By the time the Great War broke out the German propaganda in America had assumed notable proportions. German newspapers were plentiful and had acquired a tremendous influence over the minds of the German-speaking folk. Many of the German societies had been consolidated into one national organisation the German-American National Alliance, with a membership of two millions, and a president, C. J. Hexamer, of Chicago, whose devotion to the Fatherland has been so great that he has been decorated with the Order of the Red Eagle. And the German people of the United States had, by a long campaign of flattery and cajolery, coupled with a systematic glorification of German genius and institutions, been won to attachment to the country of their origin that required only a touch to translate it into fanaticism.
Germany had set the stage and rehearsed the chorus. There were needed only the principals to make the drama complete. These she provided in the persons of four men: Franz von Pap en, Karl Boy-Ed, Heinrich Albert, and later Franz von Rintelen.
They were no ordinary men whom Germany had appointed to the leadership of this giant underground warfare against a peaceful country. Highly bred, possessing a wide and intensive knowledge of finance, of military strategy and of diplomatic finesse, they were admirably equipped to win the admiration and trust of the people of America at the very moment that they were attacking them. All of them were men skilled in the art of making friends; and so successfully did they employ this art that their popularity for a long time contrived to shield them from suspicion. Each of these men was assigned to the command of some particular branch of German secret service. And each brought to his task the resources of the scientist, the soldier and the statesman, coupled with the scruples of the bandit. It is impossible in this brief space to tell the full story of the activities of these gentlemen and of their many highly trained assistants. Violence, as you know, played no small part in their plans. Sedition, strikes in munitions plants, attacks upon ships carrying supplies to the Allies, the crippling of transportation facilities, bomb outrages these are a few of the main elements in the campaign to render the United States useless as a source of supply for Germany's enemies. But ultimately of more importance than this was a programme of publicity which should not only present to the German-Americans the viewpoint of their Fatherland (an entirely legitimate propaganda), but which was aimed to consolidate them into a political unit which should be used, by peaceful means if possible such as petitions and the like, but if that method failed, by absolute armed resistance to force the United States Government to declare an embargo upon shipments of munitions and foodstuffs to the Allies, and to compel it to assume a position if not of active alliance with Germany (a hope that was never seriously entertained) at least one which should distinctly favour the German Government and cause serious dissension between America and England.
There followed a twofold campaign: on the one hand, active terrorism against private industry in so far as it was of value to the Allies, reinforced by the most determined plots against Canada; on the other, an insincere and lying propaganda that presented the United States Government as a pretender of a neutrality which it did not attempt to practise as an institution controlled by men who were unworthy of the support of any but Anglophiles and hypocrites.
Left to itself, the sympathy of German-Americans would have been directed towards Germany; stimulated as it was by an unremitting campaign of publicity, this sympathy became a devotion almost rabid in its intensity. Race consciousness was aroused and placed upon the defensive by the attitude of the larger portion of the American Press, and the German-Americans grew defiant and aggressive in their apologies for the Fatherland. Even those whose German origin was so remote that they were ignorant of the very language of their fathers, subscribed to newspapers and periodicals whose sole reason for existence was that they presented the truth as Germany saw it. If in that presentation the German Press adopted a tone that was seditious why, there were those in Berlin who would applaud the more heartily. And in New York Captain von Papen and his colleagues would read and nod their heads approvingly.
At the end of the first two months of the war, and of my active service in America, the campaign of violence was well under way. Already plans had been made for several enterprises other than the Welland Canal plot, about which you read in Chapter VII. Attacks had been planned against vulnerable points on the Canadian Pacific Railway, such as the St. Clair Tunnel running under the Detroit River at Point Huron, Michigan; agents had been planted in the various munitions factories, and spies were everywhere seeking possible points of vantage at which a blow for Germany could be struck. A plan had even then been made to blow up the railway bridge at Vanceboro.
But already von Papen and his associates, including myself, knew that Germany could never succeed in crippling Allied commerce in the United States and in proceeding effectively against Canada until we could count upon the implicit co-operation of the German-Americans, even though that co-operation involved active disloyalty to the country of their adoption.
There lay the difficulty. That the bulk of the German-Americans were loyal to their Government I knew at the time. Now, happily, that is a matter which is beyond doubt. Among them there were, of course, many whose zeal outran their scruples and others whose scruples were for sale. But for the most part, although they could be cajoled into a partnership that was not always prudent, they could not be led beyond this point into positive defiance of the United States, however mistaken they might believe its policies.
The rest of the story I cannot tell at first hand, for I was not directly concerned in the events that followed. What I know I have pieced together from my recollection of conversations with von Papen, and from what many people in Berlin, who thought I was familiar with the affair, told me. Who fathered the idea I do not know. Someone conceived a scheme so treacherous and contemptible that every other act of this war seems white beside it. It was planned so to discredit the German-Americans that the hostility of their fellow-citizens would force them back into the arms of the German Government. These millions of American citizens of German descent were to be given the appearance of disloyalty in order that they might become objects of suspicion to their fellows, and through their resentment at this attitude the cleavage between Germans and non-Germans in America would be increased and perhaps culminate in armed conflict.
On the face of it this looks like the absurd and impossible dream of an insane person rather than a diplomatic programme. And yet, if it be examined more closely, the plan will be seen to have a psychological basis which, however farfetched, is essentially sound. Given a people already bewildered by the almost universal condemnation of a country which they have sincerely revered; add to that serious difference in sympathies an attitude of distrust of all German-Americans by the other inhabitants of the country; and you have sown the seed of a race-antagonism which if properly nurtured may easily grow into a violent hatred. In a word, Germany had decided that if the German-Americans could not be coaxed back into the fold they might be beaten back. She set about her part of the task with an industry which would have commanded admiration had it been better employed.
Glance back over the history of the past three years and consider how, almost overnight, the "hyphen "situation developed. America, shaken by a war which had been declared to be impossible, became suddenly conscious of the presence within her borders of a portion of her population a nation in numbers largely unassimilated, retaining its own language, and possessing characteristics which suddenly became conspicuously distasteful. Inevitably, as I say, the cleavage in sympathies produced distrust. But it was not until stories of plots in which German-Americans were implicated became current that this distrust developed into an acute suspicion. Germanophobia was rampant in those days, and to hysterical persons it was unthinkable that any German could be exempt from the suspicion of treason.
It was upon this foundation that the German agents erected their structure of lies and defamation. Not content with the efforts which the Jingo Press and Jingo individuals were unconsciously making on their behalf, they deliberately set on foot rumours which were intended to increase the distrust of German-Americans. I happen to know that during the first two years of the War many of the stories about German attempts upon Canada, about German-American complicity in various plots, emanated from the offices of Captain von Papen and his associates. I know also that many plots in which German-Americans were concerned had been deliberately encouraged by von Papen and afterwards as deliberately betrayed! Time after time enterprises with no chance of success were set on foot with the sole purpose that they should fail for thus Germany could furnish to the world evidence that America was honeycombed with sedition and treachery evidence which Americans themselves would be the first to accept.
It was in reality a gigantic game of bluff. Germany wished to give to the world convincing proof that all peoples of German descent were solidly supporting her. It was for this reason that reports of impossible German activities were set afloat; that rumours of Germans massing in the Maine woods, of aeroplane flights over Canada, and of all sorts of enterprises which had no basis in fact, were disseminated. And since many anti-German papers had been indiscreet enough to attack the German-Americans as disloyal, the German agents used and fomented these attacks for their own purposes.
Who could gain by such a campaign of slander and the feeling it would produce? Certainly not the Administration, which had great need of a united country behind it. Certainly not the American Press, which was bound to lose circulation and advertising; nor American business, which would suffer from the loss of thousands of customers of German descent, who would turn to the German merchant for their needs. Only two classes could profit: the German Press, which was liberally subsidised by the German Government, and the German Government itself.
It was to the interests of the Administration at Washington to keep the country united by keeping the Germans disunited. The reverse condition would tend to indicate that Americanism was a failure, since the country was divided at a critical time; it would seriously hamper the Government in its dealings with all the warring nations; and it would be of benefit only to the German societies and German Press, and through them to the German Government. It was of benefit. The German newspapers increased their circulations and advertising revenues, in many cases by more than 100 per cent. German banks and insurance companies received money which had formerly gone to American institutions, and which now went to swell the Imperial German War Loans. And the German clubs increased their memberships and became more and more instruments of power in the work of Germany.
There is a typical German Club in New York the Deutscher Verein in Central Park South. During the war it has been used as a sub-office of the German General Staff. It was here that von Papen used to store the dynamite that was needed in such enterprises as the Welland Canal plot. It was here that conspirators used to meet for conferences which no one, not even the other members of the Club, could tell were not as innocent as they seemed.
These German societies and other agencies were used not merely to promote sympathy for the German cause, but also to influence public opinion in matters of purely American interest. On January 21, 1916, Henry Weismann, president of the Brooklyn branch of the German-American National Alliance, sent a report to headquarters in Chicago regarding the activities of his organisation in the recent elections. In the Twenty-third Congressional District of New York, Ellsworth J. Healey had been a candidate for Congress. Both he and another man, John J. Fitzgerald, candidate for Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, were regarded by German interests as "unneutral." They were defeated, and Weismann, in commenting upon the matter, wrote: "The election returns prove that Deutschtum is armed and able, when the word is given, to seat its men."
Even in the campaign for preparedness Germany took a hand. Berlin was appealed to in some cases as to the attitude that American citizens of German descent should adopt towards this policy. Professor Appelmann, of the University of Vermont, wrote to Dr. Paul Rohrbach, one of the advisers of the Wilhelmstrasse, requesting his advice upon the subject. Dr. Rohrbach replied that American Deutschtum should not be in favour of preparedness, because "it is quite conceivable that in the event of an American- Japanese war Germany might adopt an attitude of very benevolent neutrality towards Japan and so make it easier for Japan to defeat the United States." And not long ago the Herold des Glaubens of St. Louis made this statement: "When we found that the agitation for preparedness was in the interest of the munition makers, and that its aim was a war with Germany, we certainly turned against it, and we have agitated against it for the last three months."
But this anti-militaristic spirit was a rather sudden development on the part of the German societies. In 1911, when a new treaty of arbitration with Great Britain was under consideration, a group of roughs, led and organised by a Gefrman, violently broke up a meeting held under the auspices of the New York Peace Society to support that treaty. The man who broke that meeting up was Alphonse G. Koelble. It was this same Koelble who in 1915, when Germany's attack upon America was most bitter, organised a meeting of "The Friends of Peace," in order to protest against militarism! Strange, is it not, this inconsistency? Or was it that Mr. Koelble was acting under orders?
Germany did these things not only for their political effect, but also because she knew that she could turn the evidence of her own meddling to account. It was for the same reason that Wolf von Igel, von Papen's secretary and successor, retained in his office a list of American citizens of German descent who "could be relied on." This list was found by agents of the Department of Justice when von Igel's office was raided. And the German agents were glad it was discovered. It gave to Americans an additional proof of the hold which Germany had obtained over a large group of German-Americans.
It was as late as March, 1916, that the members of the Minnesota Chapter of the German-American National Alliance received a circular, advising them of the attitude towards Germany of the various candidates for delegate to the national conventions of the different parties, and indicating by a star the names of those men "about whom it has been ascertained that they are in agreement with the views and wishes of Deutschland, and that if elected they will act accordingly." I do not believe that the men who sent that circular expected it to be widely obeyed. But unquestionably they knew it would be made public.
I think that if the German conspirators in America had confined their activities to this field they might ultimately have succeeded. They had managed to seduce a sufficient number of German-Americans to cause the entire German-American population to be regarded with suspicion. They had contrived to discredit the Pacifist and Labour movements by making public their own connection with individuals in these bodies. They had aroused the public to such a pitch of distrust that in the Presidential campaign of 1916 the support of the "German vote "was regarded with distaste by both candidates. And they had helped to create so tremendous a dissension in America that friendships of long standing were broken up, German merchants in many communities lost all but their German customers, and German-Americans were belaboured in print with such twaddle as the following:
"The German-Americans predominate in the grog-shops, low dives, pawnshops and numerous artifices for money-making and corrupt practices in politics."
The foregoing statement, which I quote from a book, "German Conspiracies in the United States," is not perhaps a fair sample of the attacks made upon German-Americans by the Press in general, but it is indicative of the heights to which feeling ran in the case of a few uninformed or hysterical persons. The point is that to a large portion of the populace the German-Americans had become enemies and objects of abuse.
They, in turn, beset on all sides by a campaign of slander insidiously fostered by men to whom they had given their trust, did exactly what had been expected. They fell right into the arms of that movement which for fourteen years had been subsidised for that very purpose. They ceased to read American newspapers. They read German newspapers, many of which almost openly preached disloyalty to the United States. They became clannish and joined German societies which frequently contained German agents. They began to boycott American business houses and dealt only with those of German affiliation.