloch, 181.
216. Ciano, Tagebücher 1937/1938, 156–9 (entries for 3–9 May 1938); Eugen Dollmann, Dolmetscher der Diktatoren, Bayreuth, 1963, 37–8; Wiedemann, 140.
217. Schmidt, 392–3; Wiedemann, 141–2; Ciano, Tagebücher, 156, note. There are minor discrepancies between the reliable description of Schmidt and that of Wiedemann (who does not mention the performance of Aïda, and has Hitler inspecting a Nazi formation following a glittering dinner attended not by the King, but by the Crown Prince).
218. Bloch, 181.
219. Ciano, Tagebücher, 157 (entry for 6 May 1938); Bloch, 182; see also Schmidt, 394.
220. Domarus, 861; and see Schmidt, 394–5.
221. DGFP, D, I, 1108–10, No.761–2; Weinberg II, 340.
222. DGFP, D, I, 1110, No.762; Weinberg II, 309.
223. Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Pol.2a 1 (6936), Bd.16, Deutsch-italienische pol. Beziehungen, Jan.-Sept. 1938. (‘Was sudetendeutsche Frage anlangt, so ergaben Unterhaltungen ohne weiteres, daß Italiener für unsere Anteilnahme am sudetendeutschen Schicksal Verständnis haben.’)
224. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 127–8.
225. See the accounts in Bloch, 183–5; Weinberg II, 367–9; Weinberg, ‘May Crisis’, and Watt, ‘Hitler’s Visit to Rome’.
226. Boris Celovsky, Das Münchener Abkommen 1938, Stuttgart, 1958, 209 and n.2.
227. Schmidt, 395–6.
228. DBFP, Ser.3,1, 332–3, 341, Nos.250, 264.
229. DGFP, D, II, 315–17, No.186.
230. Bloch,185.
231. Bloch, 185; Weinberg II, 369.
232. IMG, xxviii.372. For the suggestion that the timing of Hitler’s order of 30 May was not caused by the May Crisis, but rested on his deliberations of 20 April, see Weinberg II, 366, and 337 n.87, and 370 n.219, for the dating of Jodl’s diary entry to June-July.
233. Keitel, 185 (on Hitler’s return to Berlin; he brings it in direct relation with new directions for ‘Green’). See also Hitler’s public statements, indicating his response to the ‘Czech provocation’, in speeches on 12 September 1938 and 30 January 1939 (Domarus, 868–9).
234. Wilhelm Treue (ed.), ‘Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse (10. November 1938)’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 175–91, here 183.
235. Wiedemann, 126; Dülffer, Marine, Düsseldorf, 1973, 466.
236. Dülffer, Marine, 471–4. Hitler demanded the building of six heavy battleships — the beginnings of the later Z-Plan — saying to Raeder that he needed a ‘risk fleet’ in order to reach terms with Great Britain (‘… daß er eine Risikoflotte haben müsse, ohne die es nicht zu einem Ausgleich mit England kommen werde’). (IfZ, ZS-41, Admiral a.D. Werner Fuchs, 16 December 1951, Fol.16.) Raeder was well aware in 1938 of the hopelessness (Aussichtslosigkeit) of a war at sea against the British Navy (BA/MA, PG/34566, Akten des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine, Großadmiral Erich Raeder, ‘Aus der Unterrichtung des Amtschefs A am 12.7.38…’) The navy leadership saw the six battleships as the minimum over the following six years for an eventual conflict with Britain which would involve, taking account of the British Empire and other nations, war against a third to a half of the entire world (BA/MA, PG 34566, Admiral Rolf Carls, ‘Stellungnahme zur “Entwurfstudie” Seekriegführung gegen England’, September 1938).
237. Wiedemann, 128.
238. NCA, i.520–51, Doc.PS-3037; Wiedemann, 127.
239. Müller, Beck, 512–20 (and also 29off.).
240. IMG, xxv.433–9, here 433–4, Doc.388-PS; DGFP, D, II, 358–64, here 358, No.221.
241. ADAP, D, II, 377–80 (quotation, 377), NO.282; DGFP, D, II, 473–7, here 473, NO.282.
242. Michael Geyer, ‘Restorative Elites, German Society, and the Nazi Pursuit of War’, in Richard Bessel (ed.), Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts, Cambridge, 1996, 134–64, here 163; see also Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (= DRZW), ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 6 vols. so far published, Stuttgart, i.644ff.
243. Müller, Beck, 521–37 (and 289–97).
244. Müller, Beck, 523–5.
245. Müller, Heer, 313.
246. Müller, Heer, 313–14. See Janßen/Tobias, 206–19, for the inaccuracy of the rumours that Brauchitsch had been ‘bought’ by Hitler through a sizeable bribe to assist in the costs incurred through divorcing his wife in order to remarry. Brauchitsch’s subservience to Hitler was not purchased; it came naturally.
247. Müller, Heer, 314.
248. Müller, Armee, Dok.115, S.259–61 (Halder’s report on Hitler’s speech); Below, 103–5; Janßen/Tobias, 237ff.; Weinberg II, 385; Müller, Beck, 297; Müller, Heer, 315; IfZ, ED 1, Fol.416–17, ‘Personliche Erlebnisse des Generals d.Inf. a.D. Curt Liebmann in den Jahren 1938/39’ (compiled in November 1939).
249. Janßen/Tobias, 240.
250. Müller, Beck, 298–300.
251. Müller, Beck, 300–301 (and n.88 for a date after 16 June for the concluding discussion).
252. Müller, Beck, 307–8, 537–62. Beck imagined Brauchitsch issuing Hitler in the second half of September with a collective protest of the top military leadership and refusal to collaborate in a war against Czechoslovakia (Müller, Beck, 558). See also Müller, Heer, 315–33.
253. Müller, Beck, 552.
254. Müller, Heer, 333–5 and n.138, 337; Müller, Beck, 542–50, for the text of Beck’s memorandum of 16 July 1938. See also the account of the meeting (misdated to 3 August 1938) in General Liebmann’s memoirs, IfZ, ED 1, Fol.418.
255. Müller, Heer, 335–7.
256. Müller, Heer, 337.
257. Below, 112.
258. Below, 113.
259. Anton Hoch and Hermann Weiß, ‘Die Erinnerungen des Generalobersten Wilhelm Adam’, in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Miscellanea: Festschrift für Helmut Krausnick zum 75. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, 1980, 32–62, here 54. Adam’s account is to be preferred to one in which Hitler’s fury was directed at Beck’s criticism of the Westwall (Müller, Heer, 338).
260. Below, 113.
261. IfZ, ED 1, Liebmann Memoirs, Fol.417–18; Müller, Heer, 339; Keitel, 186–7; Below, 115.
262. Müller, Heer, 339.
263. Müller, Heer, 333, 339–40; Müller, Beck, 310–11.
264. Müller, Heer, 340; Müller, Beck, 557.
265. Müller, Beck, 311, 580.
266. See Müller, Beck, 311. For extensive analysis of Beck’s position and radicalization during the summer of 1938, see Müller, Heer, ch.7.
267. Klemperer, 96–101; Meehan, 141ff.
268. Kube, 269.
269. Weinberg II,383 and n.18.
270. Wiedemann, 166; Müller, Beck, 557, 559; Bloch, 188–9; Weinberg II, 383.
271. Wiedemann, 166, 235–6; Bloch, 188–9; Weinberg II,383.
272. TWC, xii.798–9. Hitler and Göring had told naval chiefs much the same in July (BA/MA, PG/34566, Akten des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine, Großadmiral Erich Raeder, ‘Aus der Unterrichtung des Amtschefs A am 12.7.38…’).
273. Ernst von Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, Munich/Leipzig/Freiburg i.Br., 1950, 192 (and for his quoted words, 165).
274. Cit. Blasius in Knipping and Müller, 118.
275. Irving, Führer, 118–19 (with examples, but no sources). See also Broszat, Staat Hitlers, 418.
276. Below, 112, 114–15.
277. TBJG, I/6, 49 (19 August 1938).
278. Cit. Irving, Führer, 127.
279. Text in Förster, Befestigungswesen, 123–48, here especially 132, 137, 143; and see Keitel, 185–6, for Hitler’s intended fortifications on the Westwall.
280. Irving, Führer, 128; Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 106, 556, 667, 849.
281. Hoch and Weiß, 55.
282. TBJG, I/6, 59 (26 August 1938).
283. TBJG, I/6, 61–2 (28 August 1938).
284. TBJG, I/6, 63 (30 August 1938).
285. TBJG, I/6, 68 (1 September 1938).
286. Müller, Beck, 538–9, 544–5, 561.
287. Shirer, 102.
288. TBJG, I/6, 65 (31 August 1938), 68 (1 September 1938).
289. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 133ff.; Auerbach in Knipping and Müller, 282–3.
290. BA/MA, RW19/41, WWI VII (Munich, 9 September 1938).
291. Groscurth, 105 n.29; Smelser, 231–2.
292. Bloch, 191; Weinberg II, 421, 428; Klemperer, 101ff.; Meehan, 149ff.
293. DBFP, Ser.3, II, 195–6, No.727 (and see also 220–21, No.752).
294. Weinberg II, 418–20; Smelser, 235.
295. Smelser, 235.
296. Smelser, 236–7.
297. Groscurth, 104 and n.26.
298. Groscurth, 111.
299. Groscurth, 104.
300. Groscurth, 107.
301. Groscurth, 112.
302. Groscurth, 112 and n.62; Smelser, 234–5.
303. DGFP, D/II, 686–7, NO.424; and see Bloch, 191.
304. Groscurth, 113–15.
305. Groscurth, 109.
306. Groscurth, 107.
307. Groscurth, 109.
308. Groscurth, 112.
309. Cit. Weinberg II, 423 n.195.
310. Domarus, 900–905 (especially 904–5); Shirer, 104–5 for reactions.
311. Schmidt, 401.
312. Shirer, 104–5.
313. At a meeting with his military leaders at Nuremberg on September 9–10, the target day was confirmed as that stated in Plan Green (1 October) (DGFP, D, II, 727–30, NO.448 (notes of Schmundt); Smelser, 238).
314. Smelser, 237.
315. Weinberg II, 426–9.
316. TBJG, I/6, 91 (15 September 1938); Groscurth, 118.
317. Schmidt, 401; Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, London, 1946, 364.
318. He confessed to ‘some slight sinking when I found myself flying over London and looking down thousands of feet at the houses below’, but he was soon enjoying ‘the marvellous spectacle of ranges of glittering white cumulus clouds stretching away to the horizon below me’, before experiencing ‘more nervous moments when we circled down over the aerodrome’ in Munich after passing through some turbulence when ‘the aeroplane rocked and bumped like a ship in a sea’. (Birmingham University Library, Chamberlain Collection, NC 18/1/1069, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister Ida, 19 September 1938.)
319. Birmingham University Library, Chamberlain Collection, NC 18/1/1069, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister Ida, 19 September 1938.
320. Schmidt, 401–7; DGFP, D, II, 787–98, No.487; DBFP, Ser.3, II, 342–51, No.896. According to Chamberlain’s notes of the meeting (DBFP, Ser.3, II, 338–41, No.895, here 340), his reply to Hitler had been: ‘If the Führer is determined to settle this matter by force without even waiting for a discussion between ourselves to take place, what did he let me come here for? I have wasted my time.’
321. Schmidt, 406, blames it on Ribbentrop. As Weinberg II points out, however, 433 and n.235, it appears that Ribbentrop was acting on Hitler’s orders. See DGFP, D, II, 830–31, no.532.
322. Weinberg II, 433.
323. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 184.
324. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 143.
325. TBJG, I/6, 94 (17 September 1938); Below, 123. Keitel, 189, claimed that Hitler was not satisfied at the outcome. This assertion is left unsupported, and contradicts the impressions of Weizsäcker and Below.
326. Below, 123. Keitel’s own account — since he had been present at the Berghof, but not at the actual talks — must have drawn upon Hitler’s own description and diminished the role played by Chamberlain. Hitler, reported Keitel, had threatened the cancellation of the naval pact, at which Chamberlain had ‘collapsed’ (zusammengesackt). The Führer had added that he was ready for anything, and had twenty years’ advantage over the British Prime Minister. To spare Chamberlain the long journey to Berchtesgaden, he agreed to meet him in Godesberg. He was prepared to travel to London but would be exposed there to insults of the Jews. ‘There is a determination to march,’ Keitel concluded. (Groscurth, 120 and n.102–3.)
327. Weinberg II, 438.
328. Birmingham University Library, Chamberlain Collection, NC 18/1/1069, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister Ida, 19 September 1938.
329. Weinberg II, 437–44.
330. TBJG, I/6, 94 (17 September 1938).
331. TBJG, I/6, 99 (19 September 1938).
332. TBJG, I/6, 101 (20 September 1938).
333. TBJG, I/6, 98 (18 September 1938).
334. Groscurth, 120 and n.104; Weinberg II, 434.
335. See Goebbels’s report on Hitler’s thinking in TBJG, I/6, 113 (26 September 1938).
336. TBJG, I/6, 101 (20 September 1938), 103 (21 September 1938), 105 (22 September 1938).
337. TBJG, I/6, 103 (21 September 1938).
338. Schmidt, 407.
339. Shirer, 113. For references to Hitler as the ‘carpet-biter’ in the middle of the war, see Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 187.
340. Schmidt, 407–9.
341. Schmidt, 409–11.
342. Schmidt, 412.
343. TBJG, I/6, 105 (22 September 1938).
344. Schmidt, 412.
345. Schmidt, 413–14.
346. TBJG, I/6, 113 (26 September 1938).
347. See Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 184; Weizsäcker-Papiere, 143.
348. Below’s recollection differed somewhat. According to his later account, Hitler did not believe that the Czechs would fall into line with British and German demands. Therefore, he would continue with Plan Green, aimed at the occupation of the whole of Czechoslovakia. Hitler had told his military leaders that this would be his favourite solution. The talks with Chamberlain had confirmed his impression that Britain and France would not intervene militarily. (Below, 126.)
349. Weinberg II, 449.
350. Schmidt, 415; Henderson, 159; DBFP, Ser.3, II, 554–7 (quotation, 555), No.1118, where Kirkpatrick’s note reads: ‘If France and England decided to strike, let them strike. He did not care a farthing.’
351. Domarus, 933, has 20,000; Shirer, 116, has 15,000.
352. Shirer, 116.
353. TBJG, I/6, 116 (27 September 1938).
354. Domarus, 928.
355. Domarus, 930–32.
356. Domarus, 932 (and see also 927).
357. Domarus, 932.
358. Domarus, 932–3; Shirer, 116–17.
359. Henderson, 160; Schmidt, 416–17.
360. Henderson, 160; Schmidt, 417.
361. Schmidt, 416.
362. Henderson, 160–61; Groscurth, 125–6, n.130–31 (for Weizsäcker’s authorship); Schmidt, 417; Weinberg, II, 451 and n.294 for the timing of the decision to write to Chamberlain being taken before the military demonstration that afternoon; DGFP, D, II, 966–8, No.635; DBFP, Ser.3, II, 576–8, No.1144.
363. Henderson, 161.
364. Below, 127.
365. Shirer, 117; and see Wiedemann, 175–6.
366. TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).
367. Below, 127.
368. Schmidt, 417; Shirer, 117. See also Weizsäcker-Papiere, 145; Engel, 39–40; Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin. Ein deutscbes Tagebuch, Munich, 1962, 5–6; and Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen. Stimmung und Haltung der deutscben Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Düsseldorf/Vienna, 1970, 77–9.
369. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 170.
370. Groscurth, 125 (27 September 1938) and n.127.
371. Himmler, as Weizsäcker subsequently implied, also favoured war. (See Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen 191.) The growth of his SS empire was predicated upon German expansion. But his involvement in foreign-policy deliberations was minimal.
372. Groscurth, 128 (28 September 1938).
373. Kube, 273–5.
374. Neville Chamberlain, The Struggle for Peace, London, 1939, 275; Groscurth, 125 n.129.
375. Chamberlain, 299; Schmidt, 420.
376. Henderson, 162–3.
377. DBFP, Ser.3, II, 587, no.1159; Feiling, 372–3.
378. Henderson, 162.
379. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 186–7.
380. Henderson, 162–3.
381. Schmidt, 418.
382. Henderson, 163; TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).
383. André François-Poncet, Als Botschafter im Dritten Reich. Die Erinnerungen des französischen Botschafters in Berlin September 1931 bis Oktober 1938, Mainz/Berlin, 1980, 378; Schmidt, 418–19.
384. Schmidt, 420; Henderson, 164.
385. Schmidt, 420.
386. Henderson, 164.
387. TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).
388. Henderson, 164–6; DBFP, 3rd Ser., II. 597, No.1180; Weinberg II, 453–6 for the diplomatic background to Mussolini’s decision. Goebbels [TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938)] mistakenly remarks that the idea for the Four-Power Conference was Hitler’s.
389. Chips, 171; see also Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 1930–1964, New York, 1980, 138; Jones, 410–11; Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 109; Richard Lamb, The Ghosts of Peace, 1935–1945, Salisbury, 1987, 86. Chamberlain himself commented a few days later: ‘That the news of the deliverance should come to me in the very act of closing my speech in the House was a piece of drama that no work of fiction saw surpassed’ (University of Birmingham Library, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1070, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister, Hilda, 2 October 1938). The Labour and Liberal leaders were warm in their approval of Chamberlain’s decision to go to Munich, though they were aware that any settlement would mean the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. Conservative critics, including Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden were silent. Only one Member of Parliament — a Communist — protested. (Roy Douglas, ‘Chamberlain and Appeasement’, in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, London, 1983, 79–88, here 86–7.)
390. TBJG, I/6, 120 (29 September 1938).
391. Schmidt, 421. See Celovsky, ch.10, especially 460ff., for a detailed account of the course of the conference and its results; also Keith Eubank, Munich, Norman, Oklahoma, 1963, 207–22.
392. University of Birmingham Library, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1070, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister, Hilda, 2 October 1938.
393. Description of the conference proceedings from Schmidt, 421–4. See also DBFP, 3rd Ser., 11, 630–5, No.1227; Henderson, 166–8. For the authorship of the proposal attributed to Mussolini, see Schmidt, 423, Weinberg II, 457; Kube, 273; and Blasius, Für Deutschland, 68.
394. Henderson, 166.
395. Schmidt, 421.
396. Schmidt, 424.
397. Henderson, 167.
398. TBJG, I/6, 122 (30 September 1938).
399. TBJG, I/6, 122 (1 October 1938).
400. Groscurth, 128 (29 September 1938) and n.142; Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 187–8; Schmidt, 425–6.
401. Schmidt, 425–6; see Below, 129 (a distorted account). Kube, 276 n.86; Michalka, Ribbentrop, 240 n.2; Josef Henke, England, 187–204, for Hitler’s negative reactions to Munich.
402. University of Birmingham Library, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1070, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister, Hilda, 2 October 1938.
403. Schmidt, 425; DBFP, 3rd Ser., 11, 635–50, No.1228.
404. See Henderson, 174–5.
405. IMG, xxvi.343, Doc.798-PS.
406. Kube, 275–8, 299ff.
407. Henke, England, 188.
408. According to Below, Hitler’s Wehrmacht adjutant Major Engel reported at the time that he had found Halder slumped across his desk when the announcement of the Munich Conference was made. Below was incredulous, since he was aware that Halder had been against mobilization, and only, he said, understood following the post-war revelations about his connections with a plot to depose Hitler how the Munich Agreement had pulled the rug from under his feet (Below, 130). For Halder’s connections with the emergent opposition to Hitler, and for his behaviour during the Sudeten crisis, see Hoffmann, 109–29; Christian Hartmann, Halder. Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942, Paderborn etc., 1991, 99–116; and also Gerd R. Ueberschär, Generaloberst Franz Halder. Generalstabschef, Gegner und Gefangener Hitlers, Göttingen, 1991, 33–4. On Munich and the failure of the coup plans, see Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 326; Klemperer, 109–10; and Hoffmann, 128–9. For the internal divisions of those opposed to war, and the coup plans, see Müller, in Koch, Aspects, 163–72.
409. University of Birmingham Library, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1070, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister, Hilda, 2 October 1938, where the euphoric scenes in the streets as he was driven from the aerodrome at Heston to Buckingham Palace, then in Downing Street, are described. See also The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945, ed. David Dilks, London, 1971, 111; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.1: The Gathering Storm, London etc., 1948, 286. For Chamberlain’s immediate regret at having used such a phrase while swept away by emotion on his return, see Nicolson, 140; Halifax, 198–9.
410. Manchester Guardian, 1 October 1938.
411. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 326; Müller, in Koch, Aspects, 171. See also Ritter, 204; Ulrich von Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher 1938–1944. Aufzeichnungen vom Andern Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, Berlin, 1988, 54–7.
412. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 138; Auerbach in Knipping and Müller, 284–6; Steinert, 79; Below, 129.
413. Treue, ‘Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse’, 182.
1. For the sphere of competence of the Party’s central office, see, especially, Peter Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter. Führung der Partei und Kontrolle des Staatsapparates durch den Stab Heß und die Partei-Kanzlei Bormann, Munich etc., 1992; and Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, vol.2, 1933–1945, Newton Abbot, 1973.
2. Bernd Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen-SS 1933–1945, Paderborn, 1982, 114–15.
3. See Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 188, 191.
4. Bradley F. Smith and Agnes F. Peterson (eds.), Heinrich Himmler. Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945. Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Vienna, 1974, 37 (speech to SS-Gruppenführern, 8 November 1938). See also Peter Padfield, Himmler. Reichsführer-SS, London, 1991, 238.
5. The term ‘Reichs kristallnacht’ was an ironic reference, alluding not simply to the amount of broken crystal-glass littering the streets in the centre of Berlin and other cities, but also to the obvious orchestration of the destruction from above, despite the propaganda line that there had been a spontaneous outburst of the people’s anger against the Jews (Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 35).
6. Fundamental studies are those of Helmut Genschel, Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten Reich, Göttingen, 1966; and Avraham Barkai, Vom Boykott zur ‘Entjudung’. Der wirtschaftliche Existenzkampf der Juden im Dritten Reich 1933–1943, Frankfurt am Main, 1987. See also Avraham Barkai, ‘Schicksalsjahr 1938’, in Walter H. Pehle (ed.), Der Judenpogrom 1938. Von der ‘Reichskristallnacht’ zum Völkermord, Frankfurt am Main, 1988, 94–117, 220–24; and Günter Plum, ‘Wirtschaft und Erwerbsleben’, in Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Die Juden in Deutschland 1933–1945. Leben unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft, Munich, 1988, 268–313.
7. Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 170.
8. Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 171–5.
9. IMG, xxvii, 163.
10. Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 171; Peter Hanke, Zur Geschichte der Juden in München zwischen 1933 und 1945, Munich, 1967, 204–5; Baruch Z. Ophir and Falk Wiesemann (eds.), Die jüdischen Gemeinden in Bayern 1918–1945. Geschichte und Zerstörung, Munich, 1979, 50.
11. Ophir and Wiesemann, 211; Fritz Nadler, Eine Stadt im Schatten Streichers, Nuremberg, 1969, 8–10, and Bild 2.
12. Gordon, 153.
13. Bankier, ‘Hitler’, 8.
14. Examples include pressure from Heß to include Mischlinge (part-Jews) in the discriminatory legislation, demands from the NS Lawyers’League (NS-Rechtswahrerbund) to exclude Jewish lawyers, and the successful complaint by the Reich Doctors’ Leader Gerhard Wagner to Hitler that Jewish doctors were still allowed to practise in Germany. (Adam, Judenpolitik 167–70; Bankier, ‘Hitler’, 15; Wildt, 45; Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 214–16.)
15. See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, (1961), Viewpoints edn, New York, 1973, 60ff.; Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy Toward German Jews, 1933–1939, Urbana/Chicago/London, 1970,160–64, 222–3; Barkai, ‘Schicksalsjahr’, 96–109; Barkai, Boykott, ch.3; Friedländer, 243; Harold James, ‘Die Deutsche Bank und die Diktatur’, in Lothar Gall et al., Die Deutsche Bank 1870–1995, Munich, 1995, pt.II, especially 347–51.
16. Michael H. Kater, Doctors under Hitler, Chapel Hill/London, 1989, 198–201; Barkai, Boykott, 133–4.
17. Victor Klemperer, Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten. Tagebücher 1933–1941, ed. Walter Nowojski and Hadwig Klemperer, (1995), 10th edn, Darmstadt, 1998, 415 (12 July 1938).
18. One poignant account, among the many, of the impact of the rapidly deteriorating conditions on a single family is that of Peter Gay, My German Question. Growing Up in Nazi Berlin, New Haven/London, 1998, here especially 119–23.
19. The role of denunciation in helping to enforce and drive on anti-Jewish policy has been examined by Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society. Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945, Oxford, 1990.
20. See especially, Wildt, 35ff., and Dok.9–32; also, the files relating to Eichmann’s Department II.112, in BA, R58/991–5; and Hachmeister, ch.V.
21. Tb Irving, 169–70 (23 April 1938).
22. See Magnus Brechtken, ‘Madagaskar für die Juden’. Antisemitische Idee und politische Praxis 1885–1945, Munich, 1997, especially chs.II–III.
23. According to the SD’s figures, some 370,000 Jews still remained in the ‘Old Reich’ territory on 1 January 1938 — almost three-quarters of the recorded figure in 1933. Taking account of an estimated 200–250,000 Jews who found themselves on German territory after the annexations of Austria and the Sudetenland, there were by late summer 1938 — even taking account of the forced emigration that year — probably more Jews in Nazi hands than there had been at the time of Hitler’s takeover of power (MadR, ii.21–2, 27–9).
24. Zionists had contacted Eichmann in February 1937 in the hope of encouraging more favourable arrangements for allowing Jews to emigrate to Palestine. Feivel Polkes, an emissary of the Haganah, a Jewish underground military organization, was authorized to come to Berlin and meet Eichmann for discussions about easing restrictions on the transfer of foreign currency in order to facilitate emigration. Polkes left empty-handed, but subsequently invited Eichmann to visit the Middle East. With his superior, Herbert Hagen, Eichmann left for Palestine in early November 1937. Unrest in Palestine prevented any meeting taking place there, but Eichmann and Hagen met Polkes again in Cairo. On his return, Eichmann reported negatively to Heydrich on Polkes’s proposals for subsidizing Jewish emigration to Palestine. By then, in any case, fears in the Nazi leadership of the dangers of helping erect a Jewish state in Palestine had grown rapidly. Hitler himself had intervened to order the suspension of negotiations for further transfer agreements between Germany and Palestine. (BA, R58/954, Fols.11–66 (Hagen’s report); Schleunes, 207–11; Jochen von Lang, Das Eichmann-Protokoll. Tonbandaufzeichnungen der israelischen Verhöre, Berlin, 1982, 31–5, 43–6; Wildt, 44. And see Francis R. Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question, Austin/London, 1985.)
25. Wildt, 44.
26. Wildt, 32–3.
27. Wildt, 33.
28. Wildt, 60.
29. TBJG, I/3, 490 (25 July 1938).
30. See Christian Gerlach, ‘Die Wannsee-Konferenz, das Schicksal der deutschen Juden und Hitlers politische Grundsatzentscheidung, alle Juden Europas zu ermorden’, Werkstattgeschichte, 18 (1997), 7–44, here 27.
31. Tb Irving, 214 (25 May 1938). Economics Minister Walther Funk was brought into the discussions by Goebbels.
32. Wildt, 55–6.
33. Tb Irving, 214 (25 May 1938), 253 (2 July 1938).
34. Goebbels stated in his diary again in late July that ‘the Führer approves how I am going about things (mein Vorgehen) in Berlin’ (Tb Irving, 268 (26 July 1938).
35. Wildt, 55–6.
36. TBJG, I/3, 463 (22 June 1938); Tb Irving, 246–7 and n.1; Wildt, 57.
37. Wildt, 55.
38. See Kulka, ‘Public Opinion’, xliv.
39. See Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 174.
40. Graml, Reich skristallnacht, 174; Barkai, Schicksalsjahr’, 101.
41. Wildt, 99; Kulka, ‘Public Opinion’, 274–5.
42. Graml, Reich skristallnacht, 9–12; Helmut Heiber, ‘Der Fall Grünspan’, VfZ, 5 (1957), 134–72, here 134–9; Rita Thalmann and Emmanuel Feinermann, Crystal Night: 9–10 November 1938, London, 1974, 26–42; Anthony Read and David Fisher, Kristallnacht. Unleashing the Holocaust, London, 1989, 1–6, 33–55; Lionel Kochan, Pogrom: 10 November 1938, London, 1957, 34–49. The deportation of the Polish Jews had been set in motion by the actions of the Polish government, banning the return of Polish Jews living abroad. See Sybil Milton, ‘The Expulsion of Polish Jews from Germany, October 1938 to July 1939: A Documentation’, LBYB, 29 (1984), 166–99; Sybil Milton, ‘Menschen zwischen Grenzen: Die Polenausweisung 1938’, Menora: Jahrbuch für deutsch-jüdische Geschichte 1990, 184–206; and H. G. Adler, Der verwaltete Mensch. Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland, Tübingen, 1974, 91–105. Grynszpan later successfully deployed the argument that he had had a homosexual relationship with vom Rath to prevent the show-trial which the Nazi regime had intended from taking place. See Heiber, ‘Der Fall Grünspan’, 148ff., demonstrating the implausibility of this as a genuine motive for the shooting. Hans-Jürgen Döscher, Reichskristallnacht. Die November-Pogrome 1938, Frankfurt am Main, 1988, 62–3, attempts to revive the argument that vom Rath’s killing did in fact arise from a homosexual relationship with Grynszpan, though this remains no more than speculation. Döscher’s case rests heavily upon the fact that the bar to which Grynszpan went to load his revolver on the morning of 7 November was known as a haunt of homosexuals, and that, when he went to the embassy, Grynszpan did not ask for the Ambassador, but for ‘a legation secretary’ to whom — vom Rath — he was ushered in with little prior formality. The ambassador at the time, Johannes Graf von Welczek, recalled after the war, however, returning from his morning walk and meeting Grynszpan outside the embassy, where Grynszpan, not knowing whom he was addressing, asked how he might see the Ambassador and was directed to the porter of the building (Heiber, ‘Der Fall Grünspan’, 134–5).
43. Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 13.
44. Hermann Graml, Der 9. November 1938. ‘Reichskristallnacht’, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung ‘Das Parlament’, No.45,11 November 1953, here 6th edn, Bonn, 1958 (Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst), 17–23; Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 12–16.
45. TBJG, I/6, 178 (9 November 1938); Tb Irving, 407 (9 November 1938).
46. TBJG, I/6, 180 (10 November 1938); Tb Irving, 409 (10 November 1938).
47. TBJG, I/6, 180 (10 November 1938); the alternative reading of the last word in Tb Irving, 409 (10 November 1938): ‘Now it’s good’ (‘Nun aber ist es gut’), can almost certainly be discounted, even if the text remains difficult to decipher at this point. Close comparison of the handwriting, especially in adjacent passages, gives ‘gar’ as the best reading. I am grateful to Elke Fröhlich for advice on this point.
48. IfZ, ZS-243, Bd.I (Heinrich Heim), Fol.27: statement of former SA-Gruppenführer Max Jüttner. See also Irving, Goebbels, 274.
49. Adam, Judenpolitik, 206; Domarus, 966ff. for the speech.
50. Uwe Dietrich Adam, ‘Wie spontan war der Pogrom?’, in Pehle 74–93, here 76. It seems highly unlikely, as often claimed, that Hitler heard of vom Rath’s death for the first time shortly before nine o’clock that evening during the meal at the Old Town Hall in Munich. Vom Rath had by then been dead for several hours. The Foreign Office had been informed of vom Rath’s imminent death already that morning. A telegram from Dr Brandt to Hitler, notifying him of vom Rath’s death at 4.30p.m., arrived in Berlin at 6.20p.m. It could be surmised (and would be supported by the testimony of Below that Hitler heard the news that afternoon) that the telegram followed a telephone communication. (See Below, 136.) The German News Agency (DNB) circulated the news to newspaper editors by 7.00p.m. (Ralf Georg Reuth, Goebbels, Munich, 1990, 395 — according to Irving, Goebbels, 273 and 612 n.22, though without supporting source, even as early as 5.00p.m.). The Foreign Office dispatched a telegram of sympathy to vom Rath’s father at 7.40p.m. The above chronology (except where otherwise stated) is taken from Hans-Jürgen Döscher, ‘Der Tod Ernst vom Raths und die Auslösung der Pogrome am 9. November 1938 — ein Nachwort zur “Reichskris-tallnacht”’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 41 (1990), 619–20. If indeed the stories are correct — see Adam, in Pehle, 77, 92 — that the telegram announcing vom Rath’s death was delivered to Hitler during the meal in the Old Town Hall as late as 8.45p.m., it can only, therefore, have been for effect. It seems in the light of this probable that some degree of pre-planning between Goebbels and Hitler took place between vom Rath’s shooting on 7 November and the discussion in the Old Town Hall prior to Goebbels’s speech on the night of 9 November. See Adam, in Pehle, 91–2; Döscher, ‘Der Tod Ernst vom Raths’, 620. See also Döscher, ‘Reichskristallnacht’, 79.
51. Below, 136.
52. IMG, xxxii.20–29 (Doc.3063-PS, Report of the Party Court, Feb.1939); IMG, xx.320–21 (Eberstein testimony); Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 17–18; Graml, Der 9. November 1938, 23ff.
53. TBJG, I/6, 180 (10 November 1938); Tb Irving, 409 (10 November 1938). According to the Party Court’s assessment of the pogrom and its aftermath, sent on 13 February 1939 to Göring, ‘the Führer had decided after his [Goebbels’s] account, that such demonstrations [as had occurred in the Gaue of Kurhessen and Magdeburg-Anhalt] were neither to be prepared nor organized by the Party. But if they arose spontaneously, they were not to be countered’ (IMG, xxxii.21).
54. TBJG, I/6, 180 (10 November 1938). Away from Munich, among Party leaders who had not been present at Goebbels’s speech, there were some initial attempts to ignore the encouragement to unleash pogroms. See IMG, xx.48–9, for the instructions — only partially obeyed — of Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann (Hamburg) to prevent the ‘action’ being carried out in his Gau. See also Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 24–6; Graml, Der 9. November 1938, 30–35; Irving, Goebbels, 612 n.33. Goebbels had not been content to have his message conveyed only by telephone. At 12.30 and 1.40a.m. on 10 November, he cabled Gau Propaganda Offices to ensure as much Party coordination as possible (IMG, xxxii.21–2; Graml, Der 9. November 1938, 27).
55. TBJG, I/6, 180 (10 November 1938); Tb Irving, 409 (10 November 1938). For the pogrom in Munich, see Hanke, 214ff.
56. According to a note dictated by Himmler at 3.00a.m. on 10 November (IMG, xxi.392), and the subsequent account of his chief adjutant, SS-Gruppenführer Karl Wolff (IfZ, ZS-317, Bd.II, Fol.28), Himmler was in Hitler’s apartment in Prinzregentenplatz at the time. Wolff said he had learned of the ‘action’ around 11.20p.m. — presumably at the same time as Heydrich — and had then immediately driven to Hitler’s private apartment. Heydrich was contacted at 11.15p.m. by Stapo Munich. He gave out a first order on the wearing of civilian clothing at 0.20a.m. (Adam, in Pehle, 77; Kurt Pätzold and Irene Runge, Kristallnacht. Zum Pogrom 1938, Cologne, 1988, 113–14).
57. IMG, xxi.392; IfZ, ZS-317, Bd.II, Fol.28.
58. Pätzold/Runge, 113–14.
59. IMG, xxxi. 516–18; Pätzold/Runge, 114–16; Adam, in Pehle, 77–9; Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 21, 33; Thalmann, 59–61.
60. IMG, xv, 377 (Doc.734-PS).
61. Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone. Geschichte der SA, Munich, 1989, 230–37; Pätzold/Runge, 112–13, 116–18.
62. Milton Mayer, They Thought they were Free. The Germans 1933–45, Chicago, 1955, 16–20.
63. Adam, in Pehle, 74–5.
64. Goebbels does not specify which synagogue it was. But Munich newspaper reports of the pogrom-night refer to the old synagogue in Herzog-Rudolf-Straße in flames. The interior of the synagogue for east-European Jews in Reichenbachstraße was also set on fire, but the building itself was not burnt down. The main synagogue in Herzog-Max-Straße had been demolished in the summer. See Wolfgang Benz, ‘Der Rückfall in die Barbarei. Bericht über den Pogrom’, in Pehle, 28; Hanke, 214; and Ophir and Wiesemann 50, 52.
65. The figure of 20–30,000 Jews to be arrested was mentioned in the instructions sent by telegram by Gestapo chief Heinrich Müller just before midnight (IMG, xxv.377). This was after Himmler and Hitler had met in the latter’s apartment in Prinzregentenplatz in Munich, when the SS leader had sought clarification of directions. These preliminary instructions, passed on by Himmler to Müller, were amplified only once the SS chief had returned from the midnight swearing-in of SS recruits. On his return, Himmler immediately saw Heydrich, who put out more elaborate instructions to the Gestapo by telegram at 1.20 a.m. (IMG, xxxi.516–18). The number of Jews was not specified in this later telegram. It was emphasized that, in particular, well-off and healthy male Jews were to be arrested and taken to concentration camps (Pätzold/Runge, 113–16).
66. TBJG, I/6, 180–81 (10 November 1938); Tb Irving, 409–10 (10 November 1938).
67. TBJG, I/6, 181 (10 November 1938); Tb Irving, 411 (10 November 1938).
68. Benz, in Pehle, 32. The ‘action’ nevertheless continued in various places until 13 November, when it eventually petered out. The ‘stop’ orders can be seen in Pätzold/Runge, 127–9.
69. TBJG, I/6, 182 (11 November 1938); Tb Irving, 411 (11 November 1938).
70. TBJG, I/6, 182 (11 November 1938); Tb Irving, 411 (11 November 1938).
71. See the description, one among many, in Gay, 132–6.
72. Pätzold/Runge, 136 (Heydrich’s report), but the figures are an underestimate (Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 32).
73. Günter Fellner, ‘Der Novemberpogrom in Westösterreich’, in Kurt Schmid and Robert Streibel (eds.), Der Pogrom 1938. Judenverfolgung in Österreich und Deutschland, Vienna, 1990, 34–41, here 39.
74. Elisabeth Klamper, ‘Der “Anschlußpogrom”’, in Schmid and Streibel, 25–33, here 31.
75. Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 32.
76. This is the compelling suggestion of Peter Loewenberg, ‘The Kristallnacht as a Public Degradation Ritual’, LBYB, 32 (1987), 309–23.
77. Monika Richarz (ed.), Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1918–1945, Stuttgart, 1982, 323–35. See also the testimony, along similar lines, provided in Loewenberg, 314.
78. See on this Loewenberg, especially 314, 321–3.
79. IMG, xxxii.27.
80. Wiener Library, London, PIId/15, 151, 749; Thomas Michel, Die Juden in Gaukönigshofenf/Unterfranken (1550–1942), Wiesbaden, 1988, 506–19.
81. See Walter Tausk, Breslauer Tagebuch 1933–1940, East Berlin, 1975, 181–2; Richarz, 326–7 (testimony of Hans Berger); Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 265.
82. Maschmann, Fazit, 58.
83. DBS, v.1204–5.
84. See Wiener Library, London, ‘Der 10. November 1938’ (typescript of collected short reports of persecuted Jews, compiled in 1939 and 1940); and see Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 265ff.
85. GStA, Munich, Reichsstatthalter 823, cit. in Ian Kershaw, ‘Antisemitismus und Volksmeinung. Reaktionen auf die Judenverfolgung’, in Martin Broszat and Elke Fröhlich (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit, Bd.II: Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt, Munich, 1979, 281–348, here 332.
86. StA Amberg, BA Amberg 2399, GS Hirschau, 23 November 1938, cit. Kershaw, ‘Antisemitismus und Volksmeinung’, 333. For reactions in general of the public to the pogrom and its aftermath, see: Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 263ff.; Ian Kershaw, ‘Indifferenz des Gewissens. Die deutsche Bevölkerung und die “Reichskristallnacht”’, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 11 (1988), 1319–30; Kulka, ‘Public Opinion’, xliii-iv, 277–86; David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution. Public Opinion under Nazism, Oxford, 1992, 85ff.; Hans Mommsen and Dieter Obst, ‘Die Reaktion der deutschen Bevölkerung auf die Verfolgung der Juden 1933–1943’, in Hans Mommsen and Susanne Willems (eds.), Herrschaftsalltag im Dritten Reich. Studien und Texte, Düsseldorf, 1988, 374–485, here 388ff.; William S. Allen, ‘Die deutsche Öffentlichkeit und die “Reichskristallnacht” — Konflikte zwischen Werthierarchie und Propaganda im Dritten Reich’, in Detlev Peukert and Jürgen Reulecke (eds.), Die Reihen fast geschlossen. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags unterm Nationalsozialismus, Wuppertal, 1981, 397–411.
87. IMG, xiii.131 (Funk testimony); Adam, in Pehle, 79–80; Adam, Judenpolitik, 208.
88. IMG, ix.312–13 (Göring testimony). Göring’s account has to be treated with care (despite being followed by Adam, Judenpolitik, 208, Read/Fisher, 146, Adam, in Pehle, 80, and other accounts). It was self-servingly unreliable and inaccurate, especially with regard to alleged meetings with Hitler and Goebbels in Berlin on the afternoon of 10 November. Göring claimed to have berated Hitler as soon as the Führer returned himself to Berlin, late on the morning of 10 November, about Goebbels’s irresponsibility. Hitler, Göring recalled, was equivocal. He ‘made some excuses, but agreed with me on the whole that these things should and could not happen’. This was consonant with Hitler’s continued attempts to distance himself from the events of the previous night. However, if the discussion between Göring and Hitler on 10 November took place at all, then it must have been by telephone. For, contrary to Göring’s recollection, Hitler did not return to Berlin that morning, but stayed in Munich and had lunch with Goebbels — TBJG, I/6,182 (11 November 1938). I am grateful to Karl Schleunes for alerting me to inconsistencies in Göring’s testimony.
89. IMG, ix.313–14; TBJG, I/6, 182 (11 November 1938) for the lunchtime meeting in the Osteria. For Hitler’s comments on the envisaged economic measures against Jews in the Four-Year-Plan Memorandum, see Treue, ‘Denkschrift’, VfZ, 3 (1955), 210; see also Barkai, ‘Schicksalsjahr’, in Pehle, 99.
90. Adam, Judenpolitik, 217.
91. Minutes of the meeting: IMG, xxviii.499–540 (Doc. 1816-PS); imposition of the ‘fine’, 537ff. An abbreviated version is printed in Pätzold/Runge, 142–6; summaries are given in Adam, Judenpolitik, 209–11; Read/Fisher, ch.9; Schleunes, 245–50; Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 177–9.
92. Pätzold-Runge, 146–8; see Adam, Judenpolitik, 209–12.
93. TBJG, I/6, 185 (13 November 1938).
94. Adam, Judenpolitik, 205; Reuth, Goebbels, 393–4; Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 176. For the affair, see Helmut Heiber, Joseph Goebbels, Berlin, 1962, 275–80. But Heiber goes too far in his speculation that this was a vital motive in Goebbels’s initiative in unleashing the pogrom.
95. Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 183.
96. Gay, ch.8.
97. Konrad Kwiet and Helmut Eschwege, Selbstbehauptung und Widerstand. Deutsche Juden im Kampf um Existenz und Menschenwürde 1933–1945, Hamburg, 1984, 143.
98. Gay, 140–41.
99. Bob Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany in the Netherlands, 1933–1940, Dordrecht, 1986, 87–8. See also Dan Michman, ‘Die jüdische Emigration und die niederländische Reaktion zwischen 1933 und 1940’, in Kathinka Dittrich and Hans Würzner (eds.), Die Niederlande und das deutsche Exil 1933–1940, Königstein/Ts., 1982, 73–90, especially 76, 89–90.
100. Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust. The Jewish Tragedy, London, 1986, 75.
101. Friedländer, 303–4.
102. IMG, xxxii.415 (D0C.3575-PS; summary of Göring’s address to the Reich Defence Council, 18 November 1938); in the longer extracts of the minutes, in Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 907–37, here 925—6, Göring says: ‘Gentlemen. The finances look very critical… Now, through the billion that the Jews have to pay, an improvement has taken place…’
103. Adam, Judenpolitik, 213–16.
104. Müller, Heer, 385–7.
105. Nicholas Reynolds, ‘Der Fritsch-Brief vom 11. Dezember 1938’, VfZ, 28 (1980), 358–71, here 362–3, 370.
106. JK, 89 (Doc.61).
107. Adam, Judenpolitik, 228; Wildt, 60.
108. Peter Longerich (ed.), Die Ermordung der europäischen Juden. Eine umfassende Dokumentation des Holocaust 1941–1945, Munich, 1989, 83.
109. Adam, Judenpolitik, 217–19.
110. Below, 136; IfZ, ZS-317, Bd.II, Fol.28 (Wolff); IfZ, ZS-243, Bd.I (for the comment of Hitler’s adjutant Brückner, that Hitler was said to have fallen into a rage when told of the burning of the synagogue in Munich). See also Irving, Goebbels, 277, 613 and David Irving, The War Path. Hitler’s Germany, 1933–9, London, 1978, 164–5, for Hitler’s alleged surprise at, or condemnation of, the events.
111. IMG, xxi.392.
112. Below, 136. Below’s account is very sympathetic to Hitler. Below thought Hitler knew nothing about what was going on. He also mentions Schaub’s remark that Goebbels somehow had his finger in the pie. This was something of an understatement. According to Goebbels’s own account, Schaub had been in his element when the pair of them had gone together after midnight to the Artists’ Club (TBJG, I/6, 181 (10 November 1938); Tb Irving, 410 (10 November 1938)). Below’s chronology is also inaccurate. He gives the impression that Hitler’s entourage heard of the destruction on their return from the midnight swearing-in of the SS recruits. But Hitler had been informed before he had set out for this (IMG, xxi.392; IfZ, ZS-317 (Wolff), Bd.II, Fol.28; Adam, in Pehle, 78).
113. Speer, Erinnerungen, 126.
114. Hans-Günther Seraphim (ed.), Das politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs 1934/35 und 1939/40, Munich, 1964, 81 (6 February 1939).
115. Müller, Heer, 385–6; Erich Raeder, Mein Leben, Tübingen, 2 vols., 1956–7, ii.133–4.
116. TBJG, I/6, 180 (10 November 1938); Tb Irving, 409 (10 November 1938).
117. IfZ, ZS-243, Bd.I (Heim), Fol.27 (statement by Jüttner); Irving, Goebbels, 274.
118. TBJG, I/6, 189–90 (17 November 1938); Tb Irving, 417 (17 November 1938). See also Irving, Goebbels, 282.
119. See, for a contrasting interpretation, Irving, Goebbels, 276–7. The post-war explanation of Heinrich Heim (a lawyer and civil servant employed in Hess’s office, later an adjutant of Martin Bormann, and commissioned by him to make notes of Hitler’s ‘table-talk’ monologues) was that Goebbels had regarded the casual remark by Hitler ‘that the demonstrators (for the time being only relatively harmless) should not be severely dealt with’ (‘dass man die Demonstranten (vorläufig nur relativ harmlose!) nicht scharf anpacken soll’), as a licence (Freibrief), and believed therefore that he was ‘certainly acting along the lines of what his master wanted’ (‘bestimmt im Sinne seines Herrn zu handeln’) (IfZ, ZS-243, Bd.I (Heim), Fol.29).
120. For Goebbels’s ‘anger’ at the burning of the Munich synagogue and other outrages in publicly berating his Gau Propaganda Leaders at the station in Munich on returning to Berlin, see IfZ, ZS-243, Bd.I (Heim), Fol.28 (post-war statement of Werner Naumann, later State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry); and see Irving, Goebbels, 280.
121. Domarus, 973; Treue, ‘Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse (10. November 1938)’, 175ff. Nor had Hitler given any indication, despite vom Rath’s perilous condition at the time and the menacing antisemitic climate, of any intended action when he had spoken to the ‘old guard’ of the Party at the Bürgerbräukeller on the evening of 8 November. Domarus, 966ff. for the speech. The point is made by Adam, Judenpolitik, 206.
122. Below, 137.
123. MK, 772; MK Watt, 620.
124. IMG, xxviii.538–9.
125. Das Schwarze Korps, 27 October 1938, p.6.
126. Das Schwarze Korps, 3 November 1938, p.2. And see Kochan, 39.
127. Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 185.
128. ADAP, D, IV, Dok.271, 293–5 (quotation, 293); Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 184; Adam, Judenpolitik, 234, n.4. Pirow had raised the possibility of an international loan to finance Jewish emigration and the notion of settling Jews in a former German colony such as Tanganyika — a proposal rejected out of hand by Hitler. See Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 182–3 (and n.4–5) for emigration as a policy, and 184–5 for the hostage notion. For the latter, see also the remarks of Hans Mommsen, ‘Die Realisierung des Utopischen: Die “Endlösung der Judenfrage” im “Dritten Reich”’, GG, 9 (1983), 381–420, here 396.
129. ADAP, D, IV, Dok.158, 170; Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 186; Adam, Judenpolitik, 235. It appears that his association of the Jews with the November Revolution of 1918 had also been reinforced at this time. Hitler referred vaguely to ‘threats from others’ to destroy the Reich in his annual speech to the party faithful on the anniversary of the proclamation of the Party Programme, on 24 February 1939, and immediately followed this by stating: ‘The year 1918 will never repeat itself in German history’ (Domarus, 1086). For Hitler’s ‘November Syndrome’, see Tim Mason, ‘The Legacy of 1918 for National Socialism’, in Anthony Nicholls and Erich Mathias, German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler, London, 1971, 215–39.
130. Birger Dahlerus, Der letzte Versuch. London-Berlin. Sommer 1939, Munich, 1948,126 (recording Hitler’s comment to him on 1 September 1939); Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3,1939, London, 1939, 129, no.75 (Hitler to Henderson, 28 August 1939); Domarus, 1238 (Hitler’s speech to his military leaders, 22 August 1939).
131. Das Schwarze Korps, 24 November 1938, p.1; also cit. in Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 187.
132. Hans Mommsen, ‘Hitler’s Reichstag Speech of 30 January 1939’, History and Memory, 9 (1997), 147–61, emphasizes above all (see especially 157–8) the propaganda component of the speech. He places the speech in its context of the talks between George Rublee, the American Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (charged by President Roosevelt with trying to find a way out of the crisis of Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany) and Helmut Wohltat, one of Göring’s close associates on the Four-Year Plan and on Jewish emigration. The negotiations were aimed at financing the emigration of 150,000 Jews within three years through an international loan of one and a half million Reich Marks. In Mommsen’s view (151), Hitler’s speech was ‘a rhetorical gesture designed to put pressure on the international community’ to accept the Reich’s blackmailing demand. He stresses (154) the need felt by Hitler ‘to promise effective measures on the part of the government in order to calm down the extreme antisemitic activities which endangered the emigration scheme that Göring and Schacht had worked out’. It seems doubtful, however, that Hitler was as serious about the Rublee-Wohltat scheme as Mommsen implies, and not altogether convincing to suggest (156) that it is ‘difficult to believe that [Hitler’s] inclination to exaggerate the issues involved was more than mere camouflage’.
133. Domarus, 1058.
134. Eberhard Jäckel, ‘Hitler und der Mord an europäischen Juden’, in Peter Märthesheimer and Ivo Frenzel (eds.), Im Kreuzfeuer: Der Fernsehfilm Holocaust. Eine Nation ist betroffen, Frankfurt am Main, 1979, 151–62, here 160–61.
1. Michael Jabara Carley, 1939: the Alliance that Never Was and the Coming of World War II, Chicago, 1999, 77–9.
2. Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939, London, (1989), Mandarin paperback edn, 1991, 101–4. Generally, on Oster’s role in the resistance to Hitler (though not mentioning this episode), see Romedio Galeazzo Reichsgraf von Thun-Hohenstein, Der Verschwörer. General Oster und die Militäropposition, Berlin, 1982.
3. Watt, How War Came, 40, 101, and see ch.6 passim.
4. John de Courcy, Searchlight on Europe, London, 1940, 87; Watt, How War Came, 59–64; Weinberg II, 474–8.
5. Courcy, 85–8.
6. Weinberg II, 476–8; Watt, How War Came, 64.
7. See also Weinberg II, 467–8.
8. Weinberg II, 479ff.; Watt, How War Came, 41.
9. Weinberg II, 481–3; Watt, How War Came, 65.
10. Watt, How War Came, 66. The Poles initially took the ideas to be Ribbentrop’s own. But it seems plain that the German Foreign Minister was acting as Hitler’s mouthpiece. See Joachim von Ribbentrop, Zwischen London und Moskau. Erinnerungen und letzte Aufzeichnungen, ed. Annelies von Ribbentrop, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1953, 154–5.
11. Weinberg II, 484, and see 503.
12. DGFP, D, V, 125, no.99, 141, no.110 (12 November 1938, 5 December 1938). The Polish foreign minister Josef Beck was, in fact, somewhat less intransigent at first than others in the Polish government, but there was little prospect from the outset of any flexibility on Danzig and the Corridor. (See Weinberg II, 501.)
13. Domarus, 1065.
14. Watt, How War Came, 69; DBFP, 3, IV, 80, no.82, Shepherd to Halifax, 6 February 1939. According to Shepherd’s memorandum, Hitler’s meeting with his military leaders had taken place on 21 January 1939.
15. Watt, How War Came, 70.
16. DGFP, D, IV, 529, N0.411.
17. See Dülffer, 471–88 and especially 492ff. for the genesis of the Z-Plan; DRZW, i.465–73; and Charles S. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era, London, 1990, 179–80. See Weinberg II, 503 for plans to settle with France and Great Britain before turning to the east, and Keitel, 196–7, for the ‘Ostwall’.
18. TBJG, I/6, 158 (24 October 1938).
19. Irving, Göring, 241.
20. Keitel, 196.
21. Keitel, 196–7.
22. In a memorandum of 3 September 1939 ‘on the outbreak of war’, Raeder wrote: ‘Today the war against England-France has broken out, which, according to previous comments of the Führer we did not need to reckon with before around 1944.’ He went on to outline the battle-fleet that would have been ready at the turn of the year 1944–5. He then added: ‘As far as the navy is concerned, it is obviously in autumn 1939 still nowhere near sufficiently ready for the great struggle against England.’ (‘Aw heutigen Tage ist der Krieg gegen England-Frankreich ausgebrochen, mit dem wir nach den bisherigen Ausserungen des Führers nicht vor etwa 1944 zu rechnen brauchten… Was die Kriegsmarine anbetrifft, so ist sie selbstverständlich im Herbst 1939 noch keineswegs für den grossen Kampf mit England hinreichend gerüstet.) (BA/MA, PG/33965; and see Thomas, 187). I am grateful to Prof. Meir Michaelis for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. For remarks on the inadequate state of the army at the outbreak of war, see IfZ, F34/1, ‘Erinnerungen von Nikolaus v. Vormann über die Zeit vom 22.8–27.9.1939 als Verbindungsoffizier des Heeres beim Führer und Obersten Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht’, Fol.56.
23. Martens, Göring, 169–70.
24. Watt, How War Came, ch.4; for divisions over policy towards Poland among Hitler’s entourage, 68. For Göring’s diminishing influence on the direction of foreign policy at this time, to the benefit of his arch-rival Ribbentrop, see Kube, 299ff.; and for Ribbentrop, Bloch, ch.XI.
25. In his comments to his armed forces’ leaders on 23 May 1939, Hitler, though by this time bent on destroying Poland in the near future, again indicated that the armaments programme would only be completed in 1943 or 1944, pointing to the West as the main enemy (DGFP, D, VI, 575–80, Doc.433; and see the retrospective comments of Raeder in his memorandum of 3 September 1939, BA/MA, PG/33965 (quoted above in note 22)).
26. See DRZW, i.349–68; and also Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, ‘Nationalsozialistische Großraumwirtsch-aft zwischen Utopie und Wirklichkeit — Zum Scheitern einer Konzeption 1938/39’, in Knipping and Müller, 223–45, especially 239ff., for the mounting problems in the economy and the collapse of prospects of an alternative economic strategy to the ideologically determined aim of acquiring ‘living space’.
27. R. J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford, 1994, 108–9, 196–7 (and 93ff. for the Reichswerke Hermann Göring); DRZW, i.323–31.
28. Tim Mason, Nazism, Fascism, and the Working Class. Essays by Tim Mason, ed. Jane Caplan, Cambridge, 1995, 109.
29. Göring’s speech (Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 908–33, Dok.152) gave an overview of the major problems facing the German economy in shortages of labour and raw materials, inefficient production, and precarious finances; quotation, 925.
30. TBJG, I/6, 219 (13 December 1938).
31. See the speech by Schacht of 29 November 1938: IMG, xxxvi.582–96, especially 587–8, D0C.611-EC.
32. IMG, xxxvi.365ff., Doc.EC-369. See Mason, Nazism, 108, for inflationary pressures building up by 1939. It would be important not to exaggerate their actual seriousness by that date. Even so, though stringent controls and repression had held inflation in check until then, the dangers in an increase in Reichsbank notes in circulation from 3.6 billion Reich Marks in 1933 to 5.4 in 1937, rising sharply to 8.2 billion in 1938 and 10.9 billion in 1939 were obvious. (Willi A. Boelcke, Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg, Paderborn etc., 1985, 32. See also Dietrich Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, Bd.I, 1939–1941, East Berlin, 1984, 30.)
33. Hjalmar Schacht, My First Seventy-Six Years, London, 1955, 392–4 (quotation, 392).
34. Mason, Nazism, 106–7.
35. See BA, R43II/194, 213b, for numerous complaints of Darré.
36. Mason, Nazism, 111; Timothy W. Mason, Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich. Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft, Opladen, 1977, 226ff.; J. E. Farquharson, The Plough and the Swastika. The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany, 1928–45, London/Beverly Hills, 1976, 196ff.; Gustavo Corni, Hitler and the Peasants, Agrarian Policy of the Third Reich, 1930–1939, New York/Oxford/Munich, 1990, ch. 10; Gustavo Corni and Horst Giest, Brot-Butter-Kanonen. Die Ernährungswirtschaft in Deutschland unter der Diktatur Hitlers, Berlin, 1997, 280–97; Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 55–61.
37. Mason, Nazism, 111. The investment in new farm machinery had indeed risen by 25.8 per cent during the first six years of Nazi rule, with a high point in 1938. But mechanization was progressing slowly in international comparison. Whereas there was a tractor for every 325 hectares of arable in Germany, the ratio was 1:95 in Great Britain and 1:85 in the USA and Canada. Two-thirds of German farmers still sowed their fields by hand; many used oxen and horses for ploughing. (Corni and Giest, 308.)
38. Corni and Giest, 286–7, 294; Corni, 227–9; Farquharson, 199–200.
39. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 286. Some 300,000 Polish prisoners-of-war were put to work on the land in Germany by the end of 1939, together with around 40,000 civilian workers (Ulrich Herbert, Fremdarbeiter. Politik und Praxis des ‘Ausländer-Einsatzes’ in der Kriegswirtschaft des Dritten Reiches, Berlin/Bonn, 1985, 68).
40. Mason, Sozialpolitik, 215–26; reports of the Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit for the last quarter of 1938 and first quarter of 1939, emphasizing the difficulties, are printed in Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 847–55, Dok.147, 942–59, Dok.156. Numerous reports from the Defence Districts, pointing out the problems in armaments manufacture, can be seen in BA/MA, RW 19/40, 54, 56.
41. See the analyses by Mason, Sozialpolitik, 241, 245, 295, 313ff. Tim Mason, ‘The Workers’ Opposition in Nazi Germany’, History Workshop Journal, 11 (1981), 120–37; Timothy W. Mason, ‘Die Bändigung der Arbeiterklasse im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland. Eine Einleitung’, in Carola Sachse et al., Angst, Belohnung, Zucht und Ordnung. Herrschaftsmechanismen im Nationalsozialismus, Opladen, 1982, 11—53; and also Michael Voges, ‘Klassenkampf in der “Betriebsgemeinschaft”. Die “Deutschland-Berichte” der Sopade (1934–40) als Quelle zum Widerstand der Industrie-Arbeiter im Dritten Reich’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 21 (1981), 329—84; and also Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 98–110. Even given the usual paranoia, Gestapo reports did not give the regime’s leaders the impression that the widespread discontent among industrial workers was being translated into any serious political threat from the Communist or Socialist underground resistance. See examples of reports in Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 856–7, Dok.148, 960–61, Dok.157; in BA, R58/446, 582, 584, 719; and in IML/ZPA, St3/64, St3/184, PSt3/153.
42. Mason, Nazism, 113.
43. The argument, advanced — in sophisticated fashion — by Mason in his various works, for economic determinants (within the regime’s ideological framework) shaping a social crisis and leaving Hitler with no alternative other than to risk war before Germany was ready for it, has encountered widespread criticism. See, particularly, Jost Dülffer, ‘Der Beginn des Krieges 1939: Hitler, die innere Krise und das Mächtesystem’, GG, 2 (1976), 443–70; Ludolf Herbst, ‘Die Krise des nationalsozialistischen Regimes am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges und die forcierte Aufrüstung. Eine Kritik’, VfZ, 26 (1978), 347–92; and Richard Overy, ‘Germany, “Domestic Crisis”, and War in 1939’, Past and Present, 116 (1987), 138–68. Mason, Nazism, ch.9, contains the author’s response.
44. Below, 138.
45. TBJG, I/6, 158 (24 October 1938).
46. Below, 138.
47. DGFP, D, IV, 99–100, N0.81; Keitel, 195–6.
48. See Weinberg II, 468–9.
49. TBJG, I/6, 296 (23 March 1939).
50. IMG, xii.580: ‘Der Kerl hat mir meinen Einzug nach Prag versiebt.’
51. Watt, How War Came, 142; Weinberg II, 469.
52. See, for example, the entry in TBJG, I/6, 113 (26 September 1938).
53. Courcy, 94–5.
54. See Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, Großdeutschland. Außenpolitik und Kriegsvorbereitung des Hitler-Regimes, Munich, 1987, 166–7; Watt, How War Came, 195.
55. Gedye, 371.
56. Courcy, 94–7. The economic motive was probably not in itself sufficient. But Weinberg II, 469, n.16, seems in danger of underestimating its importance.
57. Wendt, Großdeutschland, 166; Watt, How War Came, 195.
58. Weinberg II, 479.
59. Courcy, 92–3.
60. Below, 138.
61. Courcy, 85—9.
62. Irving, Goring, 240–42; Watt, How War Came, 142–3.
63. See Watt, How War Came, 143–7, for Slovakia.
64. Weinberg II, 485.
65. DGFP, D, V, 361–6, N0.272.
66. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 150. And see Jutta Sywottek, Mobilmachung für den totalen Krieg. Die propagandistische Vorbereitung der deutschen Bevölkerung auf den Zweiten Weltkrieg, Opladen, 1976, 187.
67. Watt, How War Came, 146.
68. ADAP, D, V, 127–32, Nr.119; Weinberg II, 497–8.
69. Weinberg II, 498. According to Below, it was following the failure of his visit to Warsaw that Ribbentrop began to contemplate a link with Russia to prevent Poland looking for support to Britain (Below, 146).
70. Weinberg II, 498–9 and n.140.
71. Watt, How War Came, 143; hinted at also in Weinberg II, 497–8.
72. BA, NS 11/28, Fols.55–62: quotations, Fol.58 (‘dass unser Deutschland, unser Deutsches Reich einmal die dominierende Macht Europas sein wird’); Fol.61 (‘den Geist unserer jetzigen Zeit, den Geist der Weltanschauung, die heute Deutschland beherrscht… ein zutiefst soldatischer Geist…); Fol.60 (‘Es ist mein unerschütterliche Wille, dass die deutsche Wehrmacht die stärkste Wehrmacht der ganzen Welt wird’).
73. Below, 144; Irving, Führer, 164; Irving, War Path, 1 73ff.
74. IfZ, F19/10, ‘Hitlers Rede vor dem Offiziersjahrgang 1938 am 25.1.1939 in der Reichskanzlei (geheim)’: ‘Und wenn dieser Aufbau — sagen wir — in 100 Jahren endgültig in sich gefestigt sein wird, und eine neue tragende Gesellschaftsschichte abgegeben haben wird, dann wird das Volk — das ist meine Überzeugung — das als erstes diesen Weg beschritt, die Anwartschaft besitzen, auf die Herrschaft Europas…’ (Fol.25, and see also esp. Fols.8–9, 15–16, 19, 24). A different copy of the text is in BA, NS 11/28, Fols. 63–85, quotations Fols. 68 (‘Prinzipien der demokratischen, parlamentarischen, pazifistischen, defätistischen Mentalititäf), 75 (‘Brutalität, d.h. das Schwert, wenn alle anderen Mittel versagen’), 84 (as above). See also Irving, Führer, 165.
75. BA, NS 11/28, Fols.86–119; quotations: Fols.114–15 (‘Verstehen Sie eines, meine Herren, die grossen Erfolge der letzten Zeit sind uns nur deswegen geworden, weil ich die Gelegenheiten wahrgenommen habe…’ ‘Ich habe mir vorgenommen, die deutsche Frage zu lösen, d.h. das deutsche Kaumproblem zu lösen. Nehmen Sie es zur Kenntnis, dass, solange ich lebe, dass dieser Gedanke mein ganzes Dasein beherrschen wird. Seien Sie weiter der Überzeugung, dass, sowie ich glaube, in irgendeinem Augenblick einen Schritt hiervorwärts zu kommen, dass ich dann augenblicklich immer handeln werde, dass ich dabei auch vor dem Äussersten nie zurückschrecken werde…’); Fol.119 (‘Seien Sie daher nicht überrascht, wenn auch in den kommenden Jahren bei jeder Gelegenheit irgendein deutsches Ziel zu erreichen versucht wird, und stellen Sie sich dann, bitte sehr, im gläubigsten Vertrauen hinter mich…’). See also, for summary notes of the speech, IfZ, ED 57, Irving-Sammlung, ‘Wiedergabe von Notizen einer Ansprache Hitlers an Offiziere der Wehrmacht am 10.2.1939’; brief extracts from the text are printed in Jost Dülffer, ‘Der Einfluß des Auslandes auf die nationalsozialistische Politik’, in Erhard Forndran, Frank Golczewski, and Dieter Riesenberger (eds.), Innen- und Außenpolitik unter nationalsozialistischer Bedrohung, Opladen, 1977, 295–313, here 304; Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Das Dritte Reich. Dokumente zur Innen- und Außenpolitik, Bd.1, Munich, 1985,267–8; and Irving, Führer, 165–6. See also Below, 145. In a fourth speech, to newly qualified officers, held on 11 March 1939 in Berlin, Hitler repeated themes of his speeches in January and February, including the need for ‘living space’, the heroism and racial value of the German people, the failure of its leadership in 1918, the qualities of the new state he had led since 1933, and the historical precedents for a master-race dominating an inferior people (BA, NS 11/28, Fols. 120–46).
76. TBJG, I/6, 247 (3 February 1939).
77. TBJG, I/6, 246 (1 February 1939).
78. Watt, How War Came, 147–9.
79. TBJG, I/6, 280 (11 March 1939); see also Irving, Goebbels, 288—9.
80. Below, 151; Irving, Göring, 244.
81. Keitel, 200.
82. TBJG, I/6, 283 (13 March 1939).
83. Below, 151; Irving, Goebbels, 290; Watt, How War Came, 152.
84. TBJG, I/6, 283–4 (13 March 1939).
85. TBJG, I/6, 285 (14 March 1939); DGFP, D, IV, 243–5, Doc.202.
86. Watt, How War Came, 150.
87. TBJG, I/6, 285–6 (14 March 1939, 15 March 1939).
88. Schmidt, 435; Watt, How War Came, 144, 152; Toland, 515.
89. TBJG, I/6,287 (15 March 1939); Keitel, 200. According to Keitel, Hácha’s arrival was announced to Hitler around 10.00p.m. He had only been expected in late evening (Below, 151), though photographs of the Czech President inspecting a guard of honour outside the station in Berlin in daylight suggest that he had actually arrived in the city no later than about 7.00p.m. (Domarus, 1093 n.263).
90. Keitel, 200. For Hitler’s relaxed attitude during the evening, see Below, 152.
91. Schmidt, 435–6.
92. DGFP, D, IV, 263–9, Doc. 228; Otto Meissner, Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler. Der Schicksalsweg des deutschen Volkes von 1918 bis 1945, wie ich ihn erlebte, Hamburg, 1950, 476; Keitel, 201; Schmidt, 437; Below, 150–53.
93. Keitel, 201.
94. Keitel (200–201) claimed Hácha had no knowledge. But, according to Schmidt, Hácha had been told by Mastny on arrival in Berlin that troops had crossed near Ostrau (Schmidt, 437); and Goebbels pointed out that the purpose of sending some troops into Czech territory was to exert further pressure on Hácha (TBJG, 286 (15 March 1939)).
95. Keitel, 201.
96. Irving, Göring, 245.
97. Schmidt, 438–9.
98. Schmidt, 439; DGFP, D, IV, 263–9, N0.228.
99. Schroeder, 88.
100. Below, 153; Keitel, 202; Domarus, 1097.
101. Schroeder, 88; Below, 153–4; Schneider, Nr.47, 21 November 1952, 8; TBJG, I/6, 293 (20 March 1939), where Goebbels noted that Hitler thought the people of Prague had ‘behaved quite neutrally’, and that more could not have been expected of them.
102. Schroeder, 88–9.
103. Reichsgesetzblatt (=RGBl) 1939,I, 485–8, quotation 485; Below, 154.
104. Below, 154.
105. TBJG, I/6, 293 (20 March 1939); Below, 155; Domarus, 1103.
106. See Below, 154, 156.
107. StA München, NSDAP 126, report of the Kreisleiter of Aichach, Upper Bavaria, 31 March 1939: ‘Die Menschen freuten sich über die großen Taten des Führers und blicken vertrauensvoll zu ihm auf. Die Nöte und Sorgen des Alltags sind aber so groß, daß bald wieder die Stimmung getrübt wird.’
108. Below, 156. Speer, 162, remarked on the depressed mood in Germany and the worries about the future. See also, for reactions to the latest coup, Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 139–40.
109. DBS, vi.279. Analysts at Sopade headquarters, by now moved from Prague to Paris, concluded that, in the light of Hitler’s broken promises and so many occasions in which to recognize the true essence of the Nazi regime, ‘If the world… allows itself to be deceived, then it alone is to blame… For this system, there is no right other than that of the stronger’ (DBS, vi.372–3).
110. Andreas-Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 32.
111. Eva Sternheim-Peters, Die Zeit der großen Täuschungen. Mädchenleben im Faschismus, Bielefeld, 1987, 361–2.
112. DBS, vi.278.
113. Chamberlain, Struggle, 413–20, quotation 418.
114. Courcy, 98.
115. Cit. Weinberg II, 542–3.
116. Weinberg II, 545–6.
117. DGFP, D, IV, 99–100, N0.81.
118. Domarus, 510–11, 1029, n.49a, 1109; Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 582; Watt, How War Came, 156.
119. See Weinberg II, 536.
120. Domarus, 1109, How War Came, 156–7.
121. TBJG, I/6, 296 (23 March 1939).
122. TBJG, I/6, 297 (23 March 1939); Domarus, 1109–10.
123. Domarus, 1110–14. There appears to be no evidence for the assertion by Watt, How War Came, 157, that Hitler came on land sea-sick from his stay on the Deutschland.
124. TBJG, I/6, 297 (23 March 1939).
125. TBJG, I/6, 296 (23 March 1939). Hitler had been taking it for granted for a few months that the former colonies would be returned to Germany (Weinberg II, 512–13). The issue was at best, however, of secondary importance to him, and his somewhat vague presumption was that the colonial question would be solved perhaps in the later 1940s when Germany was the master of the European continent and when the battle-fleet was ready (Klaus Hildebrand, Deutsche Außenpolitik 1933–1945. Kalkül oder Dogma?, Stuttgart etc., 1971, 78–9).
126. DGFP, D, VI, 70–72, No. 61.
127. DBFP, Ser. 3, IV, 463–4, No. 485.
128. Watt, How War Came, 158–9.
129. Below, 157; DGFP, D, VI, 117–19 (quotation, 117), No. 99. Hitler’s stance is not compatible with the post-war claim — on the basis of dubious evidence — that he had already decided upon the military occupation of Poland as early as 8 March, when he spoke to leaders of business, the Party, and the military (Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann (eds.), Anatomie des Krieges. Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des zweiten Weltkrieges, East Berlin, 1969, 204–5, Dok.88 (based on reports sent to President Roosevelt on 19 September 1939 by William Christian Bullitt, the United States Ambassador in Paris)).
130. TBJG, I/6, 300 (25 March 1939).
131. Domarus, 1115–16; Watt, How War Came, 160–61.
132. As in Domarus, 1116. Hitler was, however, displeased with Ribbentrop’s clumsy alienation of the Poles, which threatened to do just what he wanted to avoid and drive them into the arms of the British (Bloch, 220).
133. TBJG, I/6, 302 (28 March 1939).
134. Watt, How War Came, 160–61.
135. Weinberg II, 554–5.
136. DBFP, Ser.3, IV, 553, No.582. For the background, and the shifts in the British stance towards Germany in spring 1939, though inclined to interpret them as a continuation by other means of existing policy (as Chamberlain himself saw it), aimed at preserving the status quo in Eastern Europe and maintaining Britain’s status as a world power, rather than a change of direction, see Simon Newman, March 1939: the British Guarantee to Poland. A Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy, Oxford, 1976, stressing the role of Halifax in urging the Guarantee on Chamberlain. For greater emphasis upon the Guarantee as a decisive turning-point, if not intended as such, in British policy, see A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (1961), Penguin edn, Harmondsworth, 1964, 253. It is tempting to agree with P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, London, 1986, 252–5, that the simplest explanation for the Guarantee is probably the best: Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia had sharply altered opinion in Britain, including Chamberlain’s own. There had to be a significant shift in policy. Chamberlain now fully realized the extent to which he had been duped; how the Munich Agreement, which he regarded as his own achievement, had been no more than a major deception. A balanced assessment of Chamberlain’s attempts to appease then deter Hitler in 1938–9 can be found in R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement. British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, London, 1993, here especially 204ff.
137. Domarus, 1128–9. The communiqué of the meeting between Chamberlain and Beck on 5 April 1939 is in DBFP, Ser.3, V, 35, No. 10 (and see 50, No. 17 n.2, referring to the text of the speech in Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, House of Commons, vol.345, Cols.2996–9). For the firm resolution and false optimism in Warsaw that followed the announcement, see Shirer, 131. British guarantees for Romania, Greece, and Turkey and the beginning of serious negotiations with the Soviets followed (Watt, How War Came, 193; see also Weinberg II, 556).
138. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 1946, vol.2, 127: ‘Denen werde ich einen Teufelstrank brauen.’ Gisevius was reporting what he had been told by Admiral Canaris, present when Hitler made the remark.
139. Goebbels anticipated Hitler’s response: ‘So Beck has fallen after all into the Lords’ trap. Poland will perhaps some day have to pay a high price for that.’ — TBJG, I/6, 313 (10 April 1939).
140. See Dirks/Janßen, 83–4.
141. Domarus, 1119–27, especially 1120, 1125. The speech was not allowed to be transmitted live, presumably to allow the text to be edited if need be (which it was not). The orders, allegedly from Hitler himself, preventing a live broadcast were issued at such short notice that they came through to William Shirer only after Hitler had already begun to speak. The abrupt end to the broadcast of the speech, and its replacement by music, led to immediate queries from New York about whether Hitler had been assassinated (Shirer, 130).
142. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–45, (1962), Presidio paperback edn, Novato, n.d. (1964), 19–20. For the text: Walther Hubatsch (ed.), Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, (1962), Munich, 1965, 19–22 (=Weisungen); and see Müller, Heer, 390–92.
143. Domarus, 1130; Below, 159.
144. DGFP, D, VI, 223–8, Doc.185; Domarus, 1131–3. Weisungen, 22; IMG, xxxiv. 388–91, Doc.120-C (‘Fall-Weiß’), 429–42, Doc.126-C.
145. Weisungen, 22.
146. Hoffmann, 122.
147. Though Poland was aiming to modernize its armed forces, its defence budget in the years 1935–9 amounted to no more than 10 per cent of that of the Luftwaffe alone for the single year of 1939. Andrzej Suchcitz, ‘Poland’s Defence Preparations in 1939’, in Peter D. Stachura (ed.), Poland between the Wars, 1918–1939, London, 1998, 109–36, here 110.)
148. Christian Hartmann and Sergej Slutsch, ‘Franz Halder und die Kriegsvorbereitungen im Frühjahr 1939. Eine Ansprache des Generalstabschefs des Heeres’, VfZ, 45 (1997), 467–95, quotations 480, 482–3, 488–90, 495; for the dating to the second half of April, 469–70.
1. Speer, 163–4; Domarus, 1144; TBJG, I/6, 322 (20 April 1939); Below, 160; Schroeder, 92–4. And see Kurt Pätzold, ‘Hitlers fünfzigster Geburtstag am 20. April 1939’, in Dietrich Eichholtz and Kurt Pätzold (eds.), Der Weg in den Krieg. Studien zur Geschichte der Vorkriegsjahre (1935/36 bis 1939), East Berlin, 1989, 309–43.
2. Domarus, 1146. Henderson, 214, for his recall (and 220 for his return on 25 April).
3. TBJG, I/6, 323 (21 April 1939); Domarus, 1145–6; Below, 161; Schroeder, 94.
4. Fritz Terveen, ‘Der Filmbericht über Hitlers 50. Geburtstag. Ein Beispiel nationalsozialistischer Selbstdarstellung und Propaganda’, VfZ, 7 (1959), 75–84, here 82.
5. TBJG, I/6, 323 (21 April 1939).
6. DBS, vi.435–54.
7. Ilse McKee, Tomorrow the World, London, 1960, 27.
8. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 106, 148–9, 222, for examples.
9. Domarus, 1178; see also Sebastian Haffner, Anmerkungen zu Hitler, Munich, 1978, 43–5.
10. MadR, ii.160–61.
11. MadR, ii.293.
12. GStA, Reichsstatthalter 563, ‘Die Lage der bayerischen Landwirtschaft im Frühjahr 1939’, Fol. 13; see Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 61.
13. MadR, ii.159, 161, 292, 295.
14. MadR, ii.157.
15. BA/MA, RW19/68, ‘Zusammenfassender Überblick’, 31 January 1939, Fol.119.
16. BA/MA, RW19/56, Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion VI, June 1939.
17. BA/MA, RW19/56, Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion VI, July 1939.
18. See the references in Ch.5 n. 41. Though it never posed any serious danger to the regime, the illegal oppositional activity of the Left, especially the Communists, never ceased and appears to have intensified in the years immediately before the war. See Klaus Mammach, ‘Widerstandsaktionen und oppositionelles Verhalten’, in Eichholtz and Pätzold, 403–34.
19. BA, R43II/194, Fol.103.
20. IfZ, Doc. NG-5428.
21. BA, R43II/528. Lammers also regularly brought the reports of the Reich Labour Minister to Hitler’s attention in the years 1935–7, but ceased to do so after 5 January 1938 (R43II/533).
22. BA, R43II/195,Fol.182.
23. See Speer, 229.
24. See Mason, Sozialpolitik, ch.1.
25. Treue, ‘Hitlers Rede vor der deutschen Presse’, 188–9.
26. Wiedemann, 90.
27. Domarus, 1317.
28. See Below, 162.
29. Schneider, 24 October 1952, 8.
30. See Thies, Architekt; and Jost Dülffer, Jochen Thies, and Josef Henke (eds.), Hitlers Städte. Baupolitik im Dritten Reich. Eine Dokumentation, Cologne, 1978.
31. See Martin Broszat and Klaus Schwabe (eds.), Die deutschen Eliten und der Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg, Munich, 1989, especially 61–71 (Hitler); 133 (industry’s worries about war); 224–5 (role of diplomats); 285–90 (position of the military after Munich); 383ff. (agrarians’ hopes from expansion).
32. See Fritsch’s remark to von Hassell in December 1938: ‘This man — Hitler — is Germany’s fate for better or worse. If it is now into the abyss,’ which Fritsch thought likely, ‘he will drag us all down with him. There’s nothing to be done’ (Hassell, 71). The remarks betray little recognition of the part Fritsch and those like him had played in placing Hitler in such a position.
33. CD 78, for the length of the speech.
34. Domarus, 1137–8.
35. Below, 161.
36. Domarus, 1173.
37. Domarus, 1148–79 (for the text of the speech; Roosevelt ‘answers’, 1166–79); Shirer, 133, for the laughter of the. deputies.
38. Schneider, Nr.48, 28.22.52, 8.
39. Below, 162. See also Shirer, 133, who thought Hitler’s reply ‘rather shrewd’ in playing to the sympathies of the appeasers.
40. Shirer, 133.
41. Domarus, 1158–9.
42. Watt, How War Came, 196–7; Dirks/Janßen, 94ff.
43. Domarus, 1161 —3.
44. Weinberg II, 560 and n.87, and see 561 and n.90. The avoidance of further negotiations from this date favours the interpretation that Hitler had decided to solve the ‘Polish Question’ by force. (For differing positions on this point, see Müller, Heer, 391, and Henke, England, 242–5.) It is not consonant with the view that he still believed that the Poles could be coerced into accepting his terms. (Watt, How War Came, 196.)
45. Müller, Heer, 392 and n.73; see also Weinberg II, 558 and n.78.
46. Müller, Heer, 390–91 and n.67.
47. Müller, 392. Halder had reservations (393–6), but, in discussions with Beck, one of his arguments about the lack of prospect of opposition was that Danzig was unquestionably a German city (395–6). See also Below, 175; also, Hartmann/Slutsch, ‘Franz Halder und die Kriegsvorbereitungen im Frühjahr 1939’ for Halder’s aggressive speech to military leaders in April 1939, cited in the previous chapter.
48. Dülffer, Marine, 507, 510, 529–30. According to Below, 163, those present were expecting a discussion of ‘Fall Weiß’ (‘Case White’), the plan for the attack on Poland.
49. Weinberg II, 576.
50. Brauchitsch claimed after the war to remember Hitler’s words at this point: ‘I would have to be an idiot to slide into a war on account of Poland like the incapable lot (die Unfähigen) of 1914’ (/MCxx.623).
51. IMG, xxxvii.546–56, Doc.079-L; DGFP, D, VI, 574–80 (quotations 576–80); Domarus, 1196–1201; Below, 163–4 for reactions. See also Weinberg II, 579–83.
52. Mario Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel, Baltimore, 1967, 367 (and chs. 4–5 for the genesis and significance of the pact).
53. CD, 46.
54. Weinberg II. 565–6.
55. DGFP, D, VI, 450–52, No.341; see also Bloch, 225; and Toscano, Pact of Steel, 307–34; and, for Hitler’s comment on Ribbentrop, CD, 91.
56. By 1939, Sweden and Norway supplied 54 per cent of Germany’s imports of iron-ore, with 13 per cent coming from France, 8 per cent from Luxemburg, and most of the remainder from Spain, North Africa, and Newfoundland (Lotte Zumpe, Wirtschaft und Staat in Deutschland 1933 bis 194S, East Berlin, 1980, 175).
57. Weinberg II, 581, 584–93, and, a more negative assessment, Bloch, 223. For the level of economic penetration of the Balkan countries, see also Alan S. Milward, ‘Fascism and the Economy’, in Walter Laqueur (ed.), Fascism. A Reader’s Guide, Harmondsworth 1979, 409–53, here 440–41; and George W. F. Hallgarten and Joachim Radkau, Deutsche Industrie und Politik von Bismarck bis in die Gegenwart, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1981,330–32. Wendt, Großdeutschland, 167–9,245–8, indicates the continued serious deficiencies for the German economy in 1939 despite such penetration.
58. Bloch, 235. According to Below, 155, Hitler had also begun to play with such ideas following the occupation of Czechoslovakia. At this point, Hitler was, he himself later claimed, unsure whether to strike first in the east or in the west (Domarus, 1422–3 (from Hitler’s speech to military leaders on 23 November 1939)).
59. See Ribbentrop, Zwischen London und Moskau, 171; Wolfgang Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik 1933–1940. Außenpolitische Konzeptionen und Entscheidungsprozesse im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1979, 278–9; and Wolfgang Michalka, ‘From the Anti-Comintern Pact to the Euro-Asiatic Bloc: Ribbentrop’s Alternative Concept to Hitler’s Foreign Policy Programme’, in Koch, Aspects, 267–84, here 275–8.
60. Weinberg II, 550–53, 568–77; Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives, London, 1991, 676–7; Bloch, 235; Geoffrey Roberts, The Unholy Alliance. Stalin’s Pact with Hitler, London, 1989, 109–19; Watt, How War Came, ch. 13. Carley, 1939: the Alliance that Never Was, examines in detail the failings of the French and British negotiations with the USSR.
61. Roberts, 151–4.
62. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 109. For Stalin’s speech, Roberts, 118; Weinberg II, 550. Ribbentrop (if his recollections were accurate) was reading too much into Stalin’s speech. Stalin was, in fact, keeping his options open by indicating that the Soviet Union intended to keep its distance from any war among capitalist-imperialist states (Weinberg II, 550).
63. Peter Kleist, Die europäische Tragödie, Göttingen, 1961, 52.
64. DGFP, D, VI, 266–7 (here 266), N0.215.
65. Gustav Hilger and Holger G. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations 1918–1941, New York, 1953, 293–7. Hilger believed that Litvinov had been dismissed because he had pressed for an understanding with Britain and France, while Stalin had been more inclined to look to Germany. See also Bloch, 236; and Weinberg II, 570–72, for the change of Soviet foreign minister. Hitler referred to the significance of the dismissal of Litvinov in his speech to his generals on 22 August 1939 (Winfried Baumgart, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung’, VfZ, 16 (1968), 120–49, here 145), and in his letter to Mussolini of 25 August 1939 (Domarus, 1254).
66. Kleist, 58.
67. Weinberg II, 573–4.
68. Below, 170.
69. Bloch, 236; Weinberg II, 573.
70. Weinberg II, 574; Bloch, 236.
71. DGFP, D, VI, 589–93, 597–8, Nos.441, 446 (quotation, 598).
72. DGFP, D, VI, 790, 810, 813, Nos. 570, 583, 588.
73. Weinberg II, 604–5; Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, 678; Bloch, 237.
74. DGFP, D, VI, 755–6 (quotation 755), N0.700.
75. DGFP, D, VI, 1006–9, No.729; and Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace, London, 1988, 122–6.
76. DGFP, D, VI, 1047–8 (here 1048), N0.757.
77. DGFP, D, VI, 1059–62 (here 1060), 1067–8, Nos.766, 772.
78. DGFP, D, VI, 1006–9, 1015–16, 1047–8, Nos.729, 736, 757; Weizsäcker-Papiere, 157 (entry for 30 July 1939); Weinberg II, 605.
79. DGFP, D, VI, 1059–62, No.766. Molotov had been ‘unusually open’ (1059) and twice mentioned ‘well-known demands on Poland’ (1060–61).
80. Weinberg II, 604.
81. CP, 300, 304; DGFP, D, VII, 39–49 (quotation, 47), N0.43.
82. Domarus, 1217.
83. Keitel, 206; Domarus, 1214; Irving, Führer, 190.
84. Below, 166–9.
85. Below, 172–4.
86. Domarus, 1217–19.
87. Schneider, Nr.44, 31 October 1952.
88. Kubizek, 282–6.
89. CD, 91 (21 May 1939). Ciano had found Hitler well, but looking older, with more wrinkled eyes. He remarked on Hitler’s insomnia.
90. Schneider, Nr.43, 24 October 1952, 1,8. See also Sereny, Speer, 193–5.
91. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 81 (6 February 1939). Rosenberg’s opinion that Goebbels was so disliked was based, to go from the context of his remarks, on the Propaganda Minister’s use of his power for the sexual exploitation of young women hoping for career-advancement. In conversation with Himmler, Rosenberg also went on to criticize Goebbels for the damage to the state caused by the ‘Reichskristallnacht’ pogrom.
92. See Martens, 178ff., 199; Kube, 312; Irving, Göring, 247–54.
93. Sereny, 206.
94. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 234.
95. Weinberg II, 583–4 and n.199.
96. Steinert, 84ff.; Ian Kershaw, ‘Der Überfall auf Polen und die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland’, in Ernst Willi Hansen, Gerhard Schreiber, and Bernd Wegner (eds.), Politischer Wandel, organisierte Gewalt und nationale Sicherheit. Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte Deutschlands und Frankreichs. Festschrift für Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Munich, 1995, 237–50, here 239–45.
97. DBS, vi.407ff.
98. McKee, 27.
99. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18473, BA Ebermannstadt, no date (end of July 1939).
100. DBS, vi.275.
101. DBS, vi.561.
102. DBS, vi.818.
103. DBS, vi.409ff.
104. Herbert S. Levine, Hitler’s Free City. A History of the Nazi Party in Danzig, 1925–39, Chicago/London, 1973, 151; and Weinberg II, 584 n.208.
105. Carl J. Burckhardt, Meine Danziger Mission 1937–1939, Munich, 1962, 254–5 for the customs crisis.
106. Burckhardt, 255–6.
107. See Herbert S. Levine, ‘The Mediator: Carl J. Burckhardt’s Efforts to Avert a Second World War’, JMH, 45 (1973), 439–55. here 453–5.
108. Burckhardt, 261–3; and see Paul Stauffer, Zwischen Hofmannsthal und Hitler. Carl J. Burckhardt: Facetten einer aussergewöhnlichen Existenz, Zurich, 1991, 141ff., who points out (152–3) that news of the ‘secret’ meeting was deliberately leaked in advance, almost certainly on Hitler’s initiative, in an attempt to demonstrate his openness to dialogue with the west, to the French journalist (known to have sympathized in the past with Nazi Germany) Bertrand de Jouvenel.
109. Burckhardt, 264. The ‘Eagle’s Nest’, built at a height of almost 2,000 metres, some 800 metres higher up than the Berghof itself, was actually no ‘Tea House’. Hitler’s ‘Tea House’, the regular goal of his afternoon walks, lay below the Berghof. The name ‘Teehaus’ was a corruption of the official name D-Haus (Diplomaten-Haus), which betrayed the intention of making the maximum impression upon selected important foreign visitors. It had been designed by Bormann, with plans reaching back to 1936, as a present for Hitler’s fiftieth birthday. Around 3,500 men worked on it and, by the time that it was finished in summer 1938, it had cost some 30 million Reich Marks. During most of the war years it was empty and unused. (Ernst Hanisch, Der Obersalzberg: das Kehlsteinhaus und Adolf Hitler, Berchtesgaden, 1995, 18–21; Below, 124. See the impressions of François-Poncet, Als Botschafter, 395–7.)
110. Below, 124.
111. Schneider, Nr.46, 14 November 1952, 8; Speer, 176.
112. At his first visit to the ‘Eagle’s Nest’ the previous summer, Hitler had mentioned that he would take up there visitors he wanted especially to honour or impress (Below, 124).
113. Schneider, Nr.46, 14 November 1952, 8.
114. Burckhardt, 264–70; English text in DBFP, Ser.3, VI, 691–6, No. 659, (quotations, 694–5). See Watt, How War Came, 332, for the description of Ironside. The Ironside suggestion was also advanced by Weizsäcker, and by Henderson, but it was eventually decided in London that he would not be an appropriate person to send (Meehan, 232–3, 235). The British Embassy in Paris had warned the Foreign Office that it might be damaging to good relations between France and Britain were the Ironside proposal to be accepted without consultation with the French (Stauffer, 154).
115. Burckhardt met, in the house of his mother in Basel, Roger Makins from the British Foreign Office and Pierre Arnal of the Quai d’Orsay already on 13 August. Makins’s report on the meeting (DBFP, Ser.3, VI, 691–5, No.659) was largely dictated by Burckhardt, and was translated into German for Meine Danziger Mission, 264ff (Stauffer, 141, 179, 182).
116. DBFP, Ser.3, VI, 696, N0.659; Stauffer, 140–41.
117. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 195.
118. DBFP, Ser.3, VI, 697–8, No.659; Watt, How War Came, 435. Makins’s report, later reproduced by Burckhardt in his book, did not include remarks by Hitler which the High Commissioner added in his memoirs, written more than twenty years later, claiming, somewhat remarkably, that they had not struck him at the time: ‘Everything that I undertake is directed against Russia. If those in the West are too stupid and too blind to understand this, then I shall be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians to beat the West, and then, after its defeat, turn with all my concerted force against the Soviet Union. I need the Ukraine, so that no one will starve us out as they did in the last war’ (Burckhardt, 272; trans. Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, London, 1973, 88). Hildebrand and others have taken it for granted that the comments were intended to carry weight in London. There is, however, no indication that they were passed on, even unofficially. Neither Halifax in his memoirs, nor Cadogan in his diaries, refers to the remarks. Despite the passage finding its way into practically every account of Burckhardt’s meeting with Hitler, it is not surprising that many doubts have been raised about its authenticity. It seems on first impression inherently unlikely that Hitler would have made such comments, knowing that Burckhardt was meant to report the content of the conversation to the western powers at a time when discussions for a pact with the Russians were at such a delicate stage and when those between the Soviet Union and the western democracies were still dragging on. An extant copy of Burckhardt’s own sparse notes of Hitler’s comments, undated but allegedly from the day of his meeting with the Nazi leader, does indicate that Hitler, having stated he was not bluffing and would strike hard, did remark that ‘he would only temporarily come to an arrangement with Russia, then after victory [over] the West attack with entire force on account of Ukraine!! Grain, timber!’ (cit. Stauffer, 188). The original is, however, not contained in Burckhardt’s papers (Stauffer, 308 n.33) and, so it seems, has never been seen. Though Stauffer, after careful inquiry (178–201), is prepared to grant the benefit of doubt as regarding the authenticity of the document (189–90), a question-mark must remain until the original — allegedly held in a bank-vault — is produced. Burckhardt produced no compelling reason why he omitted to mention Hitler’s remark to Makins. If the document is taken to be authentic, the best gloss is perhaps that Hitler’s remarks struck Burckhardt as, in essence, uttered in the heat of the moment, nothing different from that which Hitler had written in Mein Kampf, and consequently uninteresting to the western governments. Hitler had spoken earlier in the meeting of the need for land in the east and the need to secure grain and timber, and the near repetition of the point perhaps made little mark on Burckhardt at the time. In any event, his published version of the remarks must be regarded as a later embellishment on Burckhardt’s part — not the only one in his published memoirs.
119. CP, 297–9.
120. CD, 124.
121. CP, 299–303. Just over a week later, on 20 August, the former head of the London branch of the German News Agency, Fritz Hesse, was conveying to the British Government, on the authorization of Ribbentrop, the impression not simply of Hitler’s determination to resolve the Danzig issue, come what may, but — probably to be seen as bluff — of his awareness ‘that if war should break out between Germany and Poland Great Britain will be in it’. (Josef Henke, ‘Hitler und England Mitte August 1939. Ein Dokument zur Rolle Fritz Hesse in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, VfZ, 21 (1973), 231–42, especially 240 and (for the quotation) 241. Henke (and Hesse himself, as he later stated) regarded the remarks as a genuine reflection of Hitler’s views at the time, not as a tactical calculation — see 236 and n.20.) The claims made by Hesse in his book, Fritz Hesse, Das Spiel um Deutschland, Munich, 1953, about the importance of his role as an intermediary between the German and British governments in the last weeks of peace are greatly exaggerated.
122. CD, 124.
123. DGFP, D, VII, 39–49 (48–9 for the interruption in the talks), 58–9, Nos. 43, 50; CP, 302.
124. DGFP, D, VII, 68–9, No.62; Bloch, 240; Read and Fisher, The Deadly Embrace, 193–4.
125. Bloch, 240. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 109–10, suggest that the Foreign Minister had himself proposed Göring. Since the two were arch-rivals, this sounds inherently unlikely. Ribbentrop’s comment that he knew nothing at this time of Hitler’s intention to attack Poland is not credible.
126. Bloch, 241–4.
127. DGFP, D, VII, 142–8, 152–3, Nos.131, 135. It was agreed on 19 August and signed, after some further delay from the Moscow end, at 2 a.m. on 20 August.
128. DGFP, D, VII, 134, No.125; Read and Fisher, The Deadly Embrace, 214.
129. That Hitler was planning to attack Poland by the end of August or beginning of September had been known to Stalin since June (Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin. Triumph and Tragedy, (1991), Rocklin Ca., 1996, 357). The frenetic diplomatic activity in Berlin in mid-August was an indicator to Stalin and Molotov that the date of the invasion was close (Weinberg II, 608). Bloch, 244, states (without source) that Stalin and Molotov knew that Hitler was intending to invade on 26 August.
130. DGFP, D, VII, 156–7, N0.142.
131. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 102. Speer’s account, 176, differs in detail, recording Hitler’s reactions on receiving the telegram (for which see Domarus, 1233).
132. Steinert, 85–6. And see Schmidt, 449; Shirer, 145.
133. Baumgart, 142 (the comment written in November 1939 of General Liebmann), and 145 n.100, citing Rundstedt’s recollections in testimony at Nuremberg on 19 June 1946; see also Below, 181.
134. TBJG, I/7, 72 (22 August 1939).
135. TBJG, I/7, 72 (24 August 1939): ‘Wir sind in Not und fressen da wie der Teufel Fliegen.’
136. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 89–90 (22 August 1939).
137. See DBS, vi.985–6.
138. DBS, vi.988.
139. Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 103.
140. TBJG, I/7, 73 (23 August 1939).
141. Watt, How War Came, 466.
142. Cit. Werner Maser, Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg, (1994), 4th edn, Munich, 1997, 59–60.
143. Watt, How War Came, 467–70.
144. Meehan, 233–4. Halifax stressed only the importance of the effect on morale.
145. Watt, How War Came, 463.
146. The order to attend the meeting was delivered to General Liebmann on the morning of 21 August (Baumgart, 141).
147. Below, 181.
148. Baumgart, 144 n.97, 148.
149. Baumgart, 144 n.97. Some present later claimed that they were there in uniform. The most contemporary accounts, however, mention civilian clothes. Below, 180, confirms this.
150. Baumgart, 142.
151. Baumgart, 143 and n.93–6, 148.
152. Baumgart, 143 and n.96.
153. Baumgart, 148 n.111. The notes were handwritten headings, according to Below, 181.
154. Baumgart, 120.
155. Baumgart, 122–8. For the significance of the document, its authenticity, and the authorship of the best version (that of Canaris), see Baumgart’s article, and his reply, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939 (Erwiderung)’, VfZ, 19 (1971), 301–4, to Hermann Böhm, ‘Zur Ansprache Hitlers vor den Führern der Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939’, VfZ, 19 (1971), 294–300.
156. IMG, xxvi, 338–44, Doc. 798-PS; DGFP, D, VII, 200–204 (quotations 204), No.192; Baumgart, 149 and n.113 for the timing and lunchtime break, 135–6, n.67. Also Below, 181.
157. For the time, Baumgart, 126, 149 n.113. Below recalled that he spoke for about two hours. (Below, 180). Baumgart, 132–3 n.53, 55 for operational talks, and reference to Halder and Warli-mont; Below, 181.
158. On the different interpretations of what Hitler meant by this phrase, see Baumgart, 133 and n.57.
159. IMG, xxvi, 523–4, D0C.1014-PS; DGFP, D, VII, 205–6, No.205–6 (quotations, 205).
160. Baumgart, 146.
161. Baumgart, 146.
162. Below, 181, thought the Soviet pact had silenced some sceptics.
163. Baumgart, 148. For Hitler’s insistence that the West would not intervene, see IfZ, F34/1, Vormann Memoirs, Fols.42–3.
164. Hassell, 71.
165. Below, 181–2.
166. Baumgart, 143 n.96, 146; Schmidt, 449–50; Bloch, 246.
167. Schmidt, 455. Hoffmann’s account of the visit to Moscow (Hitler Was My Friend, 103–14) is inaccurate and self-important. The signs are that Stalin was, in fact, less than happy at Hoffmann’s photographic interference and did not welcome the publicity (Ribbentrop Memoirs, 114).
168. Based on Ribbentrop Memoirs, 110–13, and Schmidt, 450–52. Both are variedly inaccurate on the time of arrival and first talks; see Bloch, 247. Though Schulenburg had been in Moscow for years, it was the first time that he had spoken to Stalin.
169. Below, 182.
170. Below, 183. Speer, 177, gives a distorted version of the incident, which is also graphically described by the ‘manager’ (Verwalter) at the Berghof, Herrmann Döring, BBC-Archive, ‘The Nazis: A Warning from History’, Transcript, Roll 244, Fols.30–37. Speer recalled after the war that no one hearing Hitler was shocked by his remarks about the shedding of much blood, and that Germany would have to plunge into the abyss with him if the war was not won. Speer himself was taken, so he recalled, by ‘the grandeur of the historical hour’ (Albert Speer, Spandau. The Secret Diaries, Fontana edn, London, 1977, 40–41 (entry for 21 December 1946)).
171. Schmidt, 452–3; Below, 183; Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113. A telegram containing just those words followed within two hours (DGFP, D, VII, 220, 223, Nos. 205, 210).
172. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113; Schmidt, 454. Hoffmann’s account, Hitler Was My Friend, 109–11, cannot be trusted.
173. Bloch, 249 (contradicting Ribbentrop’s own claim, Ribbentrop Memoirs, 113, that they were signed before midnight).
174. TBJG, I/7, 75 (24 August 1939).
175. Below, 183.
176. Watt, How War Came, 463, 465. Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State in the USA, was told on 22 August by Joseph E. Davies, former US Ambassador in Moscow, that news of the non-aggression pact was ‘not unexpected’ (Davies, 453–4).
177. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 200.
178. Nicolson, 154.
179. Chips, 208–9.
180. N. J. Crowsen (ed.), Fleet Street, Press Barons, and Politics: the Journals of Collin Brooks, 1932–1940, Camden Soc, 5th Ser., vol.11, London, 1998, 252.
181. Roberts, 174; Allan Merson, Communist Resistance in Nazi Germany, London, 1985, 212–13.
182. Heinz Kühnrich, ‘Der deutsch-sowjetische Nichtangriffsvertrag vom 23. August 1939 aus der zeitgenössischen Sicht der KPD’, in Eichholtz and Pätzold, 517–51, here 519 (quotation), 529.
183. Below, 184.
184. See TBJG, I/7, 74–7 (24 August 1939, 25 August 1939) for the uncertainty of Goebbels who, at this time on the Berghof, was probably echoing Hitler’s own sentiments.
185. Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, London, 1939, 96–8, No.56; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 170–71 (here 171), No.207; DGFP, D, VII, 215–16, No.200; Henderson, 256.
186. Documents, 99, No.57; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 161–3 (here 162), No.200; see Henderson, 247–8, 256–7, 301–5.
187. Documents, 99–100, N0.57; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 161–3 (here 163), N0.200; DGFP, D, VII, 210–16, No.200; Domarus, 1244–7.
188. DBFP, 3rd Ser.VII, 201–2 (quotation 201), N0.248.
189. Documents, 100–101, N0.58; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 201–2 (here 202), N0.248; DGFP, D, VII, 210–16, No.200; Henderson, 257; Domarus, 1249–50.
190. Domarus, 1247–8; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 177–9 (here, 178), No.211.
191. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 252.
192. TBJG, I/7, 76 (25 August 1939); Below, 187; Watt, How War Came, 464–5. And see Hitler’s remarks to Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich: ‘No democratic government can survive such a defeat and embarrassment as Chamberlain and Daladier have had inflicted on them through our Moscow treaty.’ (cit. Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, Bonn, 1950, 66. (‘Keine demokratische Regierung kann sich halten, der eine solche Niederlage und zugleich Blamage zuteil geworden ist, wie Chamberlain und Daladier durch unseren Moskauer Vertrag.’)) The speeches of Chamberlain and Halifax can be found in Documents, 107–18.
193. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 116.
194. Documents, 120–22, N0.68; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 227–31, Nos.283–4; Henderson, 259; Schmidt, 458–9; Domarus, 1256–7.
195. Documents, 122–3, No.69; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 230, No.284; Domarus, 1257.
196. Henderson, 259. See also DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 235, 239, Nos.286, 293.
197. TBJG, I/7, 77 (26 August 1939).
198. IMG, xxviii.389, D0C.1780-PS (Jodl’s diary, 23 August 1939) for the time set for the operation. Hitler took the decision to go ahead at 3.02p.m. on 25 August and various subsidiary orders to army units followed (Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942, ed. Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung Stuttgart, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1962–4 (= Halder KTB), i.33 (26 August 1939); Vormann, in IfZ, F34/1, Fol.24). Saturday -a day favoured by Hitler for the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the introduction of conscription, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and the Anschluß — was possibly chosen since it delayed the likely response time of the British government. (See Domarus, 1239 and n.654. See also Weinberg II, 634; Walther Hofer, Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Frankfurt am Main, 1964, 274; Hermann Graml, Europas Weg in den Krieg. Hitler und die Mächte 1939, Munich, 1990, 287 (and 277ff. for a detailed account of the developments during the last days of August.)
199. Weinberg II, 633–4.
200. Below, 178.
201. Generaloberst Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Bd. 1: Vom Polenfeldzug bis zum Eride der Westoffensive (14.8.1939–30.6.1940), ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Stuttgart, 1962 [= Halder KTB], 26 (22 August 1939); The Halder War Diary, 1939–1942, ed. Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, London, 1988 (the abridged English translation of Halder KTB = Halder Diary), 32; DGFP, D, VII, 557–9, Appendix I (extracts from Halder’s diary); Domarus, 1239.
202. Below, 182.
203. TBJG, I/7, 77 (26 August 1939).
204. Henderson, 258; Halder KTB, i.31 (25 August 1939), mentions the lifting of telephone restrictions on Britain and France by Canaris. TBJG, I/7, 79–80 (27 August 1939), refers to the introduction of ration cards, though not yet for bread and potatoes. See Shirer, 148, 150 for grumbling at the ration cards.
205. Halder KTB, i. 31–3 (25–6 August 1939), IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols.24–5.
206. Halder KTB, i. 31 (25 August 1939), 39 (28 August 1939); IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols. 26–8.
207. Müller, Heer, 416–17.
208. Halder KTB, i. 33 (26 August 1939), 39 (28 August 1939); Engel, 59 and n.160.
209. Domarus, 1254–5.
210. Weinberg II, 630–31.
211. DGFP, D, VII, 285–6, No.271. Mussolini remarked that he had been preparing for war in 1942.
212. Schmidt, 462.
213. TBJG, I/7, 78 (26 August 1939). See Halder’s remark: ‘Führer rather gone to pieces’ (‘Führer ziemlich zusammengebrochen’), Halder KTB, i.34 (26 January 1939). According to Vormann, Hitler walked up and down the room in a state of agitation speaking to this and that person. To Vormann, he said: ‘We now have to be sly, sly as foxes’ (‘“Schlau müssen wir jetzt sein, schlau wie die Füchse”’) (IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.26).
214. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.43: ‘The refusal of Mussolini was felt on all sides to be treachery and most harshly condemned’ (‘…war die Absage Mussolinis allseitig als Verrat empfunden und schärfstens verurteilt worden’). See also Below, 187–9, where, however, Hitler, despite the ‘hard words’ against his ally, did not doubt Mussolini’s loyalty.
215. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols.26–8; Ribbentrop Memoirs, 117. On the effect on Hitler’s prestige, Müller, Heer, 420 and n.206.
216. Schmidt, 462.
217. Schmidt, 459–61; IMG, x.240; Robert Coulondre, Von Moskau nach Berlin 1936–1939. Erinnerungen des französischen Botschafters, Bonn, 1950, 421–4; Weinberg II, 634 and n.32; Hofer, Entfesselung, 275; Graml, Europas Weg, 288–9.
218. Weinberg II, 635.
219. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 116–17. There is no corroborative support for Ribbentrop’s unlikely claim that, learning of the British-Polish pact, he had persuaded Hitler to halt the attack on Poland (Domarus, 1259; Schmidt, 459; Weinberg II, 637–8; and for Ribbentrop’s claim see also Bloch, 253). Below, 187, seems directly drawn from Ribbentrop’s memoirs and cannot be taken as supportive evidence. Brauchitsch — ‘not unjustifiably’, in Engel’s view — also claimed to have persuaded Hitler to postpone the attack (Engel, 59 (26 August 1939)). Goebbels makes it plain in his diary notes that it was the news from Mussolini that was decisive in the change of plan (TBJG, I/7, 78 (26 August 1939)).
220. A point made by Weinberg II, 635.
221. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 117; Bloch, 254.
222. Domarus, 1261.
223. IMG, iii.280.
224. Dahlerus, 53–6.
225. Domarus, 1261.
226. Domarus, 1264–5; CD, 135.
227. CD, 135; DGFP, D, VII, 324–6, N0.320.
228. TBJG, I/7, 80, 82–3 (28 August 1939, 29 August 1939).
229. Domarus, 1265–6.
230. Engel, 60 (27 August 1939, 29 August 1939).
231. Dahlerus, 56.
232. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 283–4, Annex I to Doc.349.
233. Dahlerus, 56–66 (quotation, 66: ‘Sein ganzes Verhalten machte den Eindruck eines völlig Anormalen’).
234. Dahlerus, 69–70.
235. Dahlerus, 78–9.
236. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 318–20, 321–2, Nos.402, 406.
237. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 324, No.411, and, especially, 328, No.420.
238. TBJG, I/7, 80 (28 September 1939).
239. Groscurth, 187 (27 August 1939).
240. Halder KTB, i. 40 (28 August 1939).
241. TBJG, I/7, 81 (28 August 1939). Goebbels was evidently getting a preview on 27 August of the talk Hitler would give the next day.
242. Halder KTB, i. 38 (28 August 1939), trans. Halder Diary, 37.
243. Documents, 128, No.75; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 330–32, 351–5, Nos.426, 455.
244. Henderson, 262.
245. Documents, 128–31, here 129, No.75; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 352, N0.455.
246. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 330, No.426; Alan Bullock, Hitler. A Study in Tyranny, (1952), Harmonds-worth, 1962, 541.
247. Documents, 126–8, No.74; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 321, No.426.
248. Henderson, 262.
249. TBJG, I/7, 83 (29 August 1939).
250. TBJG, I/7, 84 (30 August 1939). The plebiscite idea formed part of the proposals read out by Ribbentrop at his meeting with Henderson late on the evening of 30 August (Documents, 146, N0.92).
251. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, Bd.20, Aug. 1939; Irving, Führer, 222–3; Irving, War Path, 255–6.
252. Henderson, 263. Shirer, 150–54, remarked on how few people, and those with grim, silent faces, had been there the previous evening when Henderson went to the Reich Chancellery.
253. Henderson, 265; Documents, 138, No.79 (text, 135–7, no.78); DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 374–5 (here 374), N0.490, 388–90 (here, 390), No.502; Domarus, 1285–7.
254. Henderson, 267.
255. Documents, 138–9, No.80; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 376–7 (here 376), N0.493.
256. Documents, 140, No.82; DBFP, 3rd Ser., 400–401 (here 401), No.520.
257. Schmidt, 465.
258. Dahlerus, 99–100.
259. Documents, 139, Nos.81–2; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 391, 400–401, Nos.504, 520; Henderson, 268–9.
260. Domarus, 1289.
261. Domarus, 1290 and n.809 for Hitler’s use of ‘Führer’ alone after decrees from now on (though not consistently).
262. Dieter Rebentisch, Führerstaat und Verwaltung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Verfassungsentwicklung und Verwaltungspolitik 1939–1945, Stuttgart, 1989, 117–32; also Broszat, Staat, 382.
263. Schmidt, 465–9, here 467–8.
264. Henderson, 270–71; Documents, 142–3, N0.89, 145–6, no.92; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 413–14, 432–3, Nos.543, 574; text of Hitler’s offer, Domarus, 1291–3. Schmidt claimed that Ribbentrop did not read the terms too quickly, though Henderson had noted that in his report to Halifax immediately after the meeting (Documents, 145, No.92 (DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 432–3, N0.574)). For Hitler’s order to Ribbentrop not to hand out the terms, see IMG, x. 311.
265. Documents, 146, No.92; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 433, No.574.
266. Henderson, 271.
267. Schmidt, 469.
268. TBJG, I/7, 86 (31 August 1939).
269. Domarus, 1297; Henderson, 275, 277; TBJG, I/7, 87 (1 September 1939).
270. Dahlerus, 107.
271. Halder KTB, i. 46 (30 August 1939).
272. Halder KTB, i. 47 (31 August 1939).
273. Halder KTB, i. 46 (30 August 1939).
274. IMG, xxxiv, 456–9, D0C.126-C; Weisungen, 23–5.
275. Halder KTB, i. 47–8 (31 August 1939), trans. Halder Diary, 43 (31 August 1939). See also Groscurth, 195, n.441 for the timing of the transmission of the attack order, passed on by Brauchitsch at 16.20 hours. TBJG, I/7, 87 (1 September 1939) notes that at midday Hitler gave the order to attack ‘in the night approaching 5a.m.’.
276. IMG, ix.313 (Ribbentrop testimony).
277. TBJG, I/7, 87 (1 September 1939).
278. TBJG, I/7, 88 (1 September 1939).
279. Henderson, 276; Ribbentrop Memoirs, 125; Josef Lipski, Diplomat in Berlin 1933–1939, ed. Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, New York/London, 1968, 609–10; Irving, Führer, 225; Irving, War Path, 260.
280. Domarus, 1305–6.
281. Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head. The Story of Hitler’s SS, London, 1969, 238–44. In the most spectacular of the ‘incidents’, the attack on the Gleiwitz radio station, Polish uniforms were not used (as some post-war testimony claimed), and were not necessary. An SS guard had already taken over the watch on the station to ensure the success of the operation when, as pre-arranged, five SD men dressed in civilian clothes entered the building to carry out the attack (Jürgen Runzheimer, ‘Der Überfall auf den Sender Gleiwitz im Jahre 1939’, VfZ, 10 (1962), 408–26).
282. Shirer, 152.
283. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18473, LR Ebermannstadt, 31 August 1939. See also DBS, vi.980–83; Steinert, 91ff.; Wolfram Wette, ‘Zur psychologischen Mobilmachung der deutschen Bevölkerung 1933–1939’, in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Analysen-Grundzüge-Forschungsbilanz, Munich-Zurich, 1989, 205–23, here 220; and DRZW, i.142.
284. Horst Rohde, ‘Kriegsbeginn 1939 in Danzig — Planungen und Wirklichkeit’, in Michalka (ed.), Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 462–81, here 462, 472–7, 479 n.1; Levine, 153; Domarus, 1307–8. It should have been the cruiser Königsberg, but that ship had developed engine trouble (Levine, Hitler’s Free City, 152). See Baumgart, 147, for Liebmann’s report of the conversation he overheard between Raeder and Hitler following the meeting on the Berghof on 22 August. Raeder remarked that the Schleswig-Holstein would probably be sunk by Polish coastal batteries with the loss of 300 or so sea-cadets. Hitler replied with a dismissive wave of the hand. In fact, the attack on the Westerplatte did not go according to plan. The Luftwaffe had to intervene before the Westerplatte was finally taken on the afternoon of 1 September, by which time the Germans had lost between 40 and 50 men (Rohde, 474–5).
285. Halder KTB, i.52 (1 September 1939), trans. Halder Diary, 47.
286. Levine, Hitler’s Free City, 153.
287. Domarus, 1308.
288. Shirer, 156. See Henderson’s impressions, 287–91; and those of Dahlerus, 123–4.
289. Domarus, 1311, cit. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1 September 1939.
290. Shirer, 156; Domarus, 1316 and n.901. Below, 195 contradicts Shirer’s impressions, stating that Hitler was received with far more cheering than usual, which broke out repeatedly through his speech. Shirer’s contemporary account is probably to be preferred. Hellmuth Groscurth, a rooted opponent of Hitler in the Abwehr, noted in his diary: ‘10.00a.m. Reichstag speech. Terrible impression everywhere’ (Groscurth, 196).
291. Domarus, 1315; text of speech 1312–17. As regards the timing of the start of hostilities, Hitler appears simply to have made a mistake (Rohde, 479 n.1).
292. Dahlerus, 124–5.
293. See the references to Mussolini’s peace efforts in Chamberlain’s speeches in the House of Commons on 1 and 2 September 1939: Documents, 161, No.105, 172, No.116; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 501–2, 507–8, Nos. 700, 710; and Weinberg II, 640–41.
294. Domarus, 1319; DGFP, D, VII, 485–9, Nos. 504, 505, 507. In the evening of 3 September, Hitler thanked Mussolini for his efforts and explained why Germany was now at war with Great Britain and France (DGFP, D, VII, 538–9, No.565).
295. Dahlerus, 125–6. And see Hofer, Entfesselung, 392–3.
296. Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the British Foreign Office, was brisk in his reply when Dahlerus telephoned him on the early afternoon of 1 September, after his meeting with Hitler (Dahlerus, 127; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 479–80, Nos.651–2). Cadogan had already noted in his diary on 28 August that the ‘masses of messages from Dahlerus…don’t amount to much unless one can infer from them that Hitler has cold feet’ (The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 203). Dahlerus’s frantic last efforts to engineer a visit by Göring to London were no more than whistling in the wind (Dahlerus, 136–7). In an interview on BBC-TV on 14 September 1997, Sir Frank Roberts (then a prominent diplomat in the Foreign Office, later, in the 1960s, British Ambassador to Moscow, then Bonn), who took the call from Dahlerus on the morning of 3 September, after the British ultimatum had been issued, recalled that he had not thought it worth passing on the message to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax.
297. DGFP, VII, 527–8, N0.558; DBFP, 3rd Ser., IX, 539, App.IV; Weinberg, ii.649–50.
298. Henderson, 278–9; Documents, 168–9, No.109–11; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 492, No.682.
299. Documents, 175, No.118; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 521, 535, Nos.732, 757.
300. Schmidt, 472; Henderson, 284.
301. Documents, 175, No.118; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 535, No.757; German reply, DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 539–41, N0.766; Domarus, 1336–8.
302. Documents, 179, No.120.
303. Halder KTB, i.58 (3 September 1939); TBJG, I/7, 91 (4 September 1939); DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 538, No.764.
304. See IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.56.
305. Schmidt, 473. Doubts have been expressed about the accuracy of Schmidt’s account (Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Hitler and England, 1933–1945: Pretense and Reality’, German Studies Review, 8 (1985), 299–309, here 306). Certainly, Schmidt’s memoirs contain errors. However, Schmidt was present on the occasion, and Hitler’s response was short enough and striking enough for the interpreter to have remembered it correctly, even several years later. What might, perhaps, be justifiably doubted is whether Schmidt grasped Hitler’s meaning; whether Hitler was not simply asking Ribbentrop in practical terms about what the next step would be. The reported response (Schmidt, 473) of the Foreign Minister, ‘I presume that the French will hand us a similar-sounding ultimatum in the next hour,’ points in this direction.
306. Documents, 157, No.105.
307. L.B. Namier, Conflicts. Studies in Contemporary History, London, 1942, 57.
308. Klemperer, 112–29; Watt, How War Came, 390–94; Meehan, especially ch.7; Lamb, 105–8. Some of the clearest warnings of the need for Britain to take a firm stand against Hitler were passed on in the spring and summer by Lieutenant-Colonel von Schwerin, head of the ‘Foreign Armies West’ section of the Army High Command’s Intelligence Department. The Foreign Office was, however, largely dismissive of his information. ‘As usual the German army trusts us to save them from the Nazi regime,’ was the minute of one prominent diplomat, Frank K. Roberts (Klemperer, 119). I am grateful to R. A. C. Parker for referring me to reports on Schwerin in PRO, FO 371/22990 and FO 371/22968.
309. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 1946, ii.138. Gisevius did not claim these were Oster’s exact words, but was adamant that they represented his meaning.
310. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 1946; ii.140.
311. See Müller, Heer, 414–19.
312. Watt, How War Came, 394–404.
313. See Kube, 319; Martens, 199–200; Irving, Göring, 268, 272.
314. Bloch, 261. Similar thoughts were current in Berlin on the very day of the British declaration (Shirer, 159).
315. According to Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 115–16, the photographer found Hitler at the height of the crisis in August 1939 slumped in his chair in the Reich Chancellery, just after a visit by Ribbentrop, bitterly criticizing the Foreign Office. ‘I knew, of course, exactly what he meant,’ Hoffmann wrote. ‘Again and again I had myself heard Ribbentrop, with an aplomb and self-confidence out of all proportion to his knowledge and his faulty powers of judgment, assure Hitler that Britain was degenerate, that Britain would never fight, that Britain would certainly never go to war to pull someone else’s chestnuts out of the fire…’
316. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, 43: ‘Hitler glaubte nicht an einen Krieg mit den Westmächten, weil er nicht daran glauben wollte. Wie weit Ribbentrop mitverantwortlich war für diesen Glauben, wird sich wohl kaum mehr feststellen lassen. Aus der Verschiedenheit der beiden Charaktere und auf Grund der ganzen Atmosphäre im Führerhauptquartier [sic] möchte ich jedoch schließen, daß die Initiative bei Hitler gelegen hat, und der im Grund weiche Ribbendrop, der sowieso keine eigene Meinung vertrat, es für angebracht und zweckmäßig hielt, ihn in dieser Einstellung zu bestärken…’
317. See Himmler’s diary entry of 28 August 1939, where Hitler was pondering his next step in the Polish crisis. Hitler said he wanted to think about it overnight. He had his clearest thoughts between 5.00 and 6.00a.m. (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1939 Bd.20; Irving, Führer, 222–3).
318. See the comment of army liaison officer Nikolaus v. Vormann, on what he regarded as characteristic for Hitler: ‘On problems that bothered him, he spoke until he was clear about them. Just as others need paper, pencil, and the peace of a study to order and clarify their thoughts sitting at a desk, he needed to speak to an audience’ (IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.47) (‘Über Probleme, die ihn beschäftigten, sprach er sich klar. Wie andere Papier und Bleistift und die Ruhe eines Arbeitszimmers brauchen, um am Schreibtisch ihre Gedanken zu ordnen und zu klären, brauchte er einen Zuhörerkreis, vor dem er sprechen konnte’).
319. See Speer, 178–9, for his little contact.
320. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 1946, ii.135.
321. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 254–5.
322. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 255.
323. DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 201–2 (quotation 201), No.248. The remark was made on 23 August.
324. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.44 (29 August): ‘Ich bin jetzt 50 Jahre alt, noch im Vollbesitz meiner Kraft. Die Probleme müssen von mir gelöst werden, und ich kann nicht mehr warten. In einigen Jahren bin ich dazu rein körperlicb und vielleicht auch geistig nicht mehr im Stande…’
325. Weinberg II, 629.
326. See Weinberg II, 654.
327. See Dahlerus, 126.
328. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols.31, 34.
329. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 162 (entry for 29 August 1939): ‘Ich habe in meinem Leben immer va banque gespielt’.
330. TBJG, I/7, 92 (4 September 1939).
1. See Broszat, Staat, 380–81.
2. Mason, Sozialpolitik, 26.
3. Schroeder, 98; Jochen von Lang, Der Sekretär. Martin Bormann: Der Mann, der Hitler beherrschte, Frankfurt am Main, 1980, 149.
4. Below, 205.
5. Below, 204.
6. Lang, 149; Irving, Hitler’s War, London etc., 1977 (Irving, HW), 3.
7. Cit. Broszat, Staat, 392 n.
8. Below, 203.
9. Below, 207.
10. Halder KTB, i.61; trans. Halder Diary, 50.
11. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms. A Global History of World War II, Cambridge, 1994 (= Weinberg III), 51.
12. Keitel, 216–17; Below, 205.
13. Keitel, 216, mentions visits to the front every other day from morning until late at night.
14. Schroeder, 98–9.
15. Halder KTB, i.80 (20 September 1939). See also Groscurth, 207–8: ‘German blood helped the Russians and Bolshevism to the effortless advance.’ See also Below, 206; Irving, HW, 19.
16. Below, 206; Irving, HW, 19–20.
17. Below, 207; Irving, HW, 24.
18. DRZW, ii.133. Czeslaw Madajczyk, Die Okkupationspolitik Nazideutschlands in Polen 1939–1945, East Berlin, 1987, 4, has 400,000. According to Weinberg III, 57 (no source), a million Polish soldiers had entered either German or Russian captivity.
19. DRZW, ii.133. Jörg K. Hoensch, Geschichte Polens, Stuttgart, 1983, S.280, has 66,300 dead, and 134,000 wounded. See also Christian Jansen/Arno Weckbecker, ‘Eine Miliz im “Weltanschauungskrieg”: der “Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz” in Polen 1939/40’, in Michalka, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 482–500, here 484. The figures do not include those murdered by the SS Einsatzkom-mandos or the Selbstschutz, etc. Madajczyk, 4, gives 66,000 dead and 133,000 wounded.
20. DRZW, ii.133. Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 4 (no source), gives figures of 16,000 German dead and 28,000 wounded. On 6 October 1939, Hitler announced 10,572 dead, 30,322 wounded, and 3,409 men missing as of 30 September. (Domarus, 1381. Groscurth, 211 (29 September 1939) gave an interim figure, between 1 and 24 September, of 5,450 dead and 22,000 wounded.)
21. Groscurth, 265–6; Janßen/Tobias, 248–9. The evidence demonstrates that his death was not, as often surmised (and immediately hinted at by Heydrich), in effect suicide. See also Groscurth, 210–11; Keitel, 219.
22. Cit. Janßen/Tobias, 247.
23. Domarus, 1367; Below, 207.
24. Groscurth, 209–10 (25 September 1939); Janßen/Tobias, 250.
25. Janßen/Tobias, 251.
26. RSA, IIA, ‘Außenpolitische Standortbestimmung nach der Reichstagswahl Juni-Juli 1928’ (first published as Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitlers Zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928, Stuttgart, 1961), 37.
27. See Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, (1961), Fischer paperback edn, Frankfurt am Main, 1965, 11–15.
28. Halder KTB, i.65 (7 September 1939).
29. Groscurth, 357; Halder KTB, i.72 (12 September 1939).
30. Groscurth, 357; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 16.
31. Domarus, 1362 (speech, 1354–66); Broszat, Polenpolitik, 16.
32. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 16–17.
33. Seraphim, Rosenberg-T agebuch, 99 (19 September 1939); Weisungen, 34 (Weisung Nr.5, 30 September 1939).
34. Domarus, 1391 (text of the speech, 1377–93).
35. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 29–35.
36. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 36–41.
37. Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 1074–83, for the War Economy Decree; Max Seydewitz, Civil Life in Wartime Germany. The Story of the Home Front, New York, 1945, 58–9; Steinert, 97.
38. Shirer, 157.
39. Shirer, 159.
40. Shirer, 164.
41. Shirer, 165.
42. Shirer, 173.
43. DBS, vi.965ff.
44. DBS, vi.1032.
45. Ortwin Buchbender and Reinhold Sterz (eds.), Das andere Gesicht des Krieges. Deutsche Feldpostbriefe 1939–1945, Munich, 1982, 41.
46. See Shirer, 173.
47. MadR, ii.331.
48. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 143–6.
49. See Broszat, Polenpolitik, 41ff.; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 14–18, 186ff.
50. In his discussion with Army Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch on 22 September, Heydrich agreed to withdraw the order — which had come, it was claimed, directly from Hitler’s train — to shoot insurgents without trial (Groscurth, 360–61).
51. Heydrich demanded, in his discussion with Brauchitsch on 22 September, that they be immediately arrested and deposited in concentration camps (Groscurth, 361–2).
52. Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolitzei und des SD 1938–1942, Stuttgart, 1981, 19–106, esp.44ff., 63, 69; Helmut Krausnick, ‘Judenverfolgung’, in Hans Buchheim et al., Anatomie des SS-Staates, Olten-Freiburg im Breisgau, 1965, ii.348–9; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 14ff., 187; Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 524 (entry on ‘Intelligenzaktion’). The terror against the Polish population was far from confined to the German zone of occupation. After the Soviet Union had occupied the eastern part of Poland on 17 September, the NKVD (Stalin’s secret police, which sustained links at the time with the SS), arrested and deported to the Arctic or Central Asia an estimated 315,000–330,000 Poles, and in the spring of 1940 perpetrated the infamous massacre of thousands of captured Polish officers, later discovered in the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk (Norman Davies, Europe. A History, Oxford, 1996, 1002–5 (where the number of 1–2 million deportees is given, following the figures claimed by the Polish exiled government during the war)). The most detailed analysis of the expulsions and closest estimates of the numbers involved is provided by Günther Häufele, ‘Zwangsumsiedlungen in Polen 1939–1941. Zum Vergleich sowjetischer und deutscher Besatzungspolitik’, in Dittmar Dahlmann and Gerhard Hirschfeld (eds.), Lager, Zwangs-arbeit, Vertreibung und Deportation. Dimensionen der Massenverbrechen in der Sowjetunion und in Deutschland 1933 bis 1945, Essen, 1999, 515–33, here 526 and 521 for the estimated 11,000 victims of the Katyn ‘executions’.
53. Helmut Krausnick, ‘Hitler und die Morde in Polen’, VfZ, 11 (1963), 196–209, here 196–7.
54. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 483.
55. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 484.
56. Hilarius Breitinger, Als Deutschenseelsorger in Posen und im Warthegau 1934–1945. Erin-nerungen, Mainz, 1984, 30–38; Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 484.
57. Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 12–13; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 50–51. The exiled Polish government in London, citing the report of an Englishwoman who had lived in Bromberg and had been there on the so-called ‘Bloody Sunday’ of 3 September, implied that nothing untoward had happened that day and that it had been purely a German invention (The German New Order in Poland, London, n.d. (1941), 131).
58. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 51.
59. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 51 and 180 n.78 (for the later claim by Hitler’s Army Adjutant Gerhard Engel that the dictator had personally given the order to exaggerate the number of victims); Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 12–13, and n.23. See also Breitinger, 38–42, and, for a detailed examination of the myth launched by German propaganda, Karol Marian Pospieszalski, ‘The Case of the 58,000 “Volksdeutsche”. An Investigation into Nazi Claims Concerning Losses of the German Minority in Poland before and during 1939’, in Documenta Occupationis, ed. Instytut Zachodni, vol.vii, 2nd edn, Poznan, 1981.
60. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 484.
61. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 51.
62. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 486. A full analysis of the role of the ‘Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz’ is provided in the book by the same authors: Christian Jansen and Arno Weckbecker, Der ‘Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz’ in Polen 1939/40, Munich, 1992, especially, for the atrocities perpetrated by the organization, 111–59.
63. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 486.
64. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 487–8; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 14.
65. Cit. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 490.
66. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 32.
67. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 491.
68. Jansen/Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 496; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 14.
69. Groscurth, 201 (8 September 1939) and n.476, including the recollection that Hitler had made the same complaints as Heydrich on the same day to Keitel.
70. Halder KTB, i.79 (19 September 1939). See Broszat, Polenpolitik, 20, for the first use of ‘Flurbereinigung’ in the notes of Canaris’s talk with Keitel on 12 September.
71. Halder KTB, i.67 (10 September 1939); Groscurth, 203 (11 September 1939).
72. IfZ, Nuremberg Documents, PS-3047, Serie II, Blatt 2, ‘Aktenvermerk über die Besprechung im Führerzug am 12.9.1939 in Ilnau’; Groscurth, 358; also cit. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 20; Jansen-Weckbecker, ‘Miliz’, 494.
73. Groscurth, 202 (9 September 1939).
74. IMG, xxvi.255–7, Doc.686-PS; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 22 and 175, n.35.
75. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 21–2; also printed in Kurt Pätzold (ed.), Verfolgung, Vertreibung, Vernich-tung. Dokumente des faschistischen Antisemitismus 1933 bis 1942, Leipzig, 1983, 239–40 (misdated to 27 September); and Europa unterm Hakenkreuz: Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Polen (1939–1945), Dokumentenauswahl und Einleitung von Werner Röhr et al., East Berlin, 1989, 119–20 (and 120–22 for the instructions issued the same day to the commanders of the Einsatzgruppen). The SD’s ‘Jewish Department’ II 112 had already begun collecting detailed data early in May on the Jewish population in Poland, building up a card-index which, in the event of its deployment, could be passed on to an Einsatzkommando. (I am most grateful to Professor Dan Michmann, Bar-Ilan, Israel, for passing to me a copy of the relevant document, taken from BA, R 58/954. See also Dan Michmann, ‘Preparing for Occupation? A Nazi Sicherheitsdienst Document of Spring 1939 on the Jews of Holland’, Studia Rosenthaliana, 32 (1998), 173–80, here 177.)
76. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 98–9. Unlike Heydrich, Hitler evidently envisaged the eastern fortifications beyond the General Government, but excluding the area of Jewish settlement. Heydrich depicted it as running along the line of the German provinces.
77. TBJG, I/7, 147 (10 October 1939). Hitler’s contempt for the Poles was, as he told Mussolini several months later, bolstered by his impressions of Poland during the campaign (Andreas Hillgruber (ed.), Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler. Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen 1939–1941, Munich, 1969 (= Staatsmänner I) 46–7 (18 March 1940)).
78. Domarus, 1283; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 23.
79. The meeting was apparently occasioned by a complaint by Hans Frank about his military superiors (Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 85).
80. General Governor Frank later, on 30 May 1940, justified the liquidation of a Polish ruling stratum in the notorious ‘AB-Aktion’ — the ‘Außerordentliche Befriedungsaktion’ (‘Extraordinary Pacification Action’), camouflage for the liquidation of mainly political opponents and criminals in the General Government between May and July 1940 — by recourse to a directive from Hitler (Krausnick, Morde, 203; Müller, Heer, 453).
81. IMG, xxvi.378–9 (quotation, 379), Doc.864-PS; Documenta Occupationis, vol.vi, ed. Instytut Zachodni, Poznan, 1958, 27–30; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 25.
82. IMG, xxvi.381, Doc.864-PS; Documenta Occupationis, vi.29; Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 86.
83. Though doubts are implied in Irving, HW, 12.
84. Krausnick, Morde, 206–7.
85. Groscurth, 358; Müller, Heer, 428. Brauchitsch’s wishes, outlined to Heydrich on 22 September, for ‘no over-hasty elimination of the Jews’, to back the Führer’s order of priority for economic matters, and for ‘ethnic-political movements’ only after the end of military operations, also indicate his broad knowledge of the ‘ethnic-cleansing’ programme. Heydrich told him explicitly on this occasion that, as far as economic concerns went, no consideration could be made for nobility, clergy, teachers, and legionaries: ‘But those weren’t many — a few thousand,’ he said (Groscurth, 361).
86. Documenta Occupationis, vol.v, ed. Instytut Zachodni, Poznan, 1952, 40.
87. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 76–7; Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army. Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, New York/Oxford, 1991, 62–7. Marcel Reich-Ranicki, the German literary critic, of Polish-Jewish descent, described the plundering and sadistic behaviour of German soldiers in Warsaw in autumn 1939, which he witnessed at first hand, as ‘the pleasure of the hunt’. Freed of any constraints they might have felt at home, they were subject to no control, and could simply ‘let rip’ (Marcel Reich-Ranicki, Mein Leben, Stuttgart, 1999, 178ff., especially 183–4).
88. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 77–8 (quotation from the amnesty decree, 82).
89. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 80.
90. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 84; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 34 (for the complaint by Gauleiter Forster).
91. TBJG, I/7, 153 (14 October 1939).
92. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 87.
93. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 34–5.
94. See Müller, Heer, 437–50, for the complaints of Blaskowitz and Ulex.
95. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 97–8, 102–3; Ernst Klee, Willi Dreßen, and Volker Rieß (eds.), ‘Schöne Zeiten’. Judenmord aus der Sicht der Täter und Gaffer, Frankfurt am Main, 1988, 14–15; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 1939–1945, Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten, 5th edn, Darmstadt, 1961, 606–8; Müller, Heer, 448–9.
96. See Müller, Heer, 428ff.
97. IfZ, MA 1564/24, Nuremberg Documents, NOKW-1799; text printed in Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 103–4 and n.425; Brauchitsch’s comments came a day after Blaskowitz’s final report, and five days after the complaint of Ulex.
98. Engel, 68; Krausnick, Morde, 204, n.42.
99. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 103.
100. Müller, Heer, 451, n.152.
101. Cit. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 106; Klaus-Jurgen Müller, ‘Zu Vorgeschichte und Inhalt der Rede Himmlers vor der höheren Generalität am 13.März 1940 in Koblenz’, VfZ, 18 (1970), 95–120, here 108. See Albert Zoller, Hitler privat. Erlebnisbericht seiner Geheimsekretärin, Düsseldorf, 1949, 195, for Himmler’s comments, evidently in the same context: ‘The person of the Führer must on no account be brought into connection with [the atrocities in Poland]. I accept full responsibility.’
102. IfZ, ZS 627, (Gen. Wilhelm Ulex) Fol.124: ‘Ich tue nichts, was der Führer nicht weiß.’ See also Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 105; Krausnick, Morde, 205; Müller, Heer, 451. Irving, HW, 13n, casts doubt on the veracity of Ulex’s recollection, on the grounds that no one else present on the occasion subsequently referred to these words.
103. Broszat, Polenpolitik, 41.
104. TBJG, I/7, 157 (17 October 1939). For the production and content of the film, see the detailed study of Stig Hornshøh-Møller, ‘Der ewige Jude’. Quellenkritische Analyse eines antisemitischen Propagandafilms, Institut fürden Wissenschaftlichen Film, Göttingen, 1995.
105. TBJG, I/7, 173 (29 October 1939); quotation, 177 (2 November 1939). Hitler took a direct interest in the film. He had suggestions to make when Goebbels spoke to him again about the development of the film in mid-November (TBJG, I/7, 201 (19 November 1939). Fritz Hippler, head of the film department in the Propaganda Ministry and producer of the film, claimed in his memoirs long after the war that Goebbels had told him when commissioning film of the Polish ghettos that the Führer wanted all the Jews resettled in Madagascar or elsewhere, and that the film was required for archival purposes (Hornshøh-Møller, ‘Der ewige Jude’ 16; Fritz Hippler, Die Verstrickung, Düsseldorf, 1981, 187). Goebbels’s language on the Poles resembled that of Hitler: ‘Drive over Polish roads. That’s already Asia. We’ll have a lot to do to germanize this area’ (TBJG, I/7, 177 (2 November 1939)).
106. Michael Burleigh, Germany turns Eastwards. A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich, Cambridge, 1988, especially ch.4.
107. Documenta Occupationis, v.2–28; Broszat, Polenpolitik, 26–7.
108. See Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung. Auschwitz und die deutschen Plane für eine neue europäische Ordnung, Frankfurt am Main, 1993.
109. For a brief sketch of Greiser’s personality and career, see Ian Kershaw, ‘Arthur Greiser — Ein Motor der “Endlösung” ’, in Ronald M. Smelser, Enrico Syring, and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), Die Braune Elite II, Darmstadt, 1993, 116–27. Greiser’s motor-boat licence from 1930 is in his file in NA, IRR, Box 69, XE 000933, NND 871063, Folder 3. By then he had already joined the Party, because, he was said to have stated (letter in the file to Greiser from Rolf-Heinz Höppner, 22 November 1943), ‘that this was the only thing that could still save him’ (‘dass dies das einzige sei, was ihn noch retten könne’). His political enemies later claimed that he was engaged at the time in currency smuggling.
110. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Greiser’, 118.
111. Burckhardt, 78.
112. Burckhardt, 79.
113. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Greiser’, 125.
114. Rebentisch, 163–88, here especially 183.
115. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Greiser’, 125.
116. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Greiser’, 123.
117. Archiwum Panstowe Poznan, Best. Schutzpolizei Posen, Bd.7, S.1, Dienstabt. Jarotschin, 15 October 1939, Dienstbefehl Nr.i.
118. Dienstbefehl, Nr. 5, 20 March 1940.
119. Information kindly provided by Stanislaw Nawrocki, Director of the Archiwum Panstowe Poznan, 25 September 1993. The figures relate to the situation in 1942–3.
120. Cit. Krausnick/Wilhelm, Truppe, 626–7, cit. BA R43 II/1549, Bormann to Lammers, 20 November 1940.
121. See Broszat, Polenpolitik, 200, n.45.
122. Broszat, Polenpolitik, ch.5.
123. See Ian Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide? The Emergence of the “Final Solution” in the “Warthegau” ’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., 2 (1992), 51–78. It was no accident that the first extermination unit, Chelmno, to begin operations, at the beginning of December 1941, was situated in the ‘Warthegau’.
124. Ernst Klee (ed.), Dokumente zur ‘Euthanasie’, Frankfurt am Main, 1985, 85; Ernst Klee, ‘Euthanasie’ im NS-Staat. Die ‘Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens’, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, 100; facsimile in Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State. Germany, 1933–1945, Cambridge, 1991, 143. Philipp Bouhler was Head of the Chancellery of the Führer of the NSDAP, responsible for dealing with the voluminous correspondence addressed to Hitler as Party Leader. Dr Rudolf Brandt had since 1934 been Hitler’s personal doctor. (Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 51–2, 54–5.)
125. Lothar Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie und Justiz im Dritten Reich’, VfZ, 20 (1972), 235–79, here 241; Lothar Gruchmann, Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933–1940. Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der Ara Gürtner, Munich, 1990, 502, and 497–534 for the reactions of the judicial authorities to the ‘euthanasia action’; Burleigh and Wippermann, 143; Jeremy Noakes, ‘Philipp Bouhler und die Kanzlei des Führers der NSDAP: Beispiel einer Sonderverwaltung im Dritten Reich’, in Dieter Rebentisch and Karl Teppe (eds.), Verwaltung contra Menschenführung im Staat Hitlers. Studien zum politisch-administrativen System, Göttingen, 1986, 208–36, here 229.
126. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 241, 254.
127. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 247–50; Klee, Dokumente, 86–7.
128. Klee, Dokumente, 86–7; Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 241–2.
129. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 242.
130. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 254.
131. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 255; Gruchmann, Justiz, 511–13; Susanne Willems, Lothar Kreyssig. Vom eigenen verantwortlichen Handeln. Eine biographische Studie zum Protest gegen die Euthanasi-everhrechen in Nazi-Deutschland, Göttingen, n.d. (1996), 137–61.
132. The background of ‘racial hygiene’ and eugenics ideas, and their transportation into the Third Reich, is thoroughly dealt with by Hans-Walter Schmuhl, Rassenhygiene, Nationalsozialismus, Euthanasie. Von der Verhütung zur Vernichtung ‘lebensunwerten Lebens’, 1890–1945, Göttingen, 1987; Robert N. Proctor, Racial Hygiene. Medicine under the Nazis, Cambridge, Mass., 1988; and Paul Weindling, Health, Race, and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945, Cambridge, 1989.
133. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 19–28; Schmuhl, 115–25; Burleigh, Death, 15ff.; Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 235–6; Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors. Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide, New York, 1986, ch. 2.
134. Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance. ‘Euthanasia’ in Germany, c.1900–1945, Cambridge, 1994, ch.1, especially 24, 33, 38–9; and 53–4. See also Hans Ludwig Siemen, ‘Reform und Radikalisi-erung. Veränderungen der Psychiatrie in der Weltwirtschaftskrise’, in Norbert Frei (ed.), Medizin und Gesundheitspolitik in der NS-Zeit, Munich, 1991, 191–200; Michael Burleigh, ‘Psychiatry, German Society, and the Nazi “Euthanasia” Programme’, in Michael Burleigh, Ethics and Extermination. Reflections on Nazi Genocide, Cambridge, 1997, 113–29; Schmuhl, 121, 147, 192–3; and Hilde Steppe, ’ “Mit Tränen in den Augen haben wir dann diese Spritzen aufgezogen”. Die Beteiligung von Krankenschwestern und Krankenpflegern an den Verbrechen gegen die Menschlich-keit’, in Hilde Steppe (ed.), Krankenpflege im Nationalsozialismus, 7th edn, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, 137–74, especially 146ff. The sharp caesura of 1933, discernible in the shift towards pro-euthanasia views that followed, is well brought out in Michael Schwarz, ’ “Euthanasie”-Debatten in Deutschland (1895–1945)’, VfZ, 46 (1998), 617–65, especially 621–2, 643ff. The bureaucratic administration of the ‘euthanasia action’ is thoroughly examined by Henry Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide. From Euthanasia to the Final Solution, Chapel Hill/London, 1995.
135. Kurt Nowak, ‘Widerstand, Zustimmung, Hinnahme. Das Verhalten der Bevölkerung zur “Euthanasie” ’, in Frei, Medizin und Gesundheitspolitik, 235–51; Schwarz, 639–43, 647–9.
136. MK, 279–80; transl. MK Watt, 232.
137. RSA, III.2, 347.
138. RSA, III.2, 348.
139. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 46–7.
140. Burleigh, Death, 97.
141. Cit. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 235.
142. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 236. See also Cardinal Faulhaber’s public warnings in 1934 of the dangers in possible moves towards euthanasia (Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 53).
143. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 236–7.
144. Cit. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 238; IfZ, 2719/61, Fols.28–9: ‘Aktenvermerk zu dem Erm-ittlungsverfahren gegen Professor Dr Werner Heyde und Rechtsanwalt Dr Gerhard Bohne (Stand vom 1.1.1961)’. Hitler had already indicated to Wagner the previous year his readiness to override the law in preventing the prosecution of any doctor accused of carrying about terminating a pregnancy where one of the partners suffered from hereditary illness (Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 239–40).
145. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 53.
146. Burleigh, Death, 187.
147. Burleigh, Death, 184, 188.
148. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 66ff.
149. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 63; Burleigh, Death, ch.2.
150. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 62.
151. Cit. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 63.
152. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 210–11.
153. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 221.
154. Albert Krebs, Tendenzen und Gestalten der NSDAP. Erinnerungen an die Frühzeit der Partei, Stuttgart, 1959, 142, 197; Orlow, 59.
155. For biographical sketches, see Hans-Walter Schmuhl, ‘Philipp Bouhler — Ein Vorreiter des Massenmordes’, in Smelser, Syring, and Zitelmann (eds.), Die braune Elite II, 39–50; Robert Wistrich, Wer war wer in Dritten Reich, Munich, 1983, 29; Werß, Biographisches Lexikon, 51–2.
156. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 211–12, 234.
157. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 223–4.
158. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 223.
159. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 226.
160. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 225–7.
161. Burleigh, Death, 94–5.
162. Gitta Sereny, Into that Darkness. An Examination of Conscience, Pan Books edn, London, 1977, 65; Burleigh, Death, 93.
163. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 227; Burleigh, Death, 98; Udo Benzenhöfer, Der gute Tod? Euthanasie und Sterbehilfe in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Munich, 1999, 114–18. Udo Benzenhöfer, ‘Der Fall “Kind Knauer” ’, Deutsches Ärzteblatt, 95, Heft 19, 8 May 1998, 54–5, was able to identify the child concerned, which was born on 20 February and died on 25 July 1939. See also Ulf Schmidt, ‘Reassessing the Beginning of the “Euthanasia” Programme’, German History, 17 (1999), 543–50.
164. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 227; Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 240. Hitler’s doctor, Theo Morell, prepared a memorandum during the summer of 1939 on the need for a ‘euthanasia’ law, and spoke to Hitler, probably on the basis of this memorandum about it, though at what precise date is unclear (Burleigh, Death, 98).
165. Sereny, Into that Darkness, 64ff., here 68; Klee, Dokumente, 40–46, 146–51; Udo Benzenhöfer and Karin Finsterbuch, Moraltheologie pro ‘NS-Euthanasie’. Studien zu einem ‘Gutachten (1940) von Prof. Joseph Mayer mit Edition des Textes, Hannover, 1998.
166. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 227–8.
167. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 241.
168. Noakes, ‘Bouhler’, 228.
169. Bert Honolka, Die Kreuzelschreiber. Ärzte ohne Gewissen: Euthanasie im Dritten Reich, Hamburg, 1961, 35. Broszat, Staat, 399, suggests only about fifty doctors and technicians knew the full extent of the ‘action’. The German names for the dummy-organizations involved were, respectively: ‘Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft der Heil- und Pflegeanstalten’; ‘Gemeinnützige Kranken-transportgesellschaft’; and ‘Gemeinnützige Stiftung für Anstaltspflege’.
170. Honolka, 37.
171. Honolka, 33.
172. Burleigh/Wippermann, The Racial State, 148.
173. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 95–8, 112–15,192–3; Schmuhl, 240–42; Götz Aly, ‘Endlösung’. Völkerver-schiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, 114–26; Benzenhöfer, Der gute Tod?, 118–19.
174. Gruchmann, ‘Euthanasie’, 244 and n.33; Burleigh/Wippermann, The Racial State, 153.
175. Including the killings which continued in asylums despite the ‘stop decree’, the thousands more later killed in the so-called ‘wild’ euthanasia and the ‘14f13’ programme that continued down to the end of the war, the thousands of ‘euthanasia’ victims who were killed in Poland, the Soviet Union, and other occupied territories, and the children murdered in the ‘Child Euthanasia’ programme (which was not halted by the ‘stop decree’), it is possible to reach estimates as high as a further 90,000 to add to the 70,000 or more of the T4 ‘action’. (Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 345ff.; Burleigh/Wippermann, The Racial State, 144, 148; Benzenhöfer, Der gute Tod?, 129.)
176. Above based on Deutsch, 42–67, 81–91, 105–7, Ch.VI; and see Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 419–29.
177. Mommsen, ‘Widerstand’, 9, speaks of ‘a resistance of state servants’ (‘einen Widerstand der Staatsdiener’).
178. Deutsch, 188–9.
179. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 376–402; Kordt, 359–77; Deutsch, 189–253, and Ch.VII; Müller, Heer, Ch.XI.
180. See Peter Hoffmann, ‘Maurice Bavaud’s Attempt to Assassinate Hitler in 1938’, in George L. Mosse, Police Forces in History, Beverly Hills, 1975, 173–204, for the hare-brained schemes of the Swiss student Maurice Bavaud. For Hitler’s security, see Hoffmann, ‘Hitler’s Personal Security’, in the same volume, 151–71, and Peter Hoffmann, Hitler’s Personal Security, London, 1979. Left-wing resistance groups had by this time inevitably dwindled greatly in size since the early years of the regime, when tens of thousands of people had been involved in various forms of illegal activity. A minute fraction of the working class was now involved. Networks of friends and trusted contacts frequently formed the base. (See Detlev J. K. Peukert, ‘Working-Class Resistance: Problems and Options’, in David Clay Large (ed.), Contending with Hitler. Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich, Cambridge, 1991, 35–48, here 41–2; and Martin Broszat, ‘A Social and Historical Typology of the German Opposition to Hitler’, in the same volume, 25–33, here 27–9.) Secretly maintaining such networks of like-minded opponents of the regime, exchanging views, and keeping up morale was often an end in itself for Social Democrats. (William Sheridan Allen, ‘Die sozialdemo-kratische Untergrundbewegung: Zur Kontinuität der subkulturellen Werte’, in Schmädeke and Steinbach, 849–66, especially 857ff.) For the Communists, a difficult phase, with much disillusionment and disarray at the grass-roots of the underground resistance-movement, had begun with the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August. (Detlev Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand. Verfolgung und Untergrundarbeit an Rhein und Ruhr 1933 bis 1945, Wuppertal, 1980, 329ff.)
181. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 164: ‘… ware man der peinlichen Entscheidung überhoben, wie man denn England militärisch zu Boden zwingen kann’.
182. The sixty-five French divisions available for an assault on Germany from the West in September 1939 had massively outnumbered the Wehrmacht units, which were so heavily committed in Poland. But they were never sent into action. (DRZW, ii.18–19, 270. See also Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategic Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941, (1965), 3rd edn, Bonn, 1993, 34–5, 53.)
183. See Domarus, 1369–70, for Hitler’s suggestion to the Swedish intermediary Dahlerus on 26 September that he would guarantee security for Britain and France, needed peace to cultivate — a task requiring at least fifty years — the newly-won territories in Poland (a state which would not be allowed to be recreated), and could offer Britain peace within fourteen days without loss of face. As usual, this ‘generosity’ was coupled with threats. He had destroyed Poland within three weeks. The British (Engländer) should reflect on what could happen to them within three months. If they wanted a long war, Germany would hold out and reduce England to a heap of rubble. Some of these sentiments were repeated in Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 6 October. (See Domarus, 1388ff.)
184. Irving, HW, 25. The British War Cabinet put out the announcement on 9 September that it expected a three-year war to quell rumours that British action depended upon events in Poland (The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 215 and n).
185. DRZW, ii.240.
186. Below, 210. He had already learned from Schmundt on 8 September that Hitler was intending to attack France as soon as possible. Hitler, according to Below, spoke about this to his closest military advisers on a number of occasions during the following days and was determined to launch the attack in October or November.
187. Halder KTB, i.86–90 (27 September 1939); trans. Halder Diary, 62–6.
188. DRZW, ii.238.
189. Warlimont, 37.
190. Seraphim, Rosenberg-Tagebuch, 99 (29 September 1939).
191. Domarus, 1392.
192. Domarus, 1390.
193. Domarus, 1389, 1393.
194. Domarus, 1393.
195. Chamberlain asked who stood in the way of genuine peace in Europe, and answered his own rhetorical question: ‘It is the German Government, and the German Government alone’ (cit. Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 223). All unofficial feelers in the following months met with a similar response.
196. Halder KTB, i. 99 (7 October 1939); Müller, Heer, 475.
197. Halder KTB, i. 100 (9 October 1939); Müller, Heer, 476.
198. Cit. Müller, Heer, 476.
199. Warlimont, 50; Müller, Heer, 476.
200. Halder KTB, i. 101–3 (10 October 1939); Müller, Heer, 476; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges 1939–1940, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt, 1956, 4–20, Nr.3, S.4ff., here, 15, 19. See also DRZW, ii.239; and Hillgruber, Strategie, 45–6. Hitler remained convinced that he had been correct in his views when he referred to the memorandum in December 1944. (Helmut Heiber (ed.), Lagebesprechungen im Führerhauptquartier. Protokoli’fragmente aus Hitlers militärischen Konferenzen 1942–1945, Deutsche Buch-Gemeinschaft edn, Berlin/Darmstadt/Vienna, 1963 (=LB Darmstadt), 284.)
201. Halder KTB, i. 101 (10 October 1939).
202. Weisungen, 37–8.
203. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 268.
204. Halder KTB, i. 107 (16 October 1939, mistakenly dated the following day).
205. Halder KTB, i.iii (22 October 1939); Jacobsen, Vorgeschichte, 41 (for confirmation on 27 October 1939).
206. TBJG, I/7, 150 (12 October 1939).
207. TBJG, I/7, 153 (14 October 1939). ‘Die Engländer müssen durch Schaden klug werden.’
208. TBJG, I/7, 164 (22 October 1939).
209. Groscurth, 385; and see Müller, Heer, 493.
210. TBJG, I/7, 180 (3 November 1939).
211. TBJG, I/7, 184 (7 November 1939). The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) ended the religious and political conflicts of the Thirty Years War, but did so by weakening the central authority of the Holy Roman Empire to the advantage of the individual states. Territorial concessions had also to be made to France and Sweden, while Switzerland and the Netherlands finally established their independence of the Reich. That the settlement was anathema to Hitler is plain to see.
212. TBJG, I/7, 187 (9 November 1939).
213. Dülffer, Marine, 541ff.
214. Goring had continued in the first weeks of the war to put out unofficial feelers through Dahlerus towards a possible settlement with Britain (Irving, Goring, 274–8). The British Foreign Office was dismissive and, on 19 October, diplomatically told Dahlerus to bring the contact to an end (Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 223–6).
215. Halder KTB, i.105 (14 October 1939).
216. Müller, Heer, 480 and n.59; Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 269–70.
217. Müller, Heer, 480.
218. Müller, Heer, 481.
219. Müller, Heer, 485.
220. Müller, Heer, 485–6.
221. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 167–8; Müller, Heer, 516–17 (with doubts about whether later conspiracy details were not intermingled with the plans of 1939 in the post-war account of this document). For the Abwehr group see Deutsch, 81ff.
222. Müller, Heer, 490–96.
223. Deutsch, 16–17.
224. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 166; Müller, Heer, 500–501.
225. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 172–3; Müller, Heer, 502, 507–8. On Halder’s ambivalent opposition in autumn 1939, see also Hartmann, Halder, 162–72; Ueberschär, Halder, 35–45.
226. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 173–4.
227. Müller, Heer, 518–20.
228. Deutsch, 226–9; Müller, Heer, 520–21; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 177; Halder KTB, i. 120 (5 November 1939); IMG, xx.628; Groscurth, 224 (5 November 1939); Keitel, 225; Warlimont, 58; Below, 213; Engel, 66–7.
229. Halder KTB, i. 120 (5 November 1939); trans. Halder Diary, 78.
230. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 178.
231. Groscurth, 225, 305 (5 November 1939).
232. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 178.
233. Groscurth, 226, 306 (7 November 1939).
234. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 178–80,182–3; Müller, Heer, 524–46; Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 1946 edn, 120–22.
235. The number of postponements is given in Hauner, Hitler, 147.,
236. Groscurth, 227 (9 November 1939); Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 393–4 (where Gisevius states that he initially thought Himmler was behind the assassination attempt, and comments that Helldorf, the Berlin Police Chief, knew no more than what he had seen in the newspapers); Hoffmann, Widerstand, 181. Gisevius (396–411) eventually came to the realization that it was the work of a single man.
237. Zoller, 181.
238. TBJG, I/7, 188 (9 November 1939).
239. TBJG, I/7, 197 (17 November 1939), 201 (19 November 1939).
240. Lothar Gruchmann (ed.), Autobiographie eines Attentäters. Johann Georg Elser. Aussage zum Sprengstoffanschlag im Bürgerbräukeller, München, am 8. November 1939, Stuttgart, 1970, 13–14; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 181.
241. Most early accounts of the attempt (with the exception of that of Gisevius) took it for granted that Elser had been the ‘front-man’ for a plot. (See, e.g., Bullock, Hitler, 566–7, where it is stated that the attempt was organized by the Gestapo). That Elser had planned and carried out the attempt alone was first convincingly demonstrated by Anton Hoch, ‘Das Attentat auf Hitler im Münchener Bürgerbräukeller 1939’, VfZ, 17 (1969), 383–413. The article presented an accurate description of Elser’s background and motivation, as well as his preparation of the bomb-attack, testing the veracity of Elser’s own statement to the police (printed in Gruchmann, Elser, on which the following account rests).
242. Gruchmann, Elser, 27. He had been born in 1903 in Hermaringen (Württemberg).
243. Gruchmann, Elser, 9, 20–22, 76–8, 80–84, 146, 165, n.64.
244. Gruchmann, Elser, 84–101, 104–6, 121–4, 131, 146–53.
245. Gruchmann, Elser, 9; Domarus, 1404.
246. Domarus, 1405.
247. Domarus, 1405–14; see TBJG, I/7, 187–8 (9 November 1939).
248. Gruchmann, Elser, 9; Domarus, 1414–15. Hitler had travelled to Munich by air, but a return flight could not be guaranteed to leave on time because of weather conditions.
249. Domarus, 1414–15; Gruchmann, Elser, 8–9.
250. Zoller, 181; Below, 214.
251. Der VölkischeBeobachter (=VB), 10 November 1939 (‘Die wunderbareErrettungdesFührers’).
252. Gruchmann, Elser, 9–10.
253. Gruchmann, Elser, 7–8, 13ff., 18–20.
254. Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 961ff., 10 50ff., 1196, 1205.
255. Mason, Arbeiterklasse, 1086ff., 1183ff., 1233–4.
256. Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 298–301.
257. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth,’ 144–5.
258. Friedrich Percyval Reck-Malleczewen, Tagebuch eines Verzweifelten, Frankfurt am Main, 1971, 68.
259. MadR, iii.499. And see HM and n.88.
260. DBS, vi.1024–5 (2 December 1939).
261. IMG, xxvi.327–36, D0C.789-PS; Domarus, 1422; DGFP, D, 8, 439–46, here 440, No.384, ‘Memorandum of a Conference of the Führer with the Principal Military Commanders, November 23, 1939’.
262. Domarus, 1422; DGFP, D, 8, 441, No.384.
263. Domarus, 1423; DGFP, D, 8, 441, No.384.
264. Domarus, 1423; DGFP, D, 8, 442, No.384.
265. Domarus, 1424; DGFP, D, 8, 442, No.384.
266. Domarus, 1424; DGFP, D, 8, 443, No.384.
267. Domarus, 1424; DGFP, D, 8, 443, No.384.
268. Domarus, 1425; DGFP, D, 8, 444, N0.384.
269. This echoed the comments he had made several weeks earlier, immediately after returning from Poland, on 27 September (Halder KTB, i. 88 (27 September 1939)).
270. Domarus, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 445, No.384. See also Hillgruber, Strategie, 28–9.
271. Domarus, 1425, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 444–5, No.384.
272. Domarus, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 445–6, No.384.
273. Domarus, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 446, N0.384.
274. LB Darmstadt, 287.
275. Domarus, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 446, N0.384.
276. Domarus, 1427; DGFP, D, 8, 446, No.384.
277. Halder KTB, i.132 (23 November 1939), for Hitler’s reference to the ‘Geist von Zossen’; IMG, xx.628 (statement of von Brauchitsch, 9 August 1946).
278. Müller, Heer, 547–9, 550.
279. TBJG, I/7, 228 (12 December 1939).
280. Halder KTB, i. 154 (10 January 1940), 157 (13 January 1940), 161 (18 January 1940), 165–7 (20 January 1940), 167–9 (21 January 1940); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb. Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1930, Wiesbaden, 1957, 93.
281. See Hilberg, 137ff.; Aly, 29ff.
282. TBJG, 1/7, 220–21 (5 December 1939).
1. TBJG, 1/7, 273 (16 January 1940).
2. Halder KTB, i.93 for the pessimistic report of Major-General Georg Thomas, head of the Defence Economy and Armaments Office at the OKW, on economic shortages and the inability to satisfy the needs of the armed forces for months to come; DRZW, ii.242; Hillgruber, Strategie, 54, referring to the basic plan, aimed at a long war, approved by the British cabinet on 9 September 1939.
3. DRZW, ii.235–6; Hillgruber, Strategie, 40.
4. Hillgruber, Strategie, 38–9. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffenführungsstab (Luftwaffe Operations Staff) pressed in autumn 1939 for bombing-raids on Britain to be launched before the end of the year — targeting harbours to damage shipping and supplies — before British aerial defences could be built up (DRZW, ii.333, 336).
5. DRZW, ii.193.
6. DRZW, ii.239, 266; Hillgruber, Strategie, 34–40, 48, and (for the Z-Plan, which, on 11 July 1940, Hitler agreed to recommence) 148.
7. IMT, xv.385–6 (Jodl testimony); Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 4–5; Hillgruber, Strategie, 34, 53. The British Expeditionary Force, initially comprising a mere 152,000 men, began moving to France only on 4 September and was purely defensive in composition — without armoured division, inadequate in communications, equipment, and training, and with little air power (The Oxford Companion to the Second World War, ed. I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot, Oxford, 1995, 154–5).
8. DRZW, ii.236–7. See Staatsmänner, i.45, for Hitler’s account to Mussolini (on 18 March 1940) of how weak the German forces were on the western front at the outbreak of war, though he added that the Westwall would have provided an impenetrable barrier to an allied attack. Germany’s munitions were sufficient for a third of the available divisions for fourteen days of fighting, with reserves sufficient for a further fourteen days (Halder KTB, i.99 (8 October 1939)).
9. Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 18–21.
10. Hillgruber, Strategie, 41–5, 48.
11. Hillgruber, Strategie, 32, 45–6. See also Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Der Faktor Amerika in Hitlers Strategie 1938–1941’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung ‘Das Parlament’, B19/66 (11 May 1966), 3–21, especially 8ff.
12. DGFP, D, VIII, 604–9 (especially 608), Doc.504; Hillgruber, Strategie, 30 n.13.
13. DGFP, D, VIII, 871–80 (especially 876), Doc.663; Hillgruber, Strategie, 30 n.13. See William Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor. The Making of the Second World War, London, 1985, 113–14, for further comments along these lines, which Carr is prepared to see as an indication that Hitler’s views on Russia were undergoing a metamorphosis.
14. TBJG, 1/7, 269–70 (13 January 1940). A fortnight earlier, he had referred to Stalin as ‘a typical Asiatic Russian’. Bolshevism had eliminated the westernized leadership stratum capable of activating ‘this giant colossus’, he had said. Germany could be content that Moscow had its hands full, but would know how to deal with any attempt by Bolshevism to move westwards (TBJG, 1/7, 250 (29 December 1939)).
15. Jacobsen, 4–21 (Hitler’s ‘Denkschrift und Richtlinien über die Führung des Krieges im Westen’), here 7.
16. TBJG, 1/7, 270 (13 January 1940).
17. See Hillgruber, Strategie, 43–4, for the misreading of British motives, and, for the personalized elements of the conflict, John Lukacs, The Duel. Hitler vs. Churchill: 10 May–31 July 1940, Oxford, 1992; John Strawson, Churchill and Hitler, London, 1997, Ch.5.
18. Hillgruber, Strategie, 16.
19. DRZW, ii.193, 195–6.
20. Hillgruber, Strategie, 49–50.
21. DRZW, ii.190–92.
22. For the raid, see Churchill, i.506–8. Norwegian gunboats did not intervene. The Altmark was left grounded in the Jösing Fjord as the Cossack, with the rescued prisoners on board, made good its escape. Norwegian protests at the entry into their territorial waters were brushed aside by the British Government, which could register a needed boost in morale.
23. Below, 221–2. On the planning of the campaign, see Walther Hubatsch, ‘Weserübung’. Die deutsche Besetzung von Danemark undNorwegen 1940, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt, 2nd edn, 1960, ch.2, 39ff.; and Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Bd.I: 1935–1941, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, 176ff.; Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939–1945, ed. Gerhard Wagner, Munich, 1972, 82, 85ff.
24. DRZW, ii.197–8; Weisungen, 54–7.
25. DRZW, ii.198; see Halder KTB, i.218 (3 March 1940).
26. Weisungen, 57; DRZW, ii.200.
27. Churchill had suggested the mining operation as early as the previous September. Problems about infringement of Scandinavian neutrality and divisions within the British government and between the British and the French had led to the postponement of any action before — without realizing the imminence of ’ Weser Exercise’ — the decision to mine Narvik was taken in early April. The British aim had been both to interrupt the iron-ore supplies to Germany, and also to provoke German retaliation thereby justifying British landings in Scandinavia (DRZW, ii.204–11).
28. DRZW, ii.202.
29. TBJG, 1/8, 41–2 (9 April 1940). Two days later, Hitler was talking of the aim being a ‘nordgermanischer Staatenbund’ — effectively with Denmark and Norway as German puppet states under military ‘protection’ (TBJG, 1/8, 47 (11 April 1940)).
30. Churchill, i.524 for the Swedish reports.
31. Lothar Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Kriegführung und Politik, (1967), 4th edn, Munich, 1975, 56.
32. Based on: DRZW, ii.212–25; Weinberg III, 116–19; Lukacs, Duel, 32–5; Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, pt.I, Ch.4; R. A. C. Parker, Struggle for Survival. The History of the Second World War, Oxford, 1990, 25; Churchill, i.528–92.
33. Warlimont, 75–8.
34. Warlimont, 76, 79–80.
35. DRZW, ii.247–8.
36. A point made by Lukacs, Duel, 22.
37. DRZW, ii.248. The following rests above all on Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ‘Hitlers Gedanken zur Kriegführung im Westen’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 5 (1955), 433–46; and Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 66ff., 107ff, esp.112ff.
38. This version was, in fact, captured after a German officer’s plane was forced to land in Belgium. See Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 93–9.
39. DRZW, ii.250–51.
40. IfZ, MA 444/3, ‘Grundsätzlicher Befehl’, 11 January 1940; Domarus, 1446.
41. Engel, 75.
42. DRZW, ii.252.
43. DRZW, ii.254. François Delpla, La ruse nazi. Dunkerque — 24 mai 1940, Paris, 1997, 120 and nn.30–31, could find no reference to the term in contemporary documents. He attributed it to Churchill, who wrote after the war of ‘the German scythe-cut’ (Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.ii, Their Finest Hour, London etc., 1949, 74). Its first usage in scholarly literature, he suggested, was by Jacobsen in Fall Gelb, published in 1957.
44. Weisungen, 53; Jacobsen, Vorgeschichte, 64–8; DRZW, ii.253 (map).
45. Schmidt, 488–9; CD, 223.
46. Staatsmänner, i.47.
47. Staatsmänner, i.48.
48. Above based on Staatsmänner, i.37–59; Schmidt, 488–91; CD, 223–5; CP, 361–5.
49. CD, 224–5.
50. TBJG, 1/7, 356 (19 March 1940), 357 (20 March 1940).
51. TBJG, 1/7, 358 (20 March 1940).
52. As pointed out by Lukacs, 221.
53. TBJG, 1/8, 66 (21 April 1940).
54. TBJG, 1/8, 73 (25 April 1940).
55. Hillgruber, Strategie, 58.
56. DRZW, ii.283–4; Below, 228.
57. Below, 228–9.
58. DRZW, ii.282.
59. DRZW, ii.266–7.
60. Schroeder, 101–2, 349–50, n. 196; Below, 229–30.
61. Below, 231.
62. DRZW, ii.284–96; Weinberg III, 125–30; Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, pt.I, ch.5; Parker, Struggle, 27ff.; Churchill, ii.66–104.
63. See DRZW, ii.296 for Rundstedt’s post-war self-exculpatory view. See also Guenther Blumen-tritt, Von Rundstedt. The Soldier and the Man, London, 1952, 74–8. Churchill recognized, even writing in the late 1940s, the misleading nature of the German generals’ accounts (Churchill, ii.68–70). See also, on the ‘halt order’, Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, 63; Weinberg III, 130–31; Parker, Struggle, 35–6; Irving, HW, 120–22; Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian. A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 1875–1953, London etc., 1991,113–20; Lukacs, Duel, 90–97. Delpla, La ruse, here especially 290–92 (also François Delpla, Hitler, Paris, 1999, 326–7) is alone in interpeting the ‘halt order’ as part of a complex diplomatic manoeuvre, involving Göring and Dahlerus, to hold the British to ransom and force them to end the war on German terms.
64. Schroeder, 105–6 (where Hitler’s comment is dated to the day that he learned of the French armistice offer — 17 June).
65. Below, 232.
66. IMG, xxviii.433, Doc.1809-PS (Jodl-Tagebuch); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (ed.), Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt, 1960, 73–86; Jacobsen, 1939–1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 146; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Dünkirchen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Westfeldzuges 1940, Neckargemünd, 1958, 70–122, especially 94–5. Jodl repeated after the war that the notion that Hitler refused to send the tanks on to Dunkirk was a ‘legend’. Hitler, he stated, had hesitated to adopt Brauchitsch’s recommendation to do this because the terrain was not suitable for tanks and the risk was too great that the tanks would not be available for the thrust to the south. However, he left the decision to the local commanders, who chose not to deploy the tanks against Dunkirk (IfZ, ZS 678 (Generaloberst Alfred Jodl), ‘Hitler, eine militärische Führerpersönlichkeit. Ein Gespräch mit Generaloberst Jodl von Freg.Kapt. Meckel’, May-July 1946, Fol.3).
67. Below, 232–3.
68. Halder KTB, i.319 (25 May 1940).
69. IMG, xxviii.434, D0C.1809-PS (Jodl-Tagebuch); Jacobsen, 1939–45, 146–7; Below, 233.
70. Halder KTB, i.318–19 (24 May 1940, 25 May 1940).
71. DRZW, ii.297.
72. Halder KTB, i.318 (24 May 1940); Below, 232.
73. DGFP, D, 9, 484, N0.357.
74. DRZW, ii.296; Weinberg III, 130–31.
75. Halder KTB, i.320–21 (26 May 1940).
76. In fact, General Sir John Gort, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, had ordered the evacuation only at 7 p.m. on 26 May, and as few as 8,000 troops were evacuated during the following twenty-four hours (Lukacs, Duel, 96–7). The evacuation continued for another week. Dunkirk fell only on 4 June.
77. See Lukacs, Duel, 97ff., for Churchill’s political isolation during the days of the evacuation, and the pressure of those wanting to sue for terms, articulated above all by Lord Halifax.
78. Below, 233; Schroeder, 102.
79. See Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years. France in the 1930s, New York/London, 1996, 272–9.
80. Weinberg III, 131; Below, 233–4.
81. DRZW, ii.307; Oxford Companion, 414.
82. Schroeder, 106. Trick photography later turned Hitler’s characteristic gesture of raising his leg and slapping his thigh into a jig for joy (Lukacs, Duel, 142).
83. CD, 263–4, 268.
84. Below, 234; Domarus, 1527–8.
85. Lukacs, Duel, 139.
86. CD, 267 (18–19 June 1940).
87. CD, 266–7; Schmidt, 495.
88. TBJG, 1/8, 202 (3 July 1940).
89. Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, vol.i, ed. Warren Kimball, Princeton, 1984, 49–51, Doc.C-17X (quotation, 49).
90. Schmidt, 495; CD, 266–7; Domarus, 1528.
91. IMG, xxviii.431, Doc. 1809-PS (Jodl-Tagebücher).
92. TBJG, 11/4, 492 (10 June 1942).
93. Schmidt, 497–502; Keitel, 235–6; Domarus, 1529–30. And see Eberhard Jäckel, Frankreich in Hitlers Europa. Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart, 1966, 38–40. Hitler gave orders for the railway carriage and memorial to the French victory to be brought back to Berlin. The monument to Marshal Foch, the French hero of the First World War, was to be left untouched. The carriage was pulled through the Brandenburg Gate on ‘Heroes’ Memorial Day’ (Heldengedenktag) 1941, then put on display in the Lustgarten. (Tb Reuth, 1438, n.105.)
94. TBJG, 1/8, 186 (22 June 1940).
95. DRZW, ii.316–19.
96. Domarus, 1533.
97. Speer, 185–6.
98. Below, 235; Schroeder, 106 and 351 n.202. Hitler had already at the beginning of the month paid one visit to the battlefields, taking in the Langemarck Monument and Vimy Ridge (TBJG, 1/8, 154 (4 June 1940), 159 (6 June 1940); Below, 235).
99. Without indicating any source, Irving, HW, 131, Hauner, 152, and an editorial note to Schroeder, 351 n.203, date the visit to 23 June; Giesler, 387, to 24 June. But both Schroeder, 106, and Below, 235, place the visit after, not before, the trip to the battlefields. Speer, 186, dates the visit to ‘three days after the commencement of the armistice’, which would be 28 June. This is the date given by Domarus, 1534, referring to newspaper reports of 30 June 1940 on the visit.
100. Speer, 186–7.
101. Monologe, 116 (29 October 1941).
102. Speer, 187.
103. TBJG, 1/8, 202 (3 July 1940).
104. Speer, 187. In autumn 1941 he told the guests at the evening meal, despite mixed impressions of the city’s beauty, that he had been glad that it had not been necessary to destroy it (Monologe, 116 (29 October 1941)).
105. TBJG, 1/8, 202 (3 July 1940). England could be defeated in four weeks, Hitler had told Goebbels. See Schroeder, 105, for Hitler indicating on the very night that the armistice came into effect that he was going to make a speech (which she took to be a last appeal to England), and that if they did not comply he would proceed against them ‘unmercifully’. Schroeder dates her letter, however, 20 June 1940 — five days before the ceasefire. Below also indicated Hitler’s presumption that his ‘offer’ would be turned down (Below, 236).
106. Zoller, Hitler privat, 141; Below, 237; TBJG, 1/8, 209–10 (7 July 1940).
107. StA Neuburg an der Donau, vorl.LO A5, report of the Kreisleiter of Augsburg-Stadt, 10 July 1940.
108. GStA, MA 106683, report of the Regierungspräsident of Schwaben, 9 July 1940.
109. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 155–6. Goebbels’s comment that the people were thirsting for war with England (TBJG, 1/8, 205 (5 July 1940)) was on this occasion not far wide of the mark.
110. Below, 237.
111. Weinberg III, 145–6; Lukacs, Duel, 172–3. Hitler had assured the French, in the terms of the armistice, that he had no intention of deploying their fleet for war purposes and had allowed the French fleet to remain armed (Domarus, 1532; TBJG, 1/8, 210 (7 July 1940)).
112. TBJG, 1/8, 210 (7 July 1940).
113. CD, 275 (7 July 1940); CP, 375–9. Hitler’s words were partly directed at Britain, since he was aware that what he said to Ciano would find its way to the British (Below, 239).
114. Lukacs, Duel, 173.
115. TBJG, 1/8, 213 (9 July 1940).
116. Hillgruber, Strategie, 168; Karl Klee (ed.), Dokumente zum Unternehmen ‘Seelöwe’. Die geplante deutsche Landung in England 1940, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt, 1959, 238–9.
117. Klee, Dokumente zum Unternehmen ‘Seelöwe,’ 239–40; Karl Klee, Das Unternehmen ‘Seelöwe’, Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt, 1958, 58–9; Below, 236.
118. DRZW, ii.371. See Jodl’s Memorandum of 30 June 1940 in IMG, xxviii.301–3, D0C.1776-PS. Jodl had seen landings only as a last resort, and if air-superiority was assured.
119. Thomas, German Navy, 195.
120. Klee, Dokumente, 240–41; BA/MA, PG/31320, Handakten Raeder, Denkschrift, 11 June 1940 (kindly drawn to my attention by Meir Michaelis); see Thomas, Navy, 192.
121. Lukacs, Duel 180–81; Below, 239–40.
122. Klee, Unternehmen, 72. Invasion scares had been prevalent in Britain for weeks by this time. Churchill deliberately kept the scare running to build up fighting morale, though doubting personally the seriousness of the invasion threat (John Colville, Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955, London, 1985, 192). I am grateful for this reference to Tilman Remme. Churchill had received an insight into German naval thinking about an invasion in June (Churchill, ii.267).
123. Halder KTB, II, 19–22 (13 July 1940). Apart from ‘Sealion’, Hitler discussed with Halder proposals put forward by the army leadership for demobilization of some units. Evidently contemplating the likelihood of new military engagements in the near future, Hitler would only agree to disbanding fifteen divisions — subsequently (Halder KTB, ii.20 (13 July 1940), 27 (19 July 1940); DRZW, ii. 371; DRZW, iv.9, 261–2) raised to seventeen — instead of an intended thirty-five divisions, with the bulk of the remaining personnel to be sent on leave and therefore be made available for speedy recall. The initial plans in mid-June 1940 had foreseen the disbanding of forty divisions (DRZW, iv.260).
124. Halder KTB, ii.21 (13 July 1940), trans. Halder Diary, 227. See also Below, 240. By ‘others’, Hitler meant the Soviet Union (Hillgruber, Strategie, 155 n.53).
125. As a wave of fear of fifth-columnists mounted in Britain once the German western offensive had begun, Mosley and his wife Diana (née Mitford), a long-standing admirer of Hitler, were placed in internment (Skidelsky, 449ff.).
126. Engel, 85 (15 July 1940).
127. Below, 240.
128. Weisungen, 71.
129. Blumentritt, 85–7; and see Messenger, 125–7.
130. Domarus, 1539.
131. Below, 240–41; Shirer, Berlin Diary, 356.
132. Engel, 85–6 (22 July 1940). BA, R4311/1087a contains records relating to handsome gifts during the war of estates to Keitel, Guderian, Reichenau, Leeb, and others.
133. Below, 237, 240 (for the feeling that Brauchitsch did not deserve promotion).
134. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 355–6.
135. TBJG, 1/8, 229 (20 July 1940).
136. William L. Shirer, This is Berlin. Reporting from Nazi Germany 1938–40, London, 1999, 35.
137. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 357.
138. Domarus, 1558.
139. Domarus, 1558 (text of the speech, 1540–59).
140. Below, 242; CD, 277 (19 July 1940); Domarus, 1560.
141. Lukacs, Duel, 193ff.
142. CP, 381.
143. TBJG, 1/8, 231 (21 July 1940).
144. For the following: Halder KTB, ii.30–33 (22 July 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 230–32; Klee, Dokumente, 245–6. And see DRZW, ii.370.
145. For continued considerations of the need to discuss terms with Hitler, see John Charmley, Churchill: the End of Glory. A Political Biography, London/New York, 1993, 422–32; and Lukacs, Duel, 97ff. Ribbentrop’s plan to engage the Duke of Windsor, then in Portugal, as a go-between to groups in Britain prepared to entertain peace, presumably with the aim of bringing the Duke back to the throne at the expense of his brother, George VI, ended with the departure of the Windsors on 1 August to the Bahamas, where the Duke, from Churchill’s standpoint out of harm’s way, took up the position as Governor. (Hillgruber, Strategie, 153–4; Walter Schellenberg, Schellenberg, Mayflower edn, 1965, 67–80.)
146. Halder KTB, ii.30–33 trans. Halder Diary, 230–32 (22 July 1940). According to Below, Hitler had commented at the beginning of July that he wanted to avoid war with England because a showdown with Russia was unavoidable (Below, 236). A month earlier than this, on 2 June, he was reported to have remarked in conversation with von Rundstedt that with England, he imagined, now ready for peace he could start to settle the account with Bolshevism (Warlimont, 113; Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, Durham NC, 1960, 175–6).
147. Speer, 188.
148. See Hitler’s reported comments to Rundstedt and Jodl about the attack on Bolshevism (Warlimont, 111, 113). And see Bernd Stegemann, ‘Hitlers Kriegsziele im ersten Kriegsjahr 1939/40. Ein Beitrag zur Quellenkritik’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 27 (1980), 93–105, here especially 99.
149. Halder KTB, i.358 (16 June 1940); 372 (25 June 1940); DRZW, iv.9; Carr, Poland, 115.
150. Halder KTB, ii.6 and n.I (3 July 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 220–21. Halder had already spoken about preparations to a small number of his planning staff in mid-June (Dirks/Janßen, 131).
151. TBJG, 1/8, 232 (22 July 1940).
152. TBJG, 1/8, 234 (24 July 1940); Domarus, 1562.
153. Kubizek, 287–90.
154. Halder KTB, ii.43 (30 July 1940).
155. DRZW, ii.371.
156. Halder KTB, ii.45–6 (30 July 1940).
157. IfZ, ZS 678, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, ‘Hitler, eine militärische Führerpersönlichkeitß, Summer, 1946, Fol.5: ‘Das Heer hatte von den Absichten des Führers schon erfahren, als diese noch im Stadium der Erwägung waren. Es wurde deshalb ein Operationsplan entworfen, noch ehe der Befehl dazu erging.’ IfZ, ZS 97, Major-General Bernhard v. Loßberg, Fol. 10 (Letter of Loßberg, 7 September 1956). Loßberg also pointed out (Fol.15, letter of 16 September 1956) that a further feasibility study (by Major-General Marcks, see Jacobsen, 1939–1945, 164–7) from the OKH General Staff was already submitted by 5 August, although Hitler had only spoken to Jodl for the first time about the Russian campaign on 29 July. And already by 20 August, operational plans were so far advanced that General Quarter-Master Eduard Wagner was in a position to report to Halder on planning for troop supplies (Eduard Wagner, Der Generalquartiermeister. Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Generalquartiermeister s des Heeres General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner, ed. Elisabeth Wagner, Munich/Vienna, 1963, 261–3, especially 263). According to Jodl, in a further post-war statement (IfZ, MA 1564–1 Nuremberg Document NOKW-065, a ten-page statement by Jodl, dated 26 September 1946, here pp.9–10 (Frames 0654–5)), Hitler was concerned about the Russian threat to the Romanian oil-fields. However, the feasibility studies over the next weeks completely ruled out any early move. Preparations could not be completed in under four months and by that time it would be winter when, Jodl’s staff reckoned, military operations in the east would be impossible. For the time being, the idea of an attack on the Soviet Union was shelved. But Warlimont was commissioned in August with working out improvements aimed at speeding up troop concentration in the east. Then in November, Hitler passed on to Jodl the order that all sections of the Wehrmacht should start planning for an operation against Russia. (See also Lukacs, Duel, 213–14.) As Loßberg pointed out, the later operational plans bore a strong resemblance to the feasibility studies of summer 1940 for what he had dubbed — after his small son — ‘Operation Fritz’ and was later renamed ‘Barbarossa’. (IfZ, ZS 97, Fols.10–11, 14–15.)
158. According to Warlimont’s later account, Jodl checked the doors and windows were closed before telling them that Hitler had decided to rid the world of Bolshevism ‘once and for all’ by a surprise attack on Russia the following May (Warlimont, 111).
159. Warlimont, 111–12.
160. Warlimont, 112. See also Lukacs, Duel, 214.
161. Halder KTB, ii.46–50 (31 July 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 241–5.
162. Halder KTB, ii.6 (3 July 1940).
163. Hillgruber, Strategie, 213–14.
164. Weisungen, 75–6.
165. DRZW, ii.378, 382. Below, 244, has fighters in action from the 8th.
166. Below, 244. Churchill, ii.Ch.XVI, provides a graphic description of the ‘Battle of Britain’.
167. DRZW, ii.386 (and, for Göring’s directive of 2 August 1940, aimed initially at destroying the British fighter-arm in the London area before major attacks on the capital, 380 and nn.50–51).
168. Steinert, 367 and n.160.
169. Below, 244.
170. Domarus, 1580.
171. Below, 244. For the ‘Blitz’, see Churchill, ii. Ch.XVII-XVIII.
172. Hillgruber, Strategie, 174.
173. Halder KTB, ii.128–9 (7 October 1940); Hillgruber, Strategie, 177.
174. Hillgruber, Strategie, 175–6.
175. Halder KTB, ii.98–100 (14 September 1940); DRZW, ii.389.
176. Below, 246.
177. Domarus, 1585.
178. DRZW, ii.396; Below, 245. The city centre of Coventry (including the cathedral) was destroyed. The dead numbered 380, the injured 865. Twelve armaments factories were also damaged, though not put out of production. British decoding of German signals had forewarned the RAF of a major attack on cities in the Midlands and had even indicated Coventry as the main target. However, the air-defence of Coventry was woeful. Almost all the fleet of over 500 German bombers reached the target. Only one plane was certainly brought down (Oxford Companion, 275; Churchill, ii.332–3).
179. Klee, Unternehmen, 205; Domarus, 1586 n.505; Jacobsen, 1939–1945, 172; and see Hillgruber, Strategie, 175–6.
180. Carr, Poland, 103; Lukacs, Duel, 225–7.
181. A term coined by Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich, Stuttgart, 1966, 98 n.26; and Hans Mommsen, ‘Nationalsozialismus’, in Sowjetsystem und demokratische Gesellschaft. Eine vergleichende Enzyklopädie, ed. CD. Hernig, 7 vols, Freiburg etc., 1966–72, vol.4, column 702. For critical assessments, see Hermann Weiß, ‘Der “schwache” Diktator. Hitler und der Führerstaat’, in Wolfgang Benz, Hans Buchheim, and Hans Mommsen (eds.), Der Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Ideologie und Herrschaft, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, 64–77; Manfred Funke, Starker oder schwacher Diktator? Hitlers Herrschaft und die Deutschen. Ein Essay, Düsseldorf, 1989; and Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, London, (1985), 4th edn, 2000, Ch.4.
182. Broszat, Staat, 382, notes that radicalization of political content and disintegration of governmental form went hand in hand.
183. The following relies upon Rebentisch, 117–28, and Broszat, Staat, 382–3.
184. Hitler put out a decree to that effect on 5 June 1940 (Broszat, Staat, 382).
185. Gruchmann, ‘“Reichsregierung” im Führerstaat’, 202; Rebentisch, 290 and n.24, 371–3.
186. Rebentisch, 291.
187. Rebentisch, 291, 331ff. See Frank’s post-war comment on the recognitions of the ‘social Darwinism’ at the root of Hitler’s encouragement of conflict and struggle: ‘… I associated with my struggle the personal ambition to achieve; not to value myself lower than a Himmler or Bormann; and, trusting in the tactic of the Führer, giving broad scope to the political “Darwinism” of selection among his underlings as they fought among themselves, to be firmly confident of proving victorious in this struggle’ (Hans Frank, Im Angesicht des Galgens. Deutung Hitlers und seine Zeit auf Grund eigener Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse, Munich/Gräfelfing, 1953, 195).
188. Rebentisch, 290–91.
189. See Reinhard Bollmus, Das Amt Rosenberg und seine Gegner. Studien zum Machtkampf im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem, Stuttgart, 1970, ch.6, 236ff., especially 245; Rebentisch, 284.
190. For the term, see Hans Mommsen, ‘Der Nationalsozialismus. Kumulative Radikalisierung und Selbstzerstörung des Regimes’, in Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon, Bd.16, Mannheim, 1976, 785–790 (though Mommsen plays down ideology as a driving-force).
191. See also Rebentisch, 164, 338.
192. See Rebentisch, 132ff.; Peter Hüttenberger, Die Gauleiter. Studie zum Wandel des Machtgefüges in der NSDAP, Stuttgart, 1969, 152ff.; and Karl Teppe, ‘Der Reichsverteidigungskommissar. Organisation und Praxis in Westfalen’, in Rebentisch and Teppe, Verwaltung contra Menschenführung, 278–301.
193. Nineteen Gauleitertagungen were held during the course of the war (Rebentisch, 290 and n.26). I am most grateful to Martin Moll for letting me see a detailed study, as yet unpublished, which he has undertaken: ‘Die Tagungen der Reichs- und Gauleiter der NSDAP: Ein verkanntes Instrument zur Koordinierung im “Ämterchaos” des Dritten Reiches?’
194. Schirach, 298.
195. See Orlow, 268–72.
196. See Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, ch.VIII.
197. Rebentisch, 246–51.
198. Cit. Rebentisch, 251.
199. Rebentisch, 206ff., 247, 251; Hüttenberger, Gauleiter, 1 38ff.
200. For the administrative confusion and tangled reins of control in occupied Poland, see Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims. The Establishment of the New Order, London, 1974, 72–3.
201. See Rebentisch, 248–50 for Forster and Greiser; also Kershaw, ‘Greiser’. Forster’s remark about Himmler — ‘Wenn ich so aussehen würde wie Himmler, würde ich von Rasse überhaupt nicht reden’ — is cited in Hüttenberger, 181 (from testimony provided to the RSHA in 1943 in the dispute between Himmler and Forster) and by Jochen von Lang, Der Adjutant. Karl Wolff: Der Mann zwischen Hitler und Himmler, Munich, 1985, 147.
202. Ruth Bettina Birn, Die Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer. Himmlers Vertreter im Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten, Düsseldorf, 1986, 197–205. Martyn Housden, ‘Hans Frank — Empire Builder in the East, 1939–41’, European History Quarterly, 24 (1994), 367–93, here especially 376–8, is inclined to play down Frank’s subordination to the SS. On the figure of Hans Frank, see Christoph Kleßmann, ‘Der Generalgouverneur Hans Frank’, VfZ, 19 (1971), 245–60; Christoph Kleßmann, ‘Hans Frank — Parteijurist und Generalgouverneur in Polen’, in Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), Die braune Elite, Darmstadt, 1989, 41–51; and Joachim C. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, Harmondsworth, 1972, 315–31.
203. See Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 115ff.
204. See Christopher Browning, ‘Nazi Resettlement Policy and the Search for a Solution to the Jewish Question, 1939–1941’, in Christopher Browning (ed.), The Path to Genocide. Essays on Launching the Final Solution, Cambridge, 1992, 3–27. Aly, ‘Endlösung’, 14ff., emphasizes the interconnection of resettlement plans and genocide, which his study examines.
205. Aly, 60–62.
206. See Seev Goschen, ‘Eichmann und die Nisko-Aktion im October 1939’, VfZ, 29 (1981), 74–96, especially 72, 82, 86; Safrian, 68ff.
207. Aly, 62–4.
208. Goschen, 91ff; Safrian, 78–81.
209. Faschismus-Getto-Massenmord. Dokumentation über Ausrottung und Widerstand der Juden in Polen während des zweiten Weltkrieges, ed. Jüdisches Historisches Institut Warschau, Frankfurt am Main, n.d. [1961], 42–3.
210. Faschismus, 43–6; Hilberg, 137ff.; Kershaw, ‘“Warthegau”’, 56–7.
211. See Ernst Klee and Willi Dreßen (eds.), ‘Gott mit uns’. Der deutsche Vernichtungskrieg im Osten 1939–1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, 12–13; The New German Order in Poland, 220ff., 230–31; Faschismus, 53.
212. Faschismus, 46.
213. Glowna Komissa Badni Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce Archiwum Warsaw [War Crimes Archive], Process Artura Greisera, File 27, Fol. 167.
214. See Faschismus, 52–3.
215. Aly, 84–5. As we noted in the previous chapter, patients in asylums in Stettin and other localities on the Pomeranian coast had been murdered the previous autumn to make accommodation available for almost 50,000 ethnic Germans transported there from Latvia. (See Aly, ‘Endlösung’, 65.)
216. Aly, 85.
217. Pätzold, Verfolgung, 262.
218. Browning, Path, 32.
219. Lucjan Dobroszycki (ed.), The Chronicle of the Lodz Ghetto, 1941–1944, New Haven/London, 1984, xxxix.
220. Browning, Path, 35.
221. Werner Präg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer (eds.), Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgou verneurs in Polen 1919–1945, Stuttgart, 1975 (=DTB Frank), 261–4 (31 July 1940).
222. Kershaw, ‘“Warthegau”’, 58.
223. DTB Frank (31 July 1940), 261; Faschismus, 57–8.
224. Wildt, 32–3.
225. Brechtken, 16, 32ff.; and Leni Yahil, ‘Madagascar — Phantom of a Solution for the Jewish Question’, in Bela Vago and George L. Mosse (eds.), Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe, New York, 1974, 315–34, here 315–19, where consideration by the Polish government in the later 1930s of Madagascar as an area to resettle Jews, leading to talks with the French government about the proposal, is also outlined. On 5 March 1938, Heydrich instructed Eichmann to prepare a memorandum indicating that emigration could no longer, partly for financial reasons, be regarded as a solution to the ‘Jewish Question’, and that it was therefore necessary ‘to find a foreign-political solution as had already been negotiated between Poland and France’ (‘und dass man darum herantreten muss, eine außenpolitische Lösung zu finden, wie sie bereits zwischen Polen und Frankreich verhandelt wurde’). An arrow pointed to ‘Madagaskar-Projekt’ written in the margin. (Cit. Yahil, ‘Madagascar’, 321.)
226. Christopher Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office, New York/London, 1978, 35.
227. Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide. Himmler and the Final Solution, London, 1991, 122. The French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet had reported in late 1938 that, if other governments participating in the Evian Committee were prepared to contribute, France ‘would consider the settlement in Madagascar and New Caledonia of 10,000 persons’, though these were not to be of German origin. (Brechtken, 204. And see Yahil, ‘Madagascar’, 319.)
228. IMG, xxviii.539, 1816-PS (Minutes of meeting of 12 November 1938); Yahil, ‘Madagascar’, 322; Breitman, Architect, 122.
229. Breitman, Architect, 121, mentions Hitler speaking to Jodl on 20 May about demanding the return of German colonies as part of a settlement with Britain and (276 n.24) Himmler already working out plans for a colonial police.
230. Helmut Krausnick, ‘Denkschrift Himmlers über die Behandlung der Fremdvölkischen im Osten (Mai 1940)’, VfZ 5 (1957), 194–8, here 197. For the significance of Himmler’s remarks on extermination, as regards the Jews, see the interpretation of Breitman, Architect, 121 and n.
231. Breitman, Architect, 118 and 275–6 n.11. Aly, 140, has 25 June, but this seems an error.
232. Krausnick, ‘Denkschrift’, 197 (transl., N&P, iii.932).
233. Hans-Jürgen Döscher, Das Auswärtige Amt in Dritten Reich. Diplomatie im Schatten der ‘Endlösung’, Berlin, 1987, 215; see also Yahil, ‘Madagascar’, 325; Browning, Final Solution, 36; Breitman, Architect, 123.
234. Döscher, Das Auswärtige Amt, 219–20.
235. Browning, Final Solution, 37.
236. Döscher, Das Auswärtige Amt, 217–18.
237. Döscher, Das Auswärtige Amt, 217. See Lukacs, Duel, 142 n.
238. Döscher, Das Auswärtige Amt, 218–19; Yahil, ‘Madagascar’, 326; Browning, Final Solution, 40–41.
239. Schmidt, 495.
240. CP, 374; see also CD (18–19 June 1940), where Ribbentrop is reported to have said ‘that there is a German project to round up and send the Jews to Madagascar’.
241. Lagevorträge, 107 (20 June 1940); Brechtken, 230; Browning, Path, 18. According to the note of the meeting with Raeder, Hitler spoke, remarkably, of ‘French responsibility’ for the Jews to be deported to Madagascar. Raeder suggested exchanging Madagascar for the northern part of Portuguese Angola. Hitler said he would have the suggestion tested. The exchange hints at superficial interest in the Madagascar proposal.
242. DTB Frank, 252; Aly, 146–7 (and n.35); and Faschismus, 57.
243. John P. Fox, ‘German Bureaucrat or Nazified Ideologue? Ambassador Otto Abetz and Hitler’s Anti-Jewish Policies 1940–44’, in Michael Graham Fry (ed.), Power, Personalities, and Policies. Essays in Honour of Donald Cameron Watt, London, 1992, 175–232, here 184; Döscher, Das Auswärtige Amt, 216; Breitman, Architect, 128. The meeting took place on 3 August.
244. TBJG, 1/8, 276 (17 August 1940).
245. Goebbels thought the film was finished, but within three days had to rework it (TBJG, I/7, 264 (9 January 1940), 268 (12 January 1940); Hornshøh-Møller, 19).
246. TBJG, 1/8, 159 (6 June 1940).
247. TBJG, 1/8, 236 (25 July 1940).
248. Breitman, Architect, 131–2.
249. Pätzold, Verfolgung, 271–5; Hilberg, 392.
250. Breitman, Architect, 135.
251. IMG, xxxix, 425–9, Doc. 172-USSR; DTB Frank, 302 (6 November 1940); Breitman, Architect, 142–3. Frank was also told by Hitler that he would have to accept more Poles deported to his area from the incorporated territories. Their standard of living was immaterial.
252. Breitman, Architect, 137; Hilberg, 166; Ulrich Herbert, ‘Labour and Extermination: Economic Interest and the Primacy of Weltanschauung in National Socialism’, Past and Present, 138 (1993), 144–95, here 158ff.
253. Breitman, Architect, 139.
254. DTB Frank, 318–20 (11 January 1941); Breitman, Architect, 143.
255. IMG, xxviii.301, Doc.1776-PS; Klee, Dokumente, 298; Hillgruber, Strategie, 178.
256. Michalka, ‘From the Anti-Comintern Pact’, 282; Hillgruber, Strategie, 179; Carr, Poland, 117.
257. Carr, Poland, 107.
258. Domarus, 1588–9; Carr, Poland, 107–8; Michalka, ‘From the Anti-Comintern Pact’, 281–3; Bloch, 303–6; Weinberg III, 168–9, 182, 248.
259. Hillgruber, Strategie, 188–92.
260. Hillgruber, Strategie, 189–90; and see Carr, Poland, 117.
261. Hillgruber, Strategie, 190.
262. Bloch, 308–10.
263. CP, 395–9; Bloch, 307.
264. CD, 296 (4 October 1940).
265. CD, 297 (12 October 1940); CP, 398.
266. Bloch, 311.
267. Staatsmänner, i.124–33; and see Jäckel, Frankreich, 105–17.
268. Bloch, 310.
269. Halder KTB, ii.133 (11 October 1940); Weizsäcker-Papiere, 221 (21 October 1940).
270. Preston, Franco, 393.
271. Schmidt, 510–11, claimed that Franco’s train was an hour late. In fact, it was eight minutes late (Preston, Franco, 394).
272. Schmidt, 511.
273. The following account is based upon Staatsmänner I, 133–40 (quotation, 138); and Schmidt, 511–14. Schmidt, 511, conveys the misleading impression that he was present throughout the talks. In fact, another German interpreter was used on this occasion since Schmidt did not command fluent Spanish. Schmidt was in the party at Hendaye, however, and almost certainly drew up the (incomplete) record of the discussion for the Foreign Office. He was, therefore, thoroughly versed in the course of the talks, and his account accords well with the contemporary notes of the Spanish interpreter, Baron de las Torres. On the meeting, see, especially, Paul Preston, ‘Franco and Hitler: the Myth of Hendaye 1940’, Contemporary European History, 1 (1992), 1–16, here 9–10; and Preston, Franco, 394–400. The misleading impression given by Schmidt is pointed out in David Wingeate Pike, ‘Franco and the Axis Stigma’, JCH, 17 (1982), 369–406, here 377–9.
274. See Samuel Hoare, Ambassador on Special Mission, London, 1946, 92–5, for the general view in diplomatic circles that Spanish claims on north Africa had been the major stumbling-block in the discussions.
275. Cit. Preston, ‘Hendaye’, 10 and n.32 (the reported comment of the Spanish interpreter, Baron de las Torres, on 26 October 1940).
276. Cit. Preston, ‘Hendaye’, 12.
277. Schmidt, 514; Bloch, 311–12.
278. CP, 401–2.
279. Halder KTB, ii.158 (1 November 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 272. Halder was noting comments passed on by Hitler’s Army adjutant, Gerhard Engel.
280. Schmidt, 514–16.
281. François Delpla, Montoire. Les premiers jours de la collaboration, Paris, 1996, ch.16, and Delpla, Hitler, 337–8, places a more positive gloss on the outcome of the talks, from Hitler’s point of view, especially in terms of the propaganda impression intended to be conveyed abroad that Germany was indomitable on the continent of Europe.
282. Staatsmänner, i.49; Halder KTB, ii.157–8 (1 November 1940); CP, 401; and see Jäckel, Frankreich, 121.
283. Schmidt, 516; Below, 249. Hitler’s disappointment was implicit in the comments passed on by Engel and noted by Halder. (Halder KTB, ii.158 (1 November 1940).)
284. Below, 250.
285. Schmidt, 516–17; Engel, 88 (28 October 1940).
286. CP, 399–404; Schmidt, 517.
287. CP, 402.
288. Engel, 89–90 (4 November 1940), and n.272.
289. Carr, Poland, 98–9, 118–19; Martin van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940–1941. The Balkan Clue, Cambridge, 1973, 69–72; and see Robert Cecil, Hitler’s Decision to Invade Russia 1941, London, 1975, Ch.VI-VII.
290. Weisungen, 81, Directive No.18, Section 5 (12 November 1940).
291. Carr, Poland, 120.
292. Weizsdcker-Papiere, 224 (15 November 1940). The Molotov visit is well described in Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, ch.46, 510ff. The following account draws on Schmidt, 526–36, and the official texts of the discussions: Staatsmänner I, 166–93; ADAP, D, XI.1, 455–61, 462–72, Nos.326, 328.
293. Carr, Poland, 121.
294. Staatsmänner I, 193; ADAP, D, XI.1, 472–8, No.329.
295. ADAP, D, XI.2, 597–8, No.404; Carr, Poland, 121; Weinberg III, 201; Bloch, 316.
296. Bloch, 316.
297. Hillgruber, Strategie, 356 and n.21 (Engel communication of 10 April 1964).
298. Engel, 91 (15 November 1940).
299. Below, 253.
300. Fedor von Bock, The War Diary 1939–1945, ed. Klaus Gerbet, Atglen PA, 1996, 193–4 (3 December 1940); Hillgruber, Strategie, 361 n.50. The translation of part of the passage from Bock’s diary — ‘zumal ein wirksames Eingreifen Amerikas dann durch Japan, das nun den Rücken frei hat, erschwert wird’ (‘especially since an effective intervention by America would be complicated by Japan, which would keep our rear free’) — mistakenly implies that the implication of eliminating the Soviet Union would be that Germany’s, not Japan’s, rear would be unexposed.
301. Halder KTB, ii.209–14 (5 December 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 292–8. Hitler amended the operational plan when Jodl presented it to him on 17 December in one significant element. He insisted that strong mobile units from the centre of the front swing northwards from the Warsaw region to ensure the destruction of Soviet forces in the north and subsequently occupy Leningrad and Kronstadt. Only thereafter were operations aimed at Moscow to be undertaken. (Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), ed. Percy Ernst Schramm (=KTB OKW) Bd.I: 1. August 1940–31. Dezember 1941, Frankfurt am Main, 1965, 233.)
302. Halder KTB, ii.227–8 (13 December 1940).
303. KTB OKW, i.996; Hillgruber, Strategie, 363.
304. Weisungen, 96 (18 December 1940).
305. The Army High Command had until December 1940 used the code-name ‘Otto’ for its operational plan for the east (Halder KTB, ii.210, 214 (5 December 1940)). The Wehrmachtführungsstab, however, had used the designation ‘Fritz’, coined by Loßberg, who (see above n.157) named the operation after his son, for its own campaign-plan. The latter term was then given by Jodl to the draft directive No.21 for the ‘eastern operations’ on 12 December 1940, before being altered to ‘Barbarossa’ five days later. (KTB OKW, i.226, 233. And see B. Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, 16–18; Barry A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia 1939–1941, Oxford, 1973, 79, 82, 258; Dirks/Janßen, ch.9). Confusingly, ‘Otto-Programm’ was also used by the Army for the programme to develop rail and roads in the east (Halder KTB, ii.133 n.3, 210 n.6, 381).
306. KTB OKW, i.257–8; Hillgruber, Strategie, 364–5.
307. Below, 259.
308. Halder KTB, ii.283; trans. Halder Diary, 320 (17 February 1941); Hillgruber, Strategie, 365.
1. Below, 252, 254. He probably exaggerates (259, 279–80) the extent of reservation about the attack on the USSR. See Irving, HW, 181–2, and Irving, Göring, 307–9, for Göring’s initial objections (in November 1940) on economic, not moral, grounds — emphasizing Germany’s dependence on Soviet grain and oil — but rapid capitulation to Hitler’s arguments. Göring’s preferred strategy would have been, acting together with the Italians and Spanish, to force the British out of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and to occupy North Africa and the Balkans.
2. IfZ, F37/3 (1940–41), Kreisleitertagung am 28.11.1940, quotations Fols.290–91 (pp.18–19 of speech). In the earlier part of his speech, Himmler had stated (Fol.277) that Hitler was not interested in destroying the English people and their Empire (‘Dem Führer lag nichts an der Vernichtung des englischen Volkes und Imperiums’), but that the British had refused his offers of peace. The Führer would prefer not to undertake a landing in England, but would do so the following spring if the last resistance was not broken. He saw Britain’s future, after its collapse, residing in a probable merger (‘Fusion’) with America (Fols.279–82). Himmler went on to depict his vision of the future development of the European continent under German domination, before coming to the question of Russia.
3. Hofer, Der Nationalsozialismus, 194.
4. IMG, xxxiv.469, Doc.134-C (Hitler’s comments on 20 January 1941); and, for Hitler’s comments on 20 June 1941 (as noted by General Thomas) on the need to secure all territories needed for the defence economy, IMG, xxvii.220–21, Doc.1456-PS; see also Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims. Vol.1: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, London, 1973, 207; and Carr, Poland, 122–5.
5. See Breitman, Architect, ch.7.
6. Engel, 92 (18 December 1940).
7. DRZW, iv.244; Leach, 159–65; Hillgruber, Strategie, 501–4.
8. Leach, 140.
9. Halder KTB, ii.261 (28 January 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 314.
10. Leach, 141.
11. Bock, Diary, 197–8 (1 February 1941); Leach, 141.
12. Leach, 142–3.
13. Below, 262.
14. Leach, 143–5.
15. KTB OKW, i.339–40 (1 March 1941); DRZW, iv. 244; Leach, 159–61.
16. Halder KTB, ii.319 (17 March 1941); Leach, 162–3.
17. Engel, 92–3 (entry for 17 January 1941); Hillgruber, Strategie, 504 (where Engel’s entry is misdated to 17 March 1941); Leach, 163.
18. CD, 328–9 (16 January 1941, 18 January 1941), for Mussolini’s unease at the visit; Domarus, 1654.
19. CP, 417–20. For the visit and Mussolini’s reaction, see MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939–1941. Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War, Cambridge, (1982) 1986 paperback edn, 279–81; Milza, 791.
20. CD, 329 (entry dated 18 January 1941 in text, but actually covering the dates 18–21 January 1941, here referring to 19 January 1941). For the authenticity of the diaries, despite some touching up in 1943, see Knox, 291–2.
21. CD, 330 (entry dated 18 January 1941, but relating here to 20 January 1941).
22. IMG, xxxiv.469, Doc. 134-C.
23. CD, 330 (entry dated 18 January 1941, but relating to 21 January 1941).
24. CD, 331 (22 January 1941).
25. For scorn in the population directed at Italian war-efforts in Greece and North Africa, see Steinert, 171.
26. TBJG, I/9, 114 (29 January 1941); see also 153 (22 February 1941) for growing doubts about Mussolini, and 197–8 (21 March 1941) for further complaints about the Italian leadership and military capability.
27. TBJG, I/9, 118 (31 January 1941) for Hitler’s criticism of the Italians.
28. See Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 107, for the military defeats and numbers of prisoners; and Knox, 251ff., for the disastrous campaigns.
29. Irving, HW, 200.
30. KTB OKW, i.284 (28 January 1941).
31. Domarus, 1666.
32. CP, 421–30 (here 428). See Preston, Franco, 421–2, for the extraordinary ‘shopping-list’ of military equipment put together by the Spanish General Staff — so exorbitant that it was dismissed in Berlin as a pretext to avoid entering the war.
33. TBJG, I/9, 121 (1 February 1941).
34. TBJG, I/9, 119 (31 January 1941), 121 (1 February 1941).
35. TBJG, I/9, 121 (1 February 1941).
36. Domarus, 1661 n.50.
37. TBJG, I/9, 121 (1 February 1941).
38. Domarus, 1663.
39. Domarus, 1663 n.54; and see Jäckel, ‘Hitler und der Mord’, 151–62, here 160–62.
40. Domarus, 1659. He also remarked, in a different context, in his speech, that neither he nor the Duce were Jews or ‘doers of business’ (Geschäftemacher), and that their handshake was genuine (Domarus, 1661).
41. Aly, 269.
42. Hornshøh-Møller, 187; and see 2–3, 18–19, 179–81, 295–6. At a preview for an invited audience on 1 March 1940, the extract of Hitler’s speech, which had only recently been incorporated into the film, provoked a spontaneous burst of applause. The film was first shown in public at the ‘UFA-Palast’ in Berlin on 28 November 1940. (Møller, 18–19, 33.)
43. For the nature of the Engel ‘diary’ entries, only seemingly contemporary, see Engel, 12–13.
44. Engel, 94–5. See Breitman, Architect, 155 n., for reasons to accept this testimony, despite its contentious nature.
45. Aly, 273.
46. See Aly, 268–79.
47. Gerhard Botz, Wohnungspolitik und Judendeportation 1938–1945. Zur Funktion des Antisemi tismus als Ersatz nationalsozialistischer Sozialpolitik, Vienna, 1975, 108–9, 197; IMG, xxix.176, Doc.1950-PS.
48. TBJG, I/9, 193 (18 March 1941).
49. Aly, 212–15; Breitman, Architect, 151–2.
50. Aly, 217–18.
51. Aly, 219–25; Safrian, 96–8.
52. Aly, 269; Breitman, Architect, 152 and 285 n.33.
53. Cit. Aly, 269.
54. Aly, 269.
55. Cit. Aly, 269; Breitman, Architect, 152 and 205 n.33.
56. DTB Frank, 332–3 (17 March 1941), 336–7 (25 March 1941); Breitman, Architect, 156.
57. Breitman, Architect, 156 and 285 n.33.
58. Breitman, Architect, 146.
59. IMG, iv.535–6 (statement of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 7 January 1946); Krausnick/Wilhelm, 115; Breitman, Architect, 147.
60. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 141.
61. Breitman, Architect, 147–8.
62. Cit. Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden. Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945, Stuttgart, 1978, 28. This is the first documentary evidence hinting at the order for annihilation in the eastern campaign.
63. It was taken to Hitler at the Berghof at the end of a quiet month when, according to one who experienced the atmosphere there at first hand, it was scarcely noticeable that Germany was at war (Below, 262).
64. KTB OKW, i.341 (3 March 1941); trans, amended from Warlimont, 150–51; Krausnick/Wilhelm, 115; Breitman, Architect, 148–9; Streit, 30.
65. Warlimont, 152–3; Anatomie, 198–201, here especially 199.
66. Cit. Aly, 270. The GPU was the State Political Executive, the successor body to the Cheka, the notorious secret police of the Tsars, then of the Bolsheviks.
67. Aly, 270–22.
68. In a paper as yet unpublished, ‘From Barbarossa to Wannsee. The Role of Reinhard Heydrich’, Eberhard Jäckel (to whom I am most grateful for the opportunity to consult it) puts a compelling case for viewing Heydrich, not Himmler (as does Richard Breitman in his The Architect of Genocide), as the chief ‘architect’ of the Final Solution.
69. Halder KTB, ii.320 (17 March 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 339.
70. Streit, 31.
71. Warlimont, 158–60; Anatomie des SS-Staates, ii.172, 202–3 (Doc.2). Negotiations involving the General-Quartermaster Eduard Wagner and the SS leadership about the arrangements for the ‘special commission’ of the Reichsführer-SS in the east were under way in early March (Anatomie, ii.171–2). According to Walter Schellenberg, he himself was involved in deliberations with Wagner, and in turning them into ‘an expression of the Führer’s will’ (Schellenberg, 92; see Streit, 31–2 and 310 n.19 (for contradictions in Schellenberg’s testimony)). Wagner’s meeting with Heydrich turned upon establishing a demarcation line between police and military spheres of responsibility for the liquidation of captured political commissars, and was prompted by the Wehrmacht’s concern that Heydrich would greatly widen the scope of his own powers (Jörg Friedrich, Das Gesetz des Krieges. Das deutsche Heer in Rußland 1941–1945. Der Prozeß gegen das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Munich/Zurich, 2nd edn, 1995, 289–92).
72. DRZW, iv.416–17.
73. Halder KTB, ii.335–7 (30 March 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 345–6. According to Halder’s post-war testimony, Hitler justified his ideological warfare in the East by alluding to the fact that the USSR had not signed the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1928 relating to the treatment of prisoners-of-war. (IMG, vii.396–7 (statement by Halder on 31 October 1945). See also Anatomie, ii.174; and Streit, 36.)
74. IMG, xx.635 (testimony by Brauchitsch on 9 August 1946); see also Leach, 153; and Streit, 35.
75. Warlimont, 162. His explanation, that they had not followed Hitler’s diatribe or grasped the meaning of what he was saying, is scarcely credible.
76. Cit. Domarus, 1683, n.134.
77. Cit. Anatomie, ii.175–6; trans., Anatomy of the SS State, London, 1968, 516.
78. Anatomie, ii.176, 211–12.
79. Anatomie, ii.211.
80. See Jürgen Förster, ‘The German Army and the Ideological War against the Soviet Union’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), The Policies of Genocide. Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany, London, 1986, 15–29, here 17. See also Streit, ch.III; Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. Zeit der Indoktrination, Hamburg, 1969, 390–411; and Helmut Krausnick, ‘Kommissarbefehl und “Gerichtsbarkeitserlaß Barbarossa” in neuer Sicht’, VfZ, 25 (1977), 682–738, especially 717ff, 737.
81. Förster, ‘German Army’, 19; Streit, 36ff
82. Anatomie, ii.178–9, 215–18.
83. Förster, ‘German Army’, 19. See, on its genesis, Streit, 44–9.
84. Anatomie, ii.225–7; trans., Anatomy of the SS State, 532. (Italics in the original.)
85. Streit, 50–51.
86. Engel, 102–3 (10 May 1941); Anatomie, ii.177; DRZW, iv.446; Bodo Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow. Ein Preusse gegen Hitler, Frankfurt am Main/Berlin, 1987, 113–14. On reports of the order being implemented by different units, see Krausnick, ‘Kommissarbefehl’, 733–6. According to the most meticulous, if still provisional, statistical analysis yet made, between a half and two-thirds of front divisions implemented the order. (Detlef Siebert, ‘Die Durchführung des Kommissarbefehls in den Frontverbänden des Heeres. Eine quantifierende Auswertung der For schung’. I am most grateful to Detlef Siebert for providing me with a copy of this as yet unpublished paper.)
87. Anatomie, ii.177.
88. Leach, 154–5. It has been surmised, however, with some justification that Bock’s objections were primarily levelled against the decree limiting military jurisdiction, issued a day after the decree on treatment of ‘political functionaries’ (Anatomie, ii.174–5).
89. DRZW, iv. 24, 446. For Küchler’s support of ‘severe measures undertaken’ in Poland (where he had nonetheless criticized the brutality of the SS) in the interests of a ‘final völkisch solution’ of ‘an ethnic struggle raging for centuries on the eastern border’, see Streit, 55–6.
90. DRZW, iv. 24, 446. For a brief sketch of the career of the enigmatic Hoepner, see Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr and Gene Mueller, ‘Generaloberst Erich Hoepner’, in Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.), Hitlers militärische Elite. Bd.2, Vom Kriegsbeginn bis zum Weltkriegsende, Darmstadt, 1998, 93–9.
91. See Arno J. Mayer, Why did the Heavens not Darken? The ‘Final Solution’ in History, New York, 1988, 212.
92. As Ulrich von Hassell put it, shortly before the campaign began: ‘Brauchitsch and Halder have already gone along with Hitler’s manoeuvre of transferring the odium of incendiarism (Mordbrennerei) to the army from the SS, which up to now had alone been burdened with it’ (Hassell, 257 (15 June 1941)).
93. CP, 432 (25 March 1941).
94. Staatsmänner I, 234.
95. Staatsmänner I, 236; Irving, HW, 217, for Abwehr reports of growing anti-government feeling in Yugoslavia.
96. Keitel, 260.
97. DRZW, iii.419.
98. Hillgruber, Strategie, 337; DRZW, iii.418.
99. Weisungen, 80.
100. DRZW, iii.421.
101. Weisungen, 94.
102. Weisungen, 95; DRZW, iii. 423.
103. DRZW, iii.422.
104. See Creveld, 96ff.
105. Creveld, 134–5.
106. DRZW, iii.418 n.10; Domarus, 1623–4.
107. Domarus, 1670; Hauner, Hitler, 158.
108. Weinberg, iii.216.
109. DRZW, iii.438–40.
110. DRZW, iii.442.ff.; Creveld, 139ff.
111. Keitel, 261.
112. TBJG, I/9, 210 (29 March 1941).
113. IMG, xxviii.22, Doc.1746-PS (Hitler’s speech to his military leaders); IfZ, ED 100, Sammlung-Irving, Hewel-Diary, entry for 27 March 1941; Irving, HW, 218.
114. Below, 265.
115. Peter Bor, Gespräche mit Halder, Wiesbaden, 1950, 180. See also Heidemarie Schall-Riancour, Aufstand und Gehorsam. Offizierstum und Generalstab im Umbruch. Leben und Wirken von Generaloberst Franz Halder, Generalstabschef 1938–1942, Wiesbaden, 1972, 159. Creveld, 145, points out that preliminary preparations for a preventive attack on Yugoslavia had been undertaken months earlier, so that the army was not caught as unawares as post-war accounts sometimes claimed.
116. Halder KTB. ii.330–31 (27 March 1941); Below, 265. Ribbentrop was also present.
117. IMG, xxviii.23, Doc.1746-PS; KTB OKW, i.368 (27 March 1941).
118. Keitel, 262.
119. Weisungen, 124–6; Below, 265.
120. Keitel, 262; DRZW, iii.44.8ff.
121. DRZW, iii.451. Initially, the attacks on Greece (‘Marita’) and Yugoslavia (‘Directive 25’) were foreseen as separate operations, starting at different dates in early April. On 29 March it was decided to link the operations. According to the new timetable, the bombing of Belgrade and beginning of ‘Marita’ were put back from 1 to 5 April then, on 3 April, postponed for twenty-four hours (Creveld, 154).
122. TBJG, I/9, 211 (29 March 1941). This was the first time that Goebbels had referred to ‘Barbarossa’ in his diary (Tb Reuth, 1546, n.46).
123. Schmidt, 539–40, 542.
124. Schmidt, 536–9.
125. Irving, HW, 220.
126. The thinking in Tokyo differed sharply on this point. It was presumed that an attack on Singapore would be precisely the step to bring the USA into the war in support of Britain (Staatsmänner, I, 255 and n.5). Hitler reckoned with conflict between Germany and the USA — but not before the conquest of the USSR had given him the basis to undertake such a contest (Staatsmänner, I, 256 n.7; and see Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Hitler und die USA’, in Otmar Franz (ed.), Europas Mitte, Göttingen/Zurich, 1987, 125–44, here 134).
127. Carr, Poland, 146.
128. Schmidt, 540–42; Staatsmänner, i., 244 n.16. According to Schmidt, Hitler himself gave a broad hint on Matsuoka’s departure following his return to Berlin that conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union could not be excluded (Schmidt, 548). By this date, American cryptanalysts had broken Japanese diplomatic codes and were able to read the increasing number of messages, following Matsuoka’s visit, passed to Tokyo by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi. By mid-April 1941, US intelligence had detailed information on the forthcoming German invasion of the USSR, and was passing the information to the Russians. (Carl Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant. General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941–1945, Kansas, 1992, 18–21.)
129. Staatsmänner, I, 245 and n.18. At the lunch given for Matsuoka on 28 March, Hitler commented in an aside to the Japanese Ambassador Oshima that should the USSR attack Japan Germany would not hesitate to attack the Soviet Union (Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Japan und der Fall “Barbarossa”. Japanische Dokumente zu den Gesprächen Hitlers und Ribbentrops mit Botschafter Oshima von Februar bis Juni 1941’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 18, 1968, 312–36, here 315–16).
130. Staatsmänner I, 240–47.
131. Staatsmänner I, 248.
132. Staatsmänner I, 262.
133. CP, 436 (20 April 1941).
134. Staatsmänner I, 256–7.
135. TBJG, I/9, 248 (15 April 1941). Stalin had made demonstrative gestures of friendship towards Germany immediately following Matsuoka’s departure from Moscow, embracing the German ambassador and military attaché and declaring that Russia and Germany would march together to their goal (TBJG, I/9, 247 (14 April 1941); Schmidt, 548–9).
136. TBJG, I/9, 230 (6 April 1941).
137. TBJG, I/9, 229 (6 April 1941); Domarus, 1686.
138. Hitler had spoken extensively about this on his visit to Linz in mid-March (TBJG, I/9, 185 (13 March 1941). By mid-May, Goebbels was noting how much the transformation of Linz into a cultural capital was costing. ‘But the Führer attaches so much value to it,’ he added (TBJG, I/9, 318 (17 May 1941). Hitler would often repeat in future his intention of making Linz a cultural centre, and his criticism of Vienna. (See TBJG, II/4, 407 (30 May 1942); Picker, 377 (29 May 1942) and 493–4 (10 June 1942).)
139. TBJG, I/9, 231 (6 April 1941).
140. TBJG, I/9, 231 (6 April 1941); text of the proclamation, Domarus, 1687–9.
141. Domarus, 1689.
142. TBJG, I/9, 230 (6 April 1941); and in his speech to military leaders on 27 March 1941 (Domarus, 1677).
143. DRZW, iv.423.
144. Below, 268–9; Keitel, 263; Domarus, 1691 n.155 (where it is stated that the engine was kept under steam in case of air-attack, though without a source-reference).
145. Below, 268.
146. Below, 271; Keitel, 263–4; Domarus, 1692–3.
147. Domarus, 1692.
148. Keitel, 263.
149. Creveld, 158–66; DRZW, iii.458ff.
150. Creveld, 165–6; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 112.
151. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 112; Weinberg III, 221.
152. TBJG, I/9, 234 (8 April 1941). Hitler gushed about his admiration for the classical world, whereas he hated Christianity ‘because it had crippled everything noble about humanity’. He applauded the grandeur of classical architecture, ‘its clarity, brightness, and beauty’, and disliked the ‘gloominess and indistinct mysticism’ of Gothic architecture.
153. Creveld, 163. Jodl reported that the joint surrender had been grotesque (TBJG, I/9, Z79 (29 April 1941)).
154. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 113–14; Weinberg III, 222.
155. Keitel, 263, mistakenly says five weeks.
156. Creveld, 167.
157. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 115; Creveld, 170.
158. Creveld, 170; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 115.
159. Domarus, 1692, 1708; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 158–60.
160. Weisungen, 97.
161. Halder KTB, ii.210, 214 (5 December 1940); and see Creveld, 151.
162. IMG, xxviii.23, Doc. 1746-PS.
163. KTB OKW, i.411–12 (28 May 1941); Halder KTB, 387 (30 April 1941); Hillgruber, Strategie, 507; Domarus, 1696.
164. Hitlers politisches Testament. Die Bormann-Diktate vom Februar und April 1945, Hamburg, 1981, 88 (17 February 1945). No authentic German text of the misnamed ‘Testament’ has ever come to light, though the comments certainly have the ring of Hitler about them.
165. See Hillgruber, Strategie, 506 n.26, who points out that Hitler’s comments served only the interests of his reputation for posterity.
166. Leach, 166; Hillgruber, Strategie, 506.
167. Hillgruber, Strategie, 506 and n.26.
168. Hillgruber, Strategie, 506–7.
169. Leach, 166.
170. Irving, HW, 233.
171. Domarus, 1709.
172. Schmidt, 549.
173. Schmidt, 549; and see TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
174. Rainer F. Schmidt, ‘Der Heß-Flug und das Kabinett Churchill’, VfZ, 42 (1994), 1–38, here 12–13.
175. James Douglas-Hamilton, Motive for a Mission. The Story behind Hess’s Flight to Britain, 2nd edn, Edinburgh, 1979, 172–6; James Douglas-Hamilton, The Truth about Rudolf Hess, Edinburgh, 1993, 141–5; Peter Padfield, Hess. The Führer’s Disciple, London, 1991, 193–211.
176. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.III: The Grand Alliance, London etc., 1950, 43; Douglas-Hamilton, Motive for a Mission, 174ff, quotation 180; Colville, 306–7; John Costello, Ten Days that Saved the West, London, 1991, 417–19; Padfield, Hess, 213–17, quotation 217; James Leasor, Rudolf Hess: the Uninvited Envoy, London, 1962, ch.1–2, 7; J. Bernard Hutton, Hess: the Man and his Mission, London, 1970, 1ff., 49–52.
177. Padfield, Hess, 218–19, 225; Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 377. Cadogan was hugely irritated by what he saw as an unwelcome distraction caused by Heß. ‘Heß is the bane of my life and all my time is wasted,’ he noted on 14 May (Diaries, 378). ‘If only the parachute had failed to open, he would be a happier and more efficient man,’ he told close colleagues; ‘the handling of the whole business is difficult but very important psychologically’ (Colville, 388 (14 May 1941).
178. According to some versions, Hitler was still in bed when Pintsch arrived, though he dressed remarkably quickly (Heinz Linge, ‘Kronzeuge Linge. Der Kammerdiener des “Führers”’, Revue, Munich, November 1955-March 1956, 60; Below, 273). Linge later, however, contradicted his first account, indicating that, though not wanting to be wakened before midday, Hitler was already dressed when Pintsch arrived (Heinz Linge, Bis zum Untergang. Als Chef des persönlichen Dienstes bei Hitler, hrsg. von W. Maser, Munich/Berlin, 1980, 141–2). According to Engel, he was present — something disputed by Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 142 n. — while the Führer was discussing military matters when Pintsch was ushered into the Berghof. Angry at being disturbed, Hitler initially refused to see Pintsch, but eventually, with a bad grace, agreed to do so (Engel, 103 (11 May 1941)). General Karl Bodenschatz, Göring’s representative, claimed after the war to have been alone with Hitler when Pintsch handed over the missive from Heß around 11a.m. (lfZ, ZS 10, Karl Bodenschatz, Fol.32 (Interview with David Irving, 3oNovember 1970)); Irving, HW, 244; Schmidt, ‘Der Heß-Flug’, 5 n.20. Hitler himself apparently recalled, mistakenly, in April 1942 that he had received the news from Heinz Lorenz, Press Chief Dietrich’s representative at Führer HQ, while taking tea by the fireside (Picker, 282 (19–20 April 1942)).
179. Engel, 103 (11 May 1941). Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, 60, in a scene he claimed he would never forget, has Hitler apparently calm as he read the letter, and only on Bormann’s arrival falling into a rage and thumping his fist on the table.
180. Speer, 189. Speer’s details are, however, not always accurate. He has Pietsch instead of Pintsch for Hess’s adjutant, and Leitgen also being present, which he was not. He has Goebbels and Himmler being summoned, and Bormann doing the telephoning. Neither Himmler nor Goebbels were there in the first round. Goebbels was not informed until the following day.
181. A package from Heß had, in fact, so Hitler told his military chiefs a few days later, been delivered to the Berghof the previous evening, but, presuming it was no more than routine Party administrative material from the Deputy Führer, he had simply not bothered to open it (Halder KTB, ii.414 (15 May 1941)). See also Irving, HW, 144. There is no obvious reason why Hitler would have made this up. But, since the letters have not survived, the precise content and how the Saturday evening package (left unopened until the Sunday) and the Sunday letter which came via Pintsch related to each other is unclear. The longer letter, which Hitler had not bothered to open, appears to have been a fourteen-page memorandum with the suggestions for peace that he intended to put to the British. The shorter letter, which so appalled Hitler when he read it, apparently began by saying that by the time the letter was received, its author would be in England. (According to Bodenschatz, who claimed to have read it, this letter was only about two pages long. — IfZ, ZS 10, Fol.32.) Heß handed this letter over to Pintsch immediately before taking off from the airfield at Haunstetten (David Irving, Rudolf Heß — ein gescheiterter Friedensbote? Die Wahrheit über die unbekannten Jahre 1941–1945, Graz/Stuttgart, 1987, 89–90, 100). Heß told the Duke of Hamilton that he had made three previous attempts, but bad weather had intervened. It was, however, also the case that he needed far greater navigational detail than he had initially thought (Irving, Heß, 91–2).
182. Domarus, 1711; Irving, Heß, 90, both resting on the post-war testimony at Nuremberg of Hildegard Fath, one of Heß’s secretaries: Eidesstattliche Erklärung, undatiert, ND Beweisstück, Heß-13, IWM FO 645, Box Nr.31, Nr.3 — cit. Irving, Heß, 444, note to p.89.
183. Engel, 103–4 (11 May 1941).
184. Below, 273.
185. Hewel’s diary entry speaks of ‘great agitation (Große Erregung)’ when Pintsch delivered the letter. Ribbentrop and Göring were summoned. Hitler broke off his talks with Darían. When Göring arrived that evening and was put in the picture by Bodenschatz, he was also ‘very agitated (sehr erregt)’. Hewel also described the atmosphere of the lengthy discussion in the hall between Hitler, Ribbentrop, Göring, and Bormann as ‘very agitated (sehr erregt).’ ‘Many combinations (Viele Kombinationen)’, the diary-entry ends (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch (entry for 11 May 1941)).
186. Martin Moll (ed.), ‘Führer-Erlasse’ 1939–1945, Stuttgart, 1997,172; Domarus, 1716; Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 149–50.
187. See Orlow, ii.334.
188. See Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 1 54ff., especially 178–9.
189. IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, Irving-Sammlung, entry for 12 May 1941; Use Heß, England-Nürnberg-Spandau. Ein Schicksal in Bildern, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1952,130; Irving, HW, 246; Domarus, 1713 n.215,1714. Halder KTB, ii.414 (15 May 1941), conveys the mistaken impression that Göring and Udet had thought it probable that Heß would reach his target. According to Hewel, their initial view was that he would not; but Hitler overrode them.
190. Below, 273–4; IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, Irving-Sammlung, entry for 12 May 1941: ‘Day full of agitation. Inquiries about Heß’s flight. The Führer decides on publishing. Section that it was an act of madness pushed through by Führer.’ (‘Sehr erregter Tag. Untersuchungen über Hess’s Flug. Der Führer entschließt sich zur Veröffentlichung. Passus, daß es sich um eine Wahnsinnstat handelt, wird von F[ührer] durchgesetzt.’)
191. Domarus, 1714.
192. TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
193. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941).
194. Domarus, 1716.
195. TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
196. TBJG, I/9, 309–10 (13 May 1941). And see Below, 274. The following day — after he had seen Hitler — he wrote that it had been necessary to bring out the communiqué of 12 May and to attribute the affair to Heß’s delusions. ‘How else could it have been explained?’ he asked (TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941)).
197. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941).
198. Kriegspropaganda 1939–1941. Geheime Ministerkonferenzen im Reichspropagandaministerium, ed. Willi A. Boelcke, Stuttgart, 1966, 728–36 (13,14,15 May 1941); Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels — the Man Next to Hitler, London, 1941, 32–3 (14 May 1941); Orlow, ii.332.
199. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941). Heß was, in fact, officially the third man in the Reich, having been designated in September 1939 as Hitler’s successor after Göring in the event of his death (Domarus, 1709).
200. TBJG, I/9, 312–13 (14–15 May 1941).
201. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 167.
202. GStA, MA 106671, report of the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern, 10 June 1941: ‘… der Monat der Gerüchte’.
203. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 164.
204. TBJG, I/9, 313–14 (15 May 1941).
205. TBJG, I/9, 315 (16 May 1941).
206. Hans-Jochen Gamm, Der Flüsterwitz im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1972, 36; The Berlin Diaries 1940–1945 of Marie ‘Missie’ Vassiltchikov, London, 1985, 51 (18 May 1941), and 50–51 for other Heß jokes.
207. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 1 6off., 166–7.
208. See Hewel’s description of the meeting, IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 13 May 1941: ‘Chief and Göring on the mountain. 4 o’clock all Reichsleiter and Gauleiter up there. Bormann reads out Heß’s letters. Dramatic meeting. Great emotion. Fürer comes, speaks very personally, analyses deed as such and proves mental disturbance through illogicality… Very moving demonstration. Sympathy. “The Fürer is spared nothing.”’ (‘Chef und Göring auf dem Berg. 4 Uhr alle Reichsleiter und Gauleter oben. Bormann verliest Heß’ Briefe. Dramatische Versammlung. Große Ergriffenheit. Führer kommt, spricht sehr persönlich, analysiert Tat als solche und beweist Geistesgestörtheit an Unlogik…. Sehr ergreifende Kundgebung. Mitleid. “Dem Führer bleibt auch nichts erspart.” ‘) For a summary of Hitler’s remarks, drawn up in Gau Kurhessen on the basis of an eye-witness account, see Franz Graf-Stuhlhofer, ‘Hitler zum Fall Heß vor den Reichs- und Gauleitern am 13. Mai 1941. Dokumentation der Knoth-Nachschrift’, Geschichte und Gegenwart, 18 (1999), 95 –100.
209. Cit. Fest, Face, 292.
210. IfZ, MA 120/5, Fol.480, ‘Rede Hans Franks über Wirkung des Englandflugs von Rudolf Heß’: ‘Der Führer war so vollkommen erschüttert, wie ich das eigentlich noch nicht erlebt habe.’ ‘I was absolutely dismayed (Ich war geradezu entsetzt),’ Frank wrote after the war, in prison in Nuremberg (Frank, 411).
211. Robert M. W. Kempner, Das Dritte Reich im Kreuzverhör. Aus den Vernehmungsprotokollen des Anklägers, Düsseldorf, 1984, 107–9 (testimony of Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle).
212. TBJG, I/9, 312 (14 May 1941).
213. Kempner, 106.
214. R. Schmidt, 5 n.20, points out that the bugging of Bodenschatz’s conversations with other former high-ranking officers of the Luftwaffe while he was in British captivity has undermined his evidence, and thereby the testimony on which so many have relied to claim that Hitler was implicated. Julius Schaub, Hitler’s longstanding adjutant and general factotum, was convinced, in post-war testimony, that Hitler knew nothing of Heß’s flight. (IfZ, ZS 137, Julius Schaub, Vernehmung, 12 March 1947, Fol. 14).
215. See R. Schmidt, 5 n.20.
216. Costello tries to make the case for a British Secret Service plot. But for criticism, see R. Schmidt, 5 n.20. I am most grateful to Ted Harrison for the opportunity to read in advance of publication his essay ‘“… wir wurden schon viel zu oft hereingelegt” ‘. ‘Mai 1941: Rudolf Heß in englischer Sicht’, in Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, eds., Rudolf Heß. Der Mann an Hitlers Seite, Leipzig, 1999, 368–92, 523–6, which provides a thorough investigation of British intelligence and the Heß affair, plainly demonstrating the absence of any plan to lure Heß to Britain, or prior knowledge that he was coming.
217. After the war, Göring poured scorn on the notion that Hitler had been behind the Heß flight. Would he have sent him on such a lone mission without the slightest preparation, he asked? Had he wanted to deal with Britain, semi-official channels through neutral countries (as had been the case with Dahlerus) were open to him, and he, Göring, could through his connections have organized this within forty-eight hours (Irving, Göring, 323).
218. Cit. R. Schmidt, 14.
219. R. Schmidt, 15–16.
220. See also R. Schmidt, 26–7 for Heß’s third interrogation with Lord Simon and Kirkpatrick on 9 June. Here, too, Heß explicitly denied any knowledge of his escapade by Hitler. See also National Archives, NND 881102, US intelligence report on Heß, 28 Oct. 1941: ‘Hess has always insisted that Hitler had no knowledge of his flight.’
221. See Schmidt, 26.
222. Padfield, Hess, xiii for ‘Fräulein Anna’ and xiv for other unflattering nicknames. Sir John Simon concluded from his interrogation of Heß on 10 June ‘that Heß’s position and authority in Germany have declined and that if he could bring off the coup of early peace on Hitler’s terms he would confirm his position… and render an immense service to his adored Master and to Germany’ (cit. Schmidt, 28).
223. NA, NND — 881102; Douglas-Hamilton, The Truth about Rudolf Hess, 68, 128ff.; Irving, HW, 246–7 and n.2. Harrison, ‘Rudolf Heß’, 369–71, points out that the British counter-intelligence organization MI5 had received on 2 November 1940 a letter from Albrecht Haushofer to Hamilton, dated 23 September and intercepted by British censors. This referred to a previous letter of July 1939, and suggested a meeting with Hamilton in Lisbon, or elsewhere on the periphery of Europe. MI5 discussed the letter with the Secret Service, with a view to using Hamilton to ply the Germans with misinformation. Hamilton himself was not consulted about the idea until some months later. Meanwhile, the original of the letter went missing. Hamilton’s cagey response to the proposal left the British authorities hesitant about proceeding. It was at this point that Heß arrived.
224. Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 379, expressing Cadogan’s impatience with Churchill’s initial line, that Heß had come on a peace-mission, which he thought corresponded too closely with what German propaganda was saying. Churchill, in a furious temper, only bowed next day, 15 May, to pressure from Cadogan and other advisers to refrain from a public statement on the Heß affair. Massively relieved that the British had not acted as he would have done in making maximum propaganda capital out of the affair — ‘the only but also dreadful danger for us’ — Goebbels remarked that ‘it seems as if a guardian angel is again standing near us’, witheringly concluding that ‘we’re dealing with dim dilettantes (mit doofen Dilettanten) over there. What we would do if it were the other way round!’ (TBJG, I/9, 315 (16 May 1941).
225. See R. Schmidt, 24.
226. R. Schmidt, 29.
227. Irving, Göring, 316–17, 327; Irving, HW, 22m.
228. R. Schmidt, 10; Gabriel Gorodetsky, ‘Churchill’s Warning to Stalin. A Reappraisal’, The Historical Journal, 29 (1986), 979–90. For information reaching Stalin on the German military build-up, and his awareness of a coming invasion, see Valentin Falin, Zweite Front. Die Inter-essenkonflikte in der Anti-Hitler-Koalition, Munich, 1995, 193–5.
229. R. Schmidt, 18–19. Harrison, ‘Rudolf Heß’, 382–8, plays down the intent, emphasizing instead the confusion in the British Foreign Office and the missed propaganda opportunity, while acknowledging the enormous concern and misinterpretation which ensued in the Soviet leadership.
230. R. Schmidt, 34–6.
231. Stalin was still suspicious about the Heß affair, believing it had been a plot to involve Britain and Germany entering the war together against the Soviet Union, some three years later (Churchill, iii.49).
232. R. Schmidt, 32, 36. Such moves do not provide evidence of a prior intention on the part of the Soviet Union to attack Germany — the notorious ‘preventive war theory’. See Chapter 9 n.4, below.
233. Weisungen, 139–40; Domarus, 1719–20; Oxford Companion, 571.
234. Elizabeth-Anne Wheal and Stephen Pope, The Macmillan Dictionary of the Second World War, 2nd edn, London, 1995, 57–9, contains a summary description of the sinking of the Bismarck. A vivid account is provided by Churchill, iii.Ch.XVII.
235. Hewel recorded the ‘very depressed mood (sehr deprimierte Stimmung)’ among the Nazi leadership on account of the fate of the Bismarck. Hitler was ‘endlessly sad (unendlich traurig)’, and had ‘immeasurable anger at the navy leadership (Maßlose Wut auf Seekriegsleitung)’ for failure to adopt the correct tactics and unnecessary exposure of the Bismarck. (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch, entries for 26 May, especially, 27 May, and 31 May 1941. See also Raeder, Mein Leben, ii.269–71; Lagevorträge, 239 (6 June 1941); Irving, HW, 254, 258.)
236. Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, New York, 1992, 11.
237. Anatomie, ii. 176–82, 2o6ff.
238. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 141–50; Höhne, Death’s Head, 328–30.
239. Höhne, Death’s Head, 328.
240. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 148.
241. Ulrich Herbert, ’ “Generation der Sachlichkeit”. Die völkische Studentenbewegung der frühen zwanziger Jahre in Deutschland’, in Frank Bajohr, Werner Johe and Uwe Lohalm (eds.), Zivilisation und Barbarei, Hamburg, 1991, 115–44, especially 137–8.
242. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 148–9.
243. Höhne, Death’s Head, 330.
244. TBJG, I/9, 346 (31 May 1941).
245. Domarus, 1722.
246. CD, 352 (1 June 1941).
247. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 2 June 1941; Irving, HW, 262. Hitler told Goebbels just before the invasion that Mussolini had been broadly orientated during their Brenner meeting (TBJG, I/9, 395 (22 June 1941)).
248. CD, 352 (2 June 1941).
249. Hitler, noted Goebbels on the day that ‘Barbarossabegan, had nothing but contempt for Heß, who had caused the Party and the Wehrmacht enormous damage and ought to have been shot, had he not been mad (TBJG, I/9, 395–6 (22 June 1941)).
250. CP, 442.
251. Staatsmänner I, 260–76.
252. CD, 352 (1 June 1941); CP, 441; Staatsmänner I, 262–3.
253. Staatsmänner I, 264–6, 269–72, 276.
254. See Schmidt, 550.
255. Domarus, 1722.
256. CD, 352 (2 June 1941).
257. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 3 June 1941; Irving, HW, 262; Bernd Martin, Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Göttingen, 1969, 97 n.13; Boyd, 21.
258. Staatsmänner I, 277–91.
259. Staatsmänner I, 279, 285, 289 and n.39.
260. Staatsmänner I, 280 n.14, 288 n.36, 289 n.39.
261. Staatsmänner I, 284–90.
262. Staatsmänner I, 291.
263. Below, 277.
264. Halder KTB, 455 (14 June 1941). Despite this apparent confidence, he had, in fact, only three days earlier issued Directive 32, laying out operational plans for continuing the struggle against the British position in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East (Weisungen, 151ff.).
265. Below, 277.
266. Below, 278.
267. The following from TBJG, I/9, 377–80 (16 June 1941).
268. Below, 272–3. Goebbels was himself aware of accurate rumours and a good deal of tension both at home and abroad about the impending ‘action’ (TBJG, I/9, 372 (14 June 1941), 387 (19 June I941)).
269. BA/MA, RW 20–13/9, ‘Geschichte der Rüstungs-Inspektion XII’, Fol.156: ‘Die Konzentration zahlreicher Truppen in den Ostgebieten batte zwar die Vermutung aufkommen lassen, als bereiten sich dort bedeutungsvolle Ereignisse vor, jedoch glaubte wobl der überwiegende Teil des deutschen Volkes an keine kriegerische Auseinandersetzung mit der Sow jet-Union.’
270. TBJG, I/9, 380 (16 June 1941).
271. TBJG, I/9, 387 (19 June 1941); Tb Reuth, 1606 has 800,000. Goebbels had noted some days earlier that 30 million leaflets had been prepared in the Propaganda Ministry for distribution about the war in the east (TBJG, I/9, 366–7 (12 June 1941)).
272. Below, 278; TBJG, I/9, 395 (22 June 1941). Goebbels suggested a few alterations.
273. Below, 178–9; TBJG, I/9, 395 (22 June 1941).
274. TBJG, I/9, 395–6 (22 June 1941).
275. According to KTB OKW, i.408 (22 June 1941), the attack began at 3a.m. Domarus, 1733, has it beginning at 3.05a.m.; DRZW, iv.451, states that it began between 3.00 and 3.30, noting (n.1) that the variations in time arose from the differing point of sunrise along such a lengthy front. TBJG, I/9, 396 (22 June 1941), has ‘3.30. Now the guns are thundering.’
276. TBJG, I/9, 396 (22 June 1941); Tb Reuth, 1611 n.128.
277. Domarus, 1727.
278. Domarus, 1731.
279. Domarus, 1732.
280. Domarus, 1735–6.
281. DGFP, D, XII, 1066–9, No.660, quotation 1069.
1. TBJG, II/1, 36–7 (9 July 1941); Domarus, 1732. Hitler was by summer 1942 sufficiently aware that the parallel was being drawn that he had ‘experts’ counter the talk by declaring that Napoleon really only commenced his march into Russia on 23 June (Picker, 462 (19 July 1942)).
2. DRZW, iv.72, 75; Leach, 192; Omer Bartov, ‘From Blitzkrieg to Total War: Controversial Links between Image and Reality’, in Kershaw and Lewin, 158–84, here 165 (who points out that the Luftwaffe deployed significantly fewer aircraft than in the Western campaign); Hartmut Schustereit, Vabanque: Hitler’s Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941 als Versuch, durcb den Sieg im Osten den Westen zu bezwingen, Herford, 1988, 30–41. A detailed evaluation of the rival forces and the early military operations is provided by David M. Glantz (ed.), The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 June-August 1941, London, 1993; see 29–31 for Soviet troop dispositions and deployment on 22 June 1941.
3. DRZW, iv.Beiheft, maps 5, 7; Domarus, 1744 for the fall of Minsk, reported on 10 July.
4. See above all Gerd R. Ueberschär and Lev A. Bezymenskij (eds.), Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion. Die Kontroverse um die Präventivkriegsthese, Darmstadt, 1988, here especially VIII-IX, 59, 100–101, and, for the plan of Timoshenko and Zhukov, 186–93. See also Gabriel Gorodetsky, ‘Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Legende vom deutschen Präventivschlag’, VfZ, 37 (1989), 645–72; and Bianka Pietrow, ‘Deutschland im Juni 1941 — ein Opfer sowjetischer Aggression? Zur Kontroverse über die Präventivkriegsthese’, GG, 14 (1988), 116–35. Stalin had in a speech on 5 May warned a large audience of graduates from Soviet military academies that war was imminent. But the belated discovery of a text of the speech, of which all copies were thought lost, has disproved those reports suggesting that Stalin was advocating a preventive war against Germany. See Lev A. Bezymenskij, ‘Stalins Rede vom 5. Mai 1941 — neu dokumentiert’, in Ueberschär and Bezymenskij, 131–44; also DGFP, D, XII, 964–5, No.593; Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941–1945, New York (1964), 1984,122–3; John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad. Stalin’s War with Germany, London, (1975), Phoenix paperback edn, 1998, 82; Falin, 194—7; Weinberg III, 203—4, Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, 791, 798—9, 807.
5. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, 791–3.
6. Volkogonov, 411–13.
7. Bernd Bonwetsch, ‘Stalin, the Red Army, and the “Great Patriotic War” ’, in Kershaw and Lewin, 185–207, here 188, 193–5; and see Glantz, Initial Period, 31.
8. Soviet captives numbered some 3.8 million by the end of 1941, and 5.25 million by the end of the war (DRZW, iv.727 (586 n.523 for slightly different figures for the numbers captured by late 1941)). At least 2½ million died in German captivity, apart from a minimum of 140,000 liquidated immediately on capture (DRZW, iv.730; Streit, ch.VII). Goebbels spoke in mid-December of 900,000 already dead of hunger, exhaustion, and illness, with many more certain to die in the next weeks and months (TBJG, II.2, 484 (12 December 1941)). Shortly before this, Göing had spoken to Ciano of cannibalism in the Russian prison-of-war camps (CP, 464–5 (24–27 November 1941)).
9. Bonwetsch, 189.
10. See Streit, ch.VI; DRZW, iv.Teil II, Kap.VII; Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–45, German Troops, and the Barbarisation of Warfare, New York, 1986, Ch.4.
11. Volkogonov, 413; Irving, HW, 286–7.
12. IMG, xxxviii. 86–94, Doc. 221 — L; Klee and Dreßen, ‘Gott mit uns’, 23 (meeting of 16 July 1941). For the Wehrmacht’s brutal struggle against the partisans, see Hannes Heer, ‘Die Logik des Vernichtungskriegs. Wehrmacht und Partisanenkampf’, in Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds.), Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944, Hamburg, 1995, 104–38; Hannes Heer, ‘Killing Fields: the Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belorussia, 1941–1942’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 11 (1997), 79—101; Lutz Klinkhammer, ‘Der Partisanenkrieg der Wehrmacht 1941 — 1944’ and Timm C. Richter, ‘Die Wehrmacht und der Partisanenkrieg in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion’, both in Müllier and Volkmann, Die Wehrmacht, 815–36, 837–57.
13. TBJG, I/9, 398 (23 June 1941).
14. Below, 253, 281.
15. Domarus, 1743 for the name ‘Wolf; Schroeder, 111.
16. Below, 281–2; Warlimont, 172–3; Alfons Schulz, Drei Jahre in der Nachrichtenzentrale des Führerhauptquartiers, Stein am Rhein, 1996, 30—31, 39ff.; Hitler’s succession decree relating to Göring in Domarus, 1741.
17. Schroeder, 116, 120–21; Below, 282–3. Schroeder implies that the second briefing of the day, as later in the war, was late in the evening. But Below is precise in stipulating that it took place during the early weeks of the campaign at 6 p.m.
18. Schroeder, 115.
19. Schroeder, 120–21.
20. Schroeder, 113.
21. Below, 282–3, 285.
22. IMG, xv, 325. See also Picker, 374 (28 May 1942), where life at FHQ was referred to by Picker as a ‘monastic existence (Klösterdasein)’.
23. Schroeder, 119, 121–2.
24. Schroeder, 111–12. Goebbels remarked on the swarms of midges in the area when he first visited FHQ on 8 July 1941 (TBJG, II/1, 30 (9 July 1941)).
25. Schroeder, 112.
26. Schroeder, 125.
27. Below, 283.
28. Schroeder, 113–14. For similarly optimistic notions from the OKW and Ribbentrop around this time, see Irving, HW, 282. In the earlier version of her memoirs, noted by Zoller, Hitler allegedly added that he would build a reservoir (Staubecken) on the site of Moscow (Zoller, 143).
29. Schroeder, 120.
30. TBJG, II/1, 30 (9 July 1941).
31. TBJG, II/1, 35 (9 July 1941).
32. TBJG, II/1, 32–5 (9 July 1941).
33. Schroeder, 113.
34. Staatsmänner I, 293. Oshima was impressed by what he heard of German progress in the war and recommended to his government that Japan quickly strike against the Soviet Union in the east (Boyd, 27).
35. Schroeder, 114.
36. Below, 283; Domarus, 1740.
37. TBJG, I/9, 412 (30 June 1941). Domarus, 1740 n.323 mistakenly suggests that the ‘Russian Fanfare’ was based upon Liszt’s ‘Hungarian Rhapsody’ instead of his Symphonic Poem No. 3, ‘Les Préludes’.
38. TBJG, I/9, 412, 415–16 (30 July 1941), 415–16 (1 July 1941), 426 (5 July 1941).
39. Willi A. Boelcke (ed.), Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg? Die geheimen Goebbels-Konferenzen 1939–1943, Munich, 1969, 235–7; Tb Reuth, 1623 n.144. And see Wolfram Wette, ‘Die propagandistische Begleitmusik zum deutschen Überfall auf die Sowjetunion am 22. Juni 1941’, in Gerd R. Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette (eds.), ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’. Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Berichte, Analysen, Dokumente, Paderborn, 1984, 111–29, here especially 118–19.
40. See TBJG, II/1, 30–9 (9 July 1941): ‘The Führer is blazing about the Bolshevik leadership clique which intended to invade Germany, and thus Europe, and at the last moment, with the Reich weakened, to carry out the attempt to bolshevize the continent that had been planned since 1917’ (31). ‘The preventive war is always still the surest and mildest, if there is certainty that the enemy will in any case attack at the first best opportunity; and that was the case with Bolshevism’ (33). ‘Without doubt [the Kremlin] wanted this autumn, when we had no further possibility of aggressive action against Russia on account of the weather, to occupy Romania. Through this the Kremlin would have cut off our petroleum supply’ (38). Hitler told his entourage in mid-September: ‘It needed the greatest strength to take the decision last year for the attack on Bolshevism. I had to reckon that Stalin would go over to the attack in the course of this year. It was necessary to move as soon as at all possible. The earliest date was June 1941.’ (Monologe, 60–61 (17–18 September 1941).)
41. DRZW, iv.461.
42. Leach, 200.
43. Leach, 202.
44. KTB OKW, i.1021; DRZW, iv.487; Leach, 201.
45. Halder KTB, iii, 38; trans. Halder Diary, 446–7 (3 July 1941).
46. Monologe, 39 (5–6 July 1941).
47. ‘Aufzeichnungen des persönlichen Referenten Rosenbergs Dr Koeppen über Hitlers Tischgesprä-che 1941’(= Koeppen), Fol. 15 (19 September 1941). In fact, as the hopes of the Volkswagenwerk of returning to production of cars for civilian use dimmed over the summer and autumn of 1941, the campaign in the east demanded the production of more and more tanks. (See Hans Mommsen and Manfred Grieger, Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich, Düsseldorf, 1996, 453, 46off.)
48. Monologe, 39 (5–6 July 1941).
49. Koeppen, Fol.9 (10 September 1941).
50. Koeppen, Fol.12 (19 September 1941). Goebbels reported Hitler’s intention on 18 August as the starvation of St Petersburg (Leningrad) and Kiev. Once Leningrad had been put under siege and the bombardment had taken place, ran Hitler’s plan, ‘there would probably not be much left of this city’ (TBJG, II/1, 260–61 (19 August 1941)).
51. Monologe, 48 (27 July 1941).
52. Koeppen, Fol.28 (23 September 1941).
53. Monologe, 38 (5 July 1941).
54. Koeppen, Fol.12 (19 September 1941).
55. Koeppen, Fol.28 (24 September 1941).
56. Monologe, 42 (11–12 July 1941).
57. In September, Hitler commented that it would be a mistake to educate the native population. All this would achieve would be the sort of semi-knowledge that leads to revolution. (Monologe, 63 (17–18 September 1941); Koeppen, Fol.12 (18 September 1941).
58. Monologe, 48 (27 July 1941).
59. Monologe, 54–5 (8–11 August 1941).
60. Monologe, 51 (1–2 August 1941).
61. Monologe, 54 (8–11 August 1941).
62. Monologe, 55 (8–11 August 1941). He repeated the sentiments in similar words a month later. ‘The Russian territory (Raum) is our India,’ he stated, ‘and just as the English rule it with a handful of people, so we will govern this, our colonial territory’ (Monologe, 62–3 (17–18 September 1941)); Koeppen, Fol.12 (18 September 1941).
63. A month after these comments in mid–August, Hitler enthused about the capture of the iron-ore district of Kriwoi-Rog, whose productive capacity, he claimed, removed all worries about covering demand (Koeppen, Fol 10 (17 September 1941)).
64. Monologe, 58 (19–20 August 1941).
65. Monologe, 63 (17–18 September 1941).
66. Monologe, 62 (17–18 September 1941).
67. Monologe, 69–71 (25 September 1941).
68. Monologe, 66 (23 September 1941).
69. Monologe, 67 (23 September 1941); Koeppen, Fol.29 (23 September 1941).
70. Monologe, 68 (25 September 1941). On 27–28 September, he spoke of the aim of fighting war ‘on the edges’ of German territory (Monologe, 72). Hitler had referred earlier to a ‘living wall’ to protect the new east ‘against the mid-Asian masses’ (Monologe, 55 (8–11 August 1941)). See also Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik, Frankfurt am Main, 1991, 23–4.
71. Monologe, 71 (25–6 September 1941).
72. Monologe, 71 (25–6 September 1941).
73. Monologe, 58 (19–20 August 1941).
74. Monologe, 72 (27–8 September 1941).
75. Monologe, 65 (22–3 September 1941).
76. Monologe, 65 (22–3 September 1941).
77. An overemphasis on Hitler’s ‘modernity’ runs through the interpretation of Rainer Zitelmann, Hitler. Selbstverständnis eines Revolutionärs, Hamburg/Leamington Spa/New York, 1987. See also Rainer Zitelmann, Adolf Hitler. Eine politische Biographie, Göttingen, 1989, and his essay ‘Die totalitäre Seite der Moderne’, in Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, Darmstadt, 1991, 1–20. For strong criticism of such an emphasis, see Hans Mommsen, ‘Nationalsozialismus als vorgetäuschte Modernisierung’, in Walter H. Pehle (ed.), Der historische Ort des Nationalsozialismus. Annäherungen, Frankfurt am Main, 1990,11–46; Norbert Frei, ‘Wie modern war der Nationalsozialismus?’, GG, 19 (1993), 367–87, here especially 374ff.; Axel Schildt, ‘NS-Regime, Modernisierung und Moderne. Anmerkungen zur Hochkonjunktur einer andauernden Diskussion’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, 23 (1994), 3–22, here especially 11ff.
78. Monologe, 57 (8–11 August 1941).
79. Monologe, 64 (17–18 September 1941).
80. IMG, xxxviii, 86–94, quotation 87–8, Doc. 221-L; DGFP, 3, 13, 149–56, No.114; extracts in Klee and Dreßen, Gott mit uns, 22–3. See also Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941–1945. A Study of Occupation Policies, (1957), 2nd edn, Basingstoke/London, 1981, 84, 123, 204; and Eberhard Jäckel, ‘Hitlers doppeltes Kernstück’, in Roland G. Foerster (ed.), ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’. Zum historischen Ort der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von 1933 bis Herbst 1941, Munich, 1993, 14–22, here 14–18.
81. IMG, xxix, 235–7, 1997-PS.
82. CP, 465 (24–7 November 1941); Klee and Dreßen, Gott mit uns, 23; Halder KTB, ii.335–8 (30 March 1941); IMG, xxxi.135–7, 126-EC. The plans for mass deportation were in the process of being worked out for the ‘General Plan for the East’. See Helmut Heiber (ed.), ‘Der Generalplan Ost’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 281–325; Czeslaw Madajczyk (ed.), Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan, Munich etc., 1994; Mechtild Rößler and Sabine Schleiermacher (eds.), Der ‘Generalplan Ost’. Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik, Berlin, 1993.
83. Dallin, ch.3, especially 56ff.
84. Dallin, 84, 123–4. Civilian rule was established in the occupied territories in August and September 1941 (Dallin, 85).
85. Koeppen, Fols.12–13 (18 September 1941).
86. Dallin, 185ff.
87. Dallin, 203ff.
88. Halder KTB, iii.10 (24 June 1941).
89. Halder KTB, iii.15 (25 June 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 424.
90. Halder KTB, iii.20 (27 June 1941), 25 (29 June 1941), 29 (30 June 1941), 34–5 (2 July 1941), 39 (3 July 1941).
91. Halder KTB, iii.39 (3 July 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 448.
92. DRZW, iv.212–13; Leach, 53, 99; Dirks/Janßen, 137ff.
93. DRZW, iv.219–42; Leach, 99–118,250–69. See above, Chapter 7, n.157, for Loßberg’s post-war claim to have begun work on the strategic study already in early July 1940, and without any formal request to do so. In his post-war memoirs, Bernhard von Loßberg, Im Wehrmachtführungsstab. Bericht eines Generalstabsoffiziers, Hamburg, 1950, 104–8, Loßberg makes no mention of this.
94. See Halder KTB, ii.463–9, ‘Aufmarschanweisung OKH vom 31.1.1941 “Barbarossa”’ (Leach, 263–9 (OKH Deployment Directive, ‘Barbarossa’, 31 January 1941). The Directive was discussed by Halder and Brauchitsch with the three Army Group Commanders on 31 January 1941, then issued on 19 February 1941 (Halder KTB, ii.264 n.1, 266 (31 January 1941, 2 February 1941). Mention of Moscow was confined to a single sentence: ‘In the event of a sudden unexpected collapse of enemy resistance in northern Russia, the abandonment of the turning movement and an immediate thrust towards Moscow could be considered’ (Halder KTB, ii.465; trans. Leach, 264).
95. Weisungen, 98–9 (No.21, 18 December 1940). Hitler’s significant amendment to the original plan of attack had been conveyed to Jodl on 17 December 1940, the day before the issuing of Directive No.21 for ‘Barbarossa’ (KTB OKW, i.233).
96. Halder KTB, iii.24–5 (29 June 1941).
97. KTB OKW, i.1020; DRZW, iv.486–7; and see Warlimont, 182.
98. DRZW, iv.487.
99. Leach, 197.
100. DRZW, iv.487; Leach, 216.
101. KTB OKW, 1.1030 (during Hitler’s visit to Leeb in Army Group North on 21 July). See also Warlimont, 186; DRZW, iv.495.
102. Weisungen, 166 (23 July 1941); DRZW, iv.490; Leach, 198.
103. KTB OKW, i.1030; Halder KTB, iii.103–7 (23 July 1941), especially 104 and n.1, 106 (quotation); DRZW, iv.491.
104. Weisungen, 165; DRZW, iv.689–93; Leach, 204. Hitler’s Directive No.33 of 19 July 1941, ‘Continuation of the War in the East’, had, however, indicated that air-raids supporting the army on the south-eastern front, not on Moscow, were the first priority (Weisungen, 164–5). Göring later described the raids on Moscow as ‘prestige attacks’, prompted by sarcastic remarks by Hitler casting doubt on whether the Luftwaffe had a single squadron with the courage to raid Moscow (DRZW, iv.693).
105. Leach, 205.
106. Halder KTB, iii.151 (4 August 1941). Under ‘Losses (Verluste)’ Halder noted 46,470 officers and men dead, 11,758 missing, and 155,073 injured.
107. Leach, 205–7, 210.
108. Leach, 207.
109. KTB OKW, 1.1033.
110. DRZW, iv.493.
111. 111. KTB OKW, i.1037, 1040.
112. Warlimont, 185; Leach, 208.
113. KTB OKW, i.1040; DRZW, iv.495–6; Leach, 209.
114. Halder KTB, iii. 134 (30 July 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 490.
115. Weisungen, 168–9; DRZW, iv.495; Leach, 209.
116. DRZW, iv.495–6.
117. DRZW, iv. 499–500.
118. Halder KTB, iii.170 (11 August 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 506.
119. Weisungen, 173; and see DRZW, iv.503; Warlimont, 187.
120. DRZW, iv.504.
121. TBJG, II/1, 258 (19 August 1941). Hitler’s own — exaggerated — view was that he had not been ill since he was sixteen years old (Monologe, 190 (9–10 January 1942)).
122. Irving, Doctor, 87–8; Irving, HW, 293–5.
123. TBJG, II/i, 260–3 (19 August 1941).
124. Laurence Rees, War of the Century. When Hitler Fought Stalin, London, 1999, 52–6; Volko-gonov, 412–13.
125. TBJG, II/1, 266 (19 August 1941).
126. KTB OKW, 11.1055–9; DRZW, iv.505.
127. Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit. Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee 1923–1945, Tübingen/Stuttgart, 1950, 132–5; Warlimont, 189 (whose translation has been used).
128. KTB OKW, i.1061–3 (Halder’s memorandum, and Hitler’s order); Halder KTB, iii.192 (22 August 1941), trans. Halder Diary, 514; Warlimont, 190.
129. KTB OKW, i.1065; Halder KTB, iii.193 (22 August 1941); DRZW, iv.506; Warlimont, 190–91.
130. KTB OKW, ii.1063–8 (Hitler’s ‘Study’); DRZW, iv.505–6.
131. Halder KTB, iii.193 (22 August 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 515; and see Bock, 290–91 (23 August 1941), and Hartmann, 283.
132. Above from Guderian, 198–202.
133. Hartmann, 283–4; Halder’s reaction to Guderian’s change of mind in Halder KTB, iii.194–5 (24 August 1941).
134. Bock, 291 (24 August 1941); Hartmann, 284 n.57.
135. A point made by Warlimont, 191.
136. DRZW, iv.514, 516, 516 n.252; Leach, 222 (slightly different figures).
137. Leach, 222.
138. DRZW, iv.516; Warlimont, 193, on agreement now on the necessity of reaching Moscow before the winter.
139. In fact, once the German blockade set in, around 2.5 million civilians would be practically trapped — apart from a path over the iced Lake Ladoga — in the city over an exceptionally icy winter and beyond. (The siege would finally be raised only at the end of January 1944.) With supply routes cut off, famine conditions quickly took hold. Horses and stray dogs were rapidly consumed. Bread and gruel were in exceedingly short supply. Most people had to resort to root vegetables and, when they dried up, an unholy concoction made from peat and paper. An estimated 850–950,000 are estimated to have succumbed to starvation, cold, and illness. (Osobyi Arkhiv (Sonderarchiv), Moscow, 500–1–25, ‘Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr.191’, 10 April 1942, Fols.264–70; Oxford Companion, 683–6; Richard Overy, Russia’s War, London, 1997, 105–11.)
140. TBJG, II/1, 481–3 (24 September 1941).
141. TBJG, II.1, 486 (24 September 1941).
142. TBJG, II/1, 482 (24 September 1941). In fact, Hitler was hoping to be able to withdraw a good number of divisions after attaining the next military goals. Halder had decided as early as 8 July to make winter arrangements for an occupying rather than a combat force in the Soviet Union (Halder KTB, iii.53 (8 July 1941); Dallin, 62).
143. An attached cover-note by Keitel of 1 September states that Hitler had approved the Memorandum. Its circulation was restricted on Hitler’s orders to the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht, and the Reich Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop). Chief of Staff Halder presumably saw it only several days after its initial distribution, since he noted extracts in his diary entry for 13 September. (ADAP, D, XIII, 345–53, quotation 352, No. 265; DGFP, D, 13, 422–33, quotation 431, No.265; Halder KTB, iii.226–9; DRZW, iv.507; Warlimont, 192–3.)
144. Halder KTB, iii.205 (29 August 1941).
145. DRZW, IV. 571.
146. See Leach, 220, 222.
147. Bonwetsch, 203ff. (though the change was only gradual, and from 1942 onwards). For an emphasis, diluting the blame attached exclusively to Stalin, on the structural weaknesses in the Red Army in 1941, but rapid remedial action taken, see Jacques Sapir, ‘The Economics of War in the Soviet Union during World War II’, in Kershaw and Lewin, 208–36, here 216–19. See also David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army stopped Hitler, Kansas, 1995, 65ff.
148. Leach, 234–7 (and see also pp.118–23) for above.
149. Leach, 212, 223–4. Whether Soviet determination to stand and defend Moscow, backed by utterly ruthless butchery of those attempting to flee, would have been sustainable had Stalin fled from the capital might, however, be doubted. And such an eventuality was close in mid-October, when a special train was waiting under steam at one of Moscow’s stations ready to carry the Soviet dictator out of the city. Stalin seems to have pondered the likely consequences for morale, however, and decided to stay. (Volkogonov, 434–5; Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin, New York, 1996, 482–3; Rees, War of the Century, 71–4; Bonwetsch, 189; Glantz and House, 81; Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler’s War. German Military Strategy, 1940–1945, London, 1998, 117–18. For a guide through the labyrinth of interpretations, see Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, Hitler’s War in the East 1941–1945. A Critical Assessment, Providence/Oxford, 1997, 85–104, especially 99ff.)
150. See Leach, 238–41.
151. Hauner, Hitler, 151–2.
152. Hauner, Hitler, 166–8. For Udet, whose death was attributed by the regime to an accident while testing a new aeroplane, see Wistrich, 280.
153. Rebentisch, 374.
154. Lang, Der Sekretär, 464.
155. Rebentisch, 374.
156. Steinert, 206–8.
157. Boelcke, Wollt Ihr, 236.
158. Steinert, 209–13; Boelcke, Wollt Ihr, 234–44; Seydewitz, 70–72.
159. Heinrich Breloer (ed.), Mein Tagebuch. Geschichten vom Überleben 1939–1947, Cologne, 1984, 63.
160. Breloer, 63.
161. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18475, report of the Landrat of Ebermannstadt, 1 July 1941: ‘Nicht das geringste Verständnis besteht für die Verwirklichung von Weltherrschaftsplänen… Die überarbeiteten und abgewirtschafteten Männer und Frauen sehen nicht ein, warum der Krieg noch weiter nach Asien und Afrika hineingetragen werden muß.’
162. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18475, report of the Landrat of Ebermannstadt, 30 August 1941; printed in Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich, and Falk Wiesemann (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit. Soziale Lage und politisches Verhalten der Bevölkerung im Spiegel vertraulicher Berichte, Munich/Vienna, 1977, 152.
163. Steinert, 213–14.
164. StA Munich, LRA 61618, report of Gendarmerie-Posten Mittenwald, 24 May 1941 (‘schlecht und kriegsmüde’); report of Gendarmerie-Kreisführer Mittenwald, 28 November 1941 (‘… die sich stetig steigernden großen und kleinen Alltagssorgen…’).
165. Conway, 259–60, 383–6.
166. For Bormann’s increasing intervention in Church matters during the war, see Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 25off.
167. Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 332–4; E. D. R. Harrison, ‘The Nazi Dissolution of the Monasteries: a Case Study’, English Historical Review, 109 (1994), 323–55, here 336–41.
168. GStA Munich, Epp-Akten 157, Reichsstatthalter Epp to Lammers, 23 December 1941: ‘Staats-minister Wagner wollte mit seinem Kruzifixerlaß auf seine Weise der von Reichsleiter Bormann herausgegebenen Lehre, daß Nationalsozialismus und Christentum unvereinbare Gegensätze seien, sichtbare Auswirkung verschaffen…’
169. Landratsamt Traunstein, IV-7–177, anonymous letter to the Landrat of the Landkreis Traunstein, 20 September 1941: ‘Die Söhne unserer Stadt stehen im Osten im Kampf gegen den Bolshewismus. Viele aus ihnen geben dafür ihr Leben. Wir können nicht verstehen, dass man uns gerade in dieser schweren Zeit das Kreuz aus den Schulen nehmen will.’
170. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 340–57; Heinrich Huber (ed.), Dokumente einer christlichen Widerstandsbewegung. Gegen die Entfernung der Kruzifixe aus den Schulen 1941, Munich, 1948.
171. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 178.
172. Landratsamt Parsberg 939, report of the Landrat of Parsberg, 19 September 1941: ‘Durch-führung des Kreuzerlasses in Parsberg’: ‘… das will der Führer nicht und er weiss bestimmt nichts von dieser Kreuzentfernung’.
173. StA Munich, LRA 31933, anonymous letter (undated but received on 2 October 1941) to the Bürgermeister of Ramsau, Landkreis Berchtesgaden: ‘Braune Hemden trägt Ihr von Oben, Innen raus seid Bolschewisten u. Juden sonst könnt Ihr nicht handeln des Führers Rücken...’ (grammar and punctuation as in the original).
174. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 340; Lutz Lemhöfer, ‘Gegen den gottlosen Bolschewismus. Zur Stellung der Kirchen zum Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion’, in Ueberschär and Wette, 131–9, here 135–6.
175. This was the implication of the interpretation by Peter Hüttenberger, ‘Vorüberlegungen zum “Widerstandsbegriff”’, in Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Theorien in der Praxis des Historikers, Göttingen, 1977, 117–34.
176. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 290.
177. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 324–5.
178. 178. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 206ff., 289–91.
179. Honolka, 84–90; Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 286–7.
180. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 334.
181. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 334, 486–7 n.127.
182. Heinz Boberach (ed.), Berichte des SD und der Gestapo über Kirchen und Kirchenvolk, Mainz, 1971, 570–71.
183. Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 349–50.
184. Cit. Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 350; Peter Löffler (ed.), Bischof Clemens August Graf von Galen. Akten, Briefe und Predigten, vol.2, 1939–1946, Mainz, 1988, 864–6.
185. Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 352; see also Löffler, 874–83; and Ludwig Volk, ‘Episkopat und Kirchenkampf’, in Dieter Albrecht (ed.),Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus. Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Ludwig Volk, Mainz, 1987, 94.
186. Klee, Dokumente, 193–8; trans. N & P, iii.1036–9.
187. Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 352; Lewy, 253.
188. Papen, 481–2.
189. See Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 325–6.
190. Picker, 260 (7 April 1942).
191. Bernhard Stasiewski, ‘Die Kirchenpolitik der Nationalsozialisten im Warthegau 1939–1945’, VfZ, 7 (1959), 46–74, here 65.
192. Papen, 481–2.
193. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 335.
194. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 335.
195. TBJG, II/2, 33 (1 October 1941).
196. TBJG, II/1, 239 (15 August 1941). Goebbels referred to the possibility of linking the ‘debate’ to the film justifying ‘euthanasia’, Ich klage an (I Accuse), which he had commissioned and was now almost ready for release. See Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1 21ff. for the content of the film, first shown in Berlin on 29 August 1941.
197. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 339; Eugen Kogon et al. (eds.), Nationalsozialistische Massentötungen durch Giftgas. Eine Dokumentation, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, 62.
198. Aly, 314–15.
199. The above based on Aly, 313, 316.
200. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 340–41.
201. TBJG, I/9, 119 (31 January 1941).
202. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 340–41.
203. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 345ff., 417ff.
204. TBJG, II/1, 484 (24 September 1941).
205. The aim was to destroy the Soviet Army Group of Marshal Timoschenko before the onset of winter and, only once that was achieved, to advance on Moscow. (Weisungen, 174–8. For the military developments, see DRZW, iv.568ff.)
206. TBJG, II/2, 44 (3 October 1941).
207. Domarus, 1756.
208. Domarus, 1757.
209. TBJG, II/2, 50 (4 October 1941).
210. TBJG, II/2, 50–1 (4 October 1941).
211. TBJG, II/2, 51 (4 October 1941).
212. TBJG, II/2, 52 (4 October 1941). During the coming fortnight, Stalin would come close to fleeing from Moscow and, according to one piece of anecdotal evidence, did contemplate — if this is accurate, for a second time, following such considerations in July — putting feelers out to Germany for peace-terms (Rees, War of the Century, 55–6).
213. TBJG, II/2, 54 (4 October 1941).
214. Hewel’s diary entry notes for the afternoon of 3 October: ‘… With the Führer to the Sportpalast. Great speech — impromptu. Tremendously rapt. Directly afterwards to the train and back to Headquarters.’ (‘… mit dem F[ührer] zum Sportpalast. Ganz große Rede — aus dem Stehgreif. Unerhört andachtsvoll. Direkt anschließend zum Zug und zurück ins Hauptquartier.’ (IfZ, ED 100. And see Irving, HW, 319.)
215. TBJG, II/2, 55 (4 October 1941).
216. Domarus, 1759.
217. Domarus, 1763.
218. TBJG, II/2, 55–6 (4 October 1941).
219. Koeppen, Fol.36 (Midday, 4 October 1941); TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).
220. TBJG, II/2, 53, 56 (4 October 1941).
221. TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).
222. TBJG, II/2, 55 (4 October 1941).
223. TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).
224. See Irving, HW, 318.
225. Halder KTB, iii.266 (4 October 1941), 268 (5 October 1941).
226. DRZW, iv.574, where it is pointed out that the fighting-power, with many of the units scarcely rested and having suffered serious losses, was not up to that of the force of 22 June. See also Koeppen, 32 (2 October 1941).
227. DRZW, iv.765; see also 575ff.; Below, 292, has over 660,000 prisoners.
228. IfZ, ED 100 (Hewel diary), entry for 7 October 1941: ‘Viaz’ma taken. Ring round Timoschenko army closed. Jodl: Most decisive day of the Russian war. Comparison with Königgrätz’. (‘Wiasma genommen. Ring um Timoschenko-Armee geschlossen. Jodl: Entscheidenster Tag des Russenkrieges. Vergleich mit Königgrätz’.) For the confidence of Army Group Centre and of Halder, see DRZW, iv.576.
229. Wagner, Der Generalquartiermeister, 204.
230. Koeppen, Fols.45–6 (8–9 October 1941).
231. Monologe, 77 (10–11 October 1941). By early December, Hitler was admitting that the Wehrmacht had no satisfactory defence against the heavy Soviet tanks (TBJG, II.2, 467 (10 December 1941); Below, 297.)
232. Koeppen, Fol. 48 (16 October 1941).
233. Koeppen, Fol. 37 (4 October 1941).
234. Koeppen, Fol. 40 (5 October 1941).
235. Monologe, 78 (13 October 1941).
236. Koeppen, Fols. 51–2 (17 October 1941).
237. Bock, 337 (21 October 1941).
238. Koeppen, Fol. 57 (19 October 1941).
239. See Koeppen, Fols. 53, 57, 62 (18 October 1941, 19 October 1941, 23 October 1941). Goebbels comments several times on the bad weather: e.g. TBJG, II/2, 96 (11 October 1941); 152 (21 October 1941); 204 (30 October 1941), where he remarks that ‘the weather situation has made almost our entire operations in the east impossible’. See also DRZW, iv.578–82 for deterioration in the weather and the growing transport and supplies crisis; and for the suggestion that the bad weather was not unseasonally early, Domarus, 1770, n.439.
240. Koeppen, Fol. 72 (26 October 1941).
241. Below, 294.
242. TBJG, II/2, 215 (1 November 1941).
243. Halder KTB, iii.58 (9 July 1941), 142 (2 August 1941); E. Wagner, 206–7 (letters of 12 and 20 October). Trains with winter equipment had been standing in sidings near Breslau and Cracow since the end of August, but frozen engines and shortage of wagons were among the reasons why supplies to the front could not be sustained. (E. Wagner, 206n., 266–7. See also Irving, HW, 333, 851; Leach, 212.)
244. TBJG, II/2, 213 (1 November 1941).
245. TBJG, II/2, 214–18 (1 November 1941).
246. DRZW, iv.578 for military optimism in mid-October, 584–5 for unrealistic expectations. See also Irving, HW, 339.
247. DRZW, iv.585.
248. Domarus, 1771–81 for the text of the speech. The Bürgerbräukeller had still not been repaired since the attack on Hitler’s life there two years earlier (Domarus, 1771 n.446).
249. TBJG, II/2, 259 (10 November 1941).
250. Domarus, 1775.
251. Domarus, 1776.
252. Domarus, 1778.
253. TBJG, II/2, 261–2 (10 November 1941); Orlow, ii.270–71; Johannes Volker Wagner, Hakenkreuz über Bochum, Bochum, 1983, 206.
254. Hitler had declared in his speech the previous day that ‘a November 1918 will never repeat itself in Germany! It cannot repeat itself. Everything is possible except one thing: that Germany will ever capitulate!’ (Domarus, 1778).
255. TBJG, II/2, 262 (10 November 1941).
256. TBJG, II/2, 262–3 (10 November 1941), quotation 263.
257. The journey took so long because the Special Train did not travel at night (Koeppen, Fol. 80 (6 November 1941)).
258. Guderian, 245–8.
259. DRZW, iv.586, gives losses of 277,000 men by 16 October, with a replacement available of 151,000 men.
260. Guderian, 247.
261. DRZW, iv.586–7, 591–2.
262. DRZW, iv.587–8. See also Hartmann, 292–3.
263. See Engel, 113–16 (12 November 1941, 16 November 1941, 22 November 1941, 24 November 1941) for Hitler’s uncertainty.
264. DRZW, iv.590–91.
265. Engel, 116 (25 November 1941).
266. TBJG, II/2, 336–7 (22 November 1941). The British Army had begun its counter-offensive on 18 November.
267. TBJG, II/2, 337 (22 November 1941).
268. TBJG, II/2, 338 (22 November 1941).
269. TBJG, II/2, 364 (25 November 1941).
270. MadR, ix.3120 (5 January 1942).
271. TBJG, II/2, 403 (30 November 1941).
272. Halder KTB, iii.315 (28 November 1941); KTB OKW, i.781 (28 November 1941); Irving, HW, 342.
273. TBJG, II/2, 398–9 (30 November 1941).
274. TBJG, II/2, 399–401 (30 November 1941).
275. TBJG, II/2, 401 (30 November 1941).
276. TBJG, II/2, 403 (30 November 1941).
277. Seidler, Fritz Todt, 356. This contrasted with Hitler’s view, as expressed to Goebbels on 21 November, that the entry of the USA into the war posed no acute threat and could not alter the situation on the Continent (TBJG, II/2, 339 (22 November 1941)).
278. Walter Rohland, Bewegte Zeiten. Erinnerungen eines Eisenhüttenmannes, Stuttgart, 1978, 78; Seidler, 356–7.
279. TBJG, II/2, 404 (30 November 1941). By this time, the casualties — dead, wounded, missing — on the eastern front had risen sharply, now amounting since the starting of ‘Barbarossa’ to 743,112 persons, or 23 per cent of the eastern army (Halder KTB, iii.318 (30 November 1941)).
280. Halder KTB, iii.319 (30 November 1941).
281. Halder KTB, iii.322 (1 December 1941).
282. Halder KTB, iii.322 (1 December 1941).
283. Halder KTB, iii.325 (3 December 1941); Domarus, 1787.
284. Irving, HW, 349–50.
285. Guderian, 258–60.
286. Irving, HW, 350.
287. Irving, HW, 352, has (without source) Heinz Lorenz, a press officer in FHQ, bursting in with the news — just announced on an American radio station — towards midnight. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor took place in the early morning of Sunday, 7 December, local time, and was over by 9.45a.m. — evening in central Europe. Churchill heard of the attack shortly after 9p.m. (Churchill, iii.537). A junior officer in FHQ at the time stated from memory many years later that an orderly had brought a telegram from Berlin with the news during the evening meal, shortly before 8p.m. (though the date given, 9 December, is plainly erroneous). (Unpublished notes (25 April 1997) and taped interview with Hans Mommsen of Wolfgang Brocke, a Leutnant in the Technischer Kriegsverwaltungsrat who had served on the staff of the Führer-Begleitbataillon in FHQ since 22 June 1941. I am grateful to Hans Mommsen for giving me access to this material.
288. TBJG, II.2, 455 (9 December 1941). The Japanese Embassy in Berlin had initially reported the sinking of two battleships (Virginia and Oklahoma) and two cruisers (KTB OKW, i.803). In fact, the attack proved less of a military disaster in the long run than imagined at the time. The battleship Arizona was blown up, seven others grounded, and ten other ships sunk or damaged. Over 2,400 American servicemen were killed and a further 1,100 wounded. But the two aircraft carriers with the Pacific fleet were not in the harbour at the time and escaped. Most of the ships could be repaired. All the battleships except the Arizona returned to service (and contributed to later American naval victories). Most of the crew members survived and continued in service (Weinberg III, 260–61).
289. Weinberg III, 261.
290. Churchill, iii. 537–43 (quotation 538).
291. IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 8 December 1941: ‘Wir können den Krieg garnicht verlieren. Wir haben jetzt einen Bundesgenossen, der in 3 000 Jahren nicht besiegt worden ist…’ Hitler remarked, a few days later (entry for 16 December 1941): ‘Strange, that with the help of Japan we will destroy the positions of the white race in East Asia and that England fights against Europe with the Bolshevik swine.’ (‘Seltsam, daβ wir mit Hilfe Japans die Positionen der weiβen Rasse in Ostasien vernichten und daβ England mit den bolshewistischen Schweinen gegen Europa kämpft.’)
292. See Eberhard Jäckel, ‘Die deutsche Kriegserklärung an die Vereinigten Staaten von 1941’, in Friedrich J. Kroneck and Thomas Oppermann (eds.), Im Dienste Deutschlands und des Rechts: Festschrift für Wilhelm G. Grewe, Baden-Baden, 1981, 117–37, here 137.
293. TBJG, II.2, 457 (9 December 1941).
294. Saul Friedländer, Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941, New York, 1967,285.
295. Friedländer, Prelude, 304.
296. Friedländer, Prelude, 304–5.
297. TBJG, II/2, 339 (22 November 1941).
298. Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 126.
299. DGFP, D, 13, 806, N0.487.
300. DGFP, D, 13, 813–14, No.492.
301. IMG, xxxv. 320–23, Doc. D-656; Friedländer, Prelude, 306; Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 127–8. Oshima concluded, from his discussion with Ribbentrop, that ‘there are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary’ (Boyd, 35).
302. Friedländer, Prelude, 306.
303. Staatsmänner I, 256–7 and n.9; and see CP, 436 (20 April 1941). Hitler had commented in May that Japan held the key to the USA (IfZ, ED 100, Hewel diary, entry for 22 May 1941).
304. Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler in History, Hanover/London, 1984, 80. In the original German version of the essay, Jäckel dates Ribbentrop’s comment to Oshima to 2 December (‘Kriegserklärung’, 30). Ribbentrop again expressed the willingness of the German government to fight the USA (Boyd, 36).
305. Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 130–31; Domarus, 1788–9.
306. DGFP, D, 13, 958–9, No.546; Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 131–2; Jäckel, Hitler in History, 81.
307. Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 132–4.
308. TBJG, II/2, 346 (22 November 1941). He intended to follow it with a few weeks of recuperation at the Berghof. Given the situation on the eastern front, he evidently abandoned all thoughts of this.
309. TBJG, II/2, 453 (8 December 1941). See Below’s comment, after speaking with Hitler on 9 December: ‘He trusted that America in the foreseeable future, also compelled by the conflict with Japan, would not be able to intervene in the European theatre of war’ (Below, 296).
310. IMG, xxxv.324, DoC.657-D; Friedländer, Prelude, 308.
311. TBJG, II/2, 468 (10 December 1941); 476 (11 December 1941).
312. TBJG, II/2, 476 (11 December 1941).
313. Domarus, 1793; TBJG, II.2, 463 (10 December 1941); Below, 295.
314. TBJG, II/2, 463–4 (10 December 1941). Halder had learned from Dr Hasso von Etzdorf, Ribbentrop’s liaison man at the OKH, on 7 December, the very day of Pearl Harbor, that Japanese conflict with the USA was ‘possibly imminent’ (‘Möglich, daβ Konflikt mit Amerika bevorsteht’) (Halder KTB, iii.332 (7 December 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 582). Despite the growing awareness that war between Japan and the USA could be imminent, the Japanese had not revealed any operational plans. Ribbentrop was still hoping, two days before Pearl Harbor, that the Americans would instigate it with some act of aggression (Friedländer, Prelude, 307; and see Carr, Poland, 169).
315. TBJG, II/2, 469 (10 December 1941).
316. TBJG, II/2, 463,468 (10 December 1941).
317. TBJG, II/2, 476 (11 December 1941).
318. Weizsäcker, Erinnerungen, 328.
319. Weinberg II, 262; Friedländer, Prelude, 308; TBJG, II/2, 464 (10 December 1941). According to Wolfgang Brocke, then an officer attached to FHQ, though commenting more than fifty years after the events, declaring war on the USA was Hitler’s immediate reaction on hearing the news of Pearl Harbor (Brocke, unpubl. notes (25 April 1997) and taped interview; see above n.287).
320. Jäckel, ‘Kriegserklärung’, 136–7.
321. Friedländer, Prelude, 309.
322. Weizäcker, Erinnerungen, 328.
323. TBJG, II/2, 485 (12 December 1941). Text in Domarus, 1794–2111.
324. TBJG, II/2, 485 (12 December 1941); Domarus, 1800 and n.533.
325. Halder gave figures for total losses on the eastern front by 30 November (not counting sick) as 743,112 men, including 156,475 dead. Halder KTB, iii.318 (30 November 1941) and (iii.319) mentions a shortage of 340,000 men for the eastern army. On 5 January 1942 (iii.374), he states that total losses in the east between 22 June and 31 December 1941 numbered 830,903 men (173,722 dead), 26 per cent of the eastern army complement of 3.2 million men.
326. Domarus, 1801ff., here 1804. See also 1803, 1808 for specific allegations of Jews behind Roosevelt.
327. Domarus, 1808–10.
328. TBJG, II/2, 504 (14 December 1941).
329. See Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich. Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung 1933–1945, Stuttgart, 1997, 316–22; and Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 176.
330. See, for example, his revealing remarks in TBJG, II/2, 477 (11 December 1941), and 482–3, 486 (12 December 1941).
331. TBJG, II/2, 465 (10 December 1941). Three days later, Hitler was voicing similar sentiments. Naturally, the events in the east were painful, was his assessment, but ‘nothing could be changed about that’, and he hoped to reach the prescribed line of defence without serious losses (TBJG, II/2, 493 (13 December 1941)).
332. TBJG, II/2, 466 (10 December 1941).
333. TBJG, II/2, 467 (10 December 1941).
334. TBJG, II/2, 468 (10 December 1941).
335. TBJG, II/2, 475–6 (11 December 1941).
336. See TBJG, II/2, 483 (12 December 1941).
337. TBJG, II/2, 475–6 (11 December 1941).
338. TBJG, II/2, 494 (13 December 1941).
339. TBJG, II/2, 494–5 (13 December 1941).
340. TBJG, II/2, 495–7 (13 December 1941).
341. TBJG, II/2, 497 (13 December 1941).
342. TBJG, II/2, 498 (13 December 1941).
343. TBJG, II/2, 499 (13 December 1941).
344. TBJG, II/2, 499–500 (13 December 1941).
345. TBJG, II/2, 500 (13 December 1941); Domarus, 1812. Goebbels was amused that Hitler, in presenting the award to Oshima, forgot its name (TBJG, II/2, 506 (14 December 1941)). Oshima told Hitler of Japan’s aims to strike at India after taking Singapore. Hitler, repeating in general terms much of what he had said to Goebbels and the Gauleiter about a spring offensive, spoke of a German advance to the Caucasus on account of oil, and then into Iraq and Iran, but did not commit himself to the synchronized attack on India which Oshima had hinted at. Hitler repeated that Moscow was for him of little significance. (Staatsmänner I, 337–43).
346. Below, 298, for Hitler’s arrival back in the Wolfsschanze.
347. Halder KTB, iii. 335 (8 December 1941).
348. Halder KTB, iii.336 (9 December 1941); DRZW, iv.606.
349. DRZW, iv.609.
350. DRZW, iv.609–10.
351. DRZW, iv. 610.
352. Halder KTB, iii.346 (15 December 1941); DRZW, iv.608.
353. DRZW, iv.608.
354. Halder KTB, iii.348 (15 December 1941); Warlimont, 212.
355. Halder KTB, iii.332 (7 December 1941).
356. Bock, 391 (13 December 1941); DRZW, iv.611. Bock’s diary entry suggests, however, that he was taken aback by Hitler’s order to prohibit a withdrawal, and regarded his exhortation to close gaps by use of reserves as illusory, since he had no reserves (Bock, 394–5 (16 December 1941)).
357. Bock, 395 (16 December 1941); DRZW, iv.610.
358. Guderian, 262–3.
359. DRZW, iv.612.
360. Halder KTB, iii.350 (16 December 1941).
361. DRZW, iv.607 n.592.
362. Bock, 396–9 (16–19 December 1941); Halder KTB, iii.354 (18 December 1941); Below, 298 (referring to 18 December 1941); DRZW, iv.612 and n.608. Within weeks Bock, evidently having made a remarkable recovery, was given the command of Army Group South (DRZW, iv.612 n.608, 646).
363. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941).
364. Halder KTB, iii.285 (10 November 1941).
365. Halder KTB, iii.322 (1 December 1941).
366. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941).
367. Engel, 117 (6 December 1941); Halder KTB, iii.332 (7 December 1941).
368. Engel, 117 (6 December 1941); Irving, HW, 351, 854.
369. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941); 117 (7 December 1941); Below, 297 (referring to 9 December 1941).
370. See Bock, 395 (16 December 1941). Three months later, speaking to Goebbels, Hitler attributed much of the blame for the winter crisis to Brauchitsch. He showed nothing but contempt for his former Army Commander-in-Chief, whom he described as a ‘coward’ and wholly incapable (TBJG, II/3, 510 (20 March 1942)). Why he had retained such an unsatisfactory army chief so long in post, Hitler did not explain.
371. Below, 298; Engel, 115 (22 November 1941); 117 (6 December 1941). For biographical sketches of Kesselring, see Samuel J. Lewis, ‘Albert Kesselring — Der Soldat als Manager’, in Smelser/Syring, 270–87; Elmar Krautkrämer, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring’, in Ueberschär, Hitlers militärische Elite, i.121–9; Shelford Bidwell, ‘Kesselring’, in Correlli Barnett (ed.), Hitler’s Generals, London, 1989, 265–89. In The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, (1953), London, 1997, the change of army leadership in December 1941 is not mentioned.
372. Franz Halder, Hitler als Feldherr. Der ehemalige Chef des Generalstabes berichtet die Wahrheit, Munich, 1949, 45: ‘Das biβchen Operationsführung kann jeder machen.’
373. See Halder KTB, iii.354 and n.3 (19 December 1941); DRZW, iv.613 n.610, 614; Hartmann, 303.
374. Domarus, 1813–15.
375. A point also made in DRZW, iv.619.
376. Domarus, 1815.
377. TBJG, II/2, 554 (21 December 1941); Tb Reuth, 1523, n.224.
378. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 176.
379. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Der Weg zur Teilung der Welt, Politik und Strategie von 1939–1945, Koblenz/Bonn, 1977,134–5; Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Das Dritte Reich. Bd.2: Weltmachtanspruch und nationaler Zusammenbruch 1939–1945, Munich, 1985, 66–7; trans. (slightly amended) N & P, iii.827–8.
380. DRZW, iv.614.
381. DRZW, iv.614–15; Guderian, 264, and 269–70 for conflict with Kluge; see also Below, 298, for Kluge’s influence. Bock and Guderian had also clashed in early September, to the extent that Bock had asked on 4 September for the tank commander’s replacement. See Bock, 298–306 (31 August-6 September 1941). Bock thought Guderian an ‘outstanding and brave commander’, but ‘headstrong’ (Bock, 304–5 (4–5 September 1941)).
382. Guderian, 265–8.
383. Guderian, 270.
384. Halder KTB, iii.369 (29 December 1941), iii.376–7 (8 January 1942), iii.386 (15 January 1942); Warlimont, 223.
385. See Irving, HW, 366; and also Leach, 225–6.
386. For the constant conflict between Hitler and Kluge during this period, see Halder KTB, iii.370–385 (30 December 1941–14 January 1942).
387. Schroeder, 126–8; Irving, HW, 354–5.
388. Halder KTB, iii.385, 388 (14 January 1942, 19 January 1942); KTB OKW, ii.1268–9 (15 January 1942).
389. Willi Boelcke (ed.), Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer 1942–1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, 126–30, here 127.
390. Warlimont, 223; TBJG, II/3, 511 (20 March 1942), 517 (21 March 42); CD, 461 (29 April 1942).
391. Halder, Hitler als Feldherr, 46–7; Guenther Blumentritt, ‘Moscow’, in The Fatal Decisions, London, 1956, 29–74, here 67; John Strawson, Hitler as Military Commander, London, 1971, 147. Alan Clark, Barbarossa. The Russian-German Conflict 1941–45, (1965) New York, 1985, 182–3, exaggerates the point in describing the ‘stand-still’ order as ‘Hitler’s finest hour’, when his ‘complete mastery of the detail even of a regimental action’ saved the German army.
392. The most thorough analysis of the winter crisis, Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau. Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitler im Winter 1941/42, Stuttgart, 1972, 221–2, acknowledges that Hitler’s decision corresponded with the views of Bock and his subordinate commanders, and that ‘the claim that Hitler’s order initially saved the eastern front is as such correct (die Behauptung, daβ Hitlers Befehl die Ostfront zunächst gerettet habe, an sich richtig [ist])’. He adds, however, that the inability to provide reinforcements meant that the rigidity of the order, given the existing troop placements, also proved a weakness, and that more flexibility would have allowed the consolidation of a more defensible position.
393. William Carr, Hitler. A Study in Personality and Politics, London, 1978, 96.
394. TBJG, II/3, 501, 509, 512 (20 March 1942).
395. Hitler had said on 27 November to the Danish Foreign Minister, Erik Scavenius, that if the German people was not strong enough, then it deserved to be destroyed ‘by another, stronger power’. It was the first of a number of occasions on which he would use such characteristic social-Darwinist phraseology, offering to his own mind justification for a German defeat. (See Staatsmänner I, 329 and n.7.)
396. Monologe, 179 (5 January 1942).
397. Monologe, 183–4 (7 January 1942).
398. Monologe, 193 (10 January 1942).
399. Indeed, it has been suggested that ‘no rational man in early 1942 would have guessed at the eventual outcome of the war’ (Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won, London, 1995, 15).
400. See Klaus Reinhardt, ‘Moscow 1941. The Turning-Point’, in John Erikson and David Dilks (eds.), Barbarossa. The Axis and the Allies, Edinburgh, 1994, 207–24.
401. See Churchill, iii.341–2; Weinberg III, 284–5.
402. See Monologe, 184 (7 January 1942) for Hitler’s expression of contempt.
1. See also the remarks in Mommsen, ‘Realisierung’, 417–18.
2. Klee, Dreßen, and Rieß, ‘Schöne Zeiten’, 148, cit. a letter of Gendarmerie-Meister Fritz Jacob, 29 October 1941, on his keenness to be sent to the east.
3. DTB Frank, 386 (entry for 17 July 1941, referring to a statement by Hitler of 19 June).
4. TBJG, iv.705 (20 June 1941).
5. See Philippe Burrin, Hitler and the Jews. The Genesis of the Holocaust, (1989), London, 1994, 98–100, for evidence that a ‘territorial solution’ was what was envisaged at this time.
6. Müller, 96. See Heiber, ‘Der Generalplan Ost’, 297–324, especially 299–301, 307–9; Czeslaw Madajczyk, ‘Generalplan Ost’, Polish Western Affairs, 3 (1962), 3–54, here especially 3. In his lengthy memorandum of 27 April 1942, assessing the plan that had been drawn up in autumn 1941 in the RSHA, Dr Erhard Wetzel, head (Dezernent) of the department of racial policy in the Ostministerium, thought the figure of 31 million too low, and reckoned that 46–51 million would have to be removed. Himmler had initially wanted the ‘construction of the east (Ostaufbau)’ completed in twenty years (Heiber, 298 n.16). For the date of the commissioning of the Plan (24 June 1941), see the letter of 15 July 1941 from Prof. Dr Konrad Meyer, SS-Standartenführer and head of the planning department of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom, to Himmler in Dietrich Eichholtz, ‘Der “Generalplan Ost”. Über eine Ausgeburt imperialistischer Denkart und Politik (mit Dokumenten)’, Jahrbuch für Geschichte, 26 (1982), 217–74, here 256. See also Robert L. Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939–1945. A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, 147–51.
7. Warlimont, 150.
8. Longerich, Ermordung 116–18; Krausnick/Wilhelm, 164.
9. Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im ‘Fall Barbarossa’, Heidelberg/Karlsruhe, 1981, 89 n.333.
10. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 163; Klee, Dreßen, and Rieß, ‘Schöne Zeiten’, 52.
11. Osobyi Arkhiv, Moscow, 500–1–25, Fols.119–20: ‘Gesamtaufstellung der im Bereich des EK.3 bis zum 1.Dez.1941 durchgeführten Exekutionen’. Of the total of 138,272 persons ‘executed’ by the same Einsatzkommando (including 55,556 women, and 34,464 children), registered by the same Einsatzkommando in a handwritten summary (in the same file, Fol.128) of 9 February 1942, no fewer than 136, 421 were Jews.
12. See Krausnick/Wilhelm, 627; Streim, 88–9.
13. Burrin, 106–7.
14. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 196.
15. Christoph Dieckmann, ‘Der Krieg und die Ermordung der litauischen Juden’, in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik 1939–1945. Neue Forschungen und Kontroversen, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, 292–329, here 292–3, and 295–306. See also Dina Porat, ‘The Holocaust in Lithuania. Some Unique Aspects’, in David Cesarani (ed.), The Final Solution. Origins and Implementation, London, 1996, 159–74.
16. The encouragement of ‘self-cleansing efforts of anti-Communist and anti-Jewish circles (Selbstreinigungsbestrebungen antikommunistischer oder antijüdischer Kreise)’ had been verbally stipulated by Heydrich in his briefing in Berlin on 17 June, then laid down in writing in written orders to the chiefs of the four Einsatzgruppen on 29 June, and incorporated in the instructions to the Higher SS and Police Leaders on 2 July. (Osobyi Arkhiv, Moscow, 500–1–25, Fols.387, 391, 393.)
17. Klee, Dreßen, and Rieß, ‘Schöne Zeiten’, 32–41. And see Laurence Rees, The Nazis. A Warning from History, London, 1997, 179–81. At the end of August, instructions went to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen to prevent gatherings of spectators, including Wehrmacht officers, to view the ‘executions’. (Osobyi Arkhiv, Moscow, 500–1–25, Fol.424 (RSHA IV — Müller — to Einsatzgruppen A-D, 30 August 1941).)
18. Klee, Dreßen, and Rieß, ‘Schöne Zeiten’, 36, 38.
19. Gerald Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung. ‘Es ist des Führers Wunsch…’, Wiesbaden/Munich, 1982, 86. For the reporting system of the Einsatzgruppen, using Enigma codes, see Richard Breitman, Official Secrets. What the Nazis Planned. What the British and Americans Knew, London, 1998, Ch.4.
20. TBJG, II/1, 213 (11 August 1941).
21. TBJG, II/2, 221–2 (2 November 1941).
22. Klee and Dreßen, ‘Gott mit uns’, 101 ff.
23. See Krausnick/Wilhelm, Ch.IVB, 205–78, especially 223–43; DRZW, iv.1044ft; Streit, 109–27; and see Omer Bartov, ‘Operation Barbarossa and the Origins of the Final Solution’, in Cesarani, Final Solution, 119–36.
24. Klee and Dreßen, ‘Gott mit uns’, 102–3.
25. Klee and Dreßen, ‘Gott mit uns’, 106.
26. IMG, xxxv.85–6, D0C.411-D; Klee and Dreßen, ‘Gott mit uns’, 39–40. And see DRZW, iv. 1050–2; Krausnick/Wilhelm, 258–61 and Gerd Ueberschär and Wolfgang Wette (eds.), ‘Unterneh-men Barbarossa’. Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion, Paderborn, 1984, 373–4.
27. DRZW, iv.1052–3.
28. IMG, xxxiv.129–32 (quotation, 130–31), D0C.4064-PS; Klee and Dreßen, ‘Gott mit uns’, 41–2.
29. Heer, ‘Killing Fields’, 87–90; Richter, 844–6; and see Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia, Oxford/New York/Munich, 1989, esp. ch.6,9.
30. Stalin had called for partisan warfare in his speech of 3 July (Volkogonov, 413). But organized partisan units did not take shape before autumn 1941. The ruthless German attempts to combat the spread of partisan warfare intensified from then on.
31. DRZW, iv.1044 (and see 1041–4).
32. See DRZW, iv.1054.
33. DRZW, iv.1047.
34. DRZW, iv.1048.
35. See Bartov, Hitler’s Army, ch.4; Bartov, Barbarisation, ch.3–4; Bartov, ‘Operation Barbarossa’, 124–31.
36. Buchbender and Sterz, 73, letter 101; Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 153.
37. Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 155. German text in Omer Bartov, Hitlers Wehrmacht. Soldaten, Fanatismus und die Brutalisierung des Krieges, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1995, 232: ‘Jeder hier, selbst der Zweifler, weiβ heute, daβ der Kampf gegen diese Untermenschen, die von den Juden bis zur Raserei aufgehetzt wurden, nicht nur notwendig war, sondern auch gerade zum rechten Zeitpunkt kam. Unser Führer hat Europa vor dem sicheren Untergang bewahrt.’
38. Bartov, Barbarisation, 1 2off.
39. Burrin, 110.
40. Osobyi Arkhiv, Moscow, 500–1–25, Fol.94: ‘Tätigkeits — und Lagebericht Nr.6 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR (Berichtszeit vom 1.–31 October 1941)’: ‘Als Vergeltungsmaβnahme für die Brandstiftungen in Kiew wurden sämtliche Juden verhaftete und am 29. und 30.9 insgesamt 33 771 Juden exekutiert.’
41. Klee, Dreßen, and Rieß, ‘Schöne Zeiten’ 66–70; Klee and Dreßen, ‘Gott mit uns’ 117–36; Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?, 267–8.
42. Burrin, 104–5, 110–13; Christopher Browning, ‘Hitler and the Euphoria of Victory. The Path to the Final Solution’, in Cesarani, Final Solution, 137–47, here 140–43. The instructions were interpreted differently by the leaders of the various killing squads. Plainly they did not amount to a blanket order to kill all Jews without discrimination. (Christian Gerlach, Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord. Forschungen zur deutschen Vernichtungspolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Hamburg, 1998, 63ff., 261.)
43. Burrin, 110.
44. Burrin, 113. For the extension of the killing, see Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung. Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung, Munich/Zurich, 1998, 352–410.
45. Burrin, 104.
46. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 160; Streim, 74–80.
47. See Burrin, 102ff.; Streim, 83–4; Longerich, Politik, 310–51.
48. Browning, Path, 106. For the composition of the Einsatzgruppen, see Krausnick/Wilhelm, 141–50, 281–93; Longerich, Politik, 302–10. A good proportion of the leaders were SS men with university backgrounds, some with doctorates in law (Krausnick-Wilhelm, 282–3). The members of the battalions of the Ordnungspolizei, an organization whose leadership, like that of the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police), was dominated by the SS, were in the main young career-policemen, and ideologically trained. (See Longerich, Politik, 305–10 (with criticism of Goldhagen, Ch.6, for the latter’s emphasis on randomly selected, non-ideologically trained, recruits who were ‘ordinary Germans’; and indicating, too, that they were less ‘ordinary men’ than Browning, Ordinary Men, 45–8 and ch.18, claimed).)
49. Browning, Path, 106: by June 1942 there were 165,000 members of the units, and by January 1943 the number had risen to a staggering 300,000. See also Browning, ‘Hitler and the Euphoria of Victory’, 138ff.; and, especially, Yehoshua Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS: Himmler’s Personal Murder Brigades in 1941’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, I/1 (1986), 11–26.
50. Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42, ed. Peter Witte et al., Hamburg, 1999, 195 and n.14; Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945–1966, vol.20, Amsterdam, 1979, 435–6, No.580 a-51–2 (trial of Karl Wolff); Burrin, 105.
51. Browning, ‘Hitler and the Euphoria of Victory’, 140–41; and see Longerich, Politik, 362–9.
52. Dienstkalender, 184–5; Browning, Path, 105.
53. IMG, xxxviii, 86–94, D0C.221-L; Klee and Dreßen, ‘Gott mit uns’, 23.
54. Moll, ‘Führer-Erlasse’, 188–9; Longerich, Politik, 362–3; Breitman, Architect, 183–4.
55. Browning, ‘Hitler and the Euphoria of Victory’, 140.
56. IfZ, EW 100, Tagebuch Walther Hewel 1941, 10 July 1941; and see Irving, HW, 291: ‘Ich fühle mich wie Robert Koch in der Politik. Der fand den Bazillus [der Tuberkulose — these two words crossed out by Hewel] und wies damit der ärztlichen Wissenschaft neue Wege. Ich entdeckte den Juden als den Bazillus und das Ferment aller [menschl. — crossed out by Hewel] gesellschaftlichen Dekomposition. Ihr Ferment. Und eines habe ich bewiesen, daβ ein Staat ohne Juden leben kann. Daβ Wirtschaft, Kultur, Kunst etc etc ohne Juden bestehen kann und zwar besser. Das ist der schlimmste Schlag, den ich den Juden versetzt habe.’
57. Staatsmänner I, 304 and n.2, 295.
58. Staatsmänner I, 306–7.
59. Staatsmänner I, 309–10.
60. Pätzold, Verfolgung, 295–6.
61. Eichmann confirmed after the war that the document had been drawn up in the RSHA and merely signed by Göring (Rudolf Aschenauer (ed.), Ich, Adolf Eichmann, Leoni, 1980,479). Göring’s desk diary indicates that he had an appointment to see Heydrich on 31 July between 6.15 and 7.15p.m. (Hermann Weiß’, ‘Die Aufzeichnungen Hermann Görings im Institut für Zeitgeschichte’, VfZ, 31 (1983), 365–8, here 366–7).
62. IMG, xxvi, 266–7, Doc. 710-PS; Longerich, Ermordung, 78.
63. Aly, 270–71, 307.
64. Aly, 271; Burrin, 116.
65. The only evidence linking the document with Hitler is tenuous. Over a year later, the Foreign Office expert on anti-Jewish policy, Martin Luther, claimed to have heard Heydrich mention at the Wannsee Conference, on 20 January 1942, that he had received the commission from Göring on Hitler’s instructions (Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution, Oxford, 1986, 46n.13). There is no supporting evidence, either from the minutes or from others attending the Conference, for Heydrich’s alleged remark. (See Burrin, 116; Breitman (who accepts Luther’s comment), 193 and 296 n.27.) Eberhard Jäckel, in an as yet unpublished paper on Heydrich’s role in the development of extermination policy which he kindly allowed me to see, presumes it to be ‘very unlikely that Göring gave his signature without instruction from or at least approval by Hitler’. Since the ‘mandate’ was essentially confirming powers which Heydrich already possessed — if (which was its purpose) now establishing more plainly for others his primacy in planning a ‘final solution of the Jewish Question’ — it remains unclear why Hitler’s explicit involvement was necessary.
66. See Burrin, 116ff.; Aly, 271–3, 307; Mommsen, ‘Realisierung’, 409.
67. Aly, 307.
68. NA, T175, Roll 577, Frame 366337, Report of SD-Hauptaußenstelle Bielefeld, 5 August 1941.1 am most grateful to Prof. Otto Dov Kulka (Jerusalem) for referring me to this report.
69. TBJG, II/2, 218 (12 August 1941).
70. ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung. Aufzeichnungen von Dr. Bern-hard Losener’, VfZ, 9 (1961), 262–311, here 303.
71. ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 302–3. There is no doubt that this was an accurate reflection of Goebbels’s own views. On 7 August, he had written in his diary, in the context of reports of typhus in the Warsaw ghetto: ‘The Jews have always been carriers of infectious diseases. They should be either packed into (zusammenpferchen) a ghetto and left to themselves, or liquidated’ (TBJG, II/1, 189 (7 August 1941)).
72. ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 303.
73. ‘Das Reichsministerium des Innern und die Judengesetzgebung’, 303–4.
74. TBJG, II/1, 258–9, 261 (19 August 1941).
75. TBJG, II/1, 265–6, 269 (19 August 1941). Tobias Jersak, ‘Die Interaktion von Kriegsverlauf und Judenvernichtung’, HZ, 268 (1999), 311–49, here 349–52, argues that Hitler had already, when meeting Goebbels, taken the fundamental decision that the Jews of Europe were to be physically destroyed. But the evidence that Hitler dramatically changed policy towards the Jews, taking a fundamental decision for their destruction at this point, while suffering a nervous breakdown, under the impact of the realization that his strategic plan for rapidly defeating the Soviet Union had failed, and recognizing that following the signing of the Atlantic Charter by Roosevelt and Churchill he would inevitably be soon fighting the USA, is not persuasive. Hitler’s view of the Atlantic Charter (as expressed to Goebbels) was, moreover, predictably dismissive (TBJG, II/1, 263 (19 August I941)).
76. TBJG, II/1, 278 (20 August 1941).
77. Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung, 79.
78. NA, T175, Roll 577, reports of SD-Außenstelle Höxter, 25 September 1941, SD-HauptauEenstelle Bielefeld, 30 September 1941; MadR, ix.3245–8; Steinert, 239–40; Ian Kershaw, ‘German Popular Opinion and the “Jewish Question”, 1939–1943: Some Further Reflections’, in Arnold Paucker (ed.), Die Juden im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland, Tübingen, 1986, 366–86, here 373; Bankier, 134.
79. Andreas-Friedrich, 53 (entry for 19 September 1941, the day the decree on the wearing of the Yellow Star came into effect).
80. Klemperer, i.671 (20 September 1941), 673 (25 September 1941).
81. Inge Deutschkron, Ich trug den gelben Stern, (1978), 4th edn, Cologne, 1983, 87.
82. Bankier, 124–30.
83. Bankier, 127.
84. Faschismus, 250–52; Aly, 336–7; Fox, ‘Abetz’, 198–201.
85. Aly, 335–6, 338; see also Burrin, 118–19.
86. Christopher R. Browning, Fateful Months. Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution, New York/London, 1985, 26; Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office, 58.
87. An inference of Aly, 306.
88. Overy, Russia’s War, 232–3; Robert Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia, London, 1998, 276–7; Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers. The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, London, 1970, 59–66, 107–9.
89. Longerich, Politik, 429.
90. TBJG, II/2, 385 (9 September 1941).
91. H.D. Heilmann, ‘Aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Diplomaten Otto Brautigam’, in Biedermann und Schreibtischtäter. Materialien zur deutschen Täter-Biographie, ed. Götz Aly, Berlin, 2nd edn, 1989, 123–87, here 144–5 (entry for 14 September 1941); Adler, 176–7; Peter Witte, ‘Two Decisions concerning the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question”: Deportations to Lodz and Mass Murder in Chelmno’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 9 (1995), 293–317, here 330; see also Burrin, 122; Longerich, Politik, 429–30.
92. Adler, 176–7; Witte, ‘Two Decisions’, 330; Eberhard Jäckel, Hitlers Herrschaft. Vollzug einer Weltanschauung, (1986), Stuttgart, 1988, 116; Burrin, 122; Longerich, Politik, 430 and 699 n.45.
93. Koeppen, Fol.21 (Bericht Nr.34, Blatt 2–3, 20 September 1941). Koeppen was almost certainly uninformed at this point of the steps which had by then already been taken two days earlier. His entry probably, therefore, reflects his understanding of Hitler’s stance several days earlier. (See Longerich, Politik, 431.)
94. The emphasis placed on the Atlantic Charter as the cause of a fundamental shift in Hitler’s policy towards the Jews, allegedly bringing the decision for the ‘Final Solution’, by Jersak, 341ff., 349ff., (see above, n.75) seems exaggerated.
95. See Longerich, Politik, 431–2.
96. See Haider KTB, iii.226 (13 September 1941), for the OKW memorandum of 13 September 1941, approved by Hitler, indicating for the first time that the war was likely to last over the winter. The victory at Kiev temporarily restored Hitler’s confidence, a few days later, that an early end to the campaign was in prospect (TBJG, II/1, 481–2 (24 September 1941)).
97. Dienstkalender, 211.
98. Longerich, 430; Witte, ‘Two Decisions’, 330; Dienstkalender, 213 and n.57.
99. Longerich, Ermordung, 157. The figure of 60,000 Jews was the same as that mentioned in at least two earlier references to deportation — that of the Viennese Jews in the winter of 1940–41, and by Eichmann at a meeting in the Propaganda Ministry in March. It seems to have been plucked from thin air. The actual number agreed on, following hard bargaining between Eichmann and the regional authorities in the Warthegau, was 20,000 Jews and 5,000 Gypsies, whom Eichmann seems to have accommodated in the demands for deportation following pressure from the local Nazi authorities in the Burgenland. (Saffrian, 115–19; Michael Zimmermann, ‘Die nationalsozialistische Lösung der Zigeunerfrage’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 235–62, here 248–9.) As Zimmermann (237–8) points out, the murder of the Gypsies took place without Hitler ever showing notable interest in the ‘Gypsy question’; nor was a pre-existing programme for their persecution and extermination devised, either by Himmler or Heydrich. (Michael Zimmermann, Verfolgt, vertrieben, vernichtet. Die nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik gegen Sinti und Roma, Essen, 1989, 82–3, where the numbers of Roma and Sinti murdered is estimated at between 220,000 and 500,000.)
100. The connections with genocide have been well brought out by Gerlach, Krieg, Ernährung, Völker-mord, 167–257; and Christian Gerlach, ‘Deutsche Wirtschaftsinteressen, Besatzungspolitik und der Mord an den Juden in Weitßrutßland, 1941–1943’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 263–91.
101. See Herbert, ‘Labour and Extermination’, 167ff., for the sensitivity of the labour question in the unfolding of anti–Jewish policy at this juncture.
102. TBJG, II/1, 481–2 (24 September 1941).
103. Burrin, 123–4, sees it as such. Eichmann, whose testimony while in Israeli custody many years later was shaky on chronology, claimed to have been told by Heydrich two to three months after the beginning of the Russian campaign of the Führer’s order for the physical extermination of the Jews. (Lang, Eichmann-Protokoll, 69; see Browning, Fateful Months, 23–6.) Höß?, the Commandant of Auschwitz, recalled being told by Himmler in summer 1941 of Hitler’s decision. But his memory was as at least as fallible as Eichmann’s on detail and much, if not all, of what he said appears better to fit 1942 than 1941. {Kommandant in Auschwitz. Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen des Rudolf Höß, (1963), Munich, 4th edn, 1978, 157. And see Browning, Fateful Months, 22–3; Burrin, 170 n.15.) Breitman, Architect, 189–90, accepts the testimony for the timing of Hitler’s decision, as does Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 228–9. The view that Höß’s testimony referred to 1941 is, however, convincingly rejected by Karin Orth, ‘Rudolf Höß? und die “Endlösung der Judenfrage”. Drei Argumente gegen deren Datierung auf den Sommer 1941’, Werkstattgeschichte, 18 (1997), 45–57.
104. Longerich, Politik, 475.
105. John L. Heinemann, Hitler’s First Foreign Minister. Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, Diplomat and Statesman, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1979, 209–11.
106. TBJG, II.i.480–81 (24 September 1941).
107. TBJG, II.i.485 (24 September 1941).
108. TBJG, II.ii.169 (24 October 1941). It was the first of nine batches of deportation from Berlin before a temporary halt at the end of January 1942 because of transport problems (Tb Reuth, 1710, n.209).
109. TBJG, II.ii. 194–5 (28 October 1941).
110. TBJG, II.ii.309 (18 November 1941).
111. Das Reich, 16 Nov. 1941: ‘Die Juden sind schuld!’: ‘… Es bewahrheitet sich an ihnen [den Juden] auch die Prophezeihung, die der Führer am 30. Januar 1939 im Deutschen Reichstag aussprach… Wir erleben eben den Vollzug dieser Prophezeihung, und es erfüllt sich damit am Judentum ein Schicksal, das zwar hart, aber mehr als verdient ist. Mitleid oder Bedauern ist da gänzlich unangebracht…’ A lengthy extract from the article, including this passage, is printed in Hans–Heinrich Wilhelm, ‘Wie geheim war die “Endlösung”’, in Benz, Miscellanea, 131–48, here 137–8 (136 for Das Reich’s circulation figures); and see Reuth, Goebbels, 491. As the passage indicates, Goebbels, unlike Hitler, dated the ‘prophecy’ of 1939 correctly.
112. Irving, Goebbels, 379.
113. MadR, viii.3007 (20 November 1941).
114. TBJG, II/2, 352 (23 November 1941).
115. TBJG, II/2, 340–1 (22 November 1941). Hitler also recommended — obviously responding to a point close to the Propaganda Minister’s heart — Goebbels to tread carefully with regard to Jewish ‘mixed-marriages’, especially in artistic circles. He was of the opinion that such marriages were dying out anyway with the passage of time, and that it was not necessary to lose any sleep about them. Fifteen months later, Goebbels would ignore such a recommendation. But a week-long protest of hundreds of wives would eventually halt the planned deportation of their Jewish husbands. (See Nathan Stoltzfus, Resistance of the Heart, New York/London, 1996.)
116. See Martin Broszat, ‘Hitler und die Genesis der “Endlösung”. Aus Anlaß der Thesen von David Irving’, VfZ, 25 (1977), 739–75, here especially 752–3, 755–6.
117. Raul Hilberg, ‘Die Aktion Reinhard’, in Eberhard Jäckel and Jürgen Rohwer (eds.), Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Entschlußbildung und Verwirklichung, Stuttgart, 1985, 125–36, here 126; Longerich, Politik, 457; Aly, 342–7; Christian Gerlach, ‘Failure of Plans for an SS Extermination Camp in Mogilev, Belorussia’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 11 (1997), 60–78.
118. For the significance of local and regional initiatives in the unfolding of genocide in Poland, see Dieter Pohl, Von der ‘Judenpolitik’ zum Judenmord. Der Distrikt Lublin des Generalgouvernements 1939–1944, Frankfurt am Main, 1993; Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien. Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens, Munich, 1996; Dieter Pohl, ‘Die Ermordung der Juden im Generalgouvernement’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 98–121; Thomas Sandkühler, ‘Endlösung’ in Galizien. Der Judenmord in Ostpolen, und die Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz, Bonn, 1996; Thomas Sandkühler, ‘Judenpolitik und Judenmord im Distrikt Galizien, 1941–1942’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 122–47; also Longerich, Politik, 457–8; Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, especially 74ff.
119. See Browning, Fateful Months, ch.3 (‘The Development and Production of the Nazi Gas Van’).
120. Kommandant in Auschwitz, 159; Danuta Czech, Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz–Birkenau 1939–1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1989, 117–18; Yehuda Bauer, A History of the Holocaust, New York etc., 1982, 214–15; Leni Yahil, The Holocaust. The Fate of European Jewry, 1932–1945, New York/Oxford, 1990, 365; Browning, Fateful Months, 29; Gerald Fleming, ‘The Auschwitz Archives in Moscow’, Jewish Quarterly (Autumn, 1991), 9–12, here 9. Jean–Claude Pressac, Les Crématoires d’Auschwitz. La Machinerie du Meurtre de Masse, Paris, 1993, 26ff., especially 34, 101 n.107, 113–14, dates the gassing of the Soviet prisoners to December, rather than 3 September, the date given by Czech and most other historians. See Longerich, Politik, 444–5, 457 and 704 n.114.
121. BDC, SS–HO, 1878: ‘… Es bestehe auf jeden Fall die Gefahr, dafi vor allem von Seiten der Wirtschaft in zahlreichen Fällen Juden als unentbehrliche Arbeitskräfte reklamiert würden und daß sich niemand bemühe, an Stelle der Juden andere Arbeitskräfte zu bekommen. Dies würde aber den Plan einer totalen Aussiedlung der Juden aus den von uns besetzten Gebieten zunichte machen…’
122. Browning, Fateful Months, 30–31; Breitman, Architect, 200; Longerich, Politik, 455.
123. See Faschismus, 269–70.
124. See Yitzhak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. The Operation Reinhard Death Camps, Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1987. There are different interpretations of the derivation (and spelling) of the name. It used to be presumed that the spelling was ‘Reinhard’, and referred to Reinhard Heydrich, which was the understanding of SS men involved in the ‘Action’. This interpretation was countered by the suggestion that the name was actually spelt ‘Reinhardt’ and was taken from the State Secretary in the Reich Finance Ministry, Fritz Reinhardt, hinting at the regime’s interest in the material outcome of the mass murder of around 1.75 million Jews (mainly from Poland). When account was rendered, money and valuables worth around 180 million Reich Marks were placed in the Deutsche Reichsbank for the future use of the SS (Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 354–5). A thorough examination has, however, led to the conclusion that the attribution to Heydrich is after all the more plausible. The lack of clarity is partly a result of both spellings being used by contemporaries. See Hermann Weiß, ‘Offener Brief an Wolfgang Benz wegen Reinhard(t)’, in Hermann Graml, Angelika Königseder, and Juliane Wetzel (eds.), Vorturteil und Rassenhaß. Antisemitismus in den faschistischen Bewegungen Europas, Berlin, 2001, 443–50.
125. Faschismus, 374–7; Kommandant in Auschwitz, 157–8; Lang, Eichmann–Protokoll, 76–7; Browning, Fateful Months, 24; Breitman, Architect, 203.
126. Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, 63, 65–6.
127. Faschismus, 278; Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, 71, 73; Longerich, 451–2.
128. BDC, Personalakte Arthur Greiser, Brandt to Koppe, 14 May 1942: ‘Der letzte Entscheid muß ja in dieser Angelegenheit vom Führer gefällt werden.’
129. BDC, Personalakte Arthur Greiser, Greiser to Himmler, 21 November 1942: ‘Ich für meine Person glaube nicht, daß der Führer in dieser Angelegenheit noch einmal befragt werden muß umso mehr, als er mir bei der letzten Rücksprache erst bezüglich der Juden gesagt hat, ich möchte mit diesen nach eigenem Ermessen verfahren.’
130. Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, 65ft, 70–74.
131. Hilberg, Destruction, 232; Longerich, Politik, 461–5.
132. TBJG, II.2, 503 (14 December 1941). See Burrin, 124–5, and Ulrich Herbert, ‘Die deutsche Militärverwaltung in Paris und die Deportation der französischen Juden’, in Herbert, Vernichtungs-politik, 170–208, here 185–93, for the background to the deportation of the French Jews; and Leni Yahil, ‘Some Remarks about Hitler’s Impact on the Nazis’ Jewish Policy’, Yad Vashem Studies, 23 (1993), 281–93, here 288–9, for Hitler’s role in the moves leading to the deportation.
133. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 566–70 (Jeckeln testimony), quotation 566; Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung, 87–104; Longerich, Politik, 464.
134. Gerlach, ‘Wannsee’, 7–44, here 17; Longerich, Politik, 463.
135. Gerlach, ‘Wannsee’, 12; Fleming, Hitler und die Endlôsung, 88 and n.184, 103–4; Longerich, Politik, 464.
136. Longerich, Politik, 466.
137. A point emphasized by Eberhard Jäckel in his hitherto unpublished paper on Heydrich’s role in the genesis of the ‘Final Solution’.
138. Longerich, Politik, 466.
139. IMG, xxix, 145, Doc. PS–1919.
140. Koeppen, 42 (6 October 1941).
141. Monologe, 99; Koeppen, 60–61 (21 October 1941).
142. Himmler visited FHO nineteen times — more frequently than any other guest — between July 1941 and January 1942 (Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, 800–801).
143. Koeppen, 71 (25 October 1941).
144. Monologe, 106. The translation of the passage in Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941–1944, London, 1953, 87, is not wholly accurate, and includes a phrase — ‘Terror is a salutary thing’ — not found in the German text.
145. Himmler had spoken on 1 August about driving female Jews into the Pripet marshes. The SS had done this, but the swamps had proved too shallow for drowning (Burrin, 111–12; Browning, Path, 106).
146. It is difficult to see why Irving, HW, 331, infers from the comments that Hitler did not favour the extermination of the Jews.
147. Monologe, 130.
148. Monologe, 130–31; Koeppen, 78 (5 November 1941).
149. Domarus, 1772–3.
150. Monologe, 148; Picker, 152.
151. Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, 66 n.71 for the conflicting evidence about the precise date of the commencement of the gassing; and for the extermination at Chelmno, see above all Adalbert Rückerl (ed.), NS–Vernichtungslager im Spiegel deutscher Strafprozesse, Munich, 1977, Part 2.
152. TBJG, II.2, 498–9 (13 December 1941). Though Hitler’s extreme comments undoubtedly gave further impetus to the gathering momentum of genocide, Gerlach, ‘Wannsee’, 28, in my view goes too far in seeing his speech to the Gauleiter as the announcement of a ‘basic decision’ to murder all the Jews in Europe. See also Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, 2000, 126–30.
153. IMG, xxvii.270, Doc.PS–1517; and see Gerlach, ‘Wannsee’, 24.
154. DTB Frank, 457–8 (16 December 1941); trans., slightly amended, N & P, iii.1126–7, Doc.848.
155. IMG, xxxii.435–7, Docs. PS–3663, PS–3666 (quotation, 437).
156. Dienstkalender, 294. It is extremely unlikely that the entry can be equated in the way Gerlach, ‘Wannsee’, 22 interprets it, with a ‘basic decision’ to extend the extermination from Soviet Jewry to the rest of Europe, seeing European Jews in general as ‘imaginary partisans’. As far as is known, Hitler did not use the term ‘partisan’ in connection with Jews in the Reich or in western Europe. (See Longerich, Politik, 467 and 712 n.234.)
157. The following is taken from the minutes of the Conference: Longerich, Ermordung, 83–92; trans., N & P, iii.1127–34, Doc.849. See Eichmann’s comments on the minutes during his interrogation in Jerusalem in 1961 in Longerich, Ermordung, 92–4.
158. See Jeremy Noakes, ‘The Development of Nazi Policy towards the German–Jewish “Mischlinge” 1933–1945’, LBYB, 34 (1989), 291–354, here 341ff.
159. Longerich, Ermordung, 93.
160. Longerich, Politik, 470–71.
161. Longerich, Ermordung, 91.
162. Longerich, Politik, 514–15.
163. Dienstkalender, 73.
164. Domarus, 1829. Hitler had also issued a threat to those seeking through ‘Jewish hatred’ to bring about destruction through the war in his ‘New Year’s Appeal’ (Domarus, 1821). Two weeks later, Hitler spoke to Goebbels of the Jews deserving the catastrophe that was befalling them. ‘With the destruction of our enemies they will also experience their own destruction,’ Goebbels reported Hitler as saying {TBJG, II/3, 320 (15 February 1942)).
165. MadR, 3235.
166. Martin Broszat and Norbert Frei (eds.), Das Dritte Reich im überblick. Chronik–Ereignisse–Zusammenhänge, Munich/Zurich, 1989, 270, give the date of 17 March for the beginning of the mass killing in Belzec. The decision to exterminate most of the Jews of the districts of Lublin and Galicia had probably been taken at the beginning of March (Longerich, Politik, 513).
167. TBJG, II/3, 513 (20 March 1942).
168. TBJG, II/3, 561 (27 March 1942).
1. Schroeder, 129.
2. TBJG, II/3, 501–2 (20 March 1942).
3. TBJG, II/3, 511 (20 March 1942).
4. Schroeder, 129–30.
5. TBJG, II/3, 513 (20 March 1942). The absence of any genuinely personal contact with Hitler was underlined by Gerda Daranowski, one of his secretaries, who nevertheless still thought well of him many years after the war. (Library of Congress, Washington, Adolf Hitler Collection, tape C–63A (interview with John Toland, 26 July 1971).)
6. Koeppen, Fol. 67 (24 October 1941).
7. Guderian, 266.
8. Breloer, 100 (29 January 1942).
9. Adolf Görtz, Stichwort: Front. Tagebuch eines jungen Deutschen 1938–1942, 2nd edn, Leipzig, 1987, 139.
10. MadR, ix.3225, 29 January 1942).
11. Ernest K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda 1925–1945, Michigan, 1965, 222–3; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 180–81 and n.40; Robert Edward Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won. The Most Infamous Propaganda Campaign in History, London, 1979, 429, for the success of the film.
12. For the plainly intended parallels indicated by Goebbels himself, Hitler’s pleasure at the film, and the impact upon him of the characterization of Frederick the Great, see TBJG, II/3, 499, 506 (20 March 1942).
13. Seidler, chs.3–4.
14. Seidler, 239; Alan S. Milward, ‘Fritz Todt als Minister für Bewaffnung und Munition’, VfZ, 1966, 46; Alan S. Milward, Die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, Stuttgart, 1966, 56.
15. Seidler, 273.
16. Seidler, 262–3; Mommsen, Volkswagenwerk, 544–5.
17. Seidler, 352ff.
18. Overy, War and Economy, 354–5; Seidler, 256.
19. Overy, War and Economy, ch.11, especially 352ff.; Hans–Ulrich Thamer, Verführung und Gewalt. Deutschland 1933–1945, Berlin, 1986, 716; Ludolf Herbst, Das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945, Frankfurt am Main, 1996, 410.
20. Seidler, 256–60.
21. Seidler, 258, 265.
22. Seidler, 260, 365–6.
23. Jürgen Thorwald, Die ungeklärten Falle, Stuttgart, 1950, 144–5.
24. Seidler, 367–9; Max Müller, ‘Der Tod des Reichsministers Dr Fritz Todt’, and Reimer Hansen, ‘Der ungeklärte Fall Todt’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 18 (1967), 602–5.
25. Seidler, 375ft., Thorwald, 133–54. I am grateful to Steven Sage for a summary preview of the research he is undertaking on Fritz Todt. He sees the air-crash as arranged at Hitler’s behest.
26. Below, 305–6; Hans Baur, Ich flog Mächtige der Erde, Kempten, 1956, 216; see also TBJG, II/3, 299, 306 (13 February 1941).
27. Seidel, 377ft; Speer, 209; Fest, Speer, 181–2. Speer’s own account is unreliable and, in the published version of his memoirs (Erinnerungen, 205ft), greatly touched-up. (See Sereny, Speer, 274–83; Seidler, 366–7.) In the Speer Papers (pen-pictures of Nazi leaders, drawn up in 1946, and kindly made available to me by Gitta Sereny) AH/I/Bl.4, Albert Speer claimed that he was by chance in FHQ at the time of Todt’s crash. Speer initially asked Todt whether he could make use of the free seat in the plane to fly to Munich, backing out of the flight, scheduled for 8a.m., after talking to Hitler until the early hours. (Matthias Schmidt, Albert Speer: Das Ende eines Mythos. Speers wabre Rolle im Dritten Reich, Bern/Munich, 1982, 75.)
28. Schroeder, 132.
29. Sereny, Speer, 10 4ff.
30. Speer, 210; Seidler, 832.
31. Seidler, 403–4; Speer, 210; Speer Papers, AH/I/Bl.4.
32. Speer, 210; Sereny, Speer, 276–7; Seidler, 382.
33. Speer, 211,215,217; Overy, War and Economy, 355; Herbst, Das nationalsozialistische Deutsch-land, 410.
34. Domarus, 1836–40; Thorwald, 148.
35. Speer, 217.
36. Dietrich Eichholtz, Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, Bd.II 1941–1943, East Berlin, 1985, 265, 308ff.; Overy, War and Economy, 366–7.
37. TBJG, II.3, 299 (13 February 1942), 303, 308 (14 February 1942), 311–12, 318 (15 February 1942). See also Irving, HW, 367–8, 371–2; Domarus, 1841 n.73. The German delight was soon tempered by the news that the Scbarnhorst and Gneisenau had run on to mines laid by the RAF. The Scbarnborst was out of action for months; the Gneisenau was bombed while under repair and incapable of further deployment (Weinberg III, 358).
38. TBJG, II.3, 321 (15 February 1941); Below, 307.
39. Staatsmänner II, 48 (11 February 1942). Hitler had said on 18 December in the Wolfsschanze: ‘I didn’t want that in East Asia. For years I said to every Englishman: “You’ll lose East Asia if you begin a conflict in Europe”’ (Monologe, 156). He was rumoured to be unenthusiastic about the Japanese successes and have remarked that he would most like to send twenty divisions to the English to repel ‘the Yellows’ (Hassell, 305 (22 March 1942)). Over a year later he would ruminate wistfully on ‘whether the white man can sustain his superiority at all in the long run in the face of the enormous human reservoirs in the east’ (TBJG, II/6, 236 (8 May 1943)).
40. Schroeder, 132.
41. TBJG, II/3, 514 (20 March 1942).
42. Schroeder, 131.
43. TBJG, II/3, 319 (15 February 1942).
44. Domarus, 1842.
45. Below, 306.
46. Domarus, 1851.
47. Domarus, 1850. Hitler repeated the claim in his Reichstag speech on 26 April. In fact, the previous winter, of 1940–41, had been colder in the east (Domarus, 1871 and n.181; see also 1872 and n.183).
48. Domarus, 1850.
49. MadR, ix.3486–8 (19 March 1942); Steinert, 283–5. See also TBJG, II/3, 479 (16 March 1942), on the basis of SD reports: ‘The German people is in the main concerned with the foodstuffs situation.’ As a consequence ‘interest in military events dies away somewhat’.
50. TBJG, II/3, 488 (18 March 1942), 496 (19 March 1942).
51. TBJG, II/3, 479 (16 March 1942).
52. TBJG, II/3, 496 (19 March 1942).
53. TBJG, II/3, 497 (19 March 1942).
54. TBJG, II/3, 489 (18 March 1942), 496 (19 March 1942).
55. TBJG, II/3, 494 (19 March 1942).
56. TBJG, II/3, 484 (17 March 1942).
57. TBJG, II/3, 495 (19 March 1942).
58. TBJG, II/3, 499 (20 March 1942).
59. TBJG, II/3, 503 (20 March 1942). Clearly, however, Hitler detested being reminded of poor morale. Only a few days later he noted on a report on the decline in mood which had been presented to him: ‘If it were decisive, what people always say, everything would long since have been lost. The true bearing of the people lies much deeper and rests on a very firm inner bearing. If that were not the case, all the achievements of the people would be inexplicable’ (Picker, 206 (25 March 1942)).
60. TBJG, II/3, 504 (20 March 1942); Weiß, Biographisches Lexikon, 457–9.
61. For the capitulation of justice to the police-state, see especially Martin Broszat, ‘Zur Perversion der Strafjustiz im Dritten Reich’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 390–443; and Broszat, Staat, ch.10, especially 421–2. Thierack was appointed Reich Minister of Justice on 20 August 1942 (Wistrich, Wer war wer, 272).
62. TBJG, II/3, 505 (20 March 1942); Irving, HW, 366.
63. TBJG, II/3, 506 (20 March 1942).
64. MadR, ix.3526–9 (26 March 1942); Steinert, 287–9.
65. Picker, 222–5, here 225 (29 March 1942).
66. Domarus, 1857, 1859–60; Rebentisch, 419; Ralph Angermund, Deutsche Richterschaft 1919–1945. Krisenerfahrung, Illusion, politische Rechtsprechung, Frankfurt am Main, 1990, 249–50. For further interventions by Hitler in sentencing, see Rebentisch, 399 and n.83; Broszat, Staat, 418. It has been estimated that there were some 25–30 cases between 1939 and 1942 in which Hitler imposed the death sentence instead of a lesser penalty (Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, Documents on Nazism 1919–1945, London, 1974, 276). The supine behaviour of Schlegelberger in the Schlitt case stood in contrast to the readiness, remarkable in the circumstances, of Gauleiter Rover of Oldenburg, to take up with Hitler on 2 May the complaint of the President of the Higher Regional Court in Oldenburg and persuade him that he had been mistaken in presuming the sentence on Schlitt had been too lenient. Rover was left to convey Hitler’s regrets to the Oldenburg judges. His fury was directed at those who had ‘misled’ him. (Domarus, 1881; Angermund, 250.)
67. Picker, 199 (22 March 1942).
68. TBJG, II/4, 162–3 (24 April 1942).
69. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 197; Steinert, 286; Below, 308.
70. TBJG, II/4, 174 (26 April 1942).
71. TBJG, II/4, 176 (26 April 1942).
72. TBJG, II/4, 175–6 (26 April 1942).
73. See also Picker, 294–5 (25 April 1942) for an extended account of Hitler’s comments on vegetarianism at the lunchtime gathering.
74. TBJG, II/4, 177 (26 April 1942).
75. TBJG, II/4, 180 (27 April 1942).
76. TBJG, II/4, 181 (27 April 1942).
77. TBJG, II/4, 183–4 (27 April 1942). Picker’s account of the midday conversation deals solely with the question of the political comments of actors, particularly of Emil Jannings. Goebbels’s own account of the lunchtime session makes plain that this was only an unimportant subsidiary theme. (Picker, 296; TBJG, II/4, 185–6 (27 April 1942).)
78. TBJG, II/3, 561 (27 March 1942).
79. TBJG, II/4, 184 (27 April 1942).
80. TBJG, II/4, 183 (27 April 1942).
81. TBJG, II/4, 186–7 (2–7 April 1942).
82. Domarus, 1865–74.
83. Domarus, 1874–5.
84. Rebentisch, 420–21.
85. RGBl, 1942, I.247. See also Rebentisch, 421 and n.154 (for Lammers’s insertion); and Max Domarus, Der Reichstag und die Macht, Würzburg, 1968, 149–51.
86. Domarus, 1877.
87. MadR, x.3673–4 (27 April 1941); 3685–8 (30 April 1942); Steinert, 289.
88. MadR, x.3686–7; Steinert, 289–92; Angermund, 248–9; Klaus Oldenhage, ‘Justizverwaltung und Lenkung der Rechtsprechung im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Rebentisch and Teppe, 100–20, here 114–15.
89. Cit. Oldenhage, 115.
90. Steinert, 289–90.
91. Picker, 298–9 (26 April 1942); TBJG, II/4, 188 (27 April 1942).
92. StA Neuburg an der Donau, vorl.LO 30/35, KL Nördlingen, 11 May 1942: ‘Verzagte Gemüter… scheinen nur von einer Stelle der Rede des Führers beeindruckt worden zu sein: als der Führer von den Vorbereitungen zum Winterfeldzug 42/43 sprach. Je mehr die Grausamkeit und Härte des Winterkampfes im Osten der Heimat voll bewußt geworden ist, umso mehr ist die Sehrsucht nach einem Ende gestiegen. Nun aber ist das Ende noch nicht absehbar — darunter leiden viele Frauen und Mütter.’
93. The ‘Osteria Bavaria’ was in Schellingstraße 62, in the ‘Party district’ of Munich (Domarus, 1878, n.198).
94. Picker, 299–300 (27 April 1942). For Hitler’s railway plans, see the excellent study by Anton Joachimsthaler, Die Breitspurbahn. Das Projekt zur Erschließung des groß-europäischen Raumes 1942–1945 (1985), 6th edn, Munich, 1999.
95. Picker, 300–303 (29 April 1942). Hitler praised Furtwängler for making the Berlin Philharmonic a far superior orchestra to the Vienna Philharmonic, despite smaller subsidies. For an assessment of the relationship with the regime of Walter, Knappertsbusch, Furtwängler, and — a rapidly rising star combining musical brilliance with ruthless career-opportunism — Herbert von Karajan, see Michael H. Kater, The Twisted Muse. Musicians and their Music in the Third Reich, New York/Oxford, 1997, 40–46, 55–61, 93–4, 114–16, 195–203. Richard J. Evans, Rereading German History 1800–1996. From Unification to Reunification, London, 1997, 187–93, offers a necessary corrective to the uncritical treatment of Furtwängler in Fred K. Prieberg, Trial of Strength: Wilhelm Furt-wängler and the Third Reich, London, 1992, and Sam H. Shirakawa, The Devil’s Music Master: the Controversial Life and Career of Wilhelm Furtwängler, New York, 1992.
96. CD, 461 (29 April 1942); Schmidt, 562.
97. Staatsmänner II, 65 (29 April 1942).
98. CP, 481–4 (29–30 April 1942); CD, 461–2 (29 April 1942); Schmidt, 562–3.
99. CD, 462–3 (dated 29 April 1942, though refers to both meetings, and here to the meeting on 30 April 1942).
100. CD, 463–4.
101. Andreas Hillgruber and Jürgen Förster (eds.), ‘Zwei neue Aufzeichnungen über “Führer–Besprechungen” aus dem Jahre 1942’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 11 (1972), 109–26, here 116.
102. Rommel’s offensive was launched on 26 May against the numerically superior British forces of the 8th Army at Gazala in Libya, on the Mediterranean coast between Benghazi and Tobruk (Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 183; Weinberg III, 350). The invasion of Malta was never to take place. The summer of 1942 proved to be the height of the siege of the island. (See Oxford Companion, 713–16.)
103. Staatsmänner II, 79 (30 April 1942); Hillgruber and Förster, 114–21.
104. Picker, 304 (1 May 1942).
105. Weisungen, 215.
106. Weisungen, 213–19; Haider KTB, iii.420 (28 March 1942).
107. IMG, vii.290 (Testimony of Field–Marshal Friedrich Paulus).
108. See the comments of Bernd Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Strategische Grundlagen und historische Bedeutung’, in Michalka, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 652–66, here 659.
109. Hartmann, 314–16; Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug’, 657.
110. Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug’, 660.
111. Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug’, 658–9.
112. Hartmann, 313 (on the basis of figures compiled on 2 April 1942; see 314 n.14).
113. Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug’, 654.
114. Halder KTB, iii.430–32 (21 April 1942).
115. Hartmann, 314.
116. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 66.
117. Halder KTB, iii.442–4 (15–19 May 1942).
118. Halder KTB, iii.449–50 (28 May 1942).
119. Hartmann, 320 (and see n.58 for criticism of Irving’s interpretation, giving all credit to Hitler, and claiming Halder had subsequently altered his diary entry); Below, 310.
120. Domarus, 1883; TBJG, II/4, 344 (23 May 1942).
121. TBJG, II/4, 354 (24 May 1942).
122. TBJG, II/4, 354, 360–61 (24 May 1942). At lunch the previous day, Hitler had already launched into further scathing attacks on the judiciary (Picker, 371–2 (22 May 1942)); TBJG, II/4, 343 (23 May 1942).
123. TBJG, II/4, 357 (24 May 1942).
124. TBJG, II/4, 358–9, 362 (24 May 1942).
125. TBJG, II/4, 360 (24 May 1942).
126. TBJG, II/4, 361 (24 May 1942).
127. TBJG, II/4, 355 (24 May 1942).
128. TBJG, II/4, 355–7 (24 May 1942).
129. TBJG, II/4, 358–9, 361 (24 May 1942).
130. TBJG, II/4, 362–4 (24 May 1942).
131. Domarus, 1887–8; see also Picker, 493–504.
132. TBJG, II/4, 401 (30 May 1942).
133. TBJG, II/4, 402 (30 May 1942).
134. TBJG, II/4, 406 (30 May 1942). At his meeting with Mussert on 10 December 1942, Hitler would make plain that he envisaged, in the future new European order, the Netherlands, like Belgium, while not being treated as a conquered country, having no independence and being incorporated into a ‘Greater German Reich’ (‘groß-germanisches Reich’). Hitler explicitly mentioned the incorporation of Austria as an indicator of what he had in mind. (Hillgruber and Förster, 121–6, here 125.)
135. Charles Wighton, Heydrich. Hitler’s Most Evil Henchman, London, 1962, 268ff.; Charles Whiting, Heydrich. Henchman of Death, London, 1999, 141–7; M. R. D. Foot, Resistance. European Resistance to Nazism 1940–45, London, 1976, 204–6; Oxford Companion, 1018–22.
136. Foot, Resistance, 206, puts the death-toll of the reprisals at 2,000; Whiting, 159ff.; Tb Reuth, 1800, n.66.
137. TBJG, II/4, 405 (30 May 1942). Baum and his colleagues were arrested, tortured, sentenced to death, and executed. On the attempt, see Merson, 243; Arnold Paucker, Deutsche Juden im Widerstand 1933–1945. Tatsachen und Probleme, Beiträge zum Widerstand 1933–1945, ed. Gedenk-stätte Deutscher Widerstand, Berlin, 1999, 21; Wolfgang Benz and Walter H. Pehle (eds.), Lexikon des deutschen Widerstandes, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 225–7. Hitler had given Goebbels permission to have 500 Jewish ‘hostages’ arrested, and to respond to any further attempts by shootings. (Goebbels let the leaders of the Jewish community in Berlin know that 100–150 Jews would be shot for any new attempt. He also had a number of Jews in Sachsenhausen concentration camp shot. TBJG, 4, 432 (2 June 1942).) At the same time, Hitler had commissioned Goebbels — probably at the Propaganda Minister’s own prompting — to ‘see to it as quickly as possible that the Berlin Jews are evacuated’. But Speer had objected that replacements needed first to be found for the Jews working in the armaments industry (351 (24 May 1942)). See also 386 (28 May 1942), where Goebbels referred to the list of Jewish hostages he had had drawn up, and numerous arrests he had caused to be made, after the sabotage attempt at the exhibition.
138. TBJG, II/4, 393 (29 May 1942).
139. TBJG, II/4, 405 (30 May 1942). Goebbels repeated at the end of his summary of Hitler’s remarks that he had been practically in total agreement with what the Führer had said {TBJG, II/4, 410 (30 May 1942)).
140. TBJG, II/4, 361 (24 May 1942).
141. TBJG, II/4, 405 (30 May 1942).
142. TBJG, II/4, 406 (30 May 1942). For another version of Hitler’s comments on the Jews that lunchtime, claiming they were indeed Asiatic, not European, see Picker, 378 (29 May 1942). In speaking over supper to his entourage in his headquarters near Vinnitsa in late July of the removal of the Jews, Hitler, describing them as ‘enemy number one’, once more mentioned the prospect of removing them to Madagascar ‘or some other Jewish national state’ — plans which had been abandoned in 1940 (Picker, 471 (24 July 1942)).
143. IMG, xxix.582, Doc. 2233-PS (‘Die Weisungder Judenvernichtung kommt von höherer Stelle’). Goebbels noted, after speaking to Frank on 23 May about Jewish policy in the General Government, that it was ‘no trifling matter (nicht von Pappe)’, but that Frank could take little credit for it because the Führer had appointed an SS-State Secretary (Krüger) at his side who took his orders from Himmler. This was necessary since ‘Jewish and ethnic policy must above all follow unified guidelines’. (TBJG, II/4, 352 (24 May 1942).) In his post-war memoirs, Frank was adamant that Hitler was responsible for the order to murder the Jews. See Frank, 391–2.
144. BDC, SS-HO, 933: RFSS to Berger, 28 July 1942: ‘Verbot einer Verordnung über den Begriff “Jude”’. ‘Die besetzten Ostgebiete werden judenfrei. Die Durchführung dieses sehr schweren Befehls hat der Führer auf meine Schultern gelegt.’ For frequent recourse by those connected with the ‘Final Solution’ to an order by or wish of Hitler, see Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung, 62ff.
145. BDC, SS-HO/1220, Chef des OKW, 16 December 1942, betr. Bandenbekämpfung; SS-HO/1238, Reichsführer-SS, December 1942: ‘Meldungen an den Führer über Bandenbekämpfung, Meldung Nr.51, Rußland-Süd, Ukraine, Bialystok. Bandenbekämpfungserfolge vom 1.9 bis 1.12.1942’. Himmler’s handwritten note at the top indicates that he presented the report to Hitler on 31 December 1942.
146. See Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret. Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s ‘Final Solution, Harmondsworth, 1982, 15n., 17–18; Steinert, 257. Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden, revised trans. edn, Frankfurt am Main, 1990, iii.1283–4, has an unduly complex explanation of the excision of the explicit language by Himmler. The Reichsführer, he suggests, was keen to boast of his ‘achievements’. But he faced a problem. Speer and the Commander of the Reserve Army, General Fritz Fromm, had criticized Himmler and queried with Hitler himself the RSHA’s statistics on arrests of Jews who, they claimed, were needed for the armaments industry. Himmler’s way round his problem was to have a statistical report drawn up for Hitler, but to present it in camouflaged language. Irving, HW, 392, 503–4, 871, takes the view that the Korherr report was doctored to prevent Hitler knowing about the killing operations.
147. See Mommsen, ‘Realisierung’, 414–17.
148. TBJG, II/3, 561 (27 March 1942).
149. In his speech to the Reichs — and Gauleiter after Röver’s death, Hitler indicated that he had little interest in overseas colonies, stating instead: ‘Our colonial territory lies in the East’ (TBJG, II/4, 363 (24 May 1942)).
150. Irving uses this to allege that Hitler did not know of the ‘Final Solution’; see HW, 327 and 850–51 (n. to 326).
151. Laqueur, 18 refers to Himmler’s chief of staff, Karl Wolff, denying in his post-war trial that his boss had ever mentioned mass murder to him. Himmler’s chief adjutant, Werner Grothmann, indicated similarly in an interview long after the war that he had never heard Himmler discuss the ‘Final Solution’ (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Papers, C-58, I/T2/Si/10, taped interview with John Toland, 7 October 1971). Once — if the much later account of a telephonist in Führer Headquarters is to be trusted — the Reichsführer-SS did inadvertently break the code. He was, it was recalled, overheard on the line in mid-May 1942 telling Bormann he had good news for the Führer from Auschwitz that again 20,000 Jews had been ‘liquidated’ there. He immediately corrected the word to ‘evacuated’. But Bormann angrily reminded him that such reports, as arranged, were only to be sent to him by SS courier for passing on to the Führer (Schulz, 98). The veracity of the account is impossible to check. That Hitler was sent frequent reports by SS courier sounds doubtful; as does Himmler’s slip of the tongue. The date, too, seems early, since the routine and systematic mass extermination in Auschwitz only began in July 1942 (Longerich, Politik, 515).
152. Domarus, 1446: ‘Grundsätzlicher Befehl’, 11 January 1940; Laqueur, 18–19. The number of persons with indirect or partial knowledge was of course far wider.
153. This was given as a reason, in autumn 1942, why Gauleiter Greiser should not proceed with his aim to exterminate 30,000 Poles suffering from incurable tuberculosis (Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, 72).
154. See Steinert, 252–7, including (257) reference to Bormann’s secret circular to Gauleiter, informing them on Hitler’s behalf, that ‘in public treatment of the Jewish question all discussion of a future complete solution (Gesamtlösung) must cease. It can however be mentioned that the Jews are conscripted en blsoc for appropriate deployment of labour.’
155. IMG, xxvii.270–73, here 270, Doc. 1517-PS, Alfred Rosenberg: ‘Vermerk über Unterredung beim Führer am 14.12.41’.
156. Steinert, 252–3.
157. IMG, xxix. 145, 1919-PS; Anatomie, i.329; ii.446–7.
158. See Jäckel, ‘Hitler und der Mord an den europäischen Juden’, 161.
159. See note 144 above: BDC, SS-HO, 933: RFSS to Berger, 28 July 1942: ‘Verbot einer Verordnung über den Begriff “Jude”’.
160. See TBJG, II/4, 402 (30 May 1942) for the ‘psychological pressure’ during the winter on account of ‘the unsuccessful Napoleonic adventure’.
161. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 365, 368–9.
162. See TBJG, II/4, 482, 489 (10 June 1942).
163. S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, London, 1954, 1956, 1960, i.599ff., 614, ii.467ff., 475, iii.364ff. See also Overy, Why the Allies Won, 47 (with different figures), 49, 52.
164. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 183; Weinberg III, 350 (who gives the number of British troops captured as 28,000); DRZW, vi.623–33; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.IV, The Hinge of Fate, London etc., 1951, 371–8.
165. Weinberg III, 350–51.
166. Below, 312; Irving, HW, 399; Weinberg III, 350–51.
167. TBJG, II/4, 416 (31 May 1942). Hitler repeated that the attacks would be on ‘cultural centres’, since those on military and economic targets had hardly been worthwhile. The appointment of Air Marshal Arthur Harris as Commander-in-Chief of the RAF’s Bomber Command on 23 February had sharply intensified the British strategy of ‘area bombing’, aimed at demoralization of the population living in the centres of German cities (Overy, Why the Allies Won, 112–13).
168. TBJG, II/4, 422 (1 June 1942); 431 (2 June 1942).
169. Below, 311–12.
170. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), Bd.II: i.Jan-uar 1942–31. Dezember 1942, ed. Andreas Hillgruber, Frankfurt am Main, 1963 (=KTB OKW, ii.), ii/i, 395–6 (1 June 1942); Bock, 490 (1 June 1942); Picker, 381 (1 June 1942).
171. Picker, 381 (2 June 1942).
172. TBJG, II/4, 489 (10 June 1942).
173. A military alliance, rather than a formal pact, had been arrived at in spring 1941. The Finns had initially put out a declaration of neutrality on the day of the German attack on the Soviet Union, though Hitler’s own proclamation the same day had pointed out that German soldiers at the northern point of the front were fighting alongside Finnish divisions. Immediate Soviet attacks on Finland led to a Finnish declaration of war on 25 June 1941. (See DRZW, iv.Ch.VI, pts.1–4, especially 39off., 400–404.)
174. Bernd Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland. Das geheime Tonprotokoll seiner Unterredung mit Mannerheim am 4. Juni 1942’, VfZ, 41 (1993), 122 n.23; Domarus, 1889.
175. Wegner ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 122–3, 127.
176. Wegner ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 124, 128; Domarus, 1889.
177. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 126 and (for the text) 130–37.
178. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 127.
179. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 125–6 and n.40, 134 n.74. For the ‘preventive war’ legend, and the way it was exploited by Nazi propaganda, see above, Ch.9, notes 4, 39.
180. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 128.
181. TBJG, II/4, 489 (10 June 1942).
182. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 129.
183. TBJG, II/4, 450 (5 June 1942). Daluege rang Goebbels at 10a.m. to say that Heydrich had died a half an hour earlier. Presumably, he had first rung FHQ. But Hitler, as Goebbels pointed out, could not make any decision about the state funeral since he was in Finland and not expected back until the evening. So he must already have left FHQ when the news arrived. He landed in Finland at 11.15a.m. (Domarus, 1889). Whether Hitler was informed during his six-hour visit to Finland, or learnt of Heydrich’s death only on return (Domarus, 1890) is uncertain.
184. Picker, 386 (4 June 1942). Hitler referred here, as on an earlier occasion, on 3 May 1942 (Picker, 306–8), to attempts on his own life. Hitler repeated, when in Berlin for Heydrich’s funeral, that he had warned him only to travel in an armour-plated car (TBJG, II/4, 486 (10 June 1942)).
185. TBJG, II/4, 486 (10 June 1942).
186. TBJG, II/4, 492 (10 June 1942).
187. See DRZW, vi.868ff. for the unfolding of the campaign.
188. Halder KTB, iii.462 (21 June 1942).
189. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 66.
190. Halder KTB, iii.467 (28 June 1942).
191. Halder KTB, iii.469 (1 July 1942); Domarus, 1895–6.
192. Bock, 512–14 (3 July 1942).
193. Halder Diary, 632–9 (3–13 July 1942); Bock, 525–6 (13 July 1942); Below, 312. In his talk with Bock on 3 July, Hitler had made fun of the English for sacking generals when something went wrong and thereby undermining the freedom of decision in the army (Bock, 513 (3 July 1942)).
194. See Domarus, 1897, n.312.
195. Domarus, 1897; Hauner, Hitler, 179, for the return to Rastenburg on 1 November.
196. Schroeder, 135–41; Halder KTB, iii.483 (16 July 1942); Below, 313. Picker found the Ukraine an attractive area (Picker, 465 (22 July 1942)). Below, who had mentioned that Hitler disliked the heat and the flies in the summer of 1942, referred to the Vinnitsa headquarters during the second sojourn there in late February and early March 1943 as ‘pleasant’ (Below, 331). Goebbels, however, visiting FHQ in that period, found the location ‘desolate (trostlos)’ TBJG, II/7, 501 (9 March 1943)).
197. Below, 313; Picker, 461 (19 July 1942).
198. Picker, 457–77 (18–26 July 1942).
199. Below, 313.
200. Halder KTB, iii.492 (28 July 1942), 493–4 (30 July 1942), 494–5 n.1; KTB OKW, ii/2, 1285; Irving, HW, 405–6.
201. Hartmann, 325.
202. Below, 313.
203. See Bernd Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum. Deutschlands Kriegführung zwischen Moskau und Stalingrad’, in Jürgen Förster (ed.), Stalingrad. Ereignis-Wirkung-Symbol, Munich/Zürich, 1992, 17–37, here 19.
204. Cit. Hartmann, 326 n.90. Ninety per cent of the Soviet Union’s oil came from Baku and the north Caucasian oil-fields (Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 19).
205. Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 21, for the scepticism, but the lack of a convincing alternative on the part of the generals.
206. Wegner, ‘Hitler zweiter Feldzug’, 660; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 29.
207. Weisungen, 227. Marshal Semyon Timoshenko was the Red Army’s senior general, commonly regarded at this point as the Soviet Union’s most competent military commander. He had, however, presided over the loss of a quarter of a million men, together with their tanks and artillery, in the battle for Kharkov in spring, and was recalled to Moscow on 23 July, returning to a field-command, this time on the north-west front, only in October (Oxford Companion, 1108–9).
208. Hartmann, 325.
209. Weisungen, 227–9; see Hartmann, 326.
210. Hartmann, 328–9; DRZW, vi-953ff.
211. Halder KTB, iii.489 (23 July 1942), trans. Halder Diary, 646; Hartmann, 328.
212. Cit. Hartmann, 328.
213. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 67.
214. Halder KTB, iii.503–7 (12–19 August 1942); Hartmann, 329.
215. Halder KTB, iii.501 (9 August 1942); Speer, 252; DRZW, vi.942–3; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 30; Irving, HW, 414.
216. TBJG, ii/5, 353–4 (20 August 1942).
217. This is what Speer later claimed (Speer, 252).
218. Halder KTB, iii.508 (22 August 1942); Below, 313; Domarus, 1905.
219. Speer, 253.
220. DRZW, vi.965; Hartmann, 329.
221. Halder KTB, iii.509 (23 August 1942).
222. See Hartmann, 329.
223. Halder KTB, iii.511 (26 August 1942).
224. Warlimont, 251 (dating the meeting to 8 August); Halder KTB, iii.501 (7 August 1942); DRZW, vi.908; Irving, HW, 415.
225. Below, 314; DRZW, vi.898–906; Irving, HW, 416–18.
226. Hartmann, 330.
227. Heusinger, 200–201; trans. amended from Warlimont, 251–2.
228. Engel, 125 (4 September 1942); see also Warlimont, 251–2, 618 n.21; Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, (1955), London, 1982, 261–2. Though his diary entry is misdated, and is a post-war reconstruction, there seems no obvious reason to doubt the authenticity of Engel’s record. Heusinger’s account (Heusinger, 201, also misdated) of Hitler’s further response is less insulting than what was actually said. Heusinger accepted after the war that he had deliberately avoided publishing Hitler’s worst insult. (See Hartmann, 331–2 and nn.14, 17.)
229. Engel, 125 (4 September 1942). Halder, recognizing that he could no longer cope with Hitler’s operational leadership, appears, in fact, consciously to have been working towards the second half of July at provoking his own dismissal, aware that a conventional resignation would not be acceptable (DRZW, vi.954).
230. Engel, 126 n.395.
231. Engel, 124 (27 August 1942). This and a further entry for the same date are misdated by Engel (see 124 n.389) and repeated almost verbatim (126) under the date 7 September 1942.
232. Engel, 124 (27 August 1942).
233. Engel, 126 (8 September 1942). According to her later testimony, Jodl told his second wife, Luise, that ‘he had never witnessed such an outbreak of fury’ in Hitler. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, II/T1/S2/3 (interview, in English, with John Toland, 7 November 1970).)
234. Below, 315.
235. Warlimont, 256; Halder KTB, iii.518–19 (8 September 1942).
236. Engel, 125 (27 August 1942).
237. Irving, HW, 422.
238. Engel, 125 (27 August 1942). See his similar comments, 128 (18 September 1942).
239. Engel, 127 (8 September 1942).
240. Warlimont, 256; Below, 315.
241. Engel, 127 (18 September 1942). For Hitler’s lack of trust in his generals, see Engel 127–9 (14–30 September 1942).
242. Warlimont, 257–8.
243. Warlimont, 258.
244. Below, 316.
245. Warlimont, 259; Below, 315. Zeitzler was a close friend of Schmundt (Warlimont, 259). See Hartmann, 337–9, for a description of Zeitzler and his belief in Hitler. Hitler had pointed out to Goebbels some weeks earlier how impressed he had been by Zeitzler’s work in the west (TBJG, II/5,353 (20 August 1942)).
246. Warlimont, 260.
247. Hartmann, 339.
248. Halder KTB, iii.528 (24 September 1942). Halder was far from pessimistic about overall developments in the war. (See Weizsäcker-Papiere, 303 (30 September 1942).)
249. Hartmann, 339.
250. KTB OKW, ii/I, 669 (2 September 1942).
251. Halder KTB, iii.514 (31 August 1942).
252. Halder KTB, iii.521 (11 September 1942); DRZW, vi.982; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 32.
253. Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 32–3.
254. Below, 318; Domarus, 1924–5.
255. DRZW, vi.684–7; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 30–31; Irving, HW, 419; Domarus, 1924.
256. See Weinberg III, 351, 355–6, 361–2.
257. Below, 317.
258. TBJG, II/5, 594 (29 September 1942). For a repeat of these remarks and criticism of the behaviour of the Munich population during the raid, TBJG, II/5, 604 (30 September 1942).
259. TBJG, II/5, 358 (20 August 1942).
260. Steinert, 316; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 185.
261. Below, 317; Irving, HW, 427.
262. TBJG, II/5, 370 (20 August 1942). The date appears to have been fixed only late in September (TBJG, II/5, 584 (28 September 1942).
263. TBJG, II/5, 594–5 (29 September 1942). See also 596 for Goebbels’s scepticism; and Domarus, 1912, for the DNB summary of the speech.
264. Below, 318.
265. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, Bd. 1942 (Sept.-Okt.), from NA T78/317/1567ff., Führerrede zum Ausbau des Atlantikwalles am 29.Sept. 1942. See Irving, HW, 428–9.
266. Domarus, 1913–24.
267. Domarus, 1915; MadR, xi.4259 (1 October 1942).
268. Domarus, 1920.
269. Domarus, 1914, 1916.
270. TBJG, II/6, 42 (2 October 1942).
271. TBJG, II/5, 357 (20 August 1942).
272. TBJG, II/6, 46–7 (2 October 1942); and see also TBJG, II/5, 354 (20 August 1942).
273. TBJG, II/6, 48–9 (2 October 1942).
274. Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 33; and see Engel, 129–30 (2–3, 10 October 1942).
275. TBJG, II/5, 356 (20 August 1942).
276. DRZW, vi.987–8; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 33.
277. DRZW, vi.988–93; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 34.
278. Engel, 129 (10 February 1942).
279. DRZW, vi.993–4; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 34.
280. Domarus, 1916.
281. Below, 319; Manfred Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee im Kessel von Stalingrad’, in Förster, Stalingrad, 76–110, here 76–9.
282. Domarus, 1931.
283. Below, 320–21; 1929–30; Irving, HW, 439–42 (who draws the comparison with the fate of Generals Hoepner and Sponeck the previous January).
284. On 1 November Hitler had transferred his headquarters from Vinnitsa back to the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia, where his entourage were pleased to find that bright and spacious wooden barracks had been added to the gloomy bunkers to which they had all been earlier confined. He had left his headquarters for Berlin, then Munich, on 6 November (Below, 321).
285. German views on the eastward-bound convoy from Gibraltar varied between seeing it as carrying provisions for Malta or heading for Tripolitania to attack Rommel from the rear. The Italian General Staff more realistically presumed that the objective was the occupation of French bases in North Africa. Mussolini and Ciano expected no resistance from the French (CD, 520 (7 November 1942)).
286. The first American fighting units to be engaged in the north African theatre of war were bombing crews relocated from India to the Egyptian front in the wake of the Tobruk disaster (Weinberg III, 356).
287. Below, 321–2; Engel, 134 (8 November 1942).
288. Below, 321–2.
289. Domarus, 1937.
290. TBJG, II/6, 254 (9 November 1942).
291. TBJG, II/6, 257–9 (9 November 1942).
292. TBJG, II/6, 259 (9 November 1942).
293. Domarus, 1935.
294. Domarus, 1938.
295. Domarus, 1937; Jäckel, ‘Hitler und der Mord an den europäischen Juden’, 161.
296. Steinert, 318–19; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 186–9.
297. Engel reported that Hitler’s speech had been the subject of much discussion at Führer Headquarters. He and others, he said, had been ‘disgusted’ that Hitler had spoken so optimistically ‘with his audience in mind (berechnet auf Zuhörerkreis)’ (Engel, 134 (10 November 1942)).
298. TBJG, II/6, 259–60 (9 November 1942).
299. TBJG, II/6, 261, 263 (9 November 1942).
300. TBJG, II/6, 258–9, 261–2 (9 November 1942).
301. CD, 521 (9 November 1942); 522 (10 November 1942).
302. CD, 522 (9 November 1942).
303. CD, 522 (10 November 1942); Schmidt, 576.
304. Domarus, 1945–9.
305. Weisungen, 220–21 (Directive No.42, 29 May 1942).
306. Below, 322–3.
307. Below, 323; DRZW, vi.997; Irving, HW, 455.
308. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 191; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 80–81; DRZW, vi.997–1009, 1018–21; and, fundamental especially for the Soviet side, Erickson, ch.10. There were also more than 30,000 soldiers of other nationalities, 10,000 of them Romanians, encircled (Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 90).
309. Below, 323–4.
310. Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht, Stuttgart, 1974, 163; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 82; DRZW, vi.1024.
311. KTB OKW, ii/I, 84, ii/II, 1006 (22 November 1942); Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 183; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 85; DRZW, vi.1025.
312. Below, 324. Both those close to Hitler and those who later castigated his direction of the war concurred many years after the events that he accepted Göring’s assurances that the troops at Stalingrad could be sustained from the air. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, T1-S1, interview of Adolf Heusinger by John Toland, 30 March 1970; 68–1, interview of Otto Günsche by John Toland, 26 March 1971.) For the dreadful weather conditions in Stalingrad in November, at times dipping to as low as minus eighteen degrees Celsius, see Antony Beevor, Stalingrad, London, 1998, 214, 230, 232.
313. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 219; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 86; DRZW, vi. 1025–6; Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, 192.
314. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 220; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 87; DRZW, vi.1028–9.
315. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 192.
316. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 224; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 87–8; Manstein, 315; DRZW, vi.1032. Manstein’s own post-war account of Stalingrad (Manstein, 289–366) showed, naturally enough, his own actions in the best possible light. Hitler (almost exclusively), though to some extent Göring (for his unrealistic claims to relieve Stalingrad by air), and Paulus (for errors in not attempting to break out while there was still time) were held responsible for the débâcle. While Hitler’s disastrous leadership and overriding culpability are undeniable, it was accepted by a strong critic of Hitler’s direction of the war, former Army Operations Chief Adolf Heusinger, long after the war, that Manstein had to share some of the blame for the catastrophe. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, T1-S1, interview of Adolf Heusinger by John Toland, 30 March 1970.) See also the critical assessments by Joachim Wieder and Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel (eds.), Stalingrad. Memories and Reassessments, (1962), London, 1997, 148–78; Beevor, 308–10; and, especially, DRZW, vi.1060–3. Less critical of Manstein is Geoffrey Jukes, Hitler’s Stalingrad Decisions, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1985, 106–47, where, however, Hitler’s disastrous role is portrayed within an increasingly overloaded process of decision-making, not just on the Stalingrad front.
317. Manstein, 316; DRZW, vi.1033.
318. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 386ff.; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 97–8; DRZW, vi.1033–4.
319. Below, 324; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 192–3. For Hoth’s attempt, DRZW, vi.1035ff.
320. According to KTB OKW, ii/2, 1168 (21 December 1942), Manstein had stated at the briefing that the 6th Army could advance a maximum of 30 kilometres; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 99; Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 334; DRZW, vi.1048.
321. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 406–7; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 99–100.
322. KTB OKW, ii/2, 1168 (21 December 1942).
323. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 407; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 100; DRZW, vi.1048.
324. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 410; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 100; DRZW, vi. 1048–9.
325. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 93.
326. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 431–2; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 101.
327. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 93.
328. Below, 324.
329. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 102; Manstein, 373.
330. Weinberg III, 441; Below, 329.
331. Irving, Göring, 372–3.
332. Weinberg III, 434, 436.
333. Irving, Göring, 373.
334. See The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart, London, 1953, 368–9.
335. Staatsmänner II, 160–81 (18 December 1942), 190–6 (19 December 1942, 20 December 1942), here especially 165, 168–70, 195 (‘kriegsentscheidend’).
336. CD, 536 (18 December 1942).
337. CD, 535 (18 December 1942); Staatsmänner II, 169–70 (18 December 1942).
338. Staatsmänner II, 192 (19 December 1942).
339. William Craig, Enemy at the Gates. The Battle for Stalingrad, London, 1973, 295–6; Beevor, 313.
340. Craig, 293.
341. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 191; Buchbender/Sterz, 99. For graphic accounts of the terrible conditions of the doomed army in its last weeks, see Beevor, especially ch. 19–22; and Craig, 259–381.
342. Buchbender/Sterz, 102. Goebbels’s plans for an edition of last letters from soldiers at Stalingrad had to be abandoned when it transpired that most of them contained sentiments far from the heroic tone required. (Steinert, 328. See Letzte Briefe aus Stalingrad, Frankfurt am Main/Heidelberg, 1950, 5–6 (pointing out that only 2 per cent of the letters were favourably disposed towards the leadership of the war)).
343. Letzte Briefe, 21.
344. Letzte Briefe, 1 4.
345. Letzte Briefe, 25.
346. Letzte Briefe, 1 6–17.
347. Below, 326.
348. Below, 325–7.
349. The above based on Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 104–6; Below, 327; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 94; DRZW, vi.1056–7.
350. Boelcke, Wollt ihr, 422.
351. Boelcke, Wollt ihr, 425–6; Steinert, 327. For Goebbels’s pressure for a reorientation of press and OKW propaganda, see TBJG, II/7, 164, 180 (23 January 1943).
352. TBJG, II/7, 1 62, (23 January 1943).
353. TBJG, II/7, 169, 173 (23 January 1943).
354. TBJG, II/7, 162, 168–9 (23 January 1943).
355. TBJG, II/7, 166 (23 January 1943).
356. TBJG, II/7, 1 62, 168 (23 January 1943).
357. TBJG, II/7, 162–3, 171–2 (23 January 1943).
358. TBJG, II/7, 175 (23 January 1943).
359. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 107; DRZW, vi.1057–8.
360. Domarus, 1974.
361. Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 531; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 108; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 94; DRZW, vi.1059–60.
362. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 108.
363. Domarus, 1975.
364. This had been arranged at Goebbels’s visit to FHQ on 22 January (TBJG, II/7,173 (23 January 1943); the text is in Domarus, 1976–80).
365. Domarus, 1979.
366. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 108.
367. Domarus, 1981.
368. Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 109. The splitting of the two pockets in Stalingrad, completed on 26 January, had led to a break in communications between them from the following day. Paulus commanded the larger, southern pocket (LB Darmstadt, 72 n.76). According to Lew Besymenski, who acted as interpreter at Paulus’s first interrogation after capture, the newly elevated field-marshal insisted on recognition of his new rank, denied that he had surrendered (claiming he had been ‘surprised’ by his assailants, although he had engaged in lengthy prior negotiations), and refused to sanction the capitulation of his men (despite his own surrender) as ‘unworthy of a soldier’. (‘“Nein, nein, das ist nicht mehr meine Pflicht”. Lew Besymenski über Stalingrad und seine Erlebnisse mit Generalfeldmarschall Paulus’, Der Spiegel, 37/1992, 170 — 71.)
369. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1 94; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 109.
370. LB Darmstadt, 73 (1 February 1943).
371. LB Darmstadt, 72.
372. LB Darmstadt, 73.
373. LB Darmstadt, 74 and n.84, 79.
374. LB Darmstadt, 77, 79–80. Paulus entered Soviet captivity with the remainder of his troops, and was eventually released in 1953. In 1944 he provided support from Moscow for the ‘National Committee of Free Germany’, the organization initiated by the Soviet leadership and comprising exiled German Communists and prisoners-of-war, which sought — largely in vain — to subvert morale at the front among German troops and to incite resistance to the Nazi regime. Ernst Nolte, Der europäische Bürgerkrieg. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus, Berlin, 1987, 114–23 (especially 115), 528–9, 564 n.24, 596 n.36, used Hitler’s comments on rats in the Lubljanka prison as part of a speculative hypothesis that his paranoid antisemitism arose out of his acute and lasting horror at Bolshevik atrocities in the years immediately following the Russian Revolution. This assertion was then incorporated in the construction of his heavily criticized interpretation positing Bolshevism, and ‘class genocide’, as the prior agent of a causal nexus leading ultimately to the Nazi ‘race genocide’ against the Jews. (See Ernst Nolte, ‘Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will’, in ‘Historikerstreit’. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernicbtung, 2nd edn, Munich/Zurich, 1987, 39–47.
375. Domarus, 1985.
376. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 192.
377. Nadler, 73, 76.
378. MadR, xii.4720 (28 January 1943), 4750–1 (4 February 1943), 4760–1 (8 February 1943).
379. Goebbels acknowledged that the criticism was now also directed at Hitler (TBJG, II/7, 266 (5 February 1943).
380. Hassell, 347 (14 February 1943).
381. MadR, xii.4720 (28 January 1943).
382. GStA, Munich, MA 106671, report of the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern, 10 March 1943: ‘Der Stalingrad-Mörder’.
383. Hassell, 348–9 (14 February 1943); Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 464ff.; Ritter, 35off.; Hoffmann, 346ff., Joachim Fest, Staatsstreich. Der lange Weg zum 20. Juli, Berlin, 1994, 199–205.
384. Inge Scholl, Die Weiβe Rose, Frankfurt am Main, 1952, 108; (‘Kommilitonen! Kommilitoninnen! Erschüttert steht unser Volk vor dem Untergang der Manner von Stalingrad. Dreihundertdreiβigtausend deutsche Manner hat die geniale Strategie des Weltkriegsgefreiten sinn- und verantwortungslos in Tod und Verderben gehetzt. Führer, wir danken dir!’); also printed in Hinrich Siefken (ed.), Die Weiβe Rose und ihre Flugblätter, Manchester, 1994, 32. This was the sixth and final broadsheet. The fifth, produced between 13 and 29 January, is printed (wrongly dated to 18 February 1943) alongside other texts related to the ‘White Rose’ in Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel (eds.), Widerstand in Deutschland 1933–1945. Ein historisches Lesebuch, Munich, 1994, 236–7 (trans, in N & P, iv.457) and reproduced in facsimile in Siefken, Die Weiβe Rose und ihre Flugblätter, 88–9 (see 20–1 for dating). See also J. P. Stern, ‘The White Rose’, in Hinrich Siefken (ed.), Die Weiβe Rose. Student Resistance to National Socialism 1942/43. Forschungsergebnisse und Erfahrungsberichte, Nottingham, n.d. (1991), 11–36.
385. Benz and Pehle, Lexikon, 318–19.
386. See IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.79: Hitler was on the evening of the news of the fall of Stalingrad ‘a tired old man (ein müder alter Herrn)’, and the mood at headquarters reminded her of a visit to a cemetery on a rainy November day. See also Irving, HW, 480. According to Speer, 264, after the capitulation Hitler never referred to Stalingrad again.
387. TBJG, II/7, 171 (23 January 1943).
388. Schroeder, 130; TBJG, II/7, 171 (23 January 1943).
389. See Irving, HW, 480.
390. Below, 326.
391. Below, 329–30.
392. TBJG, II/7, 285 (8 February 1943).
393. TBJG, II/ 7, 293 (8 February 1943).
394. TBJG, II/7, 285–6 (8 February 1943); also 287–8, 293–5.
395. TBJG, II/ 7, 288–9 (8 February 1943).
396. TBJG, II/ 7, 287 (8 February 1943).
397. Below, 327.
398. TBJG, II/ 7, 287 (8 February 1943).
399. TBJG, II/ 7, 291–2 (8 February 1943).
400. TBJG, II/ 7, 290–2, 294 (8 February 1943).
401. TBJG, II/ 7, 295–6 (8 February 1943).
402. TBJG, II/ 7, 295–7, (8 February 1943).
403. TBJG, II/ 7, 292 (8 February 1943).
404. TBJG, II/7, 296 (8 February 1943).
405. The speech had been postponed from 14 March (RGBl, 1 943 I, 137; Domarus, 1998). Hitler indicated at the beginning of his speech (Domarus, 1999) that the postponement had been caused by the crisis on the eastern front. This had — temporarily — been ended by the retaking of Kharkov (which the Red Army had regained in February) on 14–15 March (KTB OKW, ii/2, 209 (14 March 1943), 214–15 (15 March 1943).
406. TBJG, II/7, 593–4, 607, 611 (20 March 1943).
407. TBJG, II/7, 610 (20 March 1943).
408. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 196–7. The figures probably seemed far too low because most people conflated them with the total casualties. In Haider’s last note of casualties on the eastern front before he left office, he gave the total killed for the period between 22 June 1941 and 10 September 1942 as 336,349, and the total losses (killed, wounded, missing) as 1,637,280 (Haider KTB, iii.522 (15 September 1942). The figure for dead provided by Hitler in March 1943 was, therefore, less outlandish than it seemed to his audience. Many presumed Hitler was referring only to dead on the eastern front, not in all theatres of war. But the eastern front in any case accounted for the vast proportion of those killed in action.
409. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 207–10.
1. Iring Fetscher, Joseph Goebbels im Berliner Sportpalast 1943. ‘Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg?’, Hamburg, 1998, 95, 98; Hofer, Der Nationalsozialismus, 251. The text of the speech is printed in Helmut Heiber (ed.), Goebbels-Reden, 2 Bde., Düsseldorf, 1971, 1972 (Bd.1:1932–1939; Bd.2: 1939–1945), ii.172–208; and Fetscher, 63–98; and analysed in Fetscher, 104–22, and Günter Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Rede zum totalen Krieg am 18. Februar 1943’, VfZ, 12 (1964), 13–43 (background to speech, 13–29, analysis 30–43); English trans., Günter Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech on Total War, February 18, 1943’, in Hajo Holborn (ed.), Republic to Reich. The Making of the Nazi Revolution, Vintage Books edn, New York, 1973, 298–342. See also Reuth, Goebbels, 518ff.; Irving, Goebbels, 421ff. Fetscher, pt.II, offers a thorough analysis of the reception of the speech abroad.
2. Boelcke, Wollt 1hr, 445–6. See also, for the aims of the speech, Fetscher, 107–8.
3. Boelcke, Wollt 1hr, 25.
4. For conflicting interpretations, see Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 310 — 14; and Irving, HW, 421, 659 n.II.
5. TBJG, II/7, 373 (19 February 1943).
6. Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 311, 313–14; TBJG, II/7, 508 (9 March 1943).
7. See Mason, Sozialpolitik, ch.1. Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 305, refers to Göring’s opposition to ‘total war’ measures in 1942.
8. See Stephen Salter, ‘The Mobilisation of German Labour, 1939–1945. A Contribution to the History of the Working Class in the Third Reich’, unpubl. D.Phil, thesis, Oxford, 1983, 29–38, 48–56, 73–4, emphasizing the concern to avoid damage to morale and political tension on the home front; and Dörte Winkler, ‘Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie. Probleme der weiblichen Erwerbstätigkeit in Deutschland 1930–1945’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 17 (1977), 99–126, here 116–20, acknowledging the morale question but stressing the decisive role of Hitler’s ideological objections.
9. Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 306–7.
10. On the rival power-blocs of Sauckel and Speer, contesting control of labour deployment, see Walter Naasner, Neue Machtzentren in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1942–1945, Boppard am Rhein, 1994, pts.1 — 2.
11. TBJG, II/7, 561 (16 March 1943).
12. He was empowered to issue directives but not binding decrees, and Hitler reserved to himself the right to decide where objections were raised to Goebbels’s directives (Rebentisch, 516 — 17).
13. TBJG, II/8, 521 (24 June 1943).
14. TBJG, II/8, 265 (10 May 1943).
15. Speer, 315. In fact, Hitler seemed remarkably cool and businesslike rather than outwardly friendly towards Eva Braun in overheard telephone conversations in the Wolfsschanze (Schulz, 90–91).
16. Schroeder, 130.
17. TBJG, II/8, 265 (10 May 1943).
18. Speer, 259.
19. Moltmann, ‘Goebbels’ Speech’, 312; Hauner, Hitler, 1 81–7; Domarus, 1999–2002 (21 March 1943), 2050–9 (8 November 1943).
20. Hauner, Hitler, 18 1–7.
21. TBJG, II/9, 160 (25 July 1943).
22. Rebentisch, 463.
23. Monologe, 221–2 (24 January 1942); Rebentisch, 466 and n.295.
24. Rebentisch, 466–70.
25. Rebentisch, 470–72.
26. Rebentisch, 473 and n.318. Vast rebuilding projects for Berlin and Linz were among the other fantasy-schemes Hitler had in mind.
27. Rebentisch, 475.
28. Rebentisch, 477.
29. Steinert, 356.
30. Speer, 234–5.
31. See Dörte Winkler, Frauenarbeit im Dritten Reich, Hamburg, 1977,114–21, for Hitler’s attitude to the Women’s Service Duty (Frauendienstpflicht).
32. IMG, xxv.61, 63–4, Doc. 016-PS (Sauckel’s statement of 20 April 1942).
33. See, for the figures, Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch III. Materialien zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches 1914–1945, ed. Dietmar Petzina, Werner Abelshauser, and Anselm Faust, Munich, 1978, 85. By 1944, foreign workers would account for 26.5 per cent of the total labour force in Germany, and no less than 46.5 per cent of those working in agriculture (Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 270).
34. Rebentisch, 478.
35. Moll, 311–13; Michalka, Das Dritte Reich, ii.294–5 (Doc.169). For the impact of the decree, see especially Ludolf Herbst, Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939–1945, Stuttgart, 1982, 207–31.
36. Salter, ‘Mobilisation’, 76–81; Stephen Salter, ‘Class Harmony or Class Conflict? The Industrial Working Class and the National Socialist Regime 1933–1945’, in Jeremy Noakes (ed.), Government, Party, and People in Nazi Germany, Exeter, 1980,76–97, here 90–91; Winkler, ‘Frauenarbeit versus Frauenideologie’, 118–20.
37. Rebentisch, 478.
38. Rebentisch, 479.
39. Speer, 265.
40. Speer, 266; Rebentisch, 480.
41. Speer, 268; Rebentisch, 479 and n.332.
42. See Rebentisch, 481ff.
43. Speer, 270–71.
44. TBJG, II/7, 444–5 (1 March 1943); Speer, 272.
45. TBJG, II/7, 450 (2 March 1943).
46. TBJG, II/7, 452 (2 March 1943).
47. TBJG, II/7, 452–3 (2 March 1943).
48. Speer, 270–71.
49. TBJG, II/7, 452 (2 March 1943).
50. TBJG, II/7, 454 (2 March 1943).
51. TBJG, II/7, 454 (2 March 1943).
52. TBJG, II/7, 456 (2 March 1943). A withering critique — with negligible results — of the Party and the urgency of its reform had been compiled in 1942 by either Gauleiter Carl Rover, or (more probably) his successor as Gauleiter of Weser-Ems, Paul Wegener. (See Peterson, 25–6; and Orlow, ii.352–5.)
53. TBJG, II/7, 456–7 (2 March 1943).
54. TBJG, II/7, 456–8 (2 March 1943); Speer, 273, 275.
55. Speer, 271.
56. TBJG, II/8, 98 (12 April 1943).
57. TBJG, II/8, 521 (24 June 1943).
58. TBJG, II/7, 456 (2 March 1943).
59. Speer, 271 and 553 n.5.
60. Rebentisch, 460, 498. Bormann’s influence was indeed great, and growing. Above all, his proximity to Hitler and control of the access of others (with important exceptions) to the Führer, in addition to his leadership of the Party, gave him his unique position of power. But in 1943, Lammers was able for the most part to hold his own, and come to a working arrangement with Bormann, in matters relating to the state administration. Later, his own access to Hitler was increasingly circumscribed by Bormann, whose power was at its peak in the final phase of the Third Reich (Rebentisch, 459–63, 531). Even then, however, Bormann had no independent power, but remained, as Lammers put it, ‘a true interpreter of Adolf Hitler’s directives’ (cit. Rebentisch, 83, n.182 (and see also 498)).
61. Speer, 274; TBJG, II/7, 501–2 (9 March 1943).
62. TBJG, II/7, 503 (9 March 1943); Speer, 275.
63. TBJG, II/7, 505–6, 512 (9 March 1943).
64. TBJG, II/7, 507 (9 March 1943).
65. Speer, 275–6; TBJG, II/7, 516 (9 March 1943).
66. TBJG, II/7, 576–7 (18 March 1943); Speer, 276.
67. Rebentisch, 495.
68. Speer, 278 (claiming it arose from Göring’s morphine addiction). A medical examination by the Americans in 1945 revealed Göring’s dependence on dihydro-codeine, whose effects and level of addiction were only a fraction of those of morphine (Irving, Göring, 476).
69. Irving, Göring, 383.
70. Speer, 279.
71. TBJG, II/9, 549–50 (21 September 1943).
72. Rebentisch, 482–3.
73. Rebentisch, 483–4.
74. Rebentisch, 485–6.
75. Rebentisch, 486–7.
76. Rebentisch, 489–90. According to one report, from Vienna, of 84,000 who had reported there under the ‘combing-out action’, closures had yielded only 3,600 men, of whom a mere 384 were useful for the armed forces (Rebentisch, 490).
77. See Steinert, 332ff.
78. StA Würzburg, SD/13, report of SD-Auβenstelle Bad Kissingen, 22 April 1943: ‘Das Ansehen der NSDAP wurde durch ein[e] Einschaltung der Partei bei der Geschäftsschlieβung und dem Arbeitseinsatz in der Provinz stark beeinträchtigt. Gerüchtweise verlautet, daβ Vg. welche durch Schlieβungen wie auch durch Verluste von Angehörigen heimgesucht wurden, Fübrerbilder in ihrer Wohnung heruntergerissen und zertrümmert hätten.’
79. For a brief sketch of Weber’s character and career, see München — Hauptstadt der Bewegung, ed. Münchner Stadtmuseum, 1993, 231–2. Weber is the subject of a documentary-novel written with much insight by Herbert Rosendorfer, Die Nacht der Amazonen. Roman, dtv edn, Munich, 1992.
80. All the above rests on Rebentisch, 490–92.
81. Guderian, 288.
82. See Churchill, IV, ch.xxxviii for a description of the conference and 615 for Churchill’s surprise. The surprise was somewhat disingenuous. As Churchill admitted, and the minutes of the war cabinet of 20 January showed, he had already before the Casablanca Conference approved the notion of stipulating a demand for ‘unconditional surrender’. For the implications — often exaggerated — of the demand for ‘Unconditional Surrender’, see Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 342–4; Weinberg, iii.482; Oxford Companion, 1174–6.
83. Below, 330; and see also 329, 339 for Hitler’s repeated recourse to the ‘unconditional surrender’ demand to reinforce his view that any suggestion of capitulating or searching for a negotiated peace was pointless. Goebbels, on the other hand, made no mention of it during his ‘total war’ speech and little or no use of it in the direction of propaganda. (See Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 344; Irving, HW, 478 n.4.)
84. Below, 329; Manstein, 406–13; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 238.
85. Guderian, 302.
86. Eberhard Schwarz, Die Stabilisierung der Ostfront nach Stalingrad: Mansteins Gegenschlag zwischen Donez und Dnieper im Frühjahr 1943, Diss. Köln, 1981, 325–6; Below, 330–31; Guderian, 302; Weinberg III, 457–9.
87. Below, 332.
88. Warlimont, 312.
89. TBJG, II/7, 593 (20 March 1943).
90. Guderian, 306.
91. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), Band III:1. Januar 1943–31. Dezember 1943, ed. Walther Hubatsch, Frankfurt am Main, 1963 (= KTB OKW, iii) pt.2, 1420–2 (Operationsbefehl Nr.5, Weisung für die Kampfführung der nächsten Monate an der Ostfront vom 13.3.1943). See also Manstein, 443–6; and Weinberg III, 601.
92. KTB OKW, iii/2, 1425–8 (Operationsbefehl Nr.6, Zitadelle, 15.4.43), quotation 1425.
93. Domarus, 2009; Manstein, 447.
94. Guderian, 306.
95. For brief portraits of Model, see Joachim Ludewig, ‘Walter Model — Hitlers bester Feldmarschall?’, in Smelser and Syring, 368–87; Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr and Gene Mueller, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model’, in Ueberschär, Hitlers militärische Elite, ii.153–60; and Carlo D’Este, ‘Model’, in Barnett, 318–33.
96. Guderian, 306.
97. Guderian, 308–9.
98. See LB Darmstadt, 197–8 (26 July 1943).
99. Timothy Mulligan, ‘Spies, Cyphers, and “Zitadelle”. Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk’, JCH, 22 (1987), 235–60; Glantz and House, 162–6.
100. Warlimont, 308, 311.
101. Warlimont, 307.
102. Warlimont, 308–10. Hitler was aware that Kesselring was ‘an enormous optimist (ein kolossaler Optimist)’, and that he needed to be careful not to be blinded by this optimism (LB Darmstadt, 95–6 (20 May 1943)).
103. Warlimont, 312.
104. Below, 333–4.
105. So Hitler told Goebbels, almost a month later (TBJG, II/8, 225 (7 May 1943)). The meetings at Klessheim took place between 7 and 10 April (Hauner, Hitler, 1 82–3).
106. Schmidt, 563.
107. TBJG, II/8, 225 (7 May 1943).
108. Dollmann, 35–7; see also Irving, HW, 504–6.
109. TBJG, II/7, 225 (7 May 1943).
110. Domarus, 2003–8.
111. 111. Staatsmanner II, 214–33, especially 217–24, 228–33 (quotations 215, 233).
112. Staatsmänner II, 234–63, quotation 238.
113. Nuremberg and Fürth were about four miles apart in the region of Middle Franconia, and had been linked in 1835 by Germany’s first stretch of railway. Nuremberg’s tradition as a ‘Freie Reichsstadt’ (Free Imperial City) in the days of the Holy Roman Empire, the ‘German’ virtues associated with the city through Wagner’s Meistetsinger von Nürnberg, and, in the Nazi era, its standing as the ‘City of the Reich Party Rallies (Stadt der Reichsparteitage)’ all contributed (together with the extreme antisemitic climate influenced by the Jew-baiting Gauleiter, Julius Streicher) to singling it out for Hitler as an especially ‘German’ city. Fürth, by contrast, had, until the late nineteenth century, had the largest Jewish population in Bavaria, coming to epitomize for the Nazis a ‘Jewish town’. In fact, by the time that Hitler came to power the proportion of Jews in the population of Fürth (2.6 per cent) was scarcely greater than that of Nuremberg (1.8 per cent). By 1939, the relative proportions had dwindled, respectively, to 1.0 per cent and 0.6 per cent (Ophir/Wiesemann, 179, 203).
114. Hillgruber, Staatsmänner II, 256–7.
115. TBJG, II/7, 515 (9 March 1943).
116. Hilberg, Vernichtung, iii. 1283–5; Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung, 148–53; Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution, (1953), Sphere Books edn, London, 1971, 534 — 5.
117. Hilberg, Destruction, 323. For the uprising, see Yisrael Gutman, The Jews of Warsaw 1939–1943. Ghetto, Underground, Revolt, London, 1982, ch.14. The length of time it took to crush the uprising was a reflection, as Gutman shows, of the extent to which the German occupying forces had underestimated the activities and tenacity of the Jewish underground in the ghetto.
118. TBJG, II/8, 104 (14 April 1943).
119. TBJG, II/8, 114–15 (17 April 1943). Hitler let Goebbels know a few days later that he wished to talk with him about the future treatment of the ‘Jewish Question’, of which he had very high hopes (II.8, 165 (25 April 1943)). For Goebbels’s exploitation of Katyn for propaganda purposes, see Bramsted, 330–32; Reuth, Goebbels, 526–7; and David Welch, The Third Reich. Politics and Propaganda, London, 1993, 112–13. Reports of the Katyn massacres by the Bolsheviks had the effect, however, of provoking comment about the killing of the Jews by the Germans. See the entry in the diary of Hassell, 365 (15 May 1943), indicating knowledge of gassing of hundreds of thousands in specially built chambers (Hallen). And see also Steinert, 255; Lawrence D. Stokes, ‘The German People and the Destruction of the European Jews’, Central European History, 6 (1973), 167–91, here 186–7; Bankier, 109; Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 365–7; and Kulka, ‘“Public Opinion”’, 289 (for the telling report from the Gauleitung of Upper Silesia pointing out wall-daubings in the area comparing Katyn and Auschwitz).
120. TBJG, II/8, 235, 237 (and see 229) (8 May 1943). Hitler returned on several occasions to emphasize the vital role to be played by antisemitic propaganda in discussions with Goebbels during the following days (TBJG, II/8, 261 (10 May 1943), 297–90 (13 May 1943)).
121. TBJG, II/8, 105 (14 April 1943), 225 (7 May 1943).
122. TBJG, II/8, 236 (8 May 1943).
123. Deutschland im Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Wolfgang Schumann et al., 6 vols., East Berlin, 1974 — 84, iii.411–13.
124. TBJG, II/8, 236, 238 (8 May 1943).
125. TBJG, II/8, 224 (7 May 1943).
126. TBJG, II/8, 229, 233–40 (8 May 1943).
127. Warlimont, 313; Domarus, 2014; Weinberg III, 446; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 221.
128. Karl Doenitz, Memoirs. Ten Years and Twenty Days, (1958), New York, 1997, 299ff., 342ff.; Thomas, 218, 226–7. On taking office Dönitz had, however, changed his mind about scrapping the battleships and was successful in persuading Hitler to retain them (Doenitz, 371ff.; Thomas, 227).
129. TBJG, II/7, 239 (8 May 1943).
130. Lagevorträge, 510 (5 June 1943): ‘Niederschrift über die Besprechung des Ob.d.M. beim Führer am 31.5.43 auf dem Berghof.’
131. Doenitz, 341; Roskill, ii.470; Thomas, 230–31.
132. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Volume V, Closing the Ring, London etc., 1952, 6–10; Overy, Why the Allies Won, 50–9; Oxford Companion, 68–9, 1168–9.
133. Weinberg III, 594.
134. Warlimont, 317–19.
135. LB Darmstadt, 97–8 (20 May 1943).
136. LB Darmstadt, 100–101.
137. LB Darmstadt, 104–6.
138. Warlimont, 331.
139. TBJG, II/8, 300 (15 May 1943), 314 (17 May 1943), 337 (21 May 1943), 351 (23 May 1943).
140. Below, 339.
141. TBJG, II/8, 492–8 (19 May 1943).
142. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 202–3.
143. TBJG, II/8, 527–8 (25 June 1943). Hitler thought, as he had said before on occasion, that it was not so bad that the inner-cities had been destroyed. Most of the industrial cities had been badly laid out and constructed. The British air-raids gave the opportunity for grandiose rebuilding schemes after the war.
144. TBJG, II/8, 533 (25 June 1943).
145. TBJG, II/8, 291 (13 May 1943).
146. TBJG, II/8, 287 (13 May 1943).
147. TBJG, II/8, 288 (13 May 1943).
148. TBJG, II/8, 288 (13 May 1943).
149. TBJG, II/8, 290 (13 May 1943).
150. The Stroop Report. The Jewish Quarter of Warsaw Is No More. A facsimile edition and translation of the official Nazi report on the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, introd. by Andrzej Wirth, (1960), London, 1980,(unpaginated), entry for 16 May 1943.
151. Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 164–71; Madajczyk, Okkupationspolitik, 422–8; Irving, HW, 528–9. Hitler expressed on several occasions his dissatisfaction with Frank, and thought of replacing him with Greiser. But, as so often, he took no decision, and ultimately pointed out that Frank’s task in the General Government was so difficult that it was beyond anyone to accomplish. (See TBJG, II/8, 226 (7 May 1943), 251 (9 May 1943), 535 (25 June 1943).)
152. IfZ, MA 316, Frames 2615096 — 8, ‘Vortrag beim Führer am 19.6.1943 auf dem Obersalzberg: “Bandenkampf und Sicherheitslage”’, quotation Frame 2615097; Fleming, Hitler und die Endlös-ung, 33. That the suggestion came from Himmler is supported by the similar wording of his letter to Hans Frank some weeks earlier, on 26 May, when he wrote: ‘The evacuation also of the last 250,000 Jews, which will without doubt provoke unrest for some weeks, must despite all the difficulties be completed as rapidly as possible’ (IfZ, MA 330, Frames 2654157–8, ‘Einladung des Generalgouverneurs an den Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler zu Besprechung’, 26 May 1943; 2654162–3, Antwortschreiben Himmlers, 26 May 1943 (quotation, 2654162: ‘Die Evakuierung auch der letzten 150,000 Juden, die für Wochen noch ohne Zweifel Unruhe hervorrufen wird, muß trotz aller Schwierigkeiten so rasch wie möglich vollzogen werden’).
153. Schirach, 288; TBJG, II/8, 265 (10 May 1943), 458 (II June 1943).
154. Schirach, 289.
155. Schirach, 290–91.
156. Schirach, 291–2.
157. Schirach, 292–4; also Monologe, 403–6, for a watered-down version; TBJG, II/8, 538–41 (25 June 1943), describing Frau von Schirach as behaving like a ‘silly goose (dumme Pute)’; Hoffmann, Hitler Was My Friend, 190–91; Below, 340 (who does not mention the incident with the Jewish women); Henriette von Schirach, DerPreis der Herrlichkeit. Erlebte Zeitgeschichte, (1956), Munich/Berlin, 1975, 8–10.
158. Guderian, 310.
159. Guderian, 3II.
160. Warlimont, 333–4.
161. TBJG, II/8, 531–2 (25 June 1943).
162. Domarus, 2021; see also Irving, HW, 532–3.
163. Below, 340.
164. See LB Stuttgart, 269–75, 297_8, 309–12, 338–40, 364–8 (midday and evening briefings, 25 July 1943), where it is apparent that tank production figures were lower than those Hitler had expected; Guderian, 306–9; Manstein, 448–9; Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: the German Defeat in the East, Washington, 1968,130–32,135–73; John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, Boulder, Colorado, 1983, 86, 97ff., 135; Ernst Klink, Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation ‘Zitadelle’ 1943, Stuttgart, 1966, 140–44, 196; Weinberg III, 601–3; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 239; Overy, Why the Allies Won, 86–97; Overy, Russia’s War, ch.7, especially 203–12; Glantz and House, 166–7; Irving, HW, 533. Accounts of the battle give differing numbers of tanks involved. Ziemke, 101, has 4,000 Soviet and 3,000 German tanks. DZW, iii.545, numbers the Soviet tanks at 2,700; see also Erickson, Road to Berlin, 144–5; and Klink, 205.
165. Guderian, 311; and see Manstein, 448.
166. Below, 341; Manstein, 448 — 9; Weinberg III, 603.
167. Guderian, 312.
168. Warlimont, 334.
169. Below, 341; Warlimont, 335–8; Weinberg III, 594; Irving, HW, 534–5; Oxford Companion, 1001–3. Looking back in 1944, Mussolini himself remarked on the poor morale of the Italian troops in Sicily prior to the Allied landing (Benito Mussolini, My Rise and Fall, (1948), New York, 1998, two vols, in one, ii.25.
170. Warlimont, 336–7.
171. Staatsmänner II, 287–300; Baur, 1ch flog Mächtige der Erde, 245–6; Warlimont, 339.
172. Based on: Staatsmänner II, 286–300; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation (1943), extracts from Mussolini’s diary, Auswärtiges Amt, Serial 715/263729–32, 263755–8 (in Italian, and in German translation); Mussolini, ii.49–51; Irving, HW, 541–2; Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini, Paladin edn, London, 1985, 341–2; Warlimont, 339–40; Schmidt, 340; Domarus, 2022–3-
173. IfZ, MA 460, Frames 2567178–81. Himmler was informed on 19 July and cabled Bormann without delay. See also Irving, HW, 543; and Meir Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews. German Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy 1922–1945, Oxford, 1978, 339–40.
174. LB Darmstadt, 148 and n.207 (25 July 1943); TBJG, II/9, 157 (25 July 1943); Below, 342.
175. Mussolini, ii.55–67; Mack Smith, 342–5; Domarus, 2023 and n.250. See also Hans Woller, Die Abrechnung mit dem Faschismus in Italien 1943 bis 1948, Munich, 1996, 9–35.
176. Mussolini, ii.68–81; Mack Smith, 346–9.
177. LB Darmstadt, 148–9. The extremist Roberto Farinacci was only one of the forces behind calling the Council meeting. The faction around the more moderate Dino Grandi intended to use the meeting to pave the way for ending Italy’s involvement in the war, (See LB Darmstadt, 148 n.207 (25 July 1943); Mack Smith, 344.)
178. LB Darmstadt, 153 (25 July 1943).
179. LB Darmstadt, 156–7, 160.
180. LB Darmstadt, 149–50, 158.
181. LB Darmstadt, 160.
182. LB Darmstadt, 159–61.
183. TBJG, II/9, 166 (26 July 1943).
184. TBJG, II/ 9, 169 (27 July 1943).
185. LB Darmstadt, 168–70 (26 July 1943).
186. TBJG, II/9, 169 (27 July 1943).
187. LB Darmstadt, 171 (26 July 1943).
188. TBJG, II/9, 174 (27 July 1943).
189. MadR, xiv, 5560–2 (2 August 1943).
190. TBJG, II/9, 169–74 (27 July 1943)-
191. LB Darmstadt, 173–96 (26 July 1943).
192. LB Darmstadt, 206 (26 July 1943).
193. TBJG, II/ 9, 177 (27 July 1943), 185 (28 July 1943).
194. TBJG, II/ 9, 179–80 (27 July 1943).
195. TBJG, II/9, 185 (27 July 1943).
196. Warlimont, 373.
197. Warlimont, 373; Irving, HW, 550.
198. Domarus, 2026. ‘The Will to Power’ (‘Der Wille zur Macht’) was the title of the work -intended as a systematic statement of his philosophy — which was left unfinished at Nietzsche’s death.
199. LB Darmstadt, 133 n.179; Broszat-Frei, 278; Weinberg III, 616; Churchill, v.459–60; Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg: Allied Bomber Forces against a German City in 1943, New York, 1981, 252ff. (for reports from citizens of Hamburg), 322ft for an assessment of the raid. For popular opinion and the difficulties facing the propaganda machine, see Gerald Kirwin, ‘Allied Bombing and Nazi Domestic Propaganda’, European History Quarterly, 15 (1985), 341–62, here 350–51.
200. LB Darmstadt, 136 (25 July 1943).
201. MadR, xiv.5562–3 (2 August 1943).
202. Speer, 296.
203. TBJG, II/9, Z05–6 (2 August 1943).
204. TBJG, II/9, 229 (6 August 1943).
205. Warlimont, 375–7, 379; Oxford Companion, 1001, 1003.
206. In fact, having rejected Kesselring because of his lack of reputation, compared with that of Rommel, Hitler eventually came, in the autumn, to prefer the optimism of the former and give him overall command in Italy (LB Darmstadt, 186 (26 July 1943) and n.258; Warlimont, 386).
207. Warlimont, 374–8; Irving, HW, 554–5, 559–60.
208. TBJG, II/8, 535 (25 June 1943).
209. Himmler had seen Hitler or Bormann with unusual frequency from the day after the fall of Mussolini until his appointment as Reich Minister of the Interior. Hitler had decided upon the appointment at the latest by 16 August, when Lammers began drawing up the necessary documents for a change of minister. Though for months Frick’s fall had seemed predestined — prevented only by Hitler’s notorious unwillingness for prestige reasons to make changes in personnel in the leading echelons of the regime — Himmler’s appointment was plainly an improvised reaction to the potential internal threat in Germany in the wake of the crisis in Italy. Goebbels and Bormann had both harboured pretensions to succeed Frick. Evidently, the determining factor in favour of Himmler was not administrative — he made few changes in this sphere — but control over the instruments of repression. (For the circumstances of Himmler’s appointment, see especially Birgit Schulze, ‘Himmler als Reichsinnenminister’, unpubl. Magisterarbeit, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 1981, 16–23; also Rebentisch, 499–500; Jane Caplan, Government without Administration. State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany, Oxford, 1988, 318–19; Peter Diehl-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von NSDAP und allgemeiner innerer Staatsverwaltung, Munich, 2nd edn, 1971, 196–7.
210. Domarus, 2028–9.
211. TBJG, II/9, 458 (10 September 1943); Irving, HW, 561.
212. Manstein, 458–67; Below, 346; Domarus, 2029, 2032–3; Irving, HW, 562–3.
213. Below, 346; TBJG, II/9, 449–50 (9 September 1943), 457 (10 September 1943)).
214. Goebbels was telephoned by Hitler before 7p.m., within an hour of the BBC broadcasting the news of the capitulation, and told to come to FHQ that very night. Plans to fly were vitiated by dense mist — it had poured down that day — so by 9.20p.m. he had left on the night train to East Prussia {TBJG,/9, 449–50, 454 (10 September 1943), 455, 457 (10 September 1943)).
215. TBJG, II/9, 455–6 (10 September 1943).
216. TBJG, II/9, 458 (10 September 1943); Warlimont, 380; Irving, HW, 564.
217. TBJG, II/9, 460 (10 September 1943).
218. Warlimont, 381; Below, 346; Weinberg III, 599; Oxford Companion, 573, 588.
219. See TBJG, II/9, 456 (10 September 1943).
220. Irving, HW, 567–8.
221. Below, 347, who says Hitler ruled out entirely any accommodation with the western powers; TBJG, II/9, 464, where his preference for overtures to Britain is recorded, 466–7 (10 September 1943); see also 566 (23 September 1943). For the possible Soviet interest in a separate peace at this time, see Weinberg III, 609–11.
222. Domarus, 2034–9 (10 September 1943).
223. Goebbels was delighted at its impact (TBJG, II/9, 489–90, 493–4 (12 September 1943), 499 (13 September 1943)); for the SD’s monitoring, see Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 211.
224. TBJG, II/9, 468, 473, 475, 483–4, 485–7 (10 September 1943).
225. Warlimont, 385–6; TBJG, II/9, 460–61, 464–5 (10 September 1943).
226. TBJG, II/9, 500–501 (13 September 1943); Below, 346–7; Otto Skorzeny, Geheimkommando Skorzeny, Hamburg, 1950, 135–51.
227. TBJG, III/9, 567–8 (23 September 1943).
228. Below, 347.
229. Mack Smith, 350–58; Woller, 45ft
230. TBJG, II/9, 561, 563, 565–7 (23 September 1943).
231. Warlimont, 388; Weinberg III, 606; Irving, HW, 565–7; Glantz and House, 172–3. Manstein, 450–86, outlines the Soviet advance and German rearguard action from his own perspective.
232. Manstein, 486–7; and see Irving, HW, 578–9.
233. Weinberg III, 605–7 (for the above military developments).
234. IMG, xxxiiii.68–9, Doc. 4024-PS, Globocnik’s report to Himmler of 4 November 1943. See also Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden. Dokumente und Aufsätze, 2nd edn, Berlin, 1955,44–5; Hilberg, Vernichtung, iii.1299; Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung, 71 n.132.
235. Leni Yahil, The Rescue of Danish Jewry. Test of a Democracy, Philadelphia, 1969, 285ff.; Herbert, Best, 363–4, 367; Ulrich Herbert, ‘Die deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Dänemark im 2. Weltkrieg und die Rettung der dänischen Juden’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, 23 (1994), 93–114; Hilberg, Vernichtung, ii.586–96; Longerich, Politik, 555–60.
236. Michaelis, 360–70; Hilberg, Vernichtung, ii.714–15; John Cornwell, Hitler’s Pope. The Secret History of Pius XII, London, 1999, 298–318. Odilo Globocnik, who had organized ‘Action Rein-hardt’ in the General Government, had been appointed Higher SS and Police Leader in Istria at the end of August. Some of the key experts on gassing, formerly with the T4 ‘euthanasia action’, had gone with him. It looks, therefore, as if the intention was to set up an extermination unit for the Italian Jews (N($$)P, iii. 1168). For reflections on different Italian and German behaviour towards Jews, see Jonathan Steinberg, All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust 1941–43, London/New York, 1991, 168–80, 220–41.
237. IMG, xxix.145–6, Doc.908; trans., slightly amended, N ($$) P, iii.1199–1200; partial extract, Michalka, Das Dritte Reich, ii.256–7.
238. Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung, 73–4.
239. TBJG, II/10, 72 (7 October 1943).
240. Smith and Peterson, Himmler. Geheimreden, 169 (entire text of the speech, 162–83; typescript, BDC, 0.238 I — H. Himmler; handwritten notes, BDC, 0–238 III — H.Himmler); Fleming, Hitler und die Endlösung, 74–5.
241. Irving, HW, 575–6.
242. Domarus, 2045.
243. Domarus, 2050–59. The speech was recorded for radio transmission that evening. Hitler had a written text for the first part, but improvised much of the second. This necessitated Goebbels, with Hitler’s permission, cutting ‘a few somewhat awkward formulations’ from the broadcast version (TBJG, II/10, 262 (9 November 1943)).
244. Broszat/Frei, 278.
245. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 211–13.
246. Domarus, 2054–5.
247. Weisungen, 270.
248. LB Darmstadt, 218–19 (20 December 1943).
1. Domarus, 2073 (text of the Proclamation, 2071–4).
2. Domarus, 2075 (text of the Daily Command, 2074–6).
3. Domarus, 2076.
4. Speer referred, in a series of short reflections on Nazi leaders which he wrote in captivity directly after the end of the war, to Hitler’s increased emphasis on ‘Fate’, attributing it to his manic overwork and loss of ability to detach himself from events and think freely. (Speer Papers, AH/II, Bl.13. I am grateful to Gitta Sereny for giving me access to this material in her possession.)
5. TBJG, II/12, 421 (7 June 1944).
6. This was the opinion, immediately after the war, of Albert Speer, who wrote that Hitler remained inwardly ‘convinced of his mission (von seiner Mission… überzeugt)’, and that the war could not be lost (Speer Papers, AH/II, Bl.14). Below, 361, however, wondered whether Hitler’s over-optimism represented his true feelings. That Hitler had since autumn 1942 harboured no illusions about the outcome of the war is strongly argued in a hitherto unpublished paper, which he kindly made available to me, by Bernd Wegner, ‘Hitler, der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Choreographic des Untergangs’.
7. Speer Papers, AH/II, Bl.I-II.
8. See, among numerous witnesses of this, TBJG, II/13, 142 (23 July 1944). Goebbels himself thought Hitler had become old and gave an impression of frailty.
9. KTB OKW, iv, ed. Percy Ernst Schramm, pt.2, 1701–2. Though Schramm’s description dates from several months later, he points out that the deterioration in Hitler’s appearance had been a steady progression. For a similar description, by Werner Best, referring to 30 December 1943, see Ernst Günther Schenck, Patient Hitler. Eine medizinische Biographie, Düsseldorf, 1989, 390–91.
10. Schenck, 190–215; Irving, Doctor, 66ff., 259–70; Fritz Redlich, Hitler. Diagnosis of a Destructive Prophet, New York/Oxford , 1999, 237–54, 358–62.
11. Redlich, 224–5.
12. Ellen Gibbels, ‘Hitlers Nervenkrankheit. Eine neurologisch-psychiatrische Studie’, VfZ, 42 (1994), 155–220; also Redlich, 232–3; Schenk, 426–38.
13. Redlich, 276.
14. Speer Papers, AH/Schl., Bl.2, for Speer’s view of Hitler as a ‘demonic phenomenon (in seiner dämonischen Erscheinung)’, and one of the ‘eternally inexplicable historical natural phenomena (eines dieser immer unerklärlichen geschichtlichen Naturereignisse)’.
15. After the first weeks of the year at the Wolf’s Lair, he repaired to the Berghof, where he stayed, with no more than a day or two’s absence, until he left his alpine retreat for the last time on 14 July 1944. He then returned to the Wolf’s Lair until his final departure from there on 20 November. After staying for three weeks in Berlin, he moved on 10 December to his field headquarters in the West, the Adlerhorst (Eagle’s Nest), which had been constructed in 1939–40 at Ziegenberg, near Bad Nauheim, where he oversaw the Ardennes offensive and remained until January 1945 (Hauner, Hitler, 187–95; Das Große Lexikon des Zweiten Weltkriegs, ed. Christian Zentner and Friedemann Bedürftig, Munich, 1988, 13, 204).
16. Hitler, who had announced his intention of giving the speech only two days earlier, was, according to Goebbels, in good form. The Propaganda Minister thought he would persuade Hitler to allow a broadcast version of the speech, but evidently did not succeed in this (TBJG, II/11, 332, 347–8 (23 February 1944, 25 February 1944)). Nor was there a report, or even an announcement of the speech, in the VB (Tb Reuth, v.1994, n.38). But Domarus, 2088–9, was mistaken in thinking that Hitler had let the entire event drop that year.
17. GStA Munich, MA 106695, report of the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern, 7 August 1944: ‘Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken als ein Scbrecken ohne Ende!’
18. These were, for example, Jodl’s sentiments when he addressed a gathering of Gauleiter in February in Munich (TBJG, II/n, 345 — 6 (25 February 1944)). Goebbels followed in like vein at a meeting of Propaganda Leaders in Berlin a few days later (Tb Reuth, v. 1996, n.41).
19. Below, 357.
20. Below, 352.
21. Below, 357.
22. ‘Freies Deutschland’, established in September 1943, blended together the organizations ‘Nationalkomitee “Freies Deutschland”’ (NKFD), which had been set up in July 1943 by the Soviet leadership and comprised largely German Communist emigrés and prisoners-of-war, and the ‘Bund Deutscher Offiziere’ (Federation of German Officers), headed by General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach (one of the Sixth Army’s senior commanders who had been captured with Paulus at Stalingrad). (Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopddie, 408, 596–7.)
23. See Waldemar Besson, ‘Zur Geschichte des nationalsozialistischen Führungsoffiziers (NSFO)’, VfZ, 9 (1961), 76–116; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Adolf Hitler und der NS-Führungsoffizier (NSFO)’, VfZ, 12 (1964), 443–56; Volker R. Berghahn, ‘NSDAP und “geistige Führung” der Wehrmacht 1939 — 1943’, VfZ, 17 (1969), 17 — 71; and Messerschmidt, 441ff. For Hitler’s order of 22 December 1943, see Besson, 94; and for the response in the army, Below, 356. The mandate to create a corps of National Socialist Leadership Officers was given to General Hermann Reinecke. Their task was to spread commitment to the National Socialist ideology through lectures and indoctrination. By the end of 1944, there were around 1,100 full-time and 47,000 part-time ‘Leadership Officers’, most of them in the reserve. (Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 608.)
24. Manstein, 500 — 503, quotation 503; Domarus, 2076 — 7.
25. Manstein, 504.
26. Manstein, 505; Domarus, 2077.
27. Guderian, 326 — 7, quotation 327.
28. Irving, Doctor, 126, mentions around 105 generals as present on the basis of Morell’s diary.
29. IfZ, F19/3, ‘Ansprache des Führers an die Feldmarschälle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze’, 56 — 7 (for new U-Boats); quotation, 63 (‘… daß niemals auch nur der leiseste Gedanke einer Kapitulation kommen kann, ganz gleich, was auch geschehen möge). Irving, HW, 598; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation (1944), extract from Nachlaß von Salmuth (undated, but from 27 March 1946, according to Irving, HW, 881); cold atmosphere: Manstein, 511; TBJG, II/11, 368 (29 February 1944), report to Goebbels by Schmundt.
30. IfZ, F19/3, ‘Ansprache des Führers an die Feldmarschlle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze’, 48 (‘In der letzten Konsequenz müßte ich, wenn ich als oberster Führer jemals verlassen sein würde, als Letztes um mich das gesamte Offizierkorps haben, das müßte dann mit gezogenem Degen um mich geschart stehen…’; differing (inaccurate) wording in Manstein, 511, and Domarus, 2080 (based on Linge), and in Traudl Junge, unpubl. memoirs, IfZ, ED TOO, Irving-Sammlung, Fol. 106.
31. IfZ, F19/3, ‘Ansprache des Führers an die Feldmarschälle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze’, 49 (‘So wird es auch sein, mein Führer!’); Manstein, 511 (with slightly different wording, both of Hitler’s remark and his own interjection).
32. IFZ, F19/3, ‘Ansprache des Führers an die Feldmarschälle und Generale am 27.1.1944 in der Wolfsschanze’, 49 (‘Das ist schön! Wenn das so sein wird, dann werden wir diesen Krieg nie verlieren können — niemals, da kann sein, was sein will. Denn die Nation wird dann mit der Kraft in den Krieg gehen, die notwendig ist. Ich nehme das sehr gern zur Kenntnis, Feldmarschall vonManstein!’). Manstein, 512, inaccurately quotes Hitler’s words, and states that Hitler then somewhat abruptly concluded his speech. In fact almost a fifth of the speech was still to come at this point.
33. On hearing of the incident, Goebbels was not inclined to take it seriously (TBJG, II/11, 249 (6 February 1944)). He altered his view some weeks later after Schmundt had described what had happened, referring then to Manstein’s ‘stupid interjection’ (biöder Zwischenruf), made ‘in rather provocative fashion (in ziemlich provozierender Form)’. Schmundt recalled that the meeting had taken place in a glacial atmosphere (in einer eisigen Kühle). Goebbels noted that Hitler’s relationship with his generals was ‘somewhat poisoned (etwas vergiftet)’ (TBJG, II/11, 368 (29 February 1944)).
34. Manstein, 512.
35. Below, 360.
36. Manstein, 510–11.
37. Manstein, 512.
38. See Irving, HW, 881 note, from Schmundt’s diary, where the interruption and tension of late were noted in connection with Manstein’s retirement.
39. TBJG, II/11, 205–6, 208 (31 January 1944).
40. Domarus, 2082–6.
41. TBJG, II/11, 273–4 (10 February 1944).
42. MadR, 16, 6299 (4 February 1944).
43. On 21 December 1943, Hitler had made Goebbels head of the newly-founded Reichsinspektion der zivilen Luftkriegsmaßnahmen (Reich Inspectorate of Civilian Air-War Measures) (Moll, 380).
44. TBJG, II/11, 401 (4 March 1944).
45. TBJG, II/11, 402 (4 March 1944).
46. TBJG, II/2, 406–7 (6 June 1944).
47. Speer, 372; Irving, HW, 531.
48. Below, 363–4.
49. TBJG, II/12, 354–5 (24 May 1944).
50. Speer, 374–8, quotation 377.
51. TBJG, II/11, 247 (6 February 1944).
52. Speer, 378; Heinz Dieter Hölsken, Die V-Waffen. Entstehung-Propaganda-Kriegseinsatz, Stuttgart, 1984, 142.
53. Irving, HW, 609.
54. TBJG, II/11, 247 (6 February 1944). Jodl told the Gauleiter later that month that the retaliation would finally begin in mid-April (TBJG, II/11, 347 (25 February 1944).
55. Irving, 609.
56. Below, 363.
57. Below, 363; and see Hoffmann, Security, 229–32, 241–4.
58. Hauner, 188; Irving, HW, 607; both have Hitler leaving on 23 Feb., but Morell’s diary records that he took the train on the evening of 22 February (Irving, Doctor, 129). TBJG, II/11, 332 (23 March 1944), for Hitler’s notification that he would speak in Munich. Goebbels, in referring to Hitler’s intention to come to Munich, offered an implicit criticism in the very next lines of his diary entry by noting that it would be good if the Führer were to visit Berlin or another city that had suffered from the bombing. So far he had not visited a single such city, and ‘that cannot be sustained in the long run’.
59. Schenck, 352, 391; Irving, Doctor, 128–9; Redlich, 346; TBJG, II/11, 297 (16 February 1944).
60. Irving, Doctor, 131–2; Redlich, 228–9, 346; Schenck, 308.
61. Irving, Doctor, 131; Redlich, 346; Schenck, 382ff.
62. TBJG, II/11, 346–7 (25 February 1944).
63. TBJG, II/11, 347–8 (25 February 1944).
64. Irving, Doctor, 129; TBJG, II/11, 349 (25 February 1944).
65. TBJG, II/11, 408–9 (4 March 1944); Irving, Doctor, 129; Irving, HW, 608. For the building of the underground passages, see Josef Geiss, Obersalzberg. The History of a Mountain, Berchtes-gaden, n.d. (1955), 147–56; and Hanisch, 35. By 1944, British intelligence had built up a surprisingly detailed knowledge of the layout of the Berghof, devised with the intention of a possible assassination attempt there on Hitler. (Operation Foxley: the British Plan to Kill Hitler, London, 1998, 87ft (for security arrangements), 100–101 (for the air-raid shelters).)
66. TBJG, II/11, 389 (3 March 1944).
67. Hauner, Hitler, 194. The armistice between Finland and the Allies was concluded on 19 September 1944: German troops had to leave Finland within two weeks.
68. TBJG, II/11, 397–8 (4 March 1944).
69. The amphibious landing had taken the German forces by surprise. But the Allied commanders had not seized the opportunity to advance, and the consolidation of their position allowed Kesselring time to marshal no fewer than six divisions to surround the Allied perimeter. Heavy fighting continued throughout February, and it was spring before the Allies, by now heavily reinforced, were able to break out. Allied losses totalled over 80,000 men (with some 7,000 killed); German losses were estimated at 40,000 (including around 5,000 killed). (Churchill, V. ch. xxvii; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 188–91; Weinberg III, 661; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 231; Oxford Companion, 45–6.)
70. TBJG, II/11, 399–400 (4 March 1944).
71. TBJG, II/11, 400 (4 March 1944).
72. TBJG, II/11, 401 (4 March 1944).
73. TBJG, II/11, 403 (4 March 1944).
74. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 248–9; Bloch, 398–9; Weinberg III, 671–2; Irving, HW, 611.
75. Warlimont, 412; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 249; Irving, HW, 611.
76. Schmidt, 587.
77. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 249. When they met again on 23 March, Hitler told Antonescu — something the Romanian leader had long been waiting to hear — that Germany was renouncing its commitment to the territorial settlement of 30 August 1940 on account of Hungary’s disloyalty, but requested him to keep this confidential for the time being. The announcement of this step which Hitler promised Antonescu never materialized (Staatsmänner II, 391–2).
78. Warlimont, 413.
79. Bloch, 399.
80. Schmidt, 587–8.
81. Domarus, 2091; also IfZ, ZS Eichmann 807, Fol.2703 (Eichmann-Prozeß, Beweisdokumente: Horthys Aussage am 4.März 1948 über Treffen mit Hitler in Klessheim).
82. Schmidt, 587–9; also Irving, HW, 612–13; Bloch, 399–400.
83. When speaking to his party leaders on 17 April, Hitler told them that raw materials and manpower would be available from Hungary. ‘In particular,’ noted Goebbels, ‘he wants to put the 700,000 Jews in Hungary to activity useful for our war purposes’ (TBJG, II/12, 137 (18 April 1944)). Even before his party leaders, Hitler held to the fiction that the Jews were being put to work (though the wording, as Goebbels reported it, was ambiguous). In fact, more than half of them were deported within three months to Auschwitz.
84. Longerich, Ermordung, 322 — 4.
85. Randolph L. Braham, The Destruction of Hungarian Jewry. A Documentary Account, New York, 1963, vol.I, 399 (facsm., 13 June 1944).
86. Hilberg, Destruction, 547. And see Staatsmänner II, 462–6, for Hitler’s comments to the new Hungarian premier Sztojay at Klessheim on 7 June 1944.
87. Goebbels (TBJG, II/11, 515 (20 March 1944)), recorded the meeting taking place at Klessheim, but Manstein (531, 533), who was present, wrote of being summoned to the Obersalzberg, and the meeting taking place there.
88. TBJG, II/11, 368 (29 February 1944), 454–5 (11 March 1944); II/12, 128 (18 April 1944).
89. See above, note 22.
90. Manstein, 532. Hitler had been particularly pleased that Manstein, his most openly critical field-marshal, had signed the declaration (TBJG, II/11, 475 (14 March 1944)).
91. Manstein, 532; TBJG, II/11, 515 (20 March 1944).
92. Manstein, 536–43. Goebbels, when he heard about it, was dismayed at the weakening of the western front. So, he had heard, was Jodl. According to his own remarkable logic, the more the Soviets advanced, the better the German political situation would be, since the western allies would then see their own peril from Bolshevik expansion. Should, however, a western invasion succeed, then the Reich would indeed be in a ‘fateful situation’ (TBJG, II/11, 568–9 (28 March 1944). See also 556–7 (26 March 1944) and 564 (27 March 1944) for Goebbels’s strong criticism of Manstein then, typically, acceptance of Hitler’s volte-face.)
93. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 250.
94. Manstein, 544.
95. TBJG, II/11, 589 (31 March 1944), II/12, 33 (1 April 1944); Manstein, 544–6. The passage in Tb Reuth, v.2030–1 (31 March 1944), deviates from the entries in TBJG.
96. Weisungen, 289.
97. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 251–2.
98. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 194.
99. TBJG, II/12, 128 (18 April 1944); Irving, HW, 624.
100. TBJG, II/12, 129–30 (18 April 1944).
101. TBJG, II/11, 472 (14 March 1944).
102. Domarus, 2090; TBJG, II/11, 456 (11 March 1944).
103. TBJG, II/12, 132 (18 April 1944).
104. TBJG, II/12, 134–40 (here, 136).
105. TBJG, II/12, 126 (18 April 1944), for Goebbels’s reporting to him on poor mood.
106. TBJG, II/12, 155 (20 April 1944).
107. TBJG, II/12, 167 (22 April 1944).
108. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 214.
109. VB (Süddeutsche Ausgabe), 20 April 1944, printed in Hans Mommsen and Susanne Willems (eds.), Herrschaftsalltag im Dritten Reich: Studien und Texte, Düsseldorf, 1988, 88–9: ‘Niemals hat das deutsche Volk so gläubig zu seinem Führer aufgeschaut wie in den Tagen und Stunden, da ihm die ganze Schwere dieses Kampfes um unser Leben bewußt wurde…’
110. Below, 367; TBJG, II/12, 160 (21 April 1944); Irving, HW, 619.
111. Below, 367–8; TBJG, II/12, 168 (22 April 1944), 191 (27 April 1944), 194–5 (27 April 1944); Domarus, 2099.
112. Staatsmänner II, 418ff.; trans. N & P, iii.868.
113. Speer, 336–47; Sereny, Speer, 409–28.
114. Speer, 344.
115. Speer, 347–8.
116. Speer, 348–54; also Below, 368–9; and Sereny, Speer, 428–30; Fest, Speer, 282–9.
117. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944 (copy of Göring’s comments on the need to increase bomber production, at a meeting on 23 May 1944 on the Obersalzberg, attended by Speer, Milch, Koller, and others); Irving, HW, 626–8.
118. Irving, HW, 580; Irving, Göring, 410–11; Carr, Hitler, 80.
119. Speer, 372–3.
120. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944: former Major-General Galland’s post-war testimony at Hitler’s explosion on learning that the Me262, despite Messerschmitt’s promise (as he saw it) was being produced as a fighter. For Göring’s anger — reflecting Hitler’s anger with him — at his advisers at Messerschmitt for what he took to be misleading advice (also from Messerschmitt himself to Hitler) on the practicality of producing the jet-bomber, see IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944, ‘Stenographische Niederschrift über die Besprechung beim Reichsmarschall am 24.Mai 1944’, 1–4. The file also contains a copy (from BA, NS6/152) of a note for Bormann of 21 October 1944, relating to Hitler’s commission in the previous October to develop the Me262 as a bomber and his expectation that it would be used to repulse an invasion in the west. The note stated: ‘On account of the failure of the Luftwaffe, the type Me262, now developed as a bomber, was not ready on time.’ (‘Infolge Versagens der Luftwaffe wurde der nunmebr als Bomber entwickelte Typ Me 262 nicht recbtzeitig fertig’). Also in the file are extracts from a further meeting on construction of the Me262 on 25 May. See also Below, 370–71; Irving, HW, 628–30.
121. Speer, 357–60. Hitler agreed to the transfer on 4 June.
122. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache vor Generalen und Offizieren am 26. Mai 1944’, Militargescbicbtlicbe Mitteilungen, 2 (1976), 123–70, here 134.
123. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 135, 167 n.74; IfZ, MA–316, Bl.2614608–46, Rede des Reichsführers-SS am 24.5.44 in Sonthofen vor den Teilnehmern des politisch-weltanschaulichen Lehrgangs (Generale), quotation Bl.2614639 (and printed in Himmler: Geheimreden, 203): ‘Eine andere Frage, die maßgeblich für die innere Sicberbeit des Reiches und Europa war, ist die Judenfrage gewesen. Sie wurde nach Befehl und standesmäßiger Erkenntnis kompromißlos gelöst.’
124. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 136.
125. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 146–7.
126. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 155.
127. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 156; see also 168 n.77. See also Wilhelm, ‘Wie geheim war die “Endlösung”?’, 131–48, here 134–6.
128. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 157.
129. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 161.
130. Below, 370; Speer, 359; Monologe, 406–12. Goebbels remarked, after discussions with Albert Bormann on arrival at the Berghof on 5 June: ‘Up here only the top leadership notices something of the war; the middle and lower leadership are rather apathetic towards it’ (TBJG, 11/12, 405 (6 June 1944)).
131. TBJG, 11/12, 405 (6 June 1944); Below, 372.
132. TBJG, 11/12, 408 (6 June 1944).
133. Weisungen, 291–2.
134. TBJG, 11/12, 407 (6 June 1944).
135. Speer, 363–4; TBJG, II/12, 407 (6 June 1944).
136. Below, 373.
137. TBJG, 11/12, 410, 413 (6 June 1944).
138. TBJG, 11/12, 414–15 (6 June 1944); and see Dieter Ose, Entscheidung im Westen. Der Oberbefehlshaber west und die Abwehr der allierten Invasion, Stuttgart, 1982, 101–2.
139. Irving, HW, 884. According to the KTB Ob West H 11–10/10 (copy in IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944), page 7, the sighting of around 100 warships west of Le Havre and in the Barfleur area offered final confirmation, at 6.42a.m., that it was the beginning of the invasion.
140. German intelligence failed miserably in the build-up to the landing. Later analysis suggested that about four-fifths of reports on the coming invasion from Abwehr agents, received before 6 June, were inaccurate. The OKW seems, in addition, to have been dismissive of reports reaching it at the beginning of June and indicating an imminent invasion. (See Irving, HW, 884, and IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944, for cables of 2–3 June 1944 from the SD warning of imminent invasion on the basis of detected coded radio messages to French resistance groups.)
141. Weinberg III, 686.
142. Weinberg III, 688.
143. Irving, HW, 638, 883–4. Rundstedt had requested the release ‘for all eventualities (für alle Fälle)’ of the two reserve divisions based between the Loire and Seine at 4.45a.m. (KTB Ob West H 11–10/10 (copy in IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944), page 4. See also KTB OKW, iv.i, 311–12.)
144. Speer, 364–5.
145. This was only partially accurate. It had, in fact, been Rommel who had placed greatest stress on the possibility of a landing in Normandy, whereas Hitler, while not excluding this, had been more inclined to follow Rundstedt in presuming the landing would take place in the Pas de Calais, at the shortest sea-crossing over the Straits of Dover (Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291).
146. Here, too, Hitler was over-optimistic. The weather on 6 June, though cloudy and windy, had improved from that of the day before (when it had been bad enough to cause ‘Operation Overlord’ to be postponed). While the German defenders thought the weather too bad for an invasion, Eisenhower had adjudged that it was just good enough. (Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197; Weinberg III, 684.)
147. TBJG, II/12, 418–19 (7 June 1944); Below, 374; Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, Bl.42.
148. Based on Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291–2; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197–8; Weinberg III, 686–8; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.6: Triumph and Tragedy, London etc., 1954,6; Oxford Companion, 853. The accounts give differing numbers of ships engaged in the landings. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197, has 2,727 vessels approaching, multiplying to 6,939 as the smaller landing craft left their parent ships. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291, has 5,134 ships and vehicles (Fahrzeuge). Oxford Companion speaks of nearly 7,000 ships and landing-craft, including 1,213 naval warships. Parker’s figure for ships on approach has been used.
149. Weinberg III, 686, 688.
150. Irving, Göring, 426–7; see also Parker, Struggle for Survival, 196.
151. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 198–9; Weinberg III, 687.
152. Weinberg III, 688.
153. See Speer, 366.
154. Speer, 366; Irving, HW, 641 (with slightly different figures from those of Speer); TBJG, II/12, 479 (17 June 1944).
155. Speer, 366; Hölsken, V-Waffen, 132. Göring had tried to blame the initial failure of the Vi on Milch. When Hitler, changing his tune completely, now demanded increased production, Göring predictably attempted to claim the credit.
156. Weinberg III, 691.
157. Die Wehrmachtherichte 1939–1945, Cologne, 1989, iii.12.8ff.: ‘Southern England and the area of London were last night and this morning bombed (belegt) with new explosives of the heaviest caliber.’ See also Domarus, 2106; and Tb Reuth, v.2058, n.125 for Dietrich’s propaganda.
158. TBJG, II/ 12, 480 (17 June 1944), 491–2 (18 June 1944). Goebbels’s dampening of expectations is mentioned in Elke Fröhlich, ‘Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 196–224, here 217–18; and Reuth, Goebbels, 542–4. For the disappointed mood and the propaganda failure over the VI, see especially Gerald Kirwin, ‘Waiting for Retaliation. A Study in Nazi Propaganda Behaviour and German Civilian Morale’, JCH, 16 (1981), 565–83.
159. Irving, HW, 642.
160. Below, 375; Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, Bl.42; Domarus, 2106; Speer, 366; Irving, HW, 641.
161. Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944. Ein Beitrag zu Rommels und des Reiches Schicksal, Tübingen/Stuttgart, 1949, 113–14.
162. Below, 375.
163. Speidel, 114–17.
164. Speidel, 118; Below, 375.
165. Speer, 366.
166. LB Stuttgart, 573–4; Weinberg III, 688.
167. Weinberg III, 687–9.
168. Below, 375–6.
169. TBJG, II/12, 463 (14 June 1944), 517 (22 June 1944).
170. TBJG, II/12, 516–18 (22 June 1944).
171. TBJG, II/12, 518–19 (22 June 1944).
172. TBJG, II/12, 519–21 (22 June 1944), quotation 521.
173. TBJG, II/12, 521–2, 527 (22 June 1944), quotation 522.
174. TBJG, II/12, 523–6 (22 June 1944).
175. IfZ, F19/3, Hitler’s speech, 22 June 1944 (quotations, page 7: ‘… daß das Ende im Falle des Nachgebens immer die Vernichtung ist, auf die Dauer die restlose Vernichtung’); ‘Vorsehung’, page 12, and his comment on page 47: ‘Ich babe das Leben schon im Weltkrieg als Geschenk der Vorsebung aufgefaßt. Ich konnte so oft tot sein und bin nicht tot. Das ist also schon ein Geschenk gewesen; ‘Der Jude ist weg ...’, page 39; ‘Niemals wird dieser neue Staat kapitulierern’, page 67); see also, especially, 55, 59, and 62 (‘Wir kämpfen hier für die deutsche Zukunft, um Sein oder Nichtsein’).
176. Below, 376. The speech was frequently interrupted by applause, and was followed by shouts of ‘Heil’ (IfZ, F19/3, page 70). Hitler was in much less good form when he spoke on 26 June — the military situation had worsened during the previous four days — to about 100 leading representatives of the armaments industry, to try to assuage them about Party interference in the economy. During this speech, there was barely applause, and Hitler’s vague philosophizing did not come across well. The attempt, which Speer had hoped would rouse the morale of the assembled businessmen, did not succeed. (The text is printed in von Kotze, 35–68; and see Speer, 369–71.)
177. TBJG, II/12, 524 (22 June 1944). Goebbels had been more sceptical. Heavy bombing attacks against German rear areas began on the night of 21–22 June; the main attacks commenced the following day (Glantz and House, 204).
178. DZW, vi.35–6; Glantz and House, ch.13.
179. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 252; Weinberg III, 704; David Glanz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, London/Totowa NJ, 1989, 362–79, here 463, 467/ff.; DZW, vi.33.
180. Irving, HW, 643–4.
181. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jürgen Rohwer, Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Frankfurt am Main, 1960, 452.
182. TBJG, II/12, 538–9, 542 (24 June 1944).
183. Weisungen, 281–5. The principle of the twelve bastions created in the theatre of Army Group Centre, with three divisions assigned to each of the strongholds, was to suck in the Red Army, tying them down, then building the basis for a successful counter-operation. The tactic backfired drastically in the Soviet offensive of June 1944.
184. Below, 377–8.
185. See DZW, vi.34.
186. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253.
187. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253; Weinberg III, 706–8; Below, 378. The Soviet offensive in the Centre, South, and North is extensively described in DZW, vi.30–52, 52–70, 70–81.
188. Wistrich, Wer war wer, 188; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253; DZW, vi.41.
189. Speidel, 127; Guderian, 334; Irving, HW, 649–51.
190. Domarus, 2110.
191. Guderian, 334.
192. Below, 378; Irving, HW, 648; Wistrich, Wer war wer, 301; Domarus, 2130.
193. Below, 378.
194. Below, 379.
195. Below, 380.
196. Below, 380.
197. Domarus, 2118. See Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenberg. A Family History, 1905–1944, Cambridge, 1995, ch.9, especially 179–80, for Stauffenberg’s involvement in the North African campaign that led to his serious injuries, sustained on 7 April 1943, and 253–4 for his presence at the briefings on 6 and 11 July 1944.
198. Domarus, 2121; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 256–60; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 469–75.
199. Witnesses gave differing times for the explosion, between 12.40 and 12.50p.m. (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 493, 817 n. 43).
1. The most wide-ranging anthology of essays on resistance is Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus, Munich/Zürich, 1985. Among the numerous guides through the labyrinth of the literature and moral debates on resistance are Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.), Der zo.Juli 1944. Bewertung und Rezeption des deutschen Widerstandes gegen das NS-Regime, Cologne, 1994; Ulrich Heinemann, ‘Arbeit am Mythos. Neuere Literatur zum bürgerlich-aristokratischen Widerstand gegen Hitler und zum 2oJuli 1944 (Teil I)’, GG, 21 (1995), 111–39; and Ulrich Heinemann and Michael Krüger-Charlé, ‘Arbeit am Mythos. Der 2oJuli 1944 in Publizistik und wissenschaftlicher Literatur des Jubiläumsjahres 1994 (Teil II)’, GG, 23 (1997), 475–501. The most detailed and thoroughly researched description of the conspiracies against Hitler remains that of Hoffmann, Widerstand, on which this chapter frequently relies. A shorter, stylish account is that of Fest, Staatsstreich. Short descriptions of the personnel can be found in Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel, Lexikon des Widerstandes 1933–1945. Munich, 1994. Problems of concepts and terminology, not entered into here, can be followed in the entries in Benz and Pehle; also in Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 4th edn, London, 2000, ch.8.
2. For reflections on the role of Prussian ideals — seen as a ‘determining motive (bestimmendes Motiv)’ within the resistance to Hitler — see Hans Mommsen, ‘Preußentum und Nationalsozialismus’, in Wolfgang Benz, Hans Buchheim, and Hans Mommsen (eds.), Der Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Ideologie und Herrschaft, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, 29–41, here 37, 41.
3. The mixture of motives within the wartime conspiracy is briefly surveyed by Peter Hoffmann, ‘Motive’, in Schmädeke und Steinbach, 1089–96; and more extensively in Theodore S. Hamerow, On the Road to the Wolf’s Lair. German Resistance to Hitler, Cambridge, Mass./London, 1997. The moral dimension is assessed by Robert Weldon Whaley, Assassinating Hitler: Ethics and Resistance in Nazi Germany, London/Ontario, 1993. See also the compilation put together in the 1950s by Annedore Leber, Conscience in Revolt, London, 1957, and the more recent collection of texts: Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel, Widerstand in Deutschland, Munich, 1994.
4. Joachim Kramarz, Claus Graf Stauffenberg. 15. November, 1907–20. Juli 1944: Das Leben eines Offiziers, Frankfurt am Main, 1965, 131; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 183.
5. See Hans Mommsen, ‘Social Views and Constitutional Plans of the Resistance’, in Hermann Graml et al., The German Resistance to Hitler, (1966), London, 1970, 55–147, here 59, for perceptions by Pater Alfred Delp and Adam von Trott of lack of popular support for a putsch. Over seven years after the events, General Klaus Uebe was adamant that the mass of the rank-and-file troops rejected any notion of a move by officers against Hitler (IfZ, ZS 164, Klaus Uebe, 3 January 1952).
6. Kramarz, 201.
7. Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Offiziere gegen Hitler, (1946), revised edn, Berlin, 1984, 109.
8. Scheurig, Tresckow, especially ch.4; also Fest, Staatsstreich, 177; Whaley, 48–9, 54, 56.
9. Scheurig, Tresckow, 111–12.
10. Scheurig, Treskow, noff.; Fest, Staatsstreich, 177–80.
11. Fest, Staatsstreich, 193–4.
12. Hassell, 307 (28 March 1942).
13. Helena P. Page, General Friedrich Olbricht. Ein Mann des 20.Juli, Bonn/Berlin, 1992, 206.
14. Fest, Staatsstreich, 194; quotation, Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung. Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte an Bormann und Hitler über das Attentat vom zo.]uli 1944. Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reischssicherheitshauptamt, ed. Archiv Peter für historische und zeitgeschichtliche Dokumentation, Stuttgart, 1961, 368.
15. Thun-Hohenstein, 224, citing Hermann Kaiser, Tagebuch v.3 February 1943. The entry was not included in the extracts from Kaiser’s diary published in ‘Neue Mitteilungen zur Vorgeschichte des 2o.Juli’, Die Wandlung, 1 (1945/46), 530–34. But see also Kaiser’s diary entry for 31 March 1943 in Annedore Leber and Freya Gräfin von Moltke, Für und wider Entscheidungen in Deutschland 1918–1945, Frankfurt, 1961,203: ‘A discussion arises about discipline and obedience of the leadership and Fromm says, in a hundred cases one must be 100 per cent obedient. Olbricht opposes this: one must be able to say no once in 99 cases. Fromm retorts vehemently in favour of unconditional obedience…’ (‘Es kommt Gespräch über Disziplin und Gehorsam der Führung auf und Fromm sagt, in hundert Fallen müsse man Iooig gehorsam sein. Olbricht dagegen: Man müsse bei 99 Fallen einmal nein sagen können. Fromm erwidert heftig, für unbedingten Gehorsam ...’) Kaiser’s involvement in the opposition is thoroughly dealt with by Ger van Roon, ‘Hermann Kaiser und der deutsche Widerstand’, VfZ, 24 (1976), 259–86.
16. For use of the term, see, e.g., Hoffmann, Widerstand, 350.
17. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 341–2.
18. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 343–6, 350; Fest, Staatsstreich, 194–5.
19. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 348–9.
20. See Hoffmann, Hitler’s Personal Security, 1 11ff.
21. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 351; Hoffman, Hitler’s Personal Security, ch.5–9.
22. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 347.
23. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 347, 351.
24. Schlabrendorff, 67–75; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 352–3; Fest, Staatsstreich, 196–7.
25. Rudolf-Christoph Frhr. v. Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang. Lebensbilder, Frankfurt etc., 1979, 128–32; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 353–60.
26. Meehan, 337; and see Klemperer, 287. Henry II had allegedly used the words, ‘Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?’ at which four knights from his entourage rode to Canterbury to murder the Archbishop, Thomas Becket. The formation of Bishop Bell’s attitude towards the Nazi regime during the 1930s can be traced in Andrew Chandler (ed.), Brethren in Adversity. Bishop George Bell, the Church of England, and the Crisis of German Protestantism, 1933–1939, Woodbridge, 1997.
27. In Lothar Kettenacker (ed.), Das ‘Andere Deutschland’ im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Emigration und Widerstand in internationaler Perspektive, Stuttgart, 1977, 203.
28. British attitudes are critically explored in Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Die britische Haltung zum deutschen Widerstand während des Zweiten Weltkriegs’, in Kettenacker, 49–76 (and see the documentation in the same volume, 164–217); and Richard Lamb, ‘Das Foreign Office und der deutsche Widerstand 1938–1944’, in Klaus-Jürgen Müller and David N. Dilks (eds.), Großbritannien und der deutsche Widerstand 1933–1944, Paderborn etc., 1994, 53–81. For differing evaluations of the Allies’ uncompromising stance, see Fest, Staatsstreich, 212–13; and Heinemann/Krüger-Charlé, 492–3. The variety of ideas on foreign policy within the resistance is explored by Hermann Graml, ‘Resistance Thinking on Foreign Policy’, in Graml et al., German Resistance, 1–54.
29. For brief surveys of the ‘Goerdeler Group’, see Ger van Roon, Widerstand im Dritten Reich. Ein Überblick, Munich, (1979), 7th revised edn, 1998, ch.8; and Benz/Pehle, Lexikon des deutschen Widerstandes, 217–22.
30. Graml, ‘Resistance Thinking’, 27. And see Goerdeler’s foreign policy plans put forward in 1941 in Germans against Hitler: July 20, 1944, 5th edn, ed. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 1969, 55–60.
31. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 372–3; Goerdeler put forward a similar programme in May 1944 (Christian Müller, Stauffenberg, Düsseldorf, 1970, 393).
32. Mommsen, ‘Social Views’, 60; Mommsen, ‘Der Widerstand gegen Hitler und die deutsche Gesellschaft’, 9, 11; and Hans Mommsen, ‘Verfassungs — und Verwaltungsreformpläne der Wider-standsgruppen des 20.Juli 1944’, in Schmädeke and Steinbach, 570–97; Roon, Widerstand, 135–9; Fest, Staatsstreich, 147–57.
33. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 373.
34. Spiegelbild, 178.
35. Spiegelbild, 56, 112; Fest, Staatsstreich, 234.
36. See Helmuth James von Moltke, Letters to Freya, 1939–1945. A Witness against Hitler, London, 1991; and Michael Balfour and Julian Frisby, Helmuth von Moltke. A Leader against Hitler, London, 1972.
37. See Ger van Roon, Neuordnung im Widerstand. Der Kreisauer Kreis innerhalb der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung, Munich, 1967; Ger van Roon, ‘Staatsvorstellungen des Kreisauer Kreises’, in Schmädeke and Steinbach, 560–9; Roon, Widerstand, 155–7; Hans Mommsen, ‘Der Kreisauer Kreis und die künftige Neuordnung Deutschlands und Europas’, VfZ, 42 (1994), 361–77; Benz/Pehle, Lexikon des deutschen Widerstandes, 247–52.
38. Roon, Widerstand, 157–8.
39. Gersdorff, 134ff. (quotation, 135).
40. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 361.
41. For the important intermediary role of Schulenburg, see Ulrich Heinemann, Ein konservativer Rebell. Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg und der 20.Juli, Berlin, 1990, 142ff. (149–50 for his temporary arrest).
42. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 363–6; Heinz Höhne, Canaris — Patriot im Zwielicht, Munich, 1976, 529; and, for the enigmatic role played by Canaris, see, apart from his biography of the Abwehr chief, also Heinz Höhne, ‘Canaris und die Abwehr zwischen Anpassung und Opposition’, in Schmädeke and Steinbach, 405–16.
43. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 373.
44. Fest, Staatsstreich, 218.
45. Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, ch. 1–2; Michael Baigent and Richard Leigh, Secret Germany: Claus von Stauffenberg and the Mystical Crusade against Hitler, London, 1994, ch.5; and see Mosse, 209–11; and Roon, Widerstand, 180.
46. Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 115–16.
47. Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 132.
48. Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 133, 151. For assessments of the varied attitudes towards Jews and antisemitism among those involved in resistance to the Nazi regime, see Christoph Dipper, ‘Der deutsche Widerstand und die Juden’, GG, 9 (1983), 349–80; Christoph Dipper, ‘Der Widerstand und die Juden’, in Schmàdeke and Steinbach, 598–616; and Hans Mommsen, ‘Der Widerstand gegen Hitler und die nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung’ (as yet unpublished, but kindly made available to me by Hans Mommsen). As could hardly otherwise be expected, strains of antisemitism — for the most part traditional resentments, far removed from the extremes of Nazi genocidal mentalities — are not infrequently encountered, especially among the older and more conservative sectors of the opposition. At opposite poles in the resistance, not least as regards attitudes towards the Jews, were Oster and Groscurth, who revealed no signs of antisemitism, and Wolf Heinrich Graf von Helldorf (the rabidly antisemitic Berlin police-chief and former SA leader) and Arthur Nebe (head of a murderous Einsatzgruppe, responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Jews). The mounting atrocities against the Jewish population in the occupied eastern territories were unquestionably, as in Stauffenberg’s case, a strong — though for the most part, it seems, not the decisive — motive in engaging in the conspiracy to kill Hitler. Yet, ambiguities almost inevitably remain: even among the courageous front officers of Army Group Centre, there seems to have been at least initial approval for the ruthless war against partisans and ‘bandits’ which was to a large extent coterminous with the growing genocidal assault on the Jews. (See Heinemann/Krüger-Charlé, 499 and n.99.)
49. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 508, for a somewhat unflattering picture of Stauffenberg.
50. Eberhard Zeller, Geist der Freiheit. Der Zwanzigste Juli, 4th edn, Munich, 1963, 244; Roon, Widerstand, 179–83.
51. Ritter, 366–7; Fest, Staatsstreich, 222; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 396; Roon, Widerstand, 184.
52. Germans against Hitler, 131.
53. Roon, Widerstand, 178–9; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 374ff., especially 386–7; Fest, Staatsstreich, 222–4.
54. For a character sketch, see Bernhard R. Kroener, ‘Friedrich Fromm — Der “starke Mann im Heimatkriegsgebiet”’, in Smelser/Syring, 171–86.
55. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 397–8.
56. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 398–405. For Bussche, see the brief portrait from personal acquaintance in Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, ‘Um der Ehre willen’. Erinnerungen an die Freunde vom 20.Juli, (1994) 2nd edn, Berlin, 1996, 67–76.
57. Kleist first asked Stauffenberg for time to think it over. He asked his father, hoping he would advise against it. His father replied without hesitation: ‘Yes, you must do it. Whoever fails in such a moment will never again be happy in his lifetime.’ (Bodo Scheurig, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin. Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler. Biographie, Berlin/Frankfurt am Main, 1994.) The father would eventually pay for his opposition with his life; the son would survive the Nazi regime.
58. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 405–6.
59. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 407–10.
60. Roon, Widerstand, 188–9.
61. See, for the reference, above, note 7.
62. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 406; Fest, Staatsstreich, 243.
63. Roon, Widerstand, 187.
64. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 469; Fest, Staatsstreich, 242–3, 246.
65. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 471–5.
66. Roon, Widerstand, 189; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 471–2; Fest, Staatsstreich, 250 52.
67. Roon, Widerstand, 189–90; Fest, Staatsstreich, 252–3.
68. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 486–8; Fest, Staatsstreich, 258–9.
69. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 489–91, 493. Fest, Staatsstreich, 261, has 12.40p.m. Below, 381, and some other witnesses suggest that time, others (e.g., in his much later second set of memoirs, Linge, 225, who, however, is frequently unreliable with detail) a slightly later time. Benz, Graml, and Weßs, Enzyklopädie des Nationalsozialismus, 814, give the precise time of 12.42p.m., though without source. According to the summary of the evidence in Hoffmann, Widerstand, 817 n.43, the explosion can not be timed more precisely than between 12.40 and 12.50p.m. Sander’s comment about explosions occurring as a result of animals setting off mines was later echoed by Hitler’s secretary Christa Schroeder (Schroeder, 147). Hitler’s valet, Heinz Linge, stated much later that he initially thought Hitler’s dog had set off a mine (Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 224). Since, however, Linge was close to the hut where the explosion took place, this sounds contrived.
70. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 491–3; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 267.
71. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 493–5; Fest, Staatsstreich, 261; Irving, HW, 662–3; Below, 381; Schroeder, 147; Irving, Doctor, 145.
72. Below, 381.
73. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 496–7; Spiegelbild, 83
74. Speer, 399; TBJG, II/13, 139 (23 July 1944).
75. Below, 381; Schroeder, 148; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 496.
76. Irving, Doctor, 146–8 (where Hitler’s pulse and blood-pressure are said to have risen, but not excessively, following the attack); Below, 381; Schroeder, 148; TBJG, II/13, 139 (23 July 1944); Redlich, 204–5; Schenck, 317–18. Morell told Paul Schmidt, the interpreter, that afternoon that Hitler’s pulse had been quite normal following the explosion (Schmidt, 593).
77. Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 225.
78. Below, 382; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 498–501; Irving, Göring, 430.
79. Schroeder, 148. Hitler asked Christa Schroeder, so she later wrote, to send the tattered coat and trousers to Eva Braun for safe keeping. One of Hitler’s other secretaries, Gerda Christian (Daranowski before her marriage in February 1943), later recalled that Hitler had been calm when he spoke to them on the evening after the attempt on his life. (Library of Congress, Washington, Toland Tapes, C-63B, interview with John Toland, 26 July 1971.)
80. Below, 382; see also Speer, 391; and Reuth, Goebbels, 548.
81. TBJG, II/13, 141 (23 July 1944); Below, 382; Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 229; Schroeder, 148–9; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 597. According to the account compiled by Linge in the 1950s, he heard from a telephonist that Stauffenberg had left the barracks in a direction from which it could be concluded that he was leaving the Führer Headquarters, and had this information conveyed to Hitler (Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, BI.83). Since Stauffenberg left the barrack-hut without cap and belt, heading in the direction of the adjutants’ building, well away from any exit from the compound and in the opposite direction to the airfield, this seems like a later elaboration by Linge, designed to play up his own role.
82. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 506ff.
83. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 509 and 823 n.88.
84. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 546.
85. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 506–11; Roon, Widerstand, 192. Himmler had ordered the communications block lifted around 3p.m.. Full clearance was only attained around an hour later. (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 504, 510–11. See also Spiegelbild, 330.)
86. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 511, 823–6 (notes 93, 95).
87. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 519 and 833 n.122. That Stauffenberg had seen a person carried from the briefing hut covered in Hitler’s cloak, presuming that it was the Führer, as he (and later Fellgiebel) claimed (Fest, Staatsstreich, 261; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 267), seems, however, unlikely. The adjutancy, where they heard the explosion, was some distance — around 200 metres (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 490) — from the hut. There were other buildings, and trees, which would have obscured the view. And it is doubtful that, following the explosion and when time was of the essence, Stauffenberg and Haeften would have hesitated long enough before hurrying away to await the first casualties being carried from the hut. It is possible that they caught a glimpse of someone being taken from the hut as they drove away. Whether, in the mêlée, it was feasible to ascertain that he was draped in Hitler’s cloak, seems doubtful.
88. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 545; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 513–14.
89. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 514; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 269.
90. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 546–7; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 519–20; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 270.
91. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 520–24.
92. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 520, 607, 609.
93. A point criticized by Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 545.
94. In the German version, Gisevius has the following account of Beck’s words: ‘Gleichgiiltig, was jetzt verbreitet werde, gleichgültig sogar, was wahr sei, für ihn, Beck, set die Entscheidung gefalien. Er fordert die Herren auf, sich mit ihm solidarisch zu erklären. “Fur mich ist dieser Mann tot. Davon lasse ich mein weiteres Handeln bestimmen.”’ (‘Whatever is now being said, whatever is even true, for him, Beck, the decision has been taken. He calls upon the gentlemen to declare in solidarity with him: “For me, this man is dead. I will let my further actions be determined by this.”) (Gisevius, Bis Zum Bittern Ende, 1946, ii.382.) The English version — Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 557 — differs: ‘… It did not matter at all whether Hitler was dead or still living. A “leader” whose immediate entourage included those who opposed him to the extent of attempting assassination must be considered morally dead.’
95. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 558; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 615.
96. Fest, Staatsstreich, 269.
97. Roon, Widerstand, 194.
98. See Hoffmann, Widerstand, 529ff.; Fest, Staatsstreich, 270–71; Roon, Widerstand, 195.
99. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 558.
100. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 581 ff.; Fest, Staatsstreich, 283–91.
101. The only way to reconcile the differing accounts of Speer, 391 and Wilfried von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, 2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1950, ii, 59ff., is to presume that there were two phone-calls from Führer Headquarters, the first from Otto Dietrich very soon after the attack, the second between 2 and 3p.m. from Heinz Lorenz. This seems accepted by Oven in his second, later account (after the publication of Speer’s memoirs) (Wilfried von Oven, ‘Der 20.Juli 1944 — erlebt im Hause Goebbels’, in Verrat und Widerstand im Dritten Reich, Nation Europa, 28 (1978), 43–58, here 47ff.). Goebbels referred to a telephone call at midday — mentioning that two of his ministerial colleagues (Funk and Speer) were with him — in his radio address on 26 July about the assassination attempt (Heiber, Goebbels-Reden, ii.342–3; see also Reuth, Goebbels, 548). It seems unlikely that in this telephone-call, minutes after the bomb-blast, as Irving, Goebbels, 471, suggests (placing the call, though without apparent supporting evidence, at 1p.m., and from Lorenz, not Dietrich), a request was passed on from Hitler for an immediate broadcast to make plain that he was alive and well. More probably, this request came in a subsequent call, in mid-afternoon, as Oven states (See Reuth, Goebbels, 550; Irving, Goebbels, 471, 473, for conflicting accounts). Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, Bl.84, referred to difficulties in reaching Goebbels that afternoon, and that the telephone link was finally established at 4.30p.m.. In his account, this was the telephone-call in which Hitler spoke to Remer. This call, however, was made around 7p.m. (See Hoffmann, Widerstand, 597; Reuth, Goebbels, 550–2. Here, as in other points of detail, Linge is unreliable.)
102. Speer, 391.
103. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 593, 595.
104. Speer, 392–3.
105. Speer, 393–4. The unease about Himmler was not altogether ungrounded. Himmler had been aware since at least autumn 1943 of ‘some sort of dark plans’ brewing and, with Hitler’s permission, had taken up contact with Popitz and, through him, other members of the conspiracy. The intermediary role was played by Himmler’s lawyer, Dr Carl Langbehn, who, as Himmler knew, had sympathized with the opposition since before the war. Himmler was obviously playing a double game. On the one hand, he was careful to demonstrate his loyalty to Hitler, pointing out to the dictator that should any rumours reach him over his contact with the opposition, he should know that his motives were beyond question. Hitler acknowledged that he had complete trust in the Reichsführer. On the other hand, Himmler was well aware that the regime’s days were numbered and that Hitler presented a block on any room for manoeuvre. He wanted to keep his options open, and to maintain a possible escape route should it prove necessary (Speer, 390; Ritter, 360–62; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 367–8; and Hedwig Maier, ‘Die SS und der 20.Juli 1944’, VFZ, 14 (1966), 299–316, here especially 311–14). It seems, nevertheless, doubtful that Himmler had an inkling of specific plans to topple Hitler on 20 July. It has been suggested that he was slow to act, leaving the Wolf’s Lair belatedly, and only appearing around midnight to take charge of putting down the coup (Padfield, Himmler, 498–514). But he was prompt enough in addressing security issues at FHQ directly following the attempt, where he appeared with his entourage within an hour of the bomb exploding (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 503, 824). He was required to accompany Hitler at the visit of Mussolini later that afternoon, which delayed his departure for Berlin. Probably, too, he waited to confer with the head of the Security Police, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, at that very time en route to the Wolf’s Lair, before leaving for the Reich capital. On arrival in Berlin, some time would have been taken up with coordinating the crushing of a military uprising whose ramifications, at that time, were still uncertain.
106. Speer, 393.
107. See Remer’s account in: Hans Adolf Jacobsen (ed.), Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung. Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20.Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung. Geheime Dokumente aus dent ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1984, ii.637ff.; also Hoffmann, Widerstand, 528, 594–5.
108. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 528.
109. Otto Ernst Remer, 20.Juli 1944, Hamburg, 1951, 12; repeated with minor variations in Otto Ernst Remer, Verschwörung und Verrat um Hitler. Urteil eines Frontsoldaten, Preußisch-Oldendorf, 1981, 33. Similar wording is given by Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, B1.84. Linge was, he said, in the room as Hitler spoke. See also Jacobsen, Spiegelbild, 639. It is unlikely that Hitler immediately promoted Remer to colonel, as Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, B1.84, claimed. (See Hoffmann, Widerstand, 597 and 854 n.343.)
110. Speer, 394–5; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 594–8. See also Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 563–4; Remer, 20.Juli 1944, Hamburg, 1951, 12; Remer, Verschwörung und Verrat um Hitler, 33–4; and Hagen’s report, Spiegelbild, 12–15.
111. 111. Germans against Hitler, 147, for the time.
112. Domarus, 2127 gives the time of the broadcast, at Hitler’s bidding, as 6.30p.m.; Speer, 395–6, recalls the broadcast as ‘towards seven o’clock in the evening’; Reuth, Goebbels, 550, gives the time of the broadcast as 6.45p.m..
113. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 599.
114. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 608, 613.
115. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 616.
116. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 620–26; Fest, Staatsstreich, 277–9.
117. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 570.
118. IMG, xxxiii.417–18, D0C.3881–PS; Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 570–71 (with some textual variation); Zeller, 397–8; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 623–5; Fest, Staatsstreich, 279–80.
119. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 623ff.; Fest, Staatsstreich, 280–81; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 276–7.
120. Schroeder, 148; Domarus, 2123.
121. Domarus, 2124; Schmidt, 595.
122. Schmidt, 593. Linge’s remark, Bis zum Untergang, 229, that Hitler had his right arm in a sling conflicts with Schmidt’s, 593, that he noticed nothing untoward in Hitler’s appearance before he used his left hand to shake hands with Mussolini and it became apparent that he had difficulty in raising his right arm. The photograph of Hitler inspecting the ruined barrack-room with Mussolini is taken at the wrong angle to be conclusive, but nevertheless does not suggest that Hitler had his arm in a sling. When he gave his radio address in the early hours of the following morning, his arm was not in a sling. (See the photographs in Fest, Staatsstreich, 265, 278.)
123. Schmidt, 594.
124. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 501–2.
125. Below, 383.
126. Schroeder, 149; Germans against Hitler, 180, has about 1a.m..
127. Domarus, 2127–9.
1. Schroeder, 148–9; Zoller, 186.
2. Speer, 399–400; trans., Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Sphere Books edn, London, 1971, 525.
3. TBJG, II/13, 206 (3 August 1944).
4. LB Darmstadt, 246–8.
5. Schroeder, 148. The phrase is also used in Bormann’s telegram to the Gauleiter at 9.20p.m. on the evening of 20 July (The Bormann Letters. The Private Correspondence between Martin Bormann and his Wife from January 1943 to April 1945, ed. H. R. Trevor-Roper, London, 1954, 63).
6. Speer, 400; trans., Speer, Inside, 525.
7. Zeller, 538 n.11, cit. W. Scheidt, ‘Gespräche mit Hitler’, Echo der Woche, 7 October 1949, p.5: ‘Die müssen sofort hängen ohne jedes Erbarmen.’ Scheidt was on the staff of Major-General Walther Scherff, the official historian in Hitler’s Headquarters (who was injured in the explosion on 20 July 1944), and heard the words at one of the military briefings following the assassination attempt, when he was deputizing for Scherff.
8. Guderian, 345–7, indicates that he was ordered to attend, and did so reluctantly and as infrequently as possible.
9. TBJG, II/13, 212 (3 August 1944). The military ‘Court of Honour’ met for the first time on 4 August 1944. On this and three subsequent sittings (14 and 24 August, 14 September), a total of fifty-five officers were expelled from the army (Germans against Hitler, 196–8).
10. Speer, 399; Schroeder, 149.
11. TBJG, II/13, 141 (23 July 1944). Goebbels added the comment (142): ‘The Führer is resolved to eradicate root and branch the entire clan of generals which has opposed us in order to break down the wall which has been artificially erected by this generals’ clique between the army on the one side and Party and people on the other.’
12. Below, 383; Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 232.
13. For a brief biographical summary, see Weiß, Biographisches Lexikon, 130–31.
14. TBJG, II/13, 141 (23 July 1944).
15. Zeller, 538 n.11, cit. Scheidt, ‘Gespräche mit Hitler’ (see above n.7): ‘Und das wichtigste ist, daß sie keine Zeit zu langen Reden erhalten dürfen. Aber der Freisler wird das schon machen. Das ist unser Wyschinski.’ Goebbels discussed with Hitler at the beginning of August, a few days before the trials before the People’s Court were to begin, how they should proceed. No lengthy speeches in defence would be permitted, it was determined. The sessions would not be public, but Goebbels would ensure that first-class journalists were present to cover the trials and produce reports on them for public consumption. He undertook to speak directly to Freisler to explain how the trials were to proceed. Hitler himself was keen that background details which cast negative light on the plotters should be brought out. He was also anxious that the fiction should be held to that the plotters had been no more than a small clique, and that there should be no sweeping attacks on the officer class as such, on the army, or on the aristocracy (which would be dealt with at a later date) (TBJG, II/13, 214 (3 August 1944)). Propaganda directives had emphasized in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup d’état that the conspirators had been only a tiny group, and that there was to be no criticism levelled at the Wehrmacht and its officers as a whole (Steinert, 473–4).
16. Bormann Letters, 62–3.
17. Speer, 397–8.
18. Kroener, 183–4. Fromm’s execution appears specifically to have been ordered by Hitler, probably at Goebbels’s prompting, after the Propaganda Minister had brought up the case again on 5 March 1945, pointing out that Fromm deserved to die ‘because he had behaved in such cowardly fashion in face of the enemy, namely the putschists of 20 July’, and that no death penalty could be expected under the current leadership of the People’s Court (TBJG, II/15, 425 (5 March 1945); Speer, 450; Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 232).
19. See Otto Skorzeny, Skorzeny’s Special Missions, London (1957), 1997, 113–19.
20. Bormann Letters, 65.
21. Bormann Letters, 64–5.
22. Spiegelbild, 23; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 625–6. Gerstenmaier was later sentenced to seven years in a penitentiary; the others were executed.
23. Spiegelbild, 16; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 629–30.
24. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 630–4; Below, 384.
25. See especially Schlabrendorff, 132–40; also Hoffmann, Widerstand, 642–3; Fest, Staatsstreich, 296–8.
26. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 628; Ritter, 420; Fest, Staatsstreich, 294.
27. Below, 385.
28. Berlin Diaries 204; Ted Harrison, ‘Der “Alte Kämpfer” Graf Helldorf im Widerstand’, VfZ, 45 (1997), 385–423, here 421.
29. Below, 385; Ritter, 411–24; Fest, Staatsstreich, 306–11.
30. Schroeder, 149.
31. TBJG, II/13, 214 (3 August 1944). Robert Ley was firmly told not to repeat the vicious attacks on the aristocracy which he had made in populist speeches.
32. ‘Die Rede Himmlers vor den Gauleitern am 3. August 1944’, ed. Theodor Eschenburg, VfZ, 1 (1953), 357–94, here 385: ‘Die Familie Graf Stauffenberg wird ausgelöscht werden bis ins letzte Glied.’ See also Hoffmann, Widerstand, 639–41; Fest, Staatsstreich, 305–6.
33. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 635.
34. Cit. Dieter Ehlers, Technik und Moral einer Verschwörung. Der Aufstand am 20.Juli 1944, Bonn, 1964, 28: ‘“Morde?… Sie sind ja ein schäbiger Lump! Zerbrechen Sie unter der Gemeinheit?”’; trans. Germans against Hitler, 198–200. See also Zeller, 461–2, and Germans against Hitler, 211. For a description of the courtroom, see Oven, Mit Goebbels, ii.113, entry for 10 August 1944.
35. Germans against Hitler, 198, 211; Reuth, Goebbels, 599–60.
36. Zeller, 463–4: ‘Dann beeilen Sie sich mit dem Aufhängen, Herr Präsident, sonst hängen Sie eher als wir’ (Fellgiebel). ‘Sie können uns dem Henker überantworten. In drei Monaten zieht das emporte und gequälte Volk Sie zur Rechenschaft und schleift Sie bei lebendigem Leibe durch den Kot der Straßen’ (Witzleben); trans., Germans against Hitler, 201.
37. Germans against Hitler, 201; TBJG, II/13, 225 (4 August 1944).
38. Germans against Hitler, 210.
39. Beheading by axe had been the traditional practice of execution in much of Germany, including Prussia, and was continued in the early years of Hitler’s rule. In some states (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Saxony, Thuringia, Bremen, Oldenburg, and Hesse), however, the guillotine was used. Discussion in legal circles (including letters sent from the general public to the Reich Ministry of Justice recommending variants of gruesomely inhumane capital punishment) eventually culminated in a decision by Hitler in 1936 to standardize execution by the guillotine throughout Germany. The wild escalation in the number of executions during the war led, however, by 1942–3 to the increasing use of hanging as a cheap and simple alternative. Shooting of condemned prisoners now also took place as the search for speedy new methods of execution grew and as the complete collapse of established legal practice gathered pace. (See Richard J. Evans, Rituals of Retribution. Capital Punishment in Germany 1600–198J, Oxford, 1996, ch.15–16, here especially 651–60, 710–20.)
40. Cit. Ehlers, 113: ‘Ich will, daft sie gehängt werden, aufgehängt wie Schlachtvieh.’
41. Based on the eye-witness accounts in Germans against Hitler, 211–12, and the evidence collected by Hoffmann, Widerstand, 649–50, and 971–3, note 111.
42. Speer, 404.
43. According to Speer’s later claim, Hitler watched it over and again (Toland, 818, cit. Speer’s interview for Playboy, June 1971). Luftwaffe adjutant Below remarked, on the other hand, that Hitler showed little interest in the photographs of the executions, which were bandied about Führer Headquarters in repulsive fashion by SS-Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein, Himmler’s liaison officer at the Wolf’s Lair (Below, 385). Walter Frentz, Hitler’s cameraman, based at Führer Headquarters and frequently a guest at the evening monologues, also claimed, long after the war, that the films had arrived there, but that Fegelein was the only one to have seen them (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 872).
44. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 652, 864–5, note 33, 874, note 123; and see Germans against Hitler, 202–9, 214–19.
45. See Irving, Doctor, 151–2. He told his military entourage at the end of the month that he ought to have spent ten to fourteen days in bed, but had carried on working at least eight hours a day (LB Darmstadt, 271 (31 July 1944)).
46. Irving, Doctor, 154.
47. Irving, Doctor, 150.
48. Redlich, 204–6; Schenck, 302, 318; Irving, Doctor, 152–3; LB Darmstadt, 270 (31 July 1944) (where Hitler ruled out flying for at least a further eight days until his ears were healed); TBJG, II/13, 209 (3 August 1944), 232 (5 August 1944).
49. Bormann Letters, 68.
50. Redlich, 205.
51. Irving, Doctor, 150; TBJG, II/13, 213 (3 August 1944).
52. Irving, Doctor, 149 (Giesing’s impressions), 157 (those of Lieutenant-General Werner Kreipe); TBJG, II/13, 209 (3 August 1944) (Goebbels’s impressions); and see Schenck, 394–5.
53. LB Darmstadt, 270 (31 July 1944).
54. Schenck, 250, cit. Morell’s diary entry of 3 October 1944; Redlich, 205.
55. Irving, Doctor, 153 (Morell diary entry for 29 July 1944); LB Darmstadt, 217 (31 July 1944).
56. Irving, Doctor, 160; Redlich, 205.
57. Hoffmann, Security, 253–4; Zoller, 186.
58. TBJG, II/13, 210 (3 August 1944); Warlimont, 442.
59. Zoller, 186.
60. Guderian, 342, and 339–40 for his appointment.
61. See TBJG, II/13, 207 (3 August 1944), where Goebbels writes that propaganda must play its part in preventing an inverted version of the 1918 stab-in-the-back. Then, in his view, the home-front had subverted the military effort; now, the military had threatened to undermine the home-front.
62. Schroeder, 149.
63. IMG, xvi. 541; Speer, 403.
64. KTBOKW, iv. 2, 1572–6.
65. LB Darmstadt, 275–7, 280; LB Stuttgart, 609–20.
66. See above, Ch. 14, note 5.
67. Propaganda directives immediately after the putsch attempt referred specifically to it as a failed ‘stab-in-the-back’ (see Steinert, 475).
68. Steinert, 472–3.
69. BA, R55/614, R55/678, ‘“Treukundgebungen” nach den 20.7.44; insbes. Berichte über einzelne Veranstaltungen und Stimmung nach dem Attentat’; Imperial War Museum, London (= IWM), ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden 1935–1945’, unpublished collection of captured documents, n.d., c.1945–6, 289–92 (instructions from the Reich Propaganda Ministry to Gauleiter and Gau Propaganda Offices, regarding ‘Treukundgebungen anläßlich des mißlungenen Attentates auf den Führer’); MadR, xvii.6684–6 (28 July 1944); Steinert, 476ff.; Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939–1945, London, 1979, 388.
70. Spiegelbild, 1–3. For the utterly contrasting reactions — based on newspaper reports and rumour — of remaining, anxiety-ridden Jews in Dresden, see the entries in Klemperer, ii.548–54 (21–28 July 1944).
71. In fact, British plans to assassinate Hitler had been formulated only a few weeks earlier than Stauffenberg’s attempt on the dictator’s life. Among the arguments used by staff officers within the British subversive agency, Special Operations Executive, to oppose a British assassination attempt — which, in any case, was almost a dead letter at the very time it was conceived — was the view that it would prove counter-productive in stirring up support for Hitler (and thereby making a post-war settlement more difficult). It was also felt ‘that, from the strictly military point of view, it was almost an advantage that Hitler should remain in control of German strategy, having regard to the blunders that he has made’ (Operation Foxley, 14–15, 30–31).
72. Spiegelbild, 4–7.
73. Spiegelbild, 8–11.
74. M.I. Gurfein and Morris Janowitz, ‘Trends in Wehrmacht Morale’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 10 (1946), 78–84, here 81; Balfour, Propaganda, 389. See also Breloer, 334, for a letter sent from one German prisoner-of-war in Texas to Hitler, congratulating him on his survival, and a diary entry from 21 July 1944 stating: ‘I don’t think I’m wrong when I say in such a sad hour for all of us: “Germany stands or falls in this struggle with the person of Adolf Hitler…” If this attack on Adolf Hitler had been successful, I am convinced that our homeland would now be in chaos.’
75. Buchbender and Sterz, 21–2.
76. Spiegelbild, 8–11.
77. See, for example, Andreas-Friedrich, 103 (entry for 31 July 1944), where she was denounced to the Gestapo for a derogatory remark about Hitler by a Party member sitting close by in a Berlin café. ‘Since the 20 July all organs of the Nazis are inclined to sense a putschist in every German citizen,’ she wrote. She narrowly escaped recriminations following the denunciation.
78. Berlin Diaries, 203.
79. Breloer, 132–3.
80. Breloer, 69.
81. Elisabeth Hoemberg, Thy People, My People, London, 1950, 161.
82. GStA, Munich, MA 106695, report of the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern, 7 August 1944: ‘… ein Teil der Bevölkerung das Gelingen des Attentats in erster Linie deshalb begrüßt bätte, weil er sich davon eine frühere Beendigung des Krieges erhoffte.’
83. StA, Munich, LRA 29656, report of the SD-Außenstelle Berchtesgaden, 3 August 1944: ‘Ja, wenn’s ihn nur erwischt hätte.’
84. Buchbender and Sterz, 146.
85. See Buchbender and Sterz, 24, 147–8. The censor’s report showed negative comments — on matters in general, not specifically on Hitler — in 25 per cent of the letters checked, an increase on the previous month. A statistic from the end of November 1944 indicates that 9,523 members of the Wehrmacht had been shot for offences including indiscipline, subversion, and sabotage following usually perfunctory court-martial proceedings. How many had been picked up by negative remarks in letters cannot be established. Comments related to the attempt on Hitler’s life, it can be safely surmised, would have been a minuscule proportion (Buchbender and Sterz, 20–25).
86. Steinert, 482.
87. Steinert, 479.
88. Jahrbucb der öffentlichen Meinung 194J–1955, ed. Elisabeth Noëlle and Erich Peter Neumann, Allensbach, 1956, 138.
89. Michael Kater, The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919–1945, Oxford, 1983, 263 (Figure 1).
90. IWM, ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden 1935–1945’, 264, report of SD-Leitabschnitt Stuttgart, 8 August 1944: ‘Mit anderen Worten würde das heißen: Der Führer gibt zu, daft die Zeit bisher nicht für uns, sondern gegen uns gearbeitet hat. Wenn sich also ein Mann wie der Führer einer solch gewaltigen Täuschung hingegeben bat,… so wäre er entweder nicht das Genie, für das er immer hingestellt wird, oder aber, er hätte in Kenntnis der Tatsache, daß Saboteurs am Werk sind, das deutsche Volk vorsätzlich belogen, was ebenso schlimm wäre, denn mit solchen Feinden im eigenen Haus könnte die Kriegsproduktion niemals gesteigert werden, könnten wir niemals siegen…. Das Bedenklicbste an der ganzen Sache ist wohl, daß die meisten Volksgenossen, auch diejenigen, die bisher unerschütterlich glaubten, jeden Glauben an den Führer verloren haben.’
91. IWM, ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden’, 276, report of SD-Leitabschnitt Stuttgart, 6 November 1944: ‘Es wird immer wieder behauptet, der Führer sei uns von Gott gesandt worden. Ich bezweifle es nicht. Der Führer wurde uns von Gott gesandt, aber nicht um Deutschland zu retten, sondern um Deutschland zu verderben. Die Vorsehung hat beschlossen, das deutsche Volk zu vernichten und Hitler ist der Vollstrecker dieses Willens.’
92. Breloer, 219–20.
93. Steinert, 498.
94. Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘Krieg in der Trümmerlandschaft. “Pflichterfüllung” wofür?’, in Ulrich Borsdorf and Mathilde Jamin (eds.), Über Leben im Krieg. Kriegserfahrungen in einer Industrieregion 1939–1945, Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1989, 169–78, here 173.
95. Matthias von Hellfeld, Edelweißpiraten in Köln, 2nd edn, Cologne, 1983, especially 9–14, 38–59; Detlev Peukert, Die Edelweißpiraten. Protestbewegungen jugendlicher Arbeiter im Dritten Reich, Cologne, 1980, 103–15; Widerstand und Verfolgung in Köln 1933–1945, ed. Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, Cologne, 1974, 394–7.
96. Widerstand und Verfolgung in Köln, 396.
97. See Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand, 388–400; Merson, 293–5; Widerstand und Verfolgung in Köln, 394–7.
98. Cit. Steinert, 499–500, 515.
99. Oven, Mit Goebbels, ii.109, entry for 5 August 1944, and Goebbels’s speech to the Gauleiter in Posen two days earlier (Heiber, Goebbels Reden, ii.360–404, here 370, 372–3, 377–8) for his comparison with the Strasser crisis in 1932; also Orlow, ii.463.
100. Bormann Letters, 61–5; Orlow, ii.462 and n.282.
101. Bormann Letters, 69. Bormann wrote, in this letter to his wife dated 26 July, that the Gauleiter conference would be on 1–2 August. In fact, it took place on 3–4 August.
102. TBJG, II/13, 221–3 (4 August 1944); Speer, 402; ‘Die Rede Himmlers’, 357–94; Goebbels’s speech of 3 August in Heiber, Goebbels Reden, ii.360–404, quotation 396: ‘das muß jetzt Schluß sein! Jetzt nimmt die Partei diese Entwicklung in die Hand’; Orlow, ii.463–4.
103. Domarus, 2138–9; Speer, 402–3.
104. See Teppe, 278–301, here 299–301.
105. See Speer, 322–4, 333–4; Rebentisch, 412–13; Herbert, Fremdarbeiter, 252–5.
106. Rebentisch, 528.
107. Fröhlich, ‘Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944’, 195–224, here 205–6; Rebentisch, 512–14; Eleanor Hancock, National Socialist Leadership and Total War 1941–45, New York, 1991, 127–36; Wolfgang Bleyer, ‘Pläne der faschistischen Führung zum totalen Krieg im Sommer 1944’, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 17 (1969), 1312–29. Speer seems to have been galvanized into action by the head of his Planning Office, Hans Kehrl, who saw the time as ripe following Goebbels’s article in Das Reich on 30 June 1944, pressing for the rigorous squeezing out of all remaining labour reserves. (See Kehrl’s letter to Speer of 10 July 1944, in Bleyer, ‘Plane der faschistischen Führung’, 1315–16.)
108. Bleyer, ‘Plane der faschistischen Fiihrung’, 1317–25 (Speer Memoranda from 12 and 20 July 1944); Peter Longerich, ‘Joseph Goebbels und der totale Krieg: eine unbekannte Denkschrift des Propagandaministers vom 18. Juli 1944’, VfZ, 35 (1987), 289–314, text of Memorandum, 305–14; Hancock, 129, 133; Fröhlich, ‘Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944’, 206.
109. 109. Rebentisch, 514.
110. 110. TBJG, II/12, 521 (22 June 1944).
111. 111. The text is in Bleyer, ‘Pläne der faschistischen Führung’, 1326–9. See also TBJG, II/13, 135–6 (23 July 1944); Rebentisch, 515; Hancock, 137–8; Longerich, ‘Joseph Goebbels und der totale Krieg’, 304–5; Fröhlich, ‘Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944’, 206–7.
112. TBJG, II/13, 154 (24 July 1944).
113. Rudolf Semmler (real name: Semler), Goebbels — the Man Next to Hitler, London, 1947, 147 (entry for 23 July 1944).
114. RGBl, 1944, 1, Nr.34, 161–2.
115. Irving, Göring, 433; Fröhlich, ‘Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944’, 207. For Rominten (and Göring’s other residences — he had ten at various times, apart from Carinhall, his main home, and special trains and yachts at his disposal), see Volker Knopf and Stefan Martens, Görings Reich. Selbstinszenierungen in Carinhall, Berlin, 1999, 158–9.
116. TBJG, II/13, 153–6 (24 July 1944).
117. Oven, Mit Goebbels, ii.94, entry for 25 July 1944.
118. Rebentisch, 516–17; Hancock, 138.
119. Text in Heiber, Goebbels Reden, ii.342–59, quotation 353: ‘Es wird im Lande sowohl für die Front wie für die Rüstungsproduktion so viel Kräfte frei machen, daft es uns nicht allzu schwerfallen dürfte, der Schwierigkeiten, die die Kriegslage immer wieder mit sich bringen wird, in souveräner Weise Herr zu werden.’ (Trans. amended from Seydewitz, 274.)
120. Orlow, ii.470.
121. According to the former housekeeper at his Munich apartment, Frau Anni Winter, Hitler’s sight had deteriorated sharply, requiring him to have five pairs of increasingly strong spectacles in as many years (IfZ, ZS 194, BI.3).
122. Rebentisch, 518–20.
123. Rebentisch, 521.
124. Rebentisch, 522.
125. Speer, 406.
126. Speer, 405–7; TBJG, II/13, 525–7 (20 September 1944).
127. Speer, 407.
128. See Speer, 575 n.5; and Rebentisch, 520.
129. Hancock, 152–5, 287 n.27. See also DZW, vi.222–37; Herbst, Der Totale Krieg, 343–7; Seydewitz, 275–9; Steinert, 505–6; Klaus Mammach, Der Volkssturm. Bestandteil des totalen Kriegseinsatzes der deutschen Bevlökerung 1944/45, East Berlin, 1981, 17–20.
130. Hancock, 157–8.
131. Harlan was also able to use the powers granted to him by Goebbels to acquire the services for his film of 4,000 sailors, training to counter Allied attacks on U-boats, as well as 6,000 horses. He was allowed to spend what he wanted. He put the costs of the film at around 8½ million marks — eight times as much as a good film normally cost to make. (Veit Harlan, Im Schatten meiner Filme. Selbstbiographie, Gütersloh, 1966, 184, 187–8. And see Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 221ff., here 234.)
132. Mammach, 39; Franz W. Seidler, ‘Deutscher Volkssturm’. Das letzte Aufgebot 1944/45, Munich, 1989, 45–9; Padfield, Himmler, 540–3. Text of Himmler’s speech at the first ‘roll-call’ of the Volkssturm in Bartenstein (East Prussia), on 18 October 1944, in IfZ, MA 315, frames 2614201ff.
133. Hitler had, in fact, in referring in 1937 to the reasons why he had had to ‘annihilate’ Ernst Rohm and other SA leaders three years earlier, explicitly rejected ‘the so-called levée en masse’ and the notion ‘that soldiers can be created only through the mobilisation of, let’s say, enthusiasm’ (Domarus, 424, 2150, n.312).
134. Mammach, 32; Hancock, 141.
135. Mammach, 24–9.
136. RGBl, 1944, 1, Nr.53, 253–4; Mammach, 32–3.
137. Mammach, 168–70.
138. Mammach, 171.
139. Mammach, 57.
140. Mammach, 54.
141. Mammach, 186–7.
142. Mammach, 65–8.
143. See Mammach, 43–51, here 47, 50.
144. Mammach, 72–3.
145. Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 788.
146. Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 171, seems to underplay this.
147. See Rebentisch, 423–63, referring largely to the 1941–3 period.
148. IMG, XXXV, 494–502, Doc.753-D (with Bormann’s reply of 5 January 1945, putting it down largely to ‘misunderstandings’). See Rebentisch, 426; Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 171–2; Gruchmann, ‘Die “Reichsregierung” im Führerstaat’, 211, 223 n.115; Broszat, Staat, 394–5; Lang, Der Sekretär, 309–10, 490; Dieter Rebentisch, ‘Hitlers Reichskanzlei zwischen Politik und Verwaltung’, in Rebentisch and Teppe, 65–99, here 96; Diehl-Thiele, 256–7.
149. Padfield, Himmler, 514, even describes him as ‘undoubtedly the chief beneficiary of the failed putsch’.
150. Padfield, Himmler, 543ff.
151. Weinberg III, 750; DZW, vi.78–9. Total losses since the beginning of the war were, by 1 October 1944, 2,748,034 men killed, injured, missing, or captured.
152. DZW, vi.183; Weinberg III, 750 (where the October losses are given as only one merchant ship). The total lost to U-boats in the last months of 1944 amounted to 321,732 tons of shipping, only about 2.3 per cent of the 14 million tons of Allied shipping launched the previous year (Oxford Companion, 69).
153. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1573.
154. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 433–4, 478, 480, 741 n.112, 786 n.155; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 295.
155. Weinberg III, 692–3; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 295–6. On the military details: John Prados, ‘Cobra: Patton’s Offensive in France, Summer 1944’, in Albert A. Nofi (ed.), The War against Hitler. Military Strategy in the West, Conshokoken, PA, 1995, 133–55.
156. In the briefing, Hitler asserted that if he could use another 800 fighters there and then, ‘the entire crisis that we have would be immediately overcome’ (LB Darmstadt, 245). In a subsequent military briefing, on 31 August, Hitler said there would always be moments when the tensions became too great to sustain an alliance. ‘Coalitions in world history have always at some point collapsed. Now we have to wait for the moment, however hard it is’ (LB Darmstadt, 276).
157. Below, 386–7. Hitler eventually gave orders to prepare for a western offensive to take place in November on 19 August, when he told Keitel, Jodl, and Speer to prepare to raise 25 new divisions for the attack. (IfZ, MA 1360, frame 6217521: ‘Notiz Keitels über Besprechung mit General der Artillerie Buhle vom 24. August 1944’, in which Buhle communicated Hitler’s thoughts; Irving, HW, 689 and 889, n. to 689. See also Guderian, 364, where the aim was registered as defeating the western powers and throwing them back into the Atlantic.)
158. LB Darmstadt, 243, 245, 253.
159. LB Darmstadt, 249.
160. LB Darmstadt, 250.
161. LB Darmstadt, 244, 250, 260.
162. Hitler correctly guessed what would have been Montgomery’s preference — a strike into the Ruhr. Eisenhower prevailed in his judgement that the attack on Germany should follow on a broad front along the Rhine. (See LB Darmstadt, 252, n.331; Weinberg III, 697–700.)
163. LB Darmstadt, 251, 253, 258, 262–3.
164. LB Darmstadt, 253, 255.
165. LB Darmstadt, 251, also 258–9, 264.
166. LB Darmstadt, 244.
167. Weinberg III, 721. Dönitz had persuaded Hitler to give priority to building two new U-boat types, Type XXI and the smaller Type XXIII, faster than their predecessors and equipped with schnorkel and radar, allowing them to remain for long periods submerged and to detect enemy aircraft. Shortage of skilled labour and materials, along with disruption caused by bombing, hindered production so that, while the Americans expected 300 new U-boats in service by the end of 1944, only 180 were actually produced by the end of the war. (Parker, Struggle for Survival, 211; see also Thomas, 244–5; Peter Padfield, Dönitz: the Last Führer, New York, 1984, 387 (for Dönitz’s comments to Hitler on 16 December about the need for the new U-boats); and Doenitz, Memoirs, 424ff., 432–3 for his retrospective views on the U-boat campaign in late 1944 and early 1945.)
168. LB Darmstadt, 244–5.
169. LB, Darmstadt, 254–5, 259, 268. The lack of ports for the landing of men and provisions was indeed a hindrance to the Allies during the autumn. Only Cherbourg, much destroyed, was initially in their hands. The surrender of Dieppe and Ostend, and the capture of Brest, Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais made things somewhat easier by October. But the shortage of big dock cranes remained a serious handicap until Antwerp, taken by the British on 4 September, became fully operational, once the Scheldt estuary had been taken, in late November (LB Darmstadt, 253, n.335; Weinberg III, 693). For Hitler’s exchange of telegrams with the commander of the German garrison at St Malo, taken in mid-August, see Domarus, 2142. Hitler told the commander (Colonel von Aulock) that every day he held out was of profit for the German war effort. The commander promised to fight to the last man. Hitler thanked him and his ‘heroic men’, and said the commander’s name would go down in history.
170. Irving, HW, 683–4; Weinberg III, 693; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 202.
171. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 296–7; Weinberg III, 692–4; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 200–2; Irving, HW, 683–9.
172. LB Darmstadt, 273. Irving, HW, 696 and n.6, 889–90, notes to 687 and 696, regards Hitler’s suspicions as justified, and is followed in this by Richard Lamb, ‘Kluge’, in Correlli Barnett (ed.), Hitler’s Generals, London, 1990, 394–409, here 407. The evidence assembled seems, however, tenuous. And it seems doubtful whether Kluge would have had the courage for such a step. Colonel von Gersdorff, who had been deeply involved in the attempts at Army Group Centre to kill Hitler, claimed he had pleaded in vain with Kluge at this time to enter into negotiations with the enemy. Gersdorff had said the decision was the sort which had faced ‘all great men in world history’. Kluge’s answer was: ‘Gersdorff, Field-Marshal v. Kluge is not a great man.’ (Cit. Gersdorff, 151–2. For Hitler’s awareness of Kluge’s connections with the resistance group, see Guderian, 341; TBJG II/13, 208, 210 (3 August 1944).)
173. LB Darmstadt, 273.
174. Gene Mueller, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge’, in Ueberschär, Hitlers militärische Elite, 1, 130–57, here 134; Peter Steinbach, ‘Hans Günther von Kluge — Ein Zauderer im Zwielicht’, in Smelser and Syring, Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches, 288–324, here 318–19. For Montgomery’s errors, see Weinberg III, 689–90, 693–4, 725.
175. Hitler remarked in a military briefing on 31 August that the suspicions were such that, had he not committed suicide, Kluge would have been immediately arrested (LB Darmstadt, 272).
176. Dieter Ose, Entscheidung im Westen. Der Oberbefehlshaber West und die Abwehr der allierten Invasion, Stuttgart, 2nd edn, 1985, 340, Anlage 18.
177. Despite the doubts of Steinbach, ‘Kluge’, 320, and Mueller, ‘Kluge’, 135, it is clear that Hitler did receive Kluge’s letter. See TBJG, II/13, 372 (31 August 1944), and Irving, HW, 696.
178. LB Darmstadt, 279 and n.383.
179. LB Darmstadt, 280. See also Irving, HW, 696.
180. See Weinberg III, 761; Oxford Companion, 418–22.
181. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 299.
182. Domarus, 2143; DZW, vi.424–5; KTB OKW, iv/1, 358–60.
183. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkreig, 297–9; Weinberg III, 694–5.
184. Ronald Heifermann, World War 11, London, 1973, 229.
185. Weinberg III, 700.
186. The military aspects are assessed in Phil Kosnett and Stephen B. Patrick, ‘Highway to the Reich: Operation Market-Garden, 17–26 September 1944’, in Nofi, 156–77.
187. DZW, vi.112–18; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 302–5; Weinberg III, 701–2; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 206–8; Heifermann, 229–30. Around 17,000 men were lost by the western Allies in the fighting in the second half of September. German losses were 3,300 troops. British losses alone numbered between 12,000 and 13,000 (DZW, vi.116).
188. Weinberg III, 752.
189. See TBJG, II/13, 204, 209 (3 August 1944). Turkey did not, in fact, declare war on Germany until 1 March 1945 (Domarus, 2136).
190. Guderian, 364–5; Irving, HW, 681.
191. Weinberg III, 713.
192. Guderian, 367.
193. Weinberg III, 714.
194. Weinberg III, 714–15.
195. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 274–5; Weinberg III, 716–17; DZW, vi.90–95.
196. Erickson, Road to Berlin, 290–307; Weinberg III, 712; DZW, vi.86–90.
197. Weinberg III, 715.
198. TBJG, II/13, 204 (3 August 1944).
199. Domarus, 2142–3; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 258.
200. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 258–9.
201. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 254–6; Weinberg III, 710–11.
202. Guderian, 355.
203. Himmler’s speech to Wehrkreis Commanders of 21 September 1944, in Smith/Petersen, Himmler. Geheimreden, 246; trans. (slightly amended), Padfield, Himmler, 524. In the handwritten notes he made for his speech to Wehrkreis commanders in Jägerhöhe on 21 September 1944, Himmler jotted: ‘General Bor in Warsaw rejects surrender. Then the population dies with him.’ (‘General Bor in Warschau lehnt Übergabe ab, dann stirbt Bevölkerung mit.’) (IfZ, MA 315, frames 2584103ff. (quotation, frame 2584105).)
204. Himmler stated this in his address to the Wehrkreis commanders on 21 September (see Padfield, Himmler, 524). For the order to raze Warsaw by Hitler on 11 October, see IMG, xii.88, cit. Dok. USSR-128 (=PS-3305); also Padfield, Himmler, 524–5; and Guderian, 358.
205. Guderian, 356; Höhne, Death’s Head, 502; Padfield, Himmler, 524–5; Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 440, 539, for the Dirlewanger and Kaminski units. See also, Hellmuth Auerbach, ‘Konzentrationslagerhäftlinge im Fronteinsatz’, in Benz, Miscellanea. Festschrift für Helmut Krausnick, 63–83, here especially 66–7.
206. Padfield, Himmler, 527; DZW, vi.61. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 257, has lower figures for both Polish and German losses.
207. IMG, xii.88; Guderian, 358.
208. Schenck, 148; Irving, Doctor, 160; also Redlich, 207.
209. Schenck, 337–8, 342–3.
210. Schenck, 329, 333–6; Irving, Doctor, 161–2, 252–6; Redlich, 224–5, 368–9. Schenck, 336–7. dismisses suggestions that Hitler might have at any point suffered a heart attack, as has sometimes been claimed (e.g. in Hauner, Hitler, 193, and Toland, 822).
211. Schenck, 148. Below, 389, attributed Hitler’s physical collapse to the news that Himmler had just given him of the involvement by Canaris, Goerdeler, Oster, Dohnanyi, and Beck in plotting against him as early as 1938–9. But Himmler gave that information to Hitler on 26 September, as Below notes (see also Irving, HW, 710–11); Hitler’s severe stomach spasms had begun in the night of 23–4 September, as Morell’s diary indicates. For Hitler’s ‘agitation’ over Arnhem and the failure of the Luftwaffe, see Irving, HW, 706–8.
212. Irving, Doctor, 163; Irving, HW, 712; Below, 389.
213. Schenck, 148–9; Irving, Doctor, 164; Irving, HW, 712; Redlich, 207.
214. Schenck, 44, 150–3; Irving, Doctor, 164–8, 172–3.
215. Irving, Doctor, 169–79; Redlich, 209.
216. Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 161.
217. See Redlich, 244–52 for a balanced assessment of Morell. Far more critical is Schenck, 287–8.
218. Redlich, 237–44. Schenck, 196–215, assesses the numerous medicines given to Hitler. See also Irving, Doctor, 259–70. Leonard L. Heston and Renate Heston, The Medical Casebook of Adolf Hitler, London, 1979, build up an implausible theory of Hitler’s dependency upon amphetamines as the basis of his irrationality. (See Redlich, 240–42 for a critique.)
219. See Redlich, 233; and Schenck, 325ff. and Redlich, 224–5 for cardiovascular problems.
220. Redlich, 332–41.
221. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens. Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941–1945, Berlin, 1986, 265ff; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 404–5; and Martin, Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 195ff.
222. IMG, xvi.533 (Speer’s testimony of 20 June 1946); Boyd, 158–9; Irving, HW, 891 (note to 699). It is unclear why Weinberg III, 720, thinks ‘there is some evidence that in the fall of 1944 Hitler for the first time seriously considered a possibility he had hitherto always dismissed out of hand’.
223. TBJG, II/13, 524 (20 September 1944).
224. TBJG, II/13, 52.4–5 (20 September 1944). Word of Oshima’s proposal had evidently by this time spread further than Goebbels’s own ministry. The following day, Goebbels castigated in his diary entry a speech, held in private to a select audience, by Labour Front leader Robert Ley which reported on the Oshima initiative and indicated that peace with Moscow was to be expected in the near future (TBJG, II/13, 535 (21 September 1944)).
225. TBJG. II/13, 536–42 (23 September 1944). The rest of his letter was an attack on Ribbentrop, his old adversary, as the man least likely to be capable of bringing about the skilful manoeuvre needed, and a disclaimer that he himself had any ambitions other than to serve Hitler, whose genius in successfully guiding this ‘greatest war in our history’ to victory and securing a happy future for the German people he did not doubt for a second.
226. TBJG, II/13, 556 (24 September 1944), 562 (25 September 1944); TBJG II/14, 83–4 (12 October 1944).
227. See Irving, HW, 689.
228. Below, 390; Guderian, 364.
229. Speer, 423.
230. Below, 390.
231. Below, 386–7.
232. Speer, 417–19. And see Kirwin, ‘Waiting for Retaliation’, for the expectations.
233. Speer, 377. Even this would have carried an explosive load of less than half that of a single combined British and American bombing sortie towards the end of the war (Speer, 572, n.9).
234. Speer, 378.
235. Below, 390.
236. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 284–5; DZW, vi.176.
237. Speer, 239–43; Mark Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power 1939–1945). Cambridge, 1989, 77–8 and ch.4, especially 136–7, and 155; Mark Walker, ‘Legenden um die deutsche Atombombe’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 45–74, here 53; Monika Renneberg and Mark Walker (eds.), Science, Technology, and National Socialism, Cambridge, 1994, 2; Kristie Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika. Scientific Research in Nazi Germany, New York/Oxford, 1993, 173–4, 244 n.41.
238. LB Darmstadt, 245.
239. Speer, 415–17.
240. Speer, 578 n.21.
241. Speer, 414.
242. Speer, 414–15.
243. Irving, Doctor, 166.
244. TBJG, II/14, 117 (29 October 1944).
245. Speer, 423.
246. Speer, 413.
247. Domarus, 2141 (in response to Papen’s offer to take soundings via Spain).
248. Speer, 423.
249. TBJG, II/13, 208, 210 (3 August 1944). See also his negative comments about Rommel on 31 August in LB Darmstadt, 273–5.
250. Keitel, 332; Domarus, 2155; Speidel, Invasion, 1 78ff.; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 651–2; Fest, Staatsstreich, 313–14.
251. Domarus, 2157.
252. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 275–6 (and see Irving, HW, 722–3).
253. Skorzeny, 126, 130, 132, 134.
254. Skorzeny, 134–5.
255. Skorzeny, 133–5.
256. Skorzeny, 136–8.
257. See Skorzeny, 138ff.; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 275–8; Irving, HW, 719–24; DZW, vi.531–2; Hilberg, Destruction, 552–4.
258. Hilberg, Destruction, 546.
259. Hilberg, Destruction, 552.
260. Hilberg, Destruction, 553 and n.1035.
261. Hilberg, Vernichtung, ii.925–6.
262. Skorzeny, 146.
263. IfZ, F29, diary of General Werner Kreipe, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, Fol.21. See also Guderian, 370–71; Irving, HW, 705. Guderian’s warnings that an offensive in the west would seriously weaken the defences in the east would all too soon prove prophetic. (See Weinberg III, 770.)
264. TBJG, II/13, 498, 500–501 (17 September 1944). See also Irving, HW, 706.
265. Warlimont, 478. For the varying views of Goebbels, Speer, and Stuckart from the Reich Ministry of the Interior, see TBJG, II/13, 491 (16 September 1944), 501 (17 September 1944). The failure of relations between the Party and the Wehrmacht in the first critical days of the Allied advance on Aachen prompted Hitler’s directives of 19 and 20 September, ordering the continuation of the activities of Party and civil administration in operational areas, also within the Reich itself, and stipulating the duties of the Gauleiter/Reich Defence Commissars. (Weisungen, 337–41; Warlimont, 478–9.)
266. TBJG, ΙΙ/13, 553 (24 September 1944).
267. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 306.
268. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 260; TBJG, II/14, 89 (23 October 1944).
269. Below, 391.
270. Bormann Letters, 139 (25 October 1944).
271. Bormann Letters, 138 (24 October 1944); Schroeder, 150.
272. TBJG, II/14, 93 (24 October 1944). See also TBJG, II/14, 88 (23 October 1944), Schroeder, 150; and Irving, HW, 725.
273. Below, 391; TBJG, II/14, 110 (26 October 1944); Irving, HW, 726, 893 note. Hitler was keen to make use of the atrocities for propaganda purposes. (See Jodl’s note arising from the military briefing on 25 October 1944 in IfZ, Nbg.-Dok., 1787-PS, 496: ‘Russian atrocities in the occupation of East Prussian territory must be spread by Wehrmacht propaganda. Photographs, questioning of witnesses, factual reports etc. for this. Where are the [Wehrmacht] propaganda companies?’ (‘Russische Greueltaten bei der Besetzung ostpreußischen Gebiets müssen durch Wpr verbreitet werden. Dazu Aufnahmen. Zeugenvernehmung, Tatsachenberichte usw. Wo bleiben die Prop.-Kompanien?’)) Whatever the propaganda exploitation, there can be no doubt that horrific atrocities were indeed perpetrated by soldiers of the Red Army. In military terms, the short-lived capture of Gumbinnen and Goldap (at high cost) provided Soviet forces with valuable experience to prepare their later full-scale assault on East Prussia. (Glantz and House, 228–9, 365–6 (n.34).)
274. KTB OKW, iv/1, 439, 442–3; Warlimont, 480; Below, 391–2.
275. Below, 390.
276. See TBJG, II/13, 582 (28 September 1944); Irving, HW, 708; Samuel W. Mitcham Jr, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim’, in Ueberschär, Hitlers militärische Elite, II, 72–7.
277. TBJG, II/14, 328 (2 December 1944).
278. In discussion with Goebbels, one of the Reich Marshal’s main detractors, Hitler defended Göring and pointed to his earlier services in building up the Luftwaffe (TBJG, II/13, 213 (3 August 1944)). Sentimentality is, however, unlikely to have been the real reason for holding on to Göring. Issues of public image were more weighty.
279. Below, 394; Irving, HW, 708, 714, 728; Mitcham, 76.
280. TBJG II/13, 582 (28 September 1944); Irving, HW 728. See also Irving, Goring, 438–45.
281. TBJG, II/14, 330 (2 December 1944).
282. Speer, 578. n.21; Irving, Goring, 442, 444. Hitler cut Below short when the latter advocated the exclusive use of the Me262s as fighters (Below, 393). Despite his insistence on their production as bombers, the first fifty fighters began operations in mid-October (Irving, Goring, 442).
283. See his comments in his military briefing on 28 December 1944 (LB Darmstadt, 314); also his hints in this direction in the briefing on 12 December (LB Darmstadt, 294). He told Goebbels at the beginning of December that German arms were superior to those of the Allies in all areas except that of the Luftwaffe, and that there was no prospect of overcoming this inferiority in the near future (TBJG, II/14, 330 (2 December 1944)).
284. TBJG, II/13, 503–4 (17 September 1944), 510 (18 September 1944).
285. TBJG, II/14, 193 (10 November 1944), 210 (13 November 1944).
286. Domarus, 2162. The words ‘Ausrottung’ (‘eradication’) and ‘Vernichtung’ (‘annihilation’) were used on numerous occasions during the proclamation.
287. Domarus, 2163.
288. Domarus, 2165–6.
289. Domarus, 2165.
290. Domarus, 2167.
291. Below, 395. For further indications of despondency, see Irving, HW, 893, note to 726, and 894, note to 739.
292. TBJG, II/14, 210 (13 November 1944), 217 (16 November 1944). For Hitler’s general ill-health, throat problems, nervous tension about the coming offensive, and irritability in November 1944, see Schenk, 256–62; Irving, Doctor, 187–97 (from Morell’s diary).
293. Below, 395; Schenck, 320–23; Irving, Doctor, 194–7; Irving, HW, 734. The operation was carried out on 22 November. For a week, he could speak only in a whisper (Below, 396).
294. TBJG II/14, 316 (2 December 1944).
295. TBJG, II/14, 317 (2 December 1944).
296. TBJG, II/14, 318–19 (2 December 1944).
297. TBJG, II/14, 322 (2 December 1944).
298. TBJG, II/14, 323–4 (2 December 1944).
299. TBJG, II/14, 321 (2 December 1944). Linge recalled Hitler’s short-lived revitalization at the beginning of the offensive (Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 250).
300. For Dietrich, see Charles Messenger, Hitler’s Gladiator. The Life and Times of Oberstgruppenführer der Waffen-SS Sepp Dietrich, London, 1988; James T. Weingartner, ‘Josef “Sepp” Dietrich — Hitlers Volksgeneral’, in Smelser and Syring, Die Militärelite des Dritten Reiches, 113–28; William T. Allbritton and Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr, ‘SS-Oberstgruppenführer und Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Joseph (Sepp) Dietrich’, in Ueberschär, Hitlers militärische Elite, ii.37–44. I am grateful to Dr Chris Clarke for letting me see a sketch of Dietrich’s character and career, ‘Josef “Sepp” Dietrich: Landsknecht im Dienste Hitlers’, forthcoming in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.), Die SS: Elite unter dem Totenkopf. 30 Lebensläufe, Paderborn etc., 2000, 119–33. Both Dietrich and Manteuffel are the subjects of a brief pen-picture by Franz Kurowski, ‘Dietrich and Manteufel’, in Barnett, Hitler’s Generals, 411–37.
301. Warlimont, 480–83 (quotations, 482, 482–3; code-names of the operation, 480, 490); KTB OKW, iv/1, 439.
302. Warlimont, 485.
303. Below, 396; Domarus, 2171, n.377.
304. LB Darmstadt, 290–91 (12 December 1944).
305. LB Darmstadt 291.
306. LB Darmstadt 277 (31 August 1944).
307. LB Darmstadt 292.
308. Weinberg III, 766.
309. Stephen B. Patrick, ‘The Ardennes Offensive: An Analysis of the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944’, in Nofi, 206–24, here 217; Oxford Companion, 114.
310. Guderian, 380–81; Warlimont, 490–91; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 310–12; Weinberg III, 766–8; Heifermann, 232–4.
311. LB Darmstadt, 302–3; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 313.
312. LB Darmstadt, 295–6 (28 December 1944).
313. LB Darmstadt, 297.
314. LB Darmstadt, 315.
315. LB Darmstadt, 305.
316. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 313–14; LB Darmstadt, 316 n.428
317. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 312; Weinberg III. 769.
318. Even reports from the Reich Propaganda Offices throughout Germany, invariably hesitant about conveying anything other than the rosiest-coloured views, mentioned disappointment about the speech (BA, R55/612, ‘Echo zur Führerrede’, Fols.20–21). Goebbels, in evident irritation, scored through the offending passages of the summary report drawn up for him. Newspaper reports of the speech struck Jewish readers in Dresden by the absence of any mention whatsoever of the western offensive (Klemperer, ii.637 (5 January 1945)).
319. Domarus, 2180.
320. Domarus, 2180, 2182.
321. Domarus, 2184.
322. IWM, ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden’, 277, report of SD-Leitabschnitt Stuttgart, 9 January 1945: ‘Der Führer habe also von allem Anfang an auf den Krieg hingearbeitet.’
323. IWM, ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden’, 67, report of the SD-Leitabschnitt Stuttgart, 12 January 1945: ‘… er hätte bewuβt diesen Weltbrand entfacht, um als groβer “Verwandler der Menschheit” proklamiert zu werden.’
324. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1345; Warlimont, 494.
325. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1346–7; also 1352–4.
326. Warlimont, 494; KTB OKW, iv/2, 1353 (heading of the section dealing with military events between 14 and 28 January 1945).
327. Weinberg III, 769.
328. Below, 398.
1. Breloer, 359–60.
2. Breloer, 359 (entry for 22 January 1945).
3. Hitler was reported to have stated this explicitly, in addressing Colonel-General Carl Hilpert, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Courland, on 18 April 1945: ‘If the German people loses the war, it will have shown itself as not worthy of me.’ (‘Wenn das deutsche Volk den Krieg verliert, hat es sich meiner als nicht würdig erwiesen.’) (KTB OKW, iv/1, 68 (introduction by Percy Ernst Schramm, citing a written account of Hitler’s meeting with Hilpert by Dr W. Heinemeyer, then responsible for compiling the War Diary of Army Group Courland).)
4. Below, 340, with reference to the visit to the Berghof on 24 June 1943 of Baldur and Henriette von Schirach, which ended in their premature departure after angering Hitler.
5. Guderian, 382; and see Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 414; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 217; DZW, vi.502–3. At the beginning of 1945, the German army had some 7.5 million men at its disposal. Of its 260 divisions, seventy-five were placed on the eastern front between the Carpathians and the Baltic, where the Soviet offensive was forecast. Apart from the seventy-six divisions in the west, a further twenty-four were deployed in Italy, seventeen were located in Norway and Denmark protecting U-boat bases and Swedish iron-ore supplies, ten were in Yugoslavia, twenty-eight defended oil and bauxite supplies from Hungary, and thirty were cut off in Memel and the Courland (Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 414).
6. Guderian, 383.
7. Guderian, 385.
8. Guderian, 386–8. Speaking privately to Goebbels a few days after the Soviet breakthrough, Hitler did not blame it primarily on a failure of the military leadership. He pointed to the unavoidable thinness of the defences around the Baranov bridgehead because of the need to take troops to the west for the Ardennes offensive, and to Hungary to secure oil supplies (ΤΒJG, II/15, 193 (23 January 1945)).
9. Guderian, 393–4, 417. Göring, who found the weakness of German defences at the Baranov bridgehead incomprehensible, given the prior intelligence that the offensive could be expected there, was critical, in discussion with Goebbels, about Hitler’s decision to attempt a counter-attack on Hungary. Goebbels thought Hitler’s approach was correct because of the urgent need of fuel (TBJG, II/15, 251 (28 January 1945)).
10. Guderian, 394–5, 412–13; Gerhard Boldt, Hitler’s Last Days. An Eye-Witness Account, (1947), Sphere Books edn, London, 1973, 50–53; Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1933–1945, Bd.II: 1942–1945, Munich, 1975, 493, 496, 520–35; Weinberg III, 721, 782; and Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘German Plans for Victory, 1944–1945’, in Gerhard L. Weinberg (ed.), Germany, Hitler, and World War II, Cambridge, 1995, 274–86, here 284–5.
11. DZW, vi.525.
12. Guderian, 396–8.
13. DZW, vi.529–36.
14. Guderian, 398.
15. DZW, vi.510–12; Guderian, 400–401; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 416.
16. Guderian, 400.
17. Goebbels underlined Himmler’s difficulties, since his ‘army group exists in practice only on paper’. He thought Hitler’s optimism about holding the line in the east misplaced (TBJG, II/15, 231 (26 January 1945)).
18. Guderian, 415.
19. For the above, see Guderian, 403–4, 414–15, 422.
20. ‘The Führer is very dissatisfied with him,’ Goebbels noted on 12 March 1945 (TBJG, II/15, 480). See also Below, 406.
21. For a description of conditions within Breslau in February 1945, see Siegfried Knappe and Ted Brusaw, Soldat. Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936–1949, New York, 1992, 299–312.
22. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 416.
23. Guderian, 402, 405, 417.
24. Orlow, ii.478. Goebbels, contemptuous of Greiser’s flight, after having misinformed Hitler about the imminence of the fall of Posen, recommended ruthless punishment (TBJG, II/15, 232 (26 January 1945). See also TBJG, II/15, 205, 210 (24 January 1945), 214, 219, 223 (25 January 1945), 241 (27 January 1945).) Hitler took no action. It transpired from what he told Goebbels, and from a conversation Goebbels had with Bormann, that Greiser had been instructed by Hitler to leave Posen — as it turned out quite prematurely. (Greiser claimed after the war that Hitler had ordered him to go to Frankfurt an der Oder as Reich Governor and that he left his post in the Warthegau on 20 January (NA, Washington, NND 871063: arrest report on Greiser, 17 May 1945; Special Interrogation Report, 1 June 1945)). The town remained for a further eight days in German hands, but the refugee columns fleeing from the Red Army received no support from the Party (TBJG, II/15, 190, 193 (23 January 1945), 261–2 (29 January 1945)). Greiser was to be put on trial after the war in Warsaw, sentenced to death, and publicly hanged in Poznan on 14 July 1946.
25. See BA, R55/622, Fols.181–2, a survey, dated 9 March 1945, of letters sent to Reich Propaganda Offices, which stated: ‘The “Greiser case” is doing the rounds and is supplemented by reports from refugees about the failure of the NSDAP in the evacuation of entire Gaue.’ (‘Der “Fall Greiser” macht überall die Runde und wird durch die Berichte der Flücbtlinge über das Versagen der NSDAP bei der Evakuierung ganzer Gaue ergänzt.’) One passage cited from an anonymous letter held to the old fable: ‘If the Führer knew how he is deceived everywhere, he would have swept through long ago.’ (‘Wenn der Führer wüβte, wie er überall hintergangen wird, hätte er längst dazwischengefegt.’)
26. Guderian, 412; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 417–18. See Speer’s description of the heated arguments between Hitler and Guderian over evacuating the troops from Courland (Speer, 428).
27. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 218; Weinberg III, 801; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 420.
28. The following passages are based on Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 420–25; Weinberg III, 811–13; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 219–20; DZW, vi. 537–58.
29. Weinberg III, 811.
30. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 423–4. Hitler told Kesselring that he was confident of holding the eastern front on which all depended. The urgent demand was to hold the western front until reinforcements from the east, new fighters and other new weapons could be employed in great numbers, and until Dönitz could make the new U-boats tell. ‘So it was,’ he concluded, ‘once again a battle for time!’ (Albert Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, (1953), Greenhill Books edn, London, 1997, 237–9 (quotation, 239)). On Rundstedt’s dismissal, see Blumentritt, 277– 9; Messenger, 228–9.
31. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 422–3; John Toland, The Last 100 Days, London, 1966, 256; LB Darmstadt, 339 n.451.
32. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 424.
33. DZW, vi.583–5; Oxford Companion, 311 –12.
34. DZW, vi.586; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 280, 414. Postwar Allied estimates reckoned that a third of the German population suffered directly from the bombing, around 14 million people losing property, up to 20 million being deprived of electricity, gas, or water at some time, 5 million being forced to evacuate. A quarter of homes had been damaged. Some 305,000 people had been killed. (United States Strategic Bombing Survey, vol.4, New York/London, 1976, 7–10.)
35. Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neiβe, repr. Munich, 1984, Bd.1, 28.
36. Hans Graf von Lehndorff, Ostpreuβisches Tagebuch. Aufzeichnungen eines Arztes aus den Jahren 1945–1947, Munich (1967), 15th edn, 1985, 18, 22.
37. Lehndorff, 18.
38. Lehndorff, 24–5.
39. Johannes Steinhoff, Peter Pechel and Dennis Showalter, Voices from the Third Reich: an Oral History, (1989), New York, 1994, 420.
40. Ursula von Kardorff, Berliner Aufzeichnungen 1942–1945, Munich (1976), 2nd edn, 1982, 228. See also the description of a woman’s flight from Breslau in January 1945, accompanied by her two small children and elderly parents, in Margarete Dörr, ‘Wer die Zeit nicht miterlebt hat…’. Frauenerfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg und in den Jahren danach, 3 vols., Frankfurt/New York, 1998, ii.455–60.
41. Andreas-Friedrich, 126.
42. See the initial scepticism about the stories in Kardorff, 229. For anxiety in Dresden, see Klemperer, ii.645–6.
43. GStA, Munich, MA 106696, report of the Regierungspräsident of Niederbayern and Oberpfalz, 10 March 1945: ‘Die aus den Ostgauen hier eintreffenden Flüchtlinge bringen zum groβen Teil recht erschütternde Nachrichten von dem Elend der flüchtenden Bevölkerung, die zum Teil panikartig ins Innere des Reiches vor den Bolschewisten geflüchtet ist.’ Goebbels wrote in his diary of ‘indescribable misery’ among the refugee treks from the east, adding two days later that reports on Bolshevik atrocities could only be released for publication abroad since they would give rise to panic among the refugees if published within Germany (TBJG, II/15, 190 (23 January 1945), 216 (25 January 1945)).
44. See, among many examples, Die Vertreibung, Bd.2, 159–64, 224–34; Käthe von Normann, Tagebuch aus Pommern 1945/46, Munich (1962), 5th edn, 1984, 12ff. Dörr, ii.406–24.
45. Barbara Johr, ‘Die Ereignisse in Zahlen’, in Helke Sander and Barbara Johr (eds.), Befreier und Befreite. Krieg, Vergewaltigungen, Kinder, Munich, 1992, 46–72, here 47–8, 58–9. I am grateful to Detlef Siebert for referring me to this essay.
46. Cit. Steinert, 547.
47. Steinert, 547–50.
48. Steinert, 550–51; text of Thierack’s decree of 15 February 1945 and Hitler’s order of 9 March 1945 in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, Kriegsende 1945. Die Zerstörung des Deutschen Reiches, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 161–4.
49. See the example in Rees, The Nazis, 231–4.
50. Kardorff, 231.
51. Cit. Steinert, 559.
52. GStA, Munich, MA 106695, report of the Regierungspräsident of Schwaben, 7 February 1945: ‘Mit Schrecken verfolgt die Bevölkerung die Ereignisse im Osten des Reiches, wo die Sturmflut der Sowjets die Grenzen der Heimat umbrandet…’
53. Dörr, ‘Wer die Zeit nicht miterlebt hat…’. Frauenerfahrungen, i.156.
54. GStA, Munich, MA 106696, report of the Regierungspräsident of Oberfranken and Mittelfranken, 8 February 1945.
55. Based on a report compiled ten years after the events by the Geschäftsführer des Interministerialen Luftkriegsauschusses der Reichsregierung in Berlin 1943–5, Theodor Ellgering, cit. in Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende 1945,158–61. See also the description of the bombing in Klemperer, ii.661–72.
56. Friedmann Behr, Mein Jahr 1945, East Berlin, 1988, 15: ‘Wir sahen die ersten Toten des Krieges und erschraken so sehr, daβ uns aller Mut verlieβ.’
57. Cit. Maschmann, 169: ‘Ja, aber das ist nicht wichtig. Deutschland muβ siegen.’
58. See Klemperer, ii.676, for comments following the raid on Dresden.
59. BA, R55/622, Fol.181, ‘Briefübersicht Nr.10’, 9 March 1945: ‘Das Vertrauen in die Führung schwindet immer mehr, weil der angekündigte Gegenschlag zur Befreiung unserer besetzten Ostprovinzen ausblieb und sich die manigfachen Versprechungen auf eine bevorstehende Wende als unerfüllbar erwiesen baben.…Besonders hart ist die Kritik an der oberen Führerschicht der Partei und der militärischen Führung.’
60. BA, R55/601. Fol.295–6, Tätigkeitsbericht, 21 March 1945: ‘Diejenigen, die noch nach wie vor unbeirrbar und unerschütterlich auf die Worte des Führers vertrauten, daβ noch in diesem Jahre die geschichtliche Wende zu unserem Gunsten eintrete, hätten gegenüber den Zweiflern und Miesmachern einen sehr schweren Stand. Bei allem unerschütterlichen Vertrauen in den Führer scheue man sich jedoch nicht zu äuβern, daβ der Führer bestimmt nicht durch die militärischen Stellen über die wirkliche Lage unterrichtet sein könne, sonst wäre es nicht zu der jetzigen schweren Krise gekommen.’ Goebbels referred even in late January to the ‘deeply depressing’ reports from the regional Propaganda Offices, the loss of hope of any new weapons turning the tide, and severe criticism of the leadership for being unprepared to combat the Soviet offensive (TBJG, II/15, 230 (26 January 1945)).
61. StA, Munich, report of the Landrat of Berchtesgaden, 4 April 1945: ‘Als der Führer der Wehrmachtseinheit am Schluβ seiner zu der Feier gehaltenen Rede ein “Sieg-Heil” auf den Führer ausbrachte, wurde es weder von der angetretenen Wehrmacht, dem Volkssturm noch von der als Zuschauer erschienenen Zivilbevölkerung erwidert. Dieses Schweigen der Masse wirkte geradezu drückend und spiegelt wohl am besten die tatsächliche Einstellung des Volkes.’ The comment was passed on by the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern in his report of 7 April 1945: GStA, Munich, MA 106695.
62. See Klemperer, ii.646, 658, 661, 675, 677; and also Monika Richarz (ed.), Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Bd.3. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1918–1945, Stuttgart, 1982, 471.
63. Klemperer, ii.658 (13 February 1945).
64. Klemperer, ii.661 (13 February 1945).
65. Martin Broszat, ‘Nationalsozialistische Konzentrationslager 1933–1945’, in Buchheim et al. (eds.), Anatomie des SS-Staates, ii.159–60; Daniel Blatman, ‘Die Todesmärsche’, in Ulrich Herbert, Karin Orth, and Christoph Dieckmann (eds.), Die nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. Entwicklung und Struktur, 2 vols., Göttingen, 1998, ii.1063–92, here 1066; and, especially, for the concentration camps in the last year of Nazi rule, Karin Orth, Das System der nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager. Eine politische Organisationsgeschichte, Hamburg, 1999, 222ff. Around half a million of the prisoners were men, some 200,000 women; they were guarded by about 40,000 SS men.
66. See a first-hand account of the horror in Richarz, 443–53 (account of Paul Heller). See also Blatman, especially 1085–7; Goldhagen, 330; Orth, 278ff., 285–6; Schmuel Krakowski, ‘The Death Marches in the Period of the Evacuation of the Camps’, and Yehuda Bauer, ‘The Death-Marches, January-May 1945’, both in Michael Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, Westport, 1989, vol.9, 476–90 (here, especially, 480–83), and 491–511; and ‘Death Marches’, in Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust, ed. Israel Gutmann, New York, 1990, 348–54.
67. Goldhagen, 365, 587 n.23; Isabell Sprenger, ‘Das KZ Groβ-Rosen in der letzten Kriegsphase’, in Herbert et al., Die Konzentrationslager, ii.1113–27, here 1120–21.
68. Czech, Kalendarium 898–900, 933, 940–41, 948–9, 952–3, 957–8; Pressac, Les Crématoires d’Auschwitz, 93.
69. Cit. Czech, 967.
70. Andrej Strzelecki, ‘Der Todesmarch der Häftlinge aus dem KL Auschwitz’, in Herbert et al., Konzentrationslager, ii. 1093–1112, here 1097–8; Orth, 276–9.
71. Cit. in Blatman, 1078–9.
72. Czech, 982.
73. See, for this camp, Sprenger, especially 1118 ff.; and also Orth, 279–81.
74. Based on Czech, 966–95; Herbert et al., Konzentrationslager, ii.1063–1138 (contributions by Blatman, Strzelecki, Sprenger, and Kolb); Eberhard Kolb, ‘Bergen-Belsen’, in Martin Broszat (ed.), Studien zur Geschichte der Konzentrationslager, Stuttgart, 1970, 130–53, here 147ff.; and Eberhard Kolb, Vom ‘Aufenthaltslager’ zum Konzentrationslager 1943 bis 1945, Göttingen, 1985, 39ff. See also Hilberg, Destruction, 631–3; Goldhagen, ch.13; Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust. The Jewish Tragedy, London, 1987, chs.40–41; Martin Gilbert, Atlas of the Holocaust, London, 1982, 215ff.
75. Hilberg, 632.
76. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 123; Pierre Galante and Eugen Silianoff, Last Witnesses in the Bunker, London, 1989,137 (testimony of Traudl Junge); Below, 400; Domarus, 2189.
77. Hitler blamed the eastern offensive for the failure of his own offensive in the west (TBJG, II/15, 197 (23 January 1945), 217 (25 January 1945)).
78. Guderian, 392–3.
79. Boldt, 36, for description of Reich Chancellery; IfZ, ZS 2235, Traudl Junge, Fol.2 (Interview with David Irving, 29 June 1968), comments that the blinds were down on the train, and the route for the cars from the station to the Reich Chancellery passed through streets which had been relatively little destroyed. Awareness that Hitler was back in the capital might have given citizens further cause for anxiety about the likelihood of intensified air-raids, as soon as the Allies knew of his presence there.
80. Boldt, 36–7.
81. Guderian, 409.
82. Guderian, 401–2.
83. Guderian, 404–5.
84. Speer, 431.
85. Hansjakob Stehle, ‘Deutsche Friedensfühler bei den Westmächten im Februar/März 1945’, VfZ, 30 (1982), 538–55; Reimer Hansen, ‘Ribbentrops Friedensfühler im Frühjahr 1945’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 18 (1967), 716–30; Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens. Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941–1945, Berlin, 1986, 267–75; Werner von Schmieden, ‘Notiz betreffend den deutschen Friedensfühler in der Schweiz Anfang 1945’, IfZ, ZS 604 (30 June 1947); Weinberg III, 783–4.
86. Schmidt, 587. According to Goebbels, in mid-January, Ribbentrop wanted to put out feelers to the British, but Hitler prohibited him from doing so (TBJG, II/15, 199 (23 January 1945)). Hitler did not give Ribbentrop ‘official authorization’ for his soundings (IMG, x.218; Hansen, ‘Ribbentrops Friedensfühler’, 718–19).
87. Schmidt, 587. According to Schmidt, Ribbentrop’s own interest diminished immediately when he learnt that his removal from office was also a precondition.
88. The Ribbentrop Memoirs, 170, 173. Speer pointed to Hitler’s vague hints at peace-feelers in early 1945. He had the impression, however, that Hitler ‘was far more concerned to create an atmosphere of the utmost irreconcilability, leaving no way open’ (Speer, 433). The secret dealings which Karl Wolff, head of the police in northern Italy and formerly the chief of Himmler’s personal staff, opened up in Zürich in February 1945 with Allen W. Dulles, head of the United States’ Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Europe, were aimed primarily at saving Wolff’s skin (ultimately, in this, proving successful) but, beyond that, at offering to deliver surrender of German forces in Italy — which did eventually capitulate prematurely, on 2 May 1945 — as part of a ploy to split the western Allies from the Soviet Union. The feelers were almost certainly put out with Himmler’s knowledge, looking to an ‘arrangement’ which would bypass Hitler’s implacable hostility to a negotiated end to the war by dispensing with the Führer in an attempt to rescue what was possible of the SS’s power by linking forces with the West in the fight against Bolshevism. (See Padfield, Himmler, 572–7.)
89. TBJG, II/15, 251–2 (28 January 1945).
90. TBJG, II/15, 232 (26 January 1945).
91. TBJG, II/15, 255 (28 January 1945).
92. LB Stuttgart, 860–61 (27 January 1945). See TBJG, II/15, 259 (29 January 1945) for Goebbels’s summary of the tenor of reports from British newspapers, asking whether British war aims had been upturned by the mounting Soviet threat.
93. TBJG, II/15, 253 (28 January 1945).
94. TBJG, II/15, 254–5 (28 January 1945); also TBJG, II/15, 220 (25 January 1945).
95. TBJG, II/15, 264–5 (29 January 1945). As so often, Goebbels had a few days earlier compared Hitler with Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War (TBJG, II/15, 221 (25 January 1945)).
96. TBJG, II/15, 273 (30 January 1945).
97. TBJG, II/15, 275 (30 January 1945).
98. TBJG, II/15, 256 (28 January 1945).
99. Text of speech in Domarus, 2195–8; quotations, 2195, 2197. According to Traudl Junge, Hitler railed in private about the appalling stories of Soviet barbarity coming from the eastern regions, repeatedly declaring: ‘It cannot and must not be that these cultureless beasts inundate Europe. I’m the last bulwark against this danger.’ (‘Es kann und darf nicht sein, dass diese kulturlosen Bestien Europa überscbwemmen. Icb bin das letzte Bollwerk gegen diese Gefahr.’) (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 125; Galante, 139 (with a loose translation).) Bormann wrote of the ‘Russian atrocities’ in a letter to his wife of 30 January, telling her that ‘the Bolsheviks are ravaging everything’, and ‘regard ordinary rape as just a joke, and mass shootings — particularly in the rural districts — as an everyday occurrence’ (Bormann Letters, 164).
100. Joachim Günther, Das letzte Jahr. Mein Tagebuch 1944/45, Hamburg, 1948, 453–4.
101. TBJG, II/15, 285 (31 January 1945); 301–2 (2 February 1945), where Goebbels admitted that ‘in intellectual circles’ there was disappointment over the absence of any assessment of the likely development in the east.
102. StA Neuburg an der Donau, vorl. Slg. Schum. Anh.3, SD-Auβenstelle Friedberg, 3 February 1945: ‘Die Propaganda hat es nicht fertiggebracht, den Glauben an eine positive Wendung zu stärken. Selbst die Führerrede zum 30. Januar vermochte nicht die lauten Zweifel zu beseitigen.’
103. Speer, 431–2. Guderian was mistaken in believing that Hitler had locked it away in his safe unread (Guderian, 407).
104. Speer, 434.
105. According to Bormann (Bormann Letters, 168), the New Reich Chancellery was not usable for the time being. However, Goebbels had discussions with Hitler in the large study there on 12 February and described the New Reich Chancellery as ‘still completely undestroyed’ (TBJG, II/15, 371 (13 February 1945)).
106. See a description of the damage in Bormann Letters, 168; also Schroeder, 197, 199; TBJG, II/15, 306 (5 February 1945), 320 (6 February 1945), 327 (7 February 1945); IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 123; Galante, 138 (Junge); Boldt, 35; Anton Joachimsthaler, Hitlers Ende. Legenden und Dokumente, Augsburg, 1999, 58–60.
107. See Ada Petrova and Peter Watson, The Death of Hitler: the Final Words from Russia’s Secret Archives, London, 1995, 84; Boldt, 73; Joachimsthaler, 47ff.
108. Schroeder, 197, 378 n.364; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 123; Galante, 137 (Junge); Joachimsthaler, 46–7, 65ff.
109. Joachimsthaler, 48, 75–7.
110. TBJG, II/15, 200 (23 January 1945).
111. Descriptions were provided by Hitler’s secretaries Christa Schroeder, Traudl Junge, and Johanna Wolf. See Schroeder, 197–8; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 124– 5; Galante (Junge), 138; Joachimsthaler, 73–81.
112. Guderian, 416.
113. Schroeder, 197, and 59–60, 318 n.75 for descriptions of the Old Reich Chancellery (Radziwill Palais).
114. Below, 405; Boldt, 37–8 (giving the impression that the meetings were still held in the undamaged wing of the Old Reich Chancellery).
115. Below, 403–4.
116. Schroeder, 197; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 124; Galante, 138 (Junge).
117. TBJG, II/15, 320 (6 February 1945); see also 371 (13 February 1945).
118. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, 123; Galante, 138 (Junge); Irving, Doctor, 216–17.
119. See the appointments diary kept by Heinz Linge, and preserved for the period 14 October 1944–28 February 1945, IfZ, F19/14, Fols.450–77 (for February 1945). The following description of Hitler’s daily routine is based on this appointments diary and Schroeder, 198–9.
120. For his medications, see Redlich, 243, 358–62; Irving, Doctor, 208ff.; Maser, 401–6; Heston, 82–9; Schenck, 446–50. Hitler, looking drained, told Goebbels in January that his working day was around 16–18 hours, and ran through the night (TBJG, II/15, 262 (29 January 1945)). Two months later, he informed Goebbels that he had had two hours sleep during the previous twenty-four hours (TBJG, II/15, 644 (31 March 1945)).
121. These were similar themes to the ‘table talk’ monologues of the earlier war years, noted down by Heim, Picker, and Koeppen. In 1951, a further series of monologues, allegedly by Hitler, dictated to Bormann, came to light (seventeen from February 1945, a last one on 2 April). The tone of the monologues is unmistakably that of Hitler. The themes are familiar, as are the rambling style and the discursive dips into history. There is talk, among other topics: of Churchill’s responsibility (influenced by Jews) for the war; of Britain’s rejection of German peace-offers which would have enabled the destruction of Bolshevism and saved the British Empire; of an unnatural coalition aiming to destroy Germany, a will to exterminate which gave the German people no other choice but to continue the struggle; of the example of Frederick the Great; of the need for eastward expansion, not the quest for colonies; of exposing to the world ‘the Jewish peril’ and of his warning to Jews on the eve of the war; of the timing and necessity of the war against the Soviet Union; of the difficulties caused for Germany by Italy’s weakness and blunders; of regrets that Japan did not enter the war against Russia in 1941, and the inevitability that the United States would enter the war against Germany; of the missed chance of going to war in 1938, which would have given Germany an advantage; of time always being against Germany; of being compelled to wage war as Europe’s last hope; and of the need to uphold the racial laws, and claim on gratitude for having eliminated Jews from Germany and central Europe. The monologues have a self-justificatory ring to them. They are intended for posterity, establishing a place in history. They have a reflective readiness — unusual, if not unique, for Hitler — to contemplate responsibility for errors, for example, in policy towards Italy and Spain.
The monologues were not, as those from 1941–4 were, the product of musings during meals attended by others in his entourage, or during the ‘tea hours’ with his secretaries. Neither a secretary nor anyone else mentioned them at the time, or apparently knew they were being compiled. Gerda Christian (formerly Daranowski), writing to Christa Schroeder long after the war, did not regard them as authentic, though she accepted that they could be a compilation of Hitler’s thoughts in the last months. She ruled out a possibility of Hitler summoning Bormann to dictate to him, pointing out from her own recollection how he hated verbatim accounts on paper of what he had said casually (Schroeder, 257). The main problem with the authenticity of the text is that no reliable and certifiable German version exists. It is impossible, therefore, to be certain. A great deal has to be taken on trust; and even then no safe mechanism for checking is available.
The original document containing the monologues was said to have been entrusted on 17 April 1945 by Martin Bormann to Walther Funk, Reich Minister for Economics, to remove from Berlin for safe keeping in a bank vault in Bad Gastein. While serving his term of imprisonment in Spandau after the Nuremberg Trials, fearing further incrimination should the document be discovered, Funk, it was claimed, commissioned a friend, Hans Rechenberg, with the destruction of the document. Rechenberg, the account continues, kept his promise in a literal sense; but he made a photocopy, and in 1951 handed it to François Genoud, a Swiss lawyer who had meanwhile acquired control over copyright matters pertaining to Bormann, Goebbels, and other Nazi leaders. Funk, after release from Spandau, authorized Genoud to seek out Hugh Trevor-Roper with a view to arranging publication outside Germany of the document. After the meeting with Trevor-Roper, according to Genoud, the photocopy was handed back to Funk. It thereafter went missing. Remarkably, it seems, no copy of the copy had been made before returning it. Genoud had made a French translation (La testament politique de Hitler. Notes recueillies par Martin Bormann, Paris, 1959), and in 1958 had had a translation back into German made from the French version. According to Genoud, this was at Funk’s wish, since he wished to compare the texts. Funk then allegedly corrected the re-translation in accordance with the still existing copy of the original, ‘so that’, in Genoud’s words, ‘a practically authentic text, coming from this time, exists’. An English edition, with an introduction by Trevor-Roper, was published in 1961 (François Genoud (ed.), The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler-Bormann Documents. February-April 1945, with an Introduction by H. R. Trevor-Roper, London, 1961). This English version contains a very loose and untrustworthy translation of the German text — itself not guaranteed to be identical with any long-lost original or the lost copy of that original — which was eventually published only in 1981 (Hitlers politisches Testament. Die Bormann Diktate von Februar und April 1945, mit einem Essay von Hugh R. Trevor-Roper und einem Nachwort von André François-Poncet, Hamburg, 1981). Further examination of the text in the meantime-though this was not mentioned by the German publishers — by Professor Eduard Baumgarten had established that the translation back into German from the French (carried out by a Dutchman) contained between the lines a second German text, written in the hand of François Genoud. The available German text is, therefore, at best a construct; neither the original nor the copy of that original exists. Baumgarten tended, since the content was consonant with Hitler’s thinking and expression, to accept the authenticity of the text. There is, however, no proof and, therefore, no reliable German text whose authenticity can be placed beyond question. (Institut für Zeitgeschichte (ed.), Wissensch-aftsfreiheit und ihre rechtlichen Schranken. Ein Kolloquium, Munich/Vienna, 1978, 45–51 (comments of François Genoud, Eduard Baumgarten, and Martin Broszat).)
122. Hermann Giesler, Ein anderer Hitler. Erlebnisse, Gespräche, Reflexionen, Leoni, 1977, 478–80. For the date of the unveiling of the model, Irving, HW, 478–80, 483.
123. See Kubizek, especially 97–110. Hitler was still dreaming when he told Goebbels, following his viewing of the Linz model, that modern technology would allow for a swift rebuilding of German cities after the war, and that housing capacity would be restored within five years (TBJG, II/15, 379 (13 February 1945)).
124. TBJG, II/t5, 321 (6 February 1945). He repeated this to Goebbels a few days later, though the Propaganda Minister noted that it could not be publicized since, otherwise, every future air-raid on Berlin would be attributed to the decision (TBJG, II/15, 370 (12 February 1945)).
125. TBJG, II/15, 320 (6 February 1945), 337 (8 February 1945), 365 (12 February 1945).
126. TBJG, II/15, 323 (6 February 1945).
127. TBJG, II/15, 368 (12 February 1945).
128. See Weinberg III, 802–9.
129. TGJG, II/15, 381–2 (13 February 1945).
130. Below, 402.
131. Speer, 433.
132. Giesler, 482.
133. Semmler, 183; Reuth, Goebbels, 581–2; Irving, Goebbels, 502.
134. LB Stuttgart, 902–3 (2 March 1945).
135. Guderian, 427 (trans. slightly amended); LB Stuttgart, 905 n.2. And see TBJG, II/15, 617, 620 (28 March 1945).
136. Jodl’s summary for Hitler of advantages and disadvantages of leaving the Geneva Convention argued that the way would then be clear for Allied usage of gas and chemical warfare at a time when they enjoyed obvious air-superiority; also that there were more German prisoners in Allied hands than Allied prisoners-of-war in Germany, so that massive retaliation would also be to Germany’s disadvantage. (IMG, xxxv.181–6, doc.606-D. See also IMG, ix.434, x.342, xiii.517–18, xvi.542, xviii.397–8, and xxxiiii.641–4, doc.158-C.)
137. Descriptions by Dr Giesing, in mid-February, and Percy Ernst Schramm a month later: Maser, 394–5, cit. Giesing report of 12 June 1945, 175ff.; Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler als militärischer Führer. Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacbt, Frankfurt am Main, 1962, 134ff.; KTB OKW, iv/2, 1701–2. See also Irving, HW, 772–3; Irving, Doctor, 211.
138. Rudolf Jordan, Erlebt und erlitten. Weg eines Gauleiters von München bis Moskau, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1971, 253.
139. Below, 402. Goebbels had remarked in his diary, early in February, that the Gauleiter had not been taking central directions from Berlin seriously and were running things in their own way (TBJG, II/15, 311 (5 February 1945)).
140. Jordan, 251–8; Karl Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’. Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse eines ehemaligen Gauleiters, Augsburg, 1954, 384–92 (where the meeting is wrongly dated to 25 February); Below, 402; Martin Moll, ‘Die Tagungen der Reichs — und Gauleiter der NSDAP: Ein verkanntes Instrument der Koordinierung im “Amterchaos” des Dritten Reiches?’, typescript, 60–61 (with best thanks to Dr Moll for the opportunity to see this valuable, as yet unpublished, paper); Irving, HW, 772–3; Toland, Adolf Hitler, 855 (based on oral testimony in 1971 of three Gauleiter present). The formal communiqué of the meeting confined itself to stating that Hitler had imparted to the Gauleiter ‘the guidelines for the victorious continuation of the struggle, for the comprehensive organization of all forces of resistance, and for the ruthless deployment of the Party in the fateful struggle of the German people’ (Domarus, 2207). In individual cases, Hitler was nevertheless even now able to rouse new hope. According to Christa Schroeder, Albert Forster, Gauleiter of Danzig-West Prussia, came to Berlin in March 1945 determined to tell Hitler the unvarnished truth about the desolate situation in Danzig. He came out of his audience reinvigorated, saying ‘he has told me he will save Danzig, and about that there can be no more doubt’ (Schroeder, 74).
141. Domarus, 2203–6. Domarus (2202, n.71, 2088) mistakenly thought the occasion had been dropped altogether in 1944. In fact, Hitler had given a speech on that occasion (24 February 1944), which Goebbels had described as ‘extraordinarily fresh’ (TBJG, II/11, 347 (25 February 1944)). In 1942, the Gauleiter of Munich and Upper Bavaria, Adolf Wagner, had read out a proclamation by Hitler (TBJG, II/3, 371 (25 February 1942)); in 1943, Hermann Esser read out the proclamation (TBJG, II/7, 412 (25 February 1943)).
142. StA Munich, LRA 29656, report of the SD-Auβenstelle Berchtesgaden, 7 February 1945: ‘… während bei der überwiegenden Zahl der Volksgenossen der Inhalt der Proklamation vorbei-rauschte wie der Wind in leerem Geäst’. Other reports underlined the impression that Hitler’s address had been unable to lift the mood and found no echo among the mass of the population (GStA, Munich, MA 106695, reports of the Regierungspräsident of Oberbayern, 7 March 1945, 7 April 1945). Some reports from mid-February noted that hope of a miracle was now confined to belief in Hitler himself (Volker Berghahn, ‘Meinungsforschung im “Dritten Reich”: Die Mundpro-paganda-Aktion der Wehrmacht im letzten Kriegshalbjahr’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1 (1967), 83–119, here 105.
143. TBJG, II/15, 420 (5 March 1945); Irving, Doctor, 212. Hitler, it seems, eventually did allow the pictures to appear in the press and newsreel, though, accommodating the delay, the impression was given that the visit had taken place on ‘Heroes’ Memorial Day’, 11 March 1945. Domarus, 2211 and Hauner, Hitler, 200, give this as the date of Hitler’s last visit to the front, while Irving, HW, 776, has 15 March 1945 (possibly based on Below, 405, who has 15 February, though presumably in error for 15 March). Goebbels was with Hitler for several hours on the evening of 11 March, though there was no mention of a second visit to the Oder front that day. He referred to the new edition of the newsreel, shown that evening, containing scenes of Hitler’s visit to the front, though this presumably refers to the Wriezen visit, not any subsequent one (TBJG, II/15, 479, 487). Among captured soldiers on the western front, trust in Hitler had fallen by March 1945 to 31 per cent, half of what it had been in January (Gurfein and Janowitz, 81).
144. TBJG, II/15, 542 (19 March 1945).
145. TBJG, II/15, 420–21, 423 (5 March 1945), 450 (8 March 1945). Goebbels first noted that Himmler had an infection; then that he had suffered an angina attack. Guderian was told that the Reichsführer had been laid low with influenza, but found him ‘in apparently robust health’ on a visit to the Hohenlychen sanatorium (Guderian, 421). See also Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs 1940–1945, London, 1956, 276–7; Padfield, Himmler, 567.
146. TBJG, II/15, 421–2 (5 March 1945). Sepp Dietrich, in whose leadership in Hungary Hitler was pinning such hopes, had been highly critical of Hitler’s repeated interventions, down to company level, in military matters, leaving his commanders no room for manoeuvre (TBJG, II/15, 404 (3 March 1945)).
147. TBJG, II/15, 421–4 (5 March 1945), quotations 422, 424, 486 (12 March 1945).
148. TBJG, II/15, 426–7 (5 March 1945).
149. TBJG, II/15, 425–6 (5 March 1945).
150. H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, (1947), Pan Books edn, London, 1973, 140.
151. TBJG, II/15, 383–4 (28 February 1935), 419 (5 March 1945), quotation 479 (12 March 1945). See also 557 (21 March 1945), 570 (22 March 1945).
152. Domarus, 2212.
153. Named after the Secretary of the US Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr, the plan envisaged dividing Germany into two and ‘pastoralizing’ the country. It was initially adopted both by Roosevelt and Churchill, and, though effectively discarded in the light of strong opposition from their advisers, was finally put to rest only in the post-war settlement at Potsdam in July-August 1945 (Churchill, vi.138–9; Weinberg III, 796–7; Oxford Companion, 758–9).
154. See Herbst, Der Totale Krieg, 345–7 (and Pt.V in general), for post-war planning within German industry in the last months of the regime. See also Neil Gregor, Daimler-Benz in the Third Reich, New Haven/London, 1998, 100–108; and Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann, Anatomie des Krieges, East Berlin, 1969, 484–6.
155. Speer, 440–42, 581 n.5; Guderian, 422–3.
156. Speer, 443. Speer, 448, refers to his memorandum of 18 March. He suggests elsewhere, however, that he himself handed the memorandum to Hitler, and after midnight on 19 March (Speer, 445). Below, 404, writes of Speer passing the memorandum to him.
157. IMG, xli.420–25 (quotation, 424–5), Beweisstück Speer, Doc.23; IMG, xvi.546–7 (Speer testimony); and see also Speer, 443, 582 n.6; Guderian, 423; Below, 404–5.
158. Speer, 444–5.
159. Speer, 446 and 583 n.8. Domarus, 2214 and n.106 points out that Speer’s recollection probably did not match Hitler’s comment exactly. According to Speer, Hitler had stated that ‘the future belongs exclusively to the stronger people of the east’ — a phrase he is otherwise not known to have used, and which stood in contradiction to his belief in the primitivity of the Soviet population.
160. See Irving, HW, 784.
161. IMG, xli.430–31, Doc. Beweisstück Speer-25; Weisungen, 348–9.
162. Speer, 453; TBJG, II/15, 612–13 (28 March 1945).
163. See IMG, xli.425–37, Docs. Beweisstück Speer-24,–28,–29; Speer, 450–64; Guderian, 424. According to Guderian, 426, Hitler was by this time reluctant to see Speer and hear his pessimistic views about the war. He told Goebbels of his anger at Speer’s comments, and how he had let himself be influenced by industrialists. He intended replacing him with Saur (TBJG, II/15, 619–20 (28 March 1945), 645 (31 March 1945).)
164. TBJG, II/15, 613 (28 March 1945).
165. Schroeder, 209.
166. TBJG, II/15, 369 (12 February 1945).
167. Boldt, 86–7.
168. See, e.g., TBJG, II/15, 425 (5 March 1945), 569–71 (22 March 1945), 618–19 (28 March 1945).
169. Walter Schellenberg, Schellenberg, Mayflower Paperback edn, London, 1965, 175; Trevor-Roper, 133 and n.i; TBJG, II/15, 613–14 (28 March 1945); Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 434; Padfield, Himmler, 577. Dietrich did not carry out the order, but was even so not dismissed by Hitler — an indication that the order had been issued in enraged frustration. (Weingartner, 124. And see n.146 above.)
170. TBJG, II/15, 480 (12 March 1945). Himmler experienced the displeasure at first hand when he had his next audience with Hitler on 15 March.(TBJG, II/15, 521 (16 March 1945). See also Padfield, Himmler, 569.)
171. TBJG, II/15, 525 (17 March 1945); and see also 532–3 (18 March 1945), 634 (30 March 1945).
172. See TBJG, II/15, 649 (31 March 1945).
173. See Guderian, 426.
174. See Boldt, 40–46 for the comparison (40, for the description of Keitel).
175. TBJG, II/15, 567 (22 March 1945), 615–16 (28 March 1945).
176. TBJG, II/15, 648 (31 March 1945). Hitler blamed Guderian, at the same time, for the winter crisis of 1941–2.
177. Guderian, 428–9, and see, for Krebs, 415–16.
178. TBJG, II/15, 606–7 (27 March 1945).
179. TBJG, II/15, 614–15, 617, 622–3 (28 March 1945); also 643 (31 March 1945), 678 (4 April 1945).
180. TBJG, II/15, 648 (31 March 1945).
181. TBJG, II/15, 616 (28 March 1945).
182. TBJG, II/15, 621 (28 March 1945).
183. Bormann Letters, 177–8 (7 February 1945).
184. See Rebentisch, 530.
185. TBJG, II/15, 613 (28 March 1945).
186. Orlow, ii.479–80.
187. TBJG, II/15,677 (4 April 1945).
188. Rebentisch, 529; Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 201–2.
189. Cit. Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker, Geschichte der NSDAP 1920–1945, Cologne, 1981, 379.
190. Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 802–4. For Goebbels’s criticism of both ‘Werwolf’ and ‘Freikorps Adolf Hitler’ — a brainchild of Robert Ley — see TBJG, II/15, 637–8 (30 March 1945).
191. Cit. Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 202.
192. See Pätzold/Weißbecker, 377; Orlow, ii.482.
193. TBJG, II/15, 672 (4 April 1945).
194. Trevor-Roper, 140–43.
195. TBJG, II/15, 638–9 (30 March 1945).
196. Speer, 467.
197. Trevor-Roper, 140–42; Speer, 467.
198. Below, 408.
199. Kesselring, 265.
200. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieq, 429; Ludewig, 383–4.
201. See Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 433; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 221; Weinberg III, 820–21; Irving, HW, 790; Boldt, 113. As a consequence, Hitler had removed a number of divisions from Army Group Vistula and transferred them to Army Group Centre and Army Group South.
202. Weisungen, 355–6.
203. Weisungen, 357–8.
204. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 436; DZW, vi.696–7; Irving, HW, 801–2.
205. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1438–9.
206. DZW, vi.686–703; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 435–7; see Below, 409–10.
207. Schroeder, 200; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.126; Galante, 14 (Junge).
1. Below, 407–8, refers to Eva Braun’s return in late March. Schroeder, 168, has February, as does (without any precise indication of the date) Gun, Eva Braun-Hitler, 181. Speer noted (Speer, 468) that she came to Berlin ‘surprisingly and without being summoned’ in the first half of April. Irving, HW, 793 (without source reference) gives a specific date, 15 April. Joachimsthaler, 472 n.23 (also without source reference), provides an equally specific — but different — date: 7 March.
2. Based on Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 270–72; and also IfZ, ZS 194, the post-war recollections of Hitler’s Munich housekeeper, Anni Winter, Fol.4, noting what she had been told by the wife of Hitler’s major-domo, Arthur Kannenberg. According to this account, Hitler had needed assistance in walking when leaving his room to meet his staff.
3. Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 272.
4. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.126: ‘20.April 1945 — Hitlers Geburtstag!… Die ersten russischen Panzer standen vor Berlin. Der Donner der Infanteriegeschütze drang bis in das Gebiet der Reicbskanzlei. Der Fübrer empfing die Glückwünscbe seiner Getreuen. Alle kamen, drückten ihm die Hand, gelobten Treue, und versuchten, ihn zum Verlassen der Stadt zu bewegen…. Draussen im Park dekorierte er Hitlerjungen. Kinder waren es, die sich ausgezeichnet batten im Kampf gegen russische Panzer. Wollte er sich auf diese Verteidigung verlassen?…’ (‘20 April 1945 — Hitler’s birthday. The first Russian tanks were on the approaches to Berlin. The thunder of infantry guns could even be heard in the Reich Chancellery. The Führer received the congratulations of his loyal supporters. All came, shook his hand, vowed loyalty, and tried to persuade him to leave the city… Outside in the park, he decorated boys from the Hitler Youth. They were children who had distinguished themselves in the fight against Russian tanks. Did he want to depend upon this defence?…)’ See also Galante, 141 (Junge), with some inaccuracy in translation; and Joachimsthaler, 141.
5. Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 273–4; Speer, 477; Keitel, 342; Joachimsthaler, 139–41.
6. Schroeder, 200.
7. Speer, 477; Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 274.
8. Karl Koller, Der letzte Monat. Die Tagebucbaufzeichnungen des ehemaligen Chefs des Genetalstabes der deutschen Luftwaffe vom 14. April bis 27. Mai 1945, Mannheim, 1949, 16–17.
9. Keitel, 343.
10. Speer, 477; Below, 410–11; Boldt, 116.
11. Irving, Goring, 452–9; for Carinhall’s fate after the end of the war, see Knopf and Martens, Görings Reich, 145ff
12. Speer, 477–8; Below, 410; Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 274; Koller, 18; Irving, Göring, 459–60.
13. Joachimsthaler, 140–41. Weisungen, 357, does not make clear that this additional order followed five days after the initial directive.
14. Cit. Joachimsthaler, 140.
15. Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Admiral Karl-Jesko von Puttkamer, 3 April 1948, FF53, Fols.8–10; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, V/8/3; Below, 410–11; Speer, 478; Joachimsthaler, 139.
16. Schroeder, 200.
17. Schroeder, 203.
18. Joachimsthaler, 143. One plane, carrying Wilhelm Arndt, one of his servants, and remaining personal possessions of Hitler and Eva Braun, crashed near Börnersdorf in Saxony. See also Robert Harris, Selling Hitler, London, 1986, 29–32.
19. Below, 411.
20. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fols. 126–8; Galante, 141–2 (Junge). Traudl Junge vigorously defended her version long after the war against those who denied that there had been any such jollifications (Library of Congress, Toland Tapes, C-86). Gerda Daranowski Christian (Tape C-64) stated that there had been no parties in the bunker itself, which was in any case too cramped for such events; but Junge had described a gathering above ground, in the partly ruined Reich Chancellery.
21. This was the news that he promptly imparted to Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Karl Koller: ‘Early in the morning Hitler rang. “Do you know that Berlin is under artillery fire? The city centre.” (‘Am frühen Morgen ruft Hitler an. “Wissen Sie, daβ Berlin unter Artilleriefeuer liegt? Das Stadtzentrum.”)’ (Koller, 20; also KTB OKW, iv.2, 1685 (entry of 21 April 1945)).
22. Koller, 20–21.
23. Koller, 21.
24. Koller, 22–3, 26.
25. Koller, 23.
26. Cit. DZW, vi.705; Joachimsthaler, 146.
27. DZW, vi.705; Joachimsthaler, 146; Boldt, 117–18.
28. Keitel, 344–5.
29. DZW, vi.705.
30. Speer, 471, 479.
31. ‘Die Vernehmung des Generaloberst Jodl durch die Sowjets’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 11 (1966), 534–42, here 535: ‘Ich werde so lange kämpfen, solange ich noch einen Soldaten habe. Wenn mich der letzte Soldat verläßt, werde ich mich erschießen.’
32. Koller, 25. See also the telegram sent to Mussolini on 21 April, speaking of ‘the spirit of dogged contempt of death’, in which the German people would halt the assault of ‘Bolshevism and the troop of Jewry’ set upon ‘plunging our continent into chaos’ (Domarus, 2226).
33. Cit. Irving, Doctor, 219. See also IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol. 143.
34. Keitel, 346.
35. Koller, 27–8.
36. Below, 411.
37. Koller, 29, comments of Eckhard Christian.
38. Joachimsthaler, 150–51 (photocopy of a report — ‘Meldung über Führerlage am 22.4.1945’ — by Oberleutnant Hans Volck, adjutant of Major-General Eckhard Christian, from 25 April 1945, containing an extract from notes of General Karl Koller’s discussion with Jodl of 23 April 1945, dated 25 April 1945), and 148–54 (post-war accounts); Koller, 28–33; Keitel, 346–8; and ‘Die Vernehmung von Generalfeldmarschall Keitel durch die Sowjets’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 11 (1966), 651–62, here 656 (for Hitler’s angry ejection of Keitel from the room, and Keitel’s remark to Jodl: ‘That’s the collapse’ (‘Das ist der Zusammenbruch’); IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fols.130–32; Galante, 2–3 (Junge); Boldt, 121–3. See also Trevor-Roper, 157ff.
39. Joachimsthaler, 152 (account of Schaub); IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fols.131–2, describes Hitler standing in the small ante-chamber to his room ‘motionless. His face has lost all expression, his eyes are dim. He looks like his own death-mask.’ [‘In dem kleinen Vorraum vor seinem Zimmer steht Hitler regungslos. Sein Gesicht hat jeden Ausdruckverloren, die Augen sind erloschen. Er sieht aus wie seine eigene Totenmaske.’)
40. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fols.131–2, 137 (slightly revised text); Galante, 2–3 (Junge, with inaccurate translation). In a letter to her sister, Gretl Braun-Fegelein, the next day, 23 April, Eva stated that Hitler had ‘lost all hope of a desirable conclusion (Der Führer selbst hat jeden Glauben an einen glücklichen Ausgang verloren)’, and that they would not let themselves be captured alive. She made arrangements to pass some of her jewellery to Gretl, and also asked her to destroy some private letters, including an envelope addressed to the Führer. (NA, Washington, NND 901065, Folder 5, text and translation of letter from Eva Braun to Gretl Braun Fegelein, 23 April 1945.)
41. Joachimsthaler, 150 (Volck report).
42. Reuth, Goebbels, 599–600.
43. See Linge, Bis zum Untergang; 275.
44. Koller, 29–30.
45. Koller, 29.
46. Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 275.
47. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1454.
48. Joachimsthaler, 156.
49. DZW, vi.711.
50. This idea was in any case already next day given up by Keitel, after speaking to Jodl, as impractical (Keitel, 352).
51. Keitel, 348; KTB OKW, iv/2, 1454.
52. Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Julius Schaub (March, 1948), FF39a, Fols.2–3, 7; Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Otto Günsche, 19–21.6.56, Bl.9; Joachimsthaler, 157 (testimony of Günsche and Schaub); Below, 411; Michael A. Musmanno, Ten Days to Die, London, 1951, 32. Traudl Junge (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.139; Galante, 3 (Junge)), stated that Schaub flew out that day (22 April). (Earlier in her text (Fol.133), Junge had ‘am nächsten Morgen’ (i.e. 23 April) for packing a chest with documents and Schaub reluctantly leaving to fly south.) Schaub repeated in his Musmanno interview that he left on 25 April.
53. Below, 412; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.133; Galante, 3 (Junge); Joachimsthaler, 158.
54. Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, testimony of Major Bernd von Loringhoven, 14 March 1948, FF51, Fol.41 (quotations in English); Joachimsthaler, 152. See also Koller, 29.
55. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1454; Boldt, 123; Domarus, 2228; Joachimsthaler, 160–61.
56. ’ “… warum dann überhaupt noch leben!” Hitlers Lagebesprechungen am 23., 25. und 27. April 1945’, Der Spiegel, 10 January 1966, 32–46, here 32–3. The typescripts of the briefings (Lagebesprechungen) are contained in PRO, WO208/3791, Fols.89–111.
57. The initiative for this had come from Goebbels in mid-March. (LB Darmstadt, 343–5 (23 March 1945).)
58. Speer, 479–81. And see Sereny, Albert Speer, 517–19, 523–33; Fest, Speer, 360–65.
59. Speer, 482–3.
60. Once Keitel had departed, only General Krebs, Chief of the General Staff, supported by his junior officers Major Bernd Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and Captain of Cavalry Gerhard Boldt, and Wehrmacht adjutant General Burgdorf remained of the military advisers. Liaison with Dönitz continued to be maintained through Admiral Voß; Below provided the links with the Luftwaffe. (Keitel, 348–9; Below, 412. See also Trevor-Roper, 181, for the personnel remaining in the bunker after 25 April.)
61. Speer, 483–4.
62. Koller, 35–40. Text: Below, 412; Domarus, 2228 n.165; Joachimsthaler, 162.
63. Speer, 485–6; Lang, Der Sekretär, 329–30.
64. Koller, 42–3; Schroeder, 210–11.
65. Speer, 487–8.
66. Keitel, 366; Irving, HW, 803.
67. Joachimsthaler, 163–4; Irving, HW 811–12. For Weidling’s account of his meeting with Hitler, see ‘Der Endkampf in Berlin (23.4–2.5.1945)’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 12/I (1962), 40–52, 111–18, 169–74, here 43. He found Hitler, face like a ‘smiling mask (gleich einer lächelnden Maske)’, both hands and one of his legs constantly trembling, hardly able to rise from his seat.
68. Joachimsthaler, 164–7; Boldt, 142–5. Towards the end of March, Eisenhower had changed the strategic plan of the western Allies. Concerned about the possibility of prolonged fighting even once the war had ended, centred on notions of a ‘National Redoubt’ in the Alps, probably with its headquarters at the Berghof, he made no attempt to advance on Berlin but, instead, directed US forces to the south of the capital into Saxony, into what had been foreseen as the Soviet zone after the war. It was as part of this advance that soldiers from the 1st US Army met Konev’s troops on 25 April at Torgau.
69. For a description, see Schroeder, 211–12; also Koller, 49, 51.
70. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, Der Spiegel, 1966, 34.
71. Keitel, 356.
72. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, Der Spiegel, 1966, 34 (and 37–8 for similar comments). See also Boldt, 145–6 for Hitler’s reaction to news of what turned out to be minor disagreements between Soviet and American commanders when they met at Torgau.
73. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, Der Spiegel, 1966, 37.
74. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, Der Spiegel, 1966, 34.
75. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, Der Spiegel, 1966, 37–9.
76. Boldt, 150.
77. Boldt, 149.
78. Boldt, 157.
79. Joachimsthaler, 168.
80. Boldt, 153.
81. Koller, 48; Hanna Reitsch, Fliegen — Mein Leben, Stuttgart, 1951, 292ff. (and for the following); also NA, Washington, NND 901065, Folder, 2, US interrogation of Hanna Reitsch, 8 October 1945, Fols. 1–14; and PRO, London, WO208/4475, Fols.7–8 of undated (1945?) intelligence report on Hanna Reitsch.
82. Koller, 60–61; Trevor-Roper, 186–91; Below, 413–14; ΝA, Washington, NND 901065, Folder, 2, US interrogation of Hanna Reitsch, 8 October 1945, Fol. 4.
83. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, Der Spiegel, 1966, 40–2.
84. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1460; Joachimsthaler, 171–2.
85. Lew Besymenski, Die letzten Notizen von Martin Bormann. Ein Dokument und sein Verfasser, Stuttgart, 1974, 230–31.
86. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, Der Spiegel, 1966, 42–4.
87. Boldt, 160.
88. Below, 414.
89. ‘Hitlers Lagebesprechungen’, Der Spiegel, 1966, 44–5.
90. Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 277.
91. Joachimsthaler, 442ff., especially 464ff.; Schroeder, 167–9.
92. Joachimsthaler, 464–5; Trevor-Roper, 191–5; Boldt, 167.
93. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1461–2 (quotation 1462).
94. Cit. Trevor-Roper, 198; Lang, Der Sekretär, 334; Olaf Groehler, Das Ende der Reichskanzlei, East Berlin, 1974, 29 (none with source reference). See also Bormann’s entry for 28 April in his desk diary: ‘Our Reich Chancellery is turned into a heap of ruins (Unsere RK [Reichskanzlei] wird zum Trümmerhaufen)’ (Besymenski, Die letzten Notizen, 230–1). Trevor-Roper noted that Bormann sent the message to Puttkamer at Munich. But Puttkamer’s own later accounts give no indication that he flew to Munich, and suggest that his destination was Salzburg, before travelling to Berchtesgaden. (Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Admiral Karl-Jesko von Puttkamer, 3 April 1948; FF53, Fols.8–10; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, V/8/3.) If indeed the message was sent to Munich, it must have sent on the Party’s telegraph line and been relayed from Munich — presumably from a Party Headquarters on its last legs — to Puttkamer in Berchtesgaden.
95. Besymenski, Die letzten Notizen, 230–3.
96. Below, 415.
97. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1463. Domarus, 2232 appears to conflate the two separate reports, that of the afternoon and that of the evening.
98. Below, 415. Below is confused in the chronology of Fegelein’s escapade in connection with the news of Himmler’s behaviour, but his comments otherwise fit the differing responses to the afternoon and evening reports.
99. Cit. Joachimsthaler, 182–3; and Groehler, Das Ende der Reichskanzlei, 30. See also Trevor-Roper, 198, 202; Boldt, 169; Below, 415.
100. This was the trigger to Hitler’s explosion. See the letter to Wenck (though never reaching him) from Bormann, referring to Himmler’s ‘proposal to the Anglo-Americans which delivers our people unconditionally to the plutocrats. A change can only by brought about by the Führer himself, and only by him.’ (‘… hat der Reichsführer SS Himmler den Anglo-Amerikanern einen Vorschlag gemacht, der unser Volk bedingungslos den Plutokraten ausliefert. Eine Wende kann nur vom Führer selbst herbeigeführt werden und nur von ihm!’) Cit. Groehler, Das Ende der Reich skanzlei, 31; Joachimsthaler, 185; and Olaf Groehler, Die Neue Reichskanzlei. Das Ende, Berlin, 1995, 60 (where it is referred to as a cable from Krebs and Bormann to Wenck, dispatched in the evening, not in the early hours).
101. See Below, 406.
102. The main first-hand accounts are Schellenberg, 170–87 (though touched up from the original diary; see Irving, HW, 610 n.4); and Graf Folke Bernadotte, Das Ende. Meine Verhandlungen in Deutschland im Fruhjahr 45 und ihre politischen Folgen, Zurich/New York, 1945. See also, for the Bernadotte dealings, Hesse, Das Spiel um Deutschland, 384–5, 429; Kleist, Die europäische Tragödie, 247–52; Kersten, 14–19 (introduction by H. R. Trevor-Roper) and 272–90; Trevor-Roper, 144–7, 155–6, 162–4, 170–3, 199–202; Padfield, Himmler, 565–96.
103. Padfield, Himmler, 565.
104. Padfield, Himmler, 566.
105. Padfield, Himmler, 567; Kersten, 276–83 (though of dubious authenticity; see Irving, HW, xx).
106. Padfield, Himmler, 578.
107. See Padfield, Himmler, 582, 585.
108. Padfield, Himmler, 578.
109. See Kersten, 278, 281; Guderian, 426; Padfield, Himmler, 567, 571, 579–80.
110. Padfield, Himmler, 591. Arrangements were discussed at the meeting for a Red Cross convoy to transport a number of Jewish women from Ravensbrück concentration camp. This had followed a remarkable rendezvous at 2a.m. that morning at the home of his masseur, Felix Kersten, between Himmler and a representative of the World Jewish Congress in New York, Norbert Masur, who had travelled to Germany incognito and under promise of safe conduct. Himmler, accompanied by his adjutant Rudolf Brandt, and Schellenberg, had agreed to release female Jews held in Ravensbrück, providing this was kept secret and they were described as Poles. He also consented that no further Jews would be killed, and to hold to his promise to hand over the concentration camps intact to the Allies (Kersten, 284–90; Padfield, Himmler, 590).
111. Schellenberg, 181–2.
112. Padfield, Himmler, 593; Trevor-Roper, 171.
113. Bernadotte, Das Ende, 79–85; Schellenberg, 182-5; Trevor-Roper, 171–2; Padfield, Himmler, 593–4.
114. Padfield, Himmler, 595; Trevor-Roper, 172, 200–201; Bernadotte, 85.
115. Padfield, Himmler, 595–6.
116. Boldt, 170; see also IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fols.152–3; Galante, 11 (Junge); Trevor-Roper, 202.
117. Trevor-Roper, 203–4, 277–8; Joachimsthaler, 183, 465; Padfield, 596–7; Below, 415 (who conflates events); Erich Kempka, Die letzten Τage mit Adolf Hitler, Preußisch Oldendorf, 1975, 78–83 (with inaccuracies); Boldt, 170; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.153; Galante, 11–12 (Junge); Hans Baur, Hitler at my Side, Houston, 1986, 187–8 (with inaccuracies); Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 278; Koller, 95.
118. Joachimsthaler, 181 (and 174 for the communications interruption).
119. Boldt, 171.
120. Boldt, 170; Trevor-Roper, 205; Reitsch, 303–4 (without mentioning the commission concerning Himmler).
121. Koller, 93. Hanna Reitsch described her and Greim’s departure from the bunker, and her confrontation with Himmler about his betrayal of Hitler in her interview with US interrogators on 8 October 1945, NA, Washington, NND 901065, Folder 2, Fols.10–13.
122. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Gertraud Junge, 24 February 1954, Bl.4; Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fol.31; Joachimsthaler, 188. Whatever the hints, Junge only fully learned of the marriage to Eva Braun when Hitler dictated his Private Testament to her. (Musmanno interview, 32; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol. 156; Galante, 16.) Gerda Daranowski Christian commented on the surprise caused by the wedding (PRO, WO208/3791, Fol.190 (Interrogation, 25 April 1946, where, however, her chronology of events is wayward); and Library of Congress, Toland Tapes, C-64 (interview with John Toland, 26 July 1971).)
123. Below, 415–16; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.156; Galante, 13, 16 (Junge, with inaccuracies), 17–18 (Günsche); Joachimsthaler, 185–9; Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 281–3; Kempka, 84–6; Boldt, 171–2; Baur, 186 (brief and inaccurate); Trevor-Roper, 207–8; Musmanno, 197ff. In her 1954 testimony (Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Gertraud Junge, 24 February 1954, Bl.4), Traudl Junge stated that Hitler’s dictation of his testament had begun shortly before midnight, before the wedding. Joachimsthaler, 185, follows her in this in speaking of the wedding ‘towards midnight’. But in her earlier testimony for Musmanno (Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fols.32–6), she had said that, while the dictation of the testament — from which that she learnt from the private will (which he dictated first) that he intended to marry Eva Braun — began about 11.30p.m., it then took two to three hours for her to type up the wills (political and private), and that the wedding took place while she was doing this. In her later testimony (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fols. 152–4), she wrote of being awakened in the middle of the night while preparations for the wedding were being made. As Trevor-Roper (207 n.1) points out, when Greim and Reitsch spoke to Koller as late as 8 May they knew nothing of the nocturnal marriage (Koller, 95). It was, therefore, after they had left the bunker. Joachimsthaler, 183, accepts that Greim and Reitsch left after midnight. The date of the wedding certificate itself is 29 April, indicating that the ceremony was completed after, not before, midnight (Joachimsthaler, 186–7). The wedding was probably, therefore, not before ia.m. Copy of the wedding certificate in PRO, WO208/3790, Fols.151–2; Joachimsthaler, 186–7 (photostat).
124. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.155 (where the impression is given that the dictation began later in the night); Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Gertraud Junge, 24 February 1954, Bl.4; Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fol.32; Galante, 13 (Junge); Joachimsthaler, 188–9; Musmanno, 202ff.
125. Joachimsthaler, 192 (text photostat); Domarus, 2240–41. In her early post-war testimony, Traudl Junge made clear that Hitler dictated first the private and then afterwards the political testament. (Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fol. 32; Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Gertraud Junge, 24 February 1954, Bl.4.) In her later memoirs, she implied that the political testament came first (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.155; Galante, 13).
126. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.155; Galante, 13.
127. The grammar of this passage is garbled in the original: ‘Ich habe weiter keinen darütber im Unklaren gelassen, dass dieses Mal nicht nur Millionen Kinder von Europäern der arischen Völker verhungern werden, nicht nur Millionen erwachsener Manner den Tod erleiden und nicht nur Hunderttausende an Frauen und Kindern in den Städten verbrannt und zu Tode bombardiert werden dürften, ohne dass der eigentlich Schuldige, wenn auch durch humanere Mittel, seine Schuld zu bussen hat.’ (‘I further left no one in doubt that this time not only millions of children… would die…without the real culprit having to atone…’) (Werner Maser (ed.), Hitlers Briefe und Notizen. Sein Weltbild in handschriftlichen Dokumenten, Düsseldorf, 1973, 360–61; Joachimsthaler, 190; trans. NCA, vi.260.)
128. Maser, Hitlers Briefe und Notizen, 356–66; Joachimsthaler, 190–91; Domarus, 2236–7; trans, (slightly amended), NCA, vi.260–61.
129. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Gertraud Junge, 24 February 1954, Bl.4; Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fol. 35; Joachimsthaler, 189.
130. Maser, Hitlers Briefe und Notizen, 368–75; Joachimsthaler, 191–2; Domarus, 2238–9; trans, (amended), NCA, vi.262–3, D0C.3569–PS. The copy of the private and political testaments in PRO, WO208/3781, Fols.90–105, was the one which Heinz Lorenz had been given to carry out of the bunker, and was found, when he was captured, sewn into his shoulder pads (PRO, WO208/3789, Fol.69).
131. Traudl Junge claimed in 1954 that she finished work on Hitler’s will, carried out while the wedding celebrations continued, only around 5a.m. (Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Gertraud Junge, 24 February 1954, Bl.4). In 1948, she had stated that the typing of the wills had taken two to three hours, putting the completion time, therefore, no later than 3a.m. (Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fol.35. See also Joachimsthaler, 189. The document itself gives the time of 4a.m. for the signing).
132. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fols.152–3 (‘Wenn der Führer tot ist, ist mein Leben sinnlos’); Galante, 16 (Junge).
133. NA, Washington, NND 901065, Folder 2; printed in Joseph Goebbels, Tagebücher 1945. Die letzten Aufzeichnungen, Hamburg, 1977, 555–6.
134. Below, 416.
135. Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 279–80.
136. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Otto Günsche, 19–21 June 1956, Bl.8; Kempka, 80; Trevor–Roper, 227 (Junge). Joachimsthaler, 250–9, convincingly argues that the poison was not cyanide, as most of the bunker inmates themselves thought, but the more effective prussic acid capsules, produced in thousands by the criminal police, and causing death within a fraction of a second.
137. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Otto Günsche, 19–21 June 1956, Bl.8–9; Joachimsthaler, 194–7; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.153; Galante, 12 (Junge); Kempka, 84.
138. Trevor-Roper, 218–21; Domarus, 2241 and n.214–16.
139. Trevor-Roper, 221; Joachimsthaler, 176–81.
140. Joachimsthaler, 193–4.
141. Boldt, 172–5.
142. Trevor-Roper, 224-5; Domarus, 2242.
143. Domarus, 2242; Trevor-Roper, 226.
144. Trevor-Roper, 223–4.
145. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1466; Joachimsthaler, 199 (photostat).
146. KTB OKW, iv/2, 1467; Joachimsthaler, 201–2 (photostat, where it is clear that the cable, with the time given as ia.m., was in fact dispatched at 2.57a.m.).
147. Joachimsthaler, 202. Keitel, 368, has another version, for which there is no other evidence and is presumably a distortion from memory: ‘No further hope of relief of Berlin and reopening of access from west; suggest break-out via Potsdam to Wenck; alternatively flight of Führer to southern region.’ The effect of the telegram seems to have been to reinvoke accusations of betrayal, now even in Keitel. (See Trevor-Roper, 228–9 (though the original text for Bormann’s cable to Dönitz does not survive and Trevor-Roper gives no source).)
148. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Erwin Jakubeck, 23 November 1954; Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fols.38, 41; Joachimsthaler, 201–4, 217; Trevor-Roper, 227 and 275 (where the leave-taking is misdated to 29 April). One guard later testified that he had witnessed a farewell ceremony for Hitler’s close entourage during the night of 29–30 April. (Joachimsthaler, 201 (Kölz testimony)). He must have been confusing this with the farewell gathering of around twenty to twenty-five mainly servants and guards. Hitler bade farewell to his ‘householdz’ only shortly before his suicide, next afternoon.
149. Joachimsthaler, 206.
150. ‘Der Endkampf in Berlin’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 12/I (1962), 118, 169–70.
151. Joachimsthaler, 210–15 (with justifiable criticisms of Kempka’s reliability); Kempka, 90–92. In his testimony of 20 June 1945, Kempka stated that Günsche had telephoned about 2.30p.m., telling him to come to the Führer bunker and to bring 200 litres of petrol (David Irving Microfilm Collection (Microform Academic Publishers, East Ardsley, Wakefield), Third Reich Documents, Group 7/13, ‘Erklärung von Herrn Erich Kempka über die letzten Tage Hitlers’).
152. Junge, often inaccurate with detail, recollected (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.159; Galante, 20) that Eva Braun wore a black dress trimmed with pink roses, one that Hitler especially liked. Linge and Günsche, two of the first to enter the suicide scene, both mentioned independently that she wore a blue dress with white trimmings. (Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Heinz Linge, 8–10 February 1956, Bl.6; testimony of Otto Günsche, 19–21 June 1956, Bl.5; Joachimsthaler, 230, 232.)
153. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Heinz Linge, Bl.4–5; testimony of Otto Günsche, 19–21 June 1956, Bl.3–5; testimony of Gertraud Junge, Bl.5; Joachimsthaler, 217–19, 221–2 (Junge, Christian, Jakubeck, Linge, and, especially, Günsche testimony); PRO, WO208/3791, Fol. 192, Interrogation report on Gerda Christian, 2 April 1946; Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fols.45–8; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fols.158–9; Galante, 20–22 (Junge, Günsche); Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 284–6 (with inaccuracies, and see Joachimsthaler, 222–4 for Linge’s unreliability as a witness); Günsche testimony in James P. O’Donnell and Uwe Bahnsen, Die Katakombe. Das Ende in der Reichskanzlei, Stuttgart, 1975, 210 (also in Galante, 21–2); Library of Congress, Washington, Toland Tapes, C–64, interview with Gerda Daranowski Christian, 26 July 1971. Reuth, 608; Trevor-Roper, 230. Kempka, 90, has Eva Braun present at the lunch. He himself was not present; those who were — Traudl Junge and Gerda Daranowski Christian — independently commented on Eva Braun’s absence. Baur, 191–2, and 1955 testimony in Joachimsthaler, 225–6, is unreliable in detail.
154. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Otto Günsche, Bl.4; Galante, 22 (Günsche). He had been told to wait ten minutes before entering.
155. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Otto Günsche, 19–21 June 1956, Bl.5; testimony of Heinz Linge, 8–10 February 1956, Bl.5; Joachimsthaler, 230, 232 (Linge, Günsche); testimony of Gertraud Junge, 24 February 1954, Bl.5; Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fols.47–8; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.159; Galante, 21 (Junge).
156. Amtsgericht Laufen, Verfahren des Amtsgerichts Berchtesgaden zur Todeserklärung bzw. Feststellung der Todeszeit von Adolf Hitler, testimony of Otto Günsche, 19–21 June 1956, Bl.5–6, 8–9; testimony of Heinz Linge, 8–10 February 1956, Bl.5–8; Joachimsthaler, 230, 232. The meticulous study of the testimony and forensic evidence by Joachimsthaler, 229–73, dispels doubt about the manner of death. The earliest accounts emanating from the bunker were that Hitler had shot himself and Eva Braun had taken poison. Below (who had left before the suicides) heard this as early as 6 May related by one of the guards attached to the bunker (PRO, London, WO2.08/3781, Fol.5, interrogation of Nicolaus von Below, n.d. (but covering letter is of 22 June 1946)). Hugh Trevor-Roper was given the same information by Erich Kempka and Artur Axmann, who saw the bodies in situ, as well as by Martin Bormann’s secretary Else Krüger. (PRO, WO208/3790, Fol.54 (Trevor-Roper’s handwritten note, on a chronology of events during the last days in the bunker).) The key witnesses give no indication that a shot was heard — counter to some of the unreliable stories (e.g. Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Gertraud Junge, 7 February 1948, FF25, Fol.48; IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Traudl Junge Memoirs, Fol.159; Galante, 21, testimony of Junge). The intentionally misleading account of Hitler’s death by cyanide poisoning put about by Soviet historians — see, especially, Lev Bezymenski, The Death of Adolf Hitler. Unknown Documents from Soviet Archives, London, 1968, can be dismissed. Equally redundant are the findings of Petrova and Watson, The Death of Hitler. The earliest suggestion that Hitler had poisoned, not shot, himself appears to have come from the reported testimony from around an hour after the shooting by Sergeant Fritz Tornow, who had helped poison Hitler’s alsatian, and said he had detected a similar odour in the room after the suicides (though he had not been in the room before the removal of the bodies) (PRO, London, WO208/3790, Fol.128 (where he is named Tornoff), testimony of Willi Otto Müller, 4 February 1946). Hitler’s pilot, Hans Baur, claimed on release from prison in Moscow in 1949 that Hitler had taken poison, then shot himself through the head. But Baur was not present at the time of the deaths, and his evidence is in any case unreliable in several respects. (See Joachimsthaler, 225, 260.) Artur Axmann, who had seen the bodies, also testified on 16 October 1947 that Hitler had first taken poison and then shot himself through the mouth (PRO, WO208/4475, Fol.39). He repeated this in his interview with Musmanno on 7 January 1948 ((Michael A. Musmanno Collection, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, interview with Artur Axmann, 7 January 1948, FFl, Fols.28–32, 44), saying he had the information from Günsche, which the latter explicitly denied (Joachimsthaler, 236–7). Axmann’s claim contradicted, moreover, his earlier testimony from 1946 (see below). Neither of the surviving witnesses to the scene immediately following the deaths — Linge and Günsche — who saw the bodies in situ suggested that Hitler had poisoned himself; and there was no trace of the acrid smell of bitter almonds on his body (in distinction to that of Eva Braun). This negative evidence in itself also rules out the faint possibility that he both took poison and shot himself. The speed at which prussic acid acts would itself render it virtually impossible for Hitler to have crushed the ampoule of poison and then shot; and if the poison could have been swallowed a split-second after the shooting, the spasms incurred would have caused the blood to splatter on the shoulder and immediate surrounds, which did not happen. (On this, see Joachimsthaler, 269–70 and, including a few lines not to be found in the German original, the English version of his book, The Last Days of Hitler. The Legends, the Evidence, the Truth, London, 1996, 179–80.) The forensic evidence also eliminates the story, first put round by Artur Axmann, though based on hearsay evidence without substance, that Hitler shot himself in the mouth. Axmann had in his earliest testimony, in fact, explicitly ruled out a shot through the mouth and claimed (as Günsche had done) that Hitler had shot himself through the right temple (PRO, WO208/3790, Fol.125 (Axmann Interrogation, 14 January 1946)). Notions that Hitler was given a coup de grâce by Linge or Günsche — a further surmise of Bezymenski — are utterly baseless. The ‘theories’ of Hugh Thomas, Doppelgànger: The Truth about the Bodies in the Berlin Bunker, London, 1995 — that Hitler was strangled by Linge, and that the female body burned was not that of Eva Braun, who escaped from the bunker, belong in fairyland.
1. This and what follows is based on Joachimsthaler, chs.5–7, the most reliable and detailed examination of the cremation of Hitler and Eva Braun, providing, in addition (347ff.), compelling reasons for utmost scepticism towards the Soviet claims to have recovered the remains of Hitler’s body and to have performed an autopsy on it. (For this, see Bezymenski, Death of Adolf Hitler, and, for an early expression of scepticism, the review of Bezymenski’s book by Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘The Hole in Hitler’s Head’, Sunday Times, 29 September 1968.) It also rests upon the testimony of Heinz Linge and Otto Günsche, given in Berchtesgaden in 1954 (Linge) and 1956 (Günsche), together with several other witnesses to Hitler’s end. I am grateful to Frau A. Regnauer, Director of the Amtsgericht Laufen, for permission to see this material. I would also like to thank Professor Robert Service (St Antony’s College, Oxford) for translating for me part of one of Günsche’s interrogations in Moscow (Osobyi Arkhiv (= Special Archive), Moscow, 130-0307, Fol.282). Even apart from forensic issues, it is remarkable that, had they possessed Hitler’s remains, the Soviet authorities never indicated this, let alone showed the remains, to Linge, Günsche, and other witnesses from the bunker whom they held in captivity for up to ten years. Instead, in countless hours of grilling them in highly inhumane fashion, including taking them back to Berlin in 1946 to reconstruct the scene in the bunker — aimed at ascertaining whether Hitler had in fact committed suicide — they continued to insist, despite consistent testimony from independent witnesses to the contrary, that Hitler was still alive. According to Linge (Amtsgericht Laufen, Fol.9), he was repeatedly interrogated about whether Hitler was alive or dead, whether he could have flown out of Berlin, and whether he had been substituted by a ‘double’. When Linge asked his interrogators during the visit to Berlin whether they had Hitler’s corpse in their possession, he was told (Fol. 10) that they had found many corpses but did not know whether Hitler’s was among them. Stalin himself also appears persistently in the immediate post-war years — not just for propaganda purposes — to have disbelieved stories of Hitler’s death. The opening of Soviet archives following the end of the Cold War brought a flurry of new ‘revelations’ about Hitler’s end and the location of his remains, which were allegedly dug up on the orders of Soviet chief Leonid Brezhnev on the night of 4–5 April 1970 by five officers of the KGB from a plot of land near a garage in Magdeburg, and burnt. The remains had, it was said, been buried there along with those of Eva Braun, the Goebbels family, and (probably) General Hans Krebs in 1946 and were now to be exhumed because of the danger of discovery through building work on the site. (See ‘Hitlers Höllenfahrt’, Der Spiegel, 14/1995, 170–87, 15/1995, 172–86; also Norman Stone, ‘Hitler, ein Gespenst in den Archiven’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 April 1995; Alexander Lesser, ‘Russians wanted to sell “Hitler skull” story’, Jerusalem Report, 11 March 1993; ‘Kremlin “secretly burned Hitler’s remains”’, Guardian, 4 April 1995; ‘Secret of Hitler’s ashes revealed in Soviet archive’, New York Post, 27 January 2000.) The Soviet evidence was most extensively examined in Petrova and Watson, and was also the subject of a BBC TV documentary, optimistically entitled ‘Hitler’s Death: The Final Report’, in April 1995. Apart from the jawbone, however, the only additional alleged remains of Hitler that have come to light are part of a skull discovered in 1946 (which has never been conclusively identified as Hitler’s). It is unclear how this skull related to the remains purported to have been found in May 1945 and exhumed — presumably headless — in Magdeburg in 1970. If, of course, the Soviets never had Hitler’s body in the first place, the post-Cold War revelations of the disposal of his remains have no standing. Whichever remains they buried in Magdeburg then dug up and burnt, it is unlikely that they were those of Hitler. In any event, the matter is chiefly of relevance to interpretations of Soviet post-war actions rather than to a study of Hitler’s life.
2. Joachimsthaler, 334.
3. Joachimsthaler, 335.
4. Joachimsthaler, 339, 346–7, 349.
5. Joachimsthaler, 356–7; Galante, 162 (Günsche).
6. Joachimsthaler, 274–6; Trevor-Roper, 238–9.
7. Joachimsthaler, 280–81.
8. Joachimsthaler, 277–8.
9. Joachimsthaler, 281 –3.
10. Domarus, 2250 and notes 250, 252; Joachimsthaler, 282–3.
11. Trevor-Roper, 240–41.
12. Joachimsthaler, 284–5; see also 278–80.
13. Trevor-Roper, 241–3; Reuth, Goebbels, 613–14; Irving, Goebbels, 531–3.
14. See Joachimsthaler, 350.
15. Trevor-Roper, 243–7; Lang, Der Sekretdr, 340–50, 436–40. The skeletons were uncovered during work on a building site in 1972. It was possible to identify Bormann and Stumpfegger with almost total certainty through dental records and pathological examination.
16. Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende 1945, 101. And see Doenitz, Memoirs, ch.22.
17. DZW, vi.748–58.
18. Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende 103.
19. DZW, vi.775–8; Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende, 103.
20. Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende, 107–8.
21. Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende, 178–9 (Dok.19); KTB OKW, vi, 1478–84.
22. KTB OKW, vi, 1482.
23. The signing took place according to western European time at 11.16p.m. on 8 May; according to central European time (German summer time) at 0.16a.m. on 9 May (Domarus, 2252, n.259).
24. KTB OKW, vi, 1485–6; Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende, 180–81 (Dok.20).
25. KTB OKW, vi, 1281–2; Müller and Ueberschär, Kriegsende, 181 (Dok.21).
26. Padfield, Himmler, 611.
27. Douglas M. Kelley, 22 Cells in Nuremberg, (1947), New York, 1961, 125–6; Ronald Smelser, Robert Ley. Hitler’s Labor Front Leader, Oxford/New York/Hamburg, 1988, 292–7.
28. Irving, Goring, 504–11; Kelley, 61.
29. Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945–46. A Documentary History, Boston New York, 1997, 57–70; 258–61.
30. Marrus, 258–60. For the pyschology behind Speer’s guilt-complex, see especially the aptly entitled book by Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with the Truth.
31. Wistrich, Wer war wer, 64, 73, 98, 141, 159, 268; Weiß, Biographisches Lexikon, 107, 125, 161, 228, 270, 451.
32. Wistrich, Wer war wer, 177–8; Weiß, Biographisches Lexikon, 304–5.
33. Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide’, 78.
34. For the post-war careers of many of those involved in the ‘euthanasia action’, see Ernst Klee, Was sie taten — Was sie wurden. Ärzte, Juristen und andere Beteiligte am Kranken– oder Judenmord, Frankfurt am Main, 1986.
35. For use of the term, see Hans Mommsen, Von Weimar nach Auschwitz. Zur Geschichte Deutschlands in der Weltkriegsepoche, Stuttgart, 1999, 247.
36. Klemperer, ii.766.
37. Victor Gollancz, In Darkest Germany. The Record of a Visit, London, 1947, 28.
38. Klemperer, ii.790.
39. Manchester Guardian, 2 May 1945.