I venture to say that not 1 per cent, of the persons who are engaged in spying for the German Government at the present time is either of German birth or descent.
I say this, not because I know how the German secret service is being conducted in the United States, but because I know how it has been conducted in other countries.
Let me explain. It is obvious that such activities as the inciting to strikes and the conspiring which were done in the last three years could be safely conducted by Germans, because the two countries were at peace. The moment that War was declared every German became an object of suspicion, and his usefulness in spying that is, the obtaining of military, naval, political and diplomatic secrets was ended immediately. For that reason Germany and every other Government which has spies in the enemy country make a practice during War of employing virtually no known citizens of its own country.
At the present time more than 90 per cent, of the German spies in England are Englishmen. The rest are Russians, Dutchmen, Roumanians what you will anything but Germans.
One of the former heads of the French secret service in America was a man who called himself Guillaume. His real name is Wilhelm and he was born in Berlin!
For that reason to arrest such men as Carl Heynen or Professor Hanneck is merely a precautionary measure. Whatever connection these men may have had with the German Government formerly, their work is now done, and their detention does not hinder the workings of the real spy system one iota.
HOW THE SPY SYSTEM WORKS
It is difficult to distinguish between the work done in neutral countries by the secret diplomatic agent the man who is engaged in fomenting disorders, such as I have described and the spy who is seeking military information which may be of future use. The two work together, in that the secret agent reports to Berlin the names of inhabitants of the country concerned who may be of use in securing information of military or naval value. It is well to remember, however, that the real spy always works alone. His connection with the Government is known only to a very few officials, and is rarely or never suspected by the people who assist him in securing information. Here permit me to make a distinction between two classes of spies: the agents or directors of espionage, who know what they are doing; and the others, the small fry, who procure bits of information here and there and pass it on to their employers, the agents, often without realising the real purpose of their actions.
In the building of the spy system in America Germans and German-Americans have been used. Business houses such as banks and insurance companies, which have unusual opportunities of obtaining information about their clients, most of whom, in the case of German institutions in America, are of German birth or descent have been of service in bringing the directors of spy work into touch with people who will do the actual spying.
The German secret service makes a point of having in its possession lists of people who are in a position to find out facts of greater or less importance about Government officials. Housemaids, small tradesmen, and the like, can be of use in the compiling of data about men of importance, so that their personal habits, their financial status, their business and social relationships become a matter of record for future use. These facts are secured, usually by a little "jollying" rather than the payment of money, by the local agent a person sometimes planted in garrison towns, State capitals, etc. who is paid a comparatively small monthly sum for such work. This information is passed to a director of spies, who thereby discovers men who are in a position to supply him with valuable data and who determine whether or not they can be reached.
Now, just how is this "reaching" done? Mainly, I think it safe to say, by blackmail and intimidation. If from this accumulated gossip about his intended victim who may be an army or naval officer, a manufacturer of military supplies, or a Government clerk the spy learns of some indiscretion committed by the man or his wife, he uses it as a lever in obtaining information that he desires. Or he may hear that a man is in financial straits. He will make a point of seeing that his victim is helped, and then will make use of the latter's friendship to worm facts out of him. In this way, sometimes without the suspicion of the victim being aroused, little bits of information are secured, which may be of no importance in themselves, but are of immense value when considered in conjunction with facts acquired elsewhere.
Ultimately the victim will jib or become suspicious. Then he is offered the alternative of continuing to supply information or of being exposed for his previous activities. Generally he accepts the lesser evil.
In this manner the spy system is built up even in peace times. The tremendous sums of money that are spent in this manner amount to millions. The quantity of information secured is, on the other hand, inconceivably small for the most part. But in the mass of useless and superfluous facts that are supplied to the spies and through them to the Government, are to be found a few that are worth the cost of the system. By the time war breaks out, if it does, the German Government has in its possession innumerable facts about the equipment of the army and navy of its enemy and, more important still, it has in its power men, sometimes high in the confidence of the enemy Government, who can be forced into giving additional information when needed.
Now, the moment that war breaks out, what happens? The German Government has, distributed throughout the country, thousands of men and women who have legitimate business there; it has its hands on men who are not spies, but who will betray secrets for a price either in money or security; it is acquainted with the strength and weakness of fortresses, various units of the service, the exact armament of every ship in the Navy, the resources of munition factories in a word, almost all of the essential details about that country's fighting and economic strength. It also knows what portion of the populace is inclined to be disaffected. And it is thoroughly familiar with the strategical points of that country, so that in case of invasion it may strike hard and effectively.
What it must learn now is:
First, what are the present military and naval activities of the enemy.
Second, what they are planning to do.
Finally, the German Government must learn the how, why, when and where of each of these things.
That, with the machinery at its command, is not so difficult as it would seem.
Here is where the value of the minor bits of information comes in. A trainman tells, for instance, that he has seen a trainload of soldiers that day, upon such and such a line. A similar report comes in from elsewhere. Meantime another agent has reported that a certain packing house has shipped to the Government so many tons of beef; while still another announces the delivery at a particular point of a totally different kind of supplies. Do you not see how all these facts, taken together, and coupled with an accurate knowledge of transportation conditions and of the geographical structure of the country would constitute an important indication of an enemy's plans, even failing the possession of any absolute secrets? Do you not suppose that weeks before you were aware that any United States soldiers had sailed for France, the Germans might have known of all the preparations that were being made and could deduce accurately the number of troops that were sailing and many facts of importance about their equipment? There is no need for the betrayal of secrets for this kind of information to become known. It is a mere matter of detective work.
But mark one feature of it. These facts are communicated by different spies not to a central clearing-house of information in the United States, as has been surmised, but to various points outside the country for transmission to the Great General Staff. They are duplicated endlessly by different agents. They are sent to many different people for transmission. And even if half of the reports were lost, or half of the spies were discovered, there would still be a sufficient number left to carry on their work successfully.
Germany does not depend upon one spy alone for even the smallest item. Always the work is duplicated. Always the same information is being secured by several men, not one of whom knows any of the others; and always that information is transmitted to Berlin through so many diverse channels that it is impossible for the most vigilant secret service in the world to prevent a goodly part of it from reaching its destination.
How that information is transmitted I shall tell in a moment. First I wish to explain how more important facts are secured the secret plans of the Government, such, for instance, as the course which had been decided upon for the squadron which carried the first American troops to France.
It is obvious that such facts as these could not have been deduced from a mass of miscellaneous reports. That secret must have been learned in its entirety. Exactly how it was discovered I do not pretend to know, nor shall I offer any theories. But here, in a situation of this sort unquestionably, is where the real spy the "master spy," if you wish to call him so steps in.
Now, it is impossible, in spite of the utmost vigilance, to keep an important document from the knowledge of all but one or two people. No matter how secret, it is almost certain to pass through the hands of a number of officials and possibly several clerks. And with every additional person who knows of it the risk of discovery or betrayal is correspondingly increased. If in code, it may be copied or memorised by a spy who is in a position to get hold of it, or by a person who is in the power of that spy! Once in Berlin, it can be deciphered. For the General Staff and the Admiralty have their experts in these matters who are very rarely defeated.