"Six-thirty," my friend replied. "It's only for a minute. He is leaving to-night."
That evening for the first time in two years I saw the man who had done his best to compromise the United States. I did not ask him what his presence meant and, needless to say, he did not inform me.
Our business was of a different character. I had just arranged to write a series of newspaper articles exposing the operations of the Kaiser's secret service, and Boy-Ed tried to induce me to suppress them.
"I cannot do it," I told him.
But the captain showed a remarkable knowledge of my private affairs.
"Under your contract," he said, "the articles cannot be published until you have endorsed them. As you have not yet affixed your signature to them, you can suppress them by merely withholding your endorsement."
This I declined to do, and our conversation ended.
Shortly afterwards Boy-Ed returned to Germany on the U53. He did not attempt to see me again, but three times within the following weeks attempts were made on my life. Later, pressure was brought to bear from sources close to the German Embassy, but they failed to secure the suppression of the articles.
But my curiosity was aroused as to the meaning of Boy-Ed's presence, and I set to work to discover the purpose of it. This was not difficult, for although I have ceased to be a secret agent, I am still in touch with many who formerly gave me information, and I know ways of discovering many things I wish to learn.
Soon I had the full story of Boy-Ed's latest activities in the United States.
He had, I learned, gone first to Mexico in an attempt to pave the way for that last essay at a Mexican-Japanese alliance, which the discovery of the famous Zimmermann note later made public. Whether he had succeeded or no I did not discover at the time. But, what was more important, I did learn that while he was in Mexico Boy-Ed had selected and established several submarine bases for Germany! His plans had also carried him to San Francisco, to which he had gone disguised only by a moustache. There he had identified several men who were needed by the counsel for the defence of the German Consul Bopp, who had been arrested on a charge of conspiring to foment sedition within the United States.
From the Pacific coast Boy-Ed had gone to Kansas City and had bought off a witness who had intended to testify for the United States in the trial of certain German agents. Thence, after a private errand of his own, he had made his way to New York, en route to Newport and Germany.
It may be well here to comment upon one feature of the Zimmermann note which has generally escaped attention. It was through no blunder of the German Government that that document came into the possession of the United States, as I happen to know. I must remind you that diplomatic negotiations are carried through in the following manner. The preliminary negotiations are conducted by men of unofficial standing, and it is not until the attitude of the various Governments involved is thoroughly understood by each of them that final negotiations are drawn up. Now, although no negotiations had taken place between Germany, Japan and Mexico, the form of the Zimmermann note would seem to indicate that there was a thorough understanding between these countries. They were drawn up in this form with a purpose. Germany wished the United States to conclude that Mexico and Japan were hostile to her; Germany had hoped that America would be outwardly silent about the Zimmermann note, but would take some diplomatic action against Mexico and Japan which would inevitably draw these two countries into an anti-American alliance.
Did President Wilson perceive this thoroughly Teutonic plot? I cannot say; but, at any rate, upon February 28 he astounded America by revealing once again Germany's evil intentions towards the United States, and by so doing not only defeated the German Government's particular plan, but effectively cemented public opinion in the United States, bringing it to a unanimous support of the Government in the crisis which was slowly driving towards war.
That marked the last stand of German intrigue as it was conducted before the war. Now there is a new danger a danger whose concrete illustration lies before me in the account of that first engagement between United States warships and German submarines.
The people of the United States, just entered into active participation in the War, are faced with a new peril the betrayal of military and naval secrets to representatives of the German Government working in America. Not only was it known to Germany that American troops had been sent to France, but the very course that the transports were to take had been communicated to Berlin. It is probable that other news of equal value has been or is being sent to Germany at the present time; and the United States is confronted with the possibility of submarine attacks upon its troopships, as well as other dangers which, if not properly grappled with, may result in serious losses and greatly hamper it in its conduct of the War.
What exactly is this spy peril which the United States now faces and which constitutes a far greater, because less easily combated, danger than actual warfare?
How can it be got rid of?
These are the questions which the American people and the American Government are asking themselves and must ask themselves if they are to bear an effective share in the War in which they are engaged.
Because of my former connection with the German Government and my work as a secret agent both in Europe and America, in the former of which I was brought into intimate contact with the workings of the secret service in other countries, I am prepared to give an accurate account of the general structure and workings of the German spy system in the United States as it is to-day.
It is important to remember that the secret diplomatic service, as it was conducted in America before the War, and with which I was connected, is entirely different both in its personnel and methods from the spy system which is in operation to-day. I shall point out presently why this is so and why it must be so.
Before the entry of the United States into the War the principal activities of the German Government's agents were confined to the fomenting of strikes in munitions plants and other war activities, the organising of plots to blow up ships, canals, or bridges anything which would hamper the transportation of supplies to the Allies and the inciting of sedition by stirring up trouble between German-Americans and Americans of other descent. All of these acts were committed in order to prevent the United States from aiding in any way the enemies of Germany; and also, by creating disorder in peace time, to furnish an object lesson of what could be done in time of war.
These things were planned, supervised and executed by Germans and by other enemies of the Allies, under the leadership of men like von Pap en, who were accredited agents of the German Government and who were protected by diplomatic immunity.
Now that War has come an entirely new task is before the German Government and an entirely new set of people are needed to do it. War-time spying is absolutely different from the work which was done before the War, and the two have no connection with each other except as the work done before the War has prepared the way for the work which is being done now.
And whereas the work done before the War was conducted by Germans, the present work, for very obvious reasons, cannot be done by anyone who is a German or who is likely to be suspected of German connections.