While I was engaged in achieving this enviable reputation, I had managed to keep in touch with the Imperial German Consulate in New York, and on August 21 I had received from the Vice- Consul, Dr. Kraske, a note informing me that the "gentleman who is interested in you" Captain von Papen "will meet you next morning at the Consulate," That letter was to figure two years later in the trial of Captain Hans Tauscher. I reproduce it here. You might note that it is addressed to "Baron von der Goltz," although my card did not bear that title, and I had registered at the Holland House under my Mexican military title of Major.
Upon the following morning I went to that old building at Number Eleven Broadway. There, in a little room in the offices of the Imperial German Consulate, began a series of meetings which were designed to bear fruit of the greatest consequences to the United States which would, had they been successful, have made American neutrality a lie, and would have perhaps drawn the United States into a serious conflict with England, if not into actual war.
I remember von Papen's enthusiasm as he outlined the general programme to me. "It was merely a question of tying their hands" that was the burden of his statements, time and again. We could hope for nothing from American neutrality; it was a fraud, a deception. Washington could not see the German view-point at all. Everything was done to favour England. Why, the entire country was supporting the Allies the Government, the Press, the people all of them! Nowhere was there a good word for Germany. And that in spite of the excellent propaganda that Germany was conducting. I remember that the failure of German propaganda was an especially sore spot with him.
"How about the German-Americans?" I asked him upon one occasion.
He made a sound that was between a grunt and a cough.
"I am attending to them," was his reply.
I did not understand what he meant until much later.
We talked much of American participation in the war in those days. Papen was convinced that it would come sooner or later; and certainly upon the side of the Entente unless the German-Americans could be brought into line. They were being attended to, he would repeat, but meanwhile it was necessary for us to decide upon some immediate action. Of course, there was Mexico to be considered. It was too bad that Huerta had fallen. What did I think of Villa? Could he be persuaded to cause a diversion if the United States abandoned its neutrality?
I told him that I thought it very unlikely. "He is not very friendly towards Germans," I said, "and he appreciates the importance of keeping on good terms with the United States. No, I don't think you can reach him now. Later, he may take a different attitude when we have had a few more victories."
Von Papen nodded. I was probably right, he thought. We must show these ignorant people how powerful the Germans were. It would have a great moral effect . But that was for the future. In the meantime, what did I think of this letter as a suggestion for possible immediate action?
"This letter" was from a man named Schumacher, who lived in Oregon, at Eden Bower Farm. He had written to the Embassy, suggesting that we should secretly fit out motor-boats armed with machine-guns, and using Buffalo, Detroit, Cleveland and Chicago as bases, make raids upon Canadian cities and towns on the Great Lakes.
There were some good features in the planits value as a means of terrorising Canadians, for instance but it was doubtful whether at that time we could carry it out successfully. Then, too, we could not be sure whether it was not merely a trap for us. Papen had been making inquiries about Schumacher and was not entirely satisfied as to his good faith.
There was a number of other schemes which we considered at this time. One was to equip reservists of the German Army, then in the United States, and co-operating with German warships, then in the Pacific Ocean, to invade Canada from the State of Washington. This plan was abandoned because of the impossibility of securing enough artillery for our purposes.
Another plan that we considered more carefully involved an expedition against Jamaica. This was a much more feasible scheme than any that had been proposed thus far, and we spent many days over it. It seemed fairly probable that with an army of ragamuffins which I could easily recruit in Mexico and Central America, we could make a success of it. Arms were easy to secure; in fact, we had a very well equipped arsenal in New York; and filibustering had become so common since the outbreak of the Mexican revolution that it would be easy to obtain what additional material we needed without disclosing our purpose. On the whole, the idea looked promising, and matters had gone so far that von Papen secured my appointment as captain, so that in the event of my being captured on British soil with arms in my hand I should be treated as a prisoner of war.
Then just when we \vere making final preparations for my departure from New York, von Papen came to me in great excitement and said he had come upon a plan that would serve our purposes to perfection. Canada was, after all, our principal objective; we could strike a telling blow against it, and at the same time create consternation throughout America by blowing up the canals which connected the Great Lakes!
"It is comparatively simple," said von Papen. "If we blow up the locks of these canals the main railway lines of Canada and the principal grain elevators will be crippled. Immediately we shall destroy one of England's chief sources of food supply as well as hamper the transportation of war materials. Canada will be thrown into a panic and public opinion will demand that her troops be held for home defence. But, best of all, it will make the Canadians believe that the thousands of German reservists and the millions of German-Americans in the United States are planning active military operations against the Dominion."
I looked at him in surprise. Where had he got such a plan? Papen enlightened me with his next words.
Two men not Germans but violently anti- English had come to him with the suggestion, he said. It was in a very indefinite form as yet, but the idea was certainly worth careful consideration. He wished me to discuss the matter with the two men at my hotel.
It did seem a good plan. As I discussed it the next evening with the two men, whom von Papen had sent to me, it seemed entirely practicable and immensely important. Together we went over maps and diagrams, which showed the vulnerable points of the different canals and railways. After a number of conferences with them and with von Papen the plot took definite shape as a plan to blow up the Welland Canal.
"It can be done," I told von Papen one day, and together we discussed the details. Finally von Papen looked up from the notes we had been examining.
"I think it will do admirably," he said. "Will you undertake it?"
I nodded.
"Good!" said von Papen. "I shall leave the details to you but keep me informed of your needs, and I shall see that they are taken care of."
So began the plot which was literally to carry the war into America. My first need was for men, and for help in getting these I appealed to von Papen, who obligingly furnished me with a letter of introduction made out in the name of Bridgeman H. Taylor to Mr. Luederitz, the German Consul at Baltimore. There were several German ships interned at that port, and we felt that we should have no difficulty in recruiting our force from them.