AFHRA Air Force Historical Research Agency
DOD U.S. Department of Defense
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
DOS U.S. Department of State
Duke Duke University Rare Book, Manuscripts and Special Collections Library FOIA Freedom of Information Act
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson Library
NARA National Archives and Records Administration
NHC Naval Historical Center
NNSA National Nuclear Security Agency
SMV Science Museum of Virginia
SNL Sandia National Laboratories
WHOI Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute
ix Francisco Simó Orts stood: Simó’s actions on the day of the accident come from several sources, most notably Flora Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs Is Missing (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp.
37–41; Tad Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares (London: Victor Gollancz, 1967), pp. 38–40; U.S.
Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Aircraft Salvage Operation Mediterranean (Aircraft Salvops Med). Sea Search and Recovery of anUnarmed Nuclear Weapon by Task Force 65, Sixth Fleet, 17 January–7 April 1966 (Reston, Va.: Ocean Systems, 1967) (henceforth Aircraft Salvops Med), vol. 1, p. 9; and author’s interviews with Joe Ramirez, January 27, 2007, and April 27, 2007.
ix Like a bronzed Kirk Douglas: The quote is from Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 40.
x And two splashed down: Some sources list the distances in meters, others in yards. The sources agree that Simó saw six parachutes, but to avoid confusion, the author mentions only those that the fisherman saw landing in the water.
3 Twenty-four hours earlier: Wendorf’s personal history and his account of the day of the accident come from two major sources: author’s interviews with Wendorf on October 16, 2004, and July 30, 2005, and U.S. Department of the Air Force, Report of Major Aircraft Accident, KC-135A, 61-0273, B-52G, 58-256 (Directorate of Safety, Sixteenth Air Force, 1966).
4 logging 2,100 flying hours: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 5.
4 His copilot: Rooney’s personal history and his account of the day of the accident come from two major sources: author’s interviews with Rooney on January 14, 2005, April 14, 2005, and June 27, 2005, and Report of Major Aircraft Accident.
4 One writer described the pilot: Rooney enjoyed “the charms of nurses, daughters of senior officers, and belles of nearby Raleigh.” Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 7.
5 The third pilot that day: Messinger’s personal history and his account of the day of the accident come from two major sources: author’s interviews with Messinger on January 31, 2003, and October 19, 2004, and Report of Major Aircraft Accident.
6 The big news stories:The New York Times, January 16, 1966, p. 1.
6 And 35,000 feet above it all: Author’s interview with Charles Wendorf, October 16, 2004.
6 32,193 nuclear warheads: www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/nucweapons/50.aspx.
6 674 bombers, 968 missiles, and 196,887 people: Alwyn T. Lloyd, A Cold War Legacy: A Tribute to the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1992 (Missoula, Mont.: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, 1999), pp. 676–677.
6 The commander of SAC directed: SAC, in conjunction with the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), was legally responsible for selecting targets for Air Force and Navy strikes, but the commander of SAC was also the director of the JSTPS. Jerome Martin, e-mail to author, March 10, 2008.
6 SAC supplied much of the military intelligence: An excellent overview of SAC’s dominance comes from Mike Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership, 1945–1982 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), especially chaps. 3 and 4.
7 At dusk on March 9, 1945: Information on the bombing of Tokyo comes from Thomas M.
Coffey, Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay (New York: Crown Publishers, 1986), pp. 155–165; Bruce Rae, “300 B-29’s Fire 15 Square Miles of Tokyo,” The New York Times, March 10, 1945, p. 1; Warren Moscow, “Center of Tokyo Devastated by Firebombs,” The New York Times, March 11, 1945, p. 1. See also “American Experience: Victory in the Pacific,” directed by Austin Hoyt, 2005, transcript at www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pacific/filmmore/pt.html.
7 LeMay had been running the show: The background on LeMay in Guam is from Curtis LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, Mission with LeMay: My Story (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), pp. 342–347, and Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 146–147.
8 Sensing impatience from Washington: Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 155–156. 8 At about 2 a.m.: Ibid., p. 163.
8 When World War II began: Background on the AAF and long-range strategic bombing comes from many sources, including Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, chap. 1; author’s interview with Jerome Martin, August 26, 2005; Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), chap. 1; Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan, eds., Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Generals Curtis E. LeMay, Leon W
Johnson, David Burchinal, and Jack Catton (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988).
9 an assignment to a bomber crew: The dangers of flying in a World War II bomber are covered in Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, chap. 1, and Coffey, Iron Eagle, chaps. 5 and 6. 9 the 100th Bomber Group lost seven planes: Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 99–100.
9 Bomber crews were more likely: Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 8.
10 A stricken B-17: Coffey, Iron Eagle, p. 86.
10 LeMay, head of the 4th Bombardment Wing: The background on LeMay in England comes from Coffey, Iron Eagle, chaps. 5 and 6, and Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, pp. 19–47.
11 The Navy brass, riding high: Coffey, Iron Eagle, p. 145.
11 In a city like Tokyo: The details on the firebombing of Tokyo come from Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 164–165; Bruce Rae, “300 B-29’s Fire 15 Square Miles of Tokyo,” The New York Times, March 10, 1945, p. 1; Warren Moscow, “Center of Tokyo Devastated by Firebombs,” The New York Times, March 11, 1945, p. 1. See also “American Experience: Victory in the Pacific” and Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon &Schuster, 1995), pp. 17–24.
12 “When you kill 100,000 people”: Drea, quoted in “American Experience: Victory in the Pacific.”
12 “No matter how you slice it”: LeMay, Mission with LeMay, p. 352.
12 When the B-29s returned from Tokyo: Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 166–172.
12 By summer, LeMay announced: Ibid., p. 174.
13 “I think it’s more immoral”: LeMay, Mission with LeMay, p. 382.
13 It was far more humane: Ibid., p. 384.
13 LeMay attended the Japanese surrender ceremonies: Ibid., p. 390.
13 the atomic bombs had been impressive but anticlimactic: Curtis LeMay, U.S. Air Force Oral History, January 1965 (AFHRA). See also Coffey, Iron Eagle, p. 179; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 25; Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 17–24.
13 In the months after VJ Day: Background on the AAF drive for independence comes from Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 27–34; “LeMay Discusses Air War of Future,” The New York Times, November 20, 1945, p. 3; John Stuart, “Army Air Leaders Want U.S. on Guard for Sudden Attack,” The New York Times, October 2, 1945, p. 1; and author’s interview with Jerome Martin, August 26, 2005.
13 The famed pilot Jimmy Doolittle: Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 30–31.
14 “Being peace-loving and weak”: Stuart, “Army Air Leaders Want U.S. on Guard for Sudden Attack.”
14 With the Army’s blessing: Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 31.
14 The Air Force started life: E-mail, Jerome Martin to author, March 10, 2008.
14 they saw SAC as the key: Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 30–33.
14 Not that there was much to grab: Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 27–29; author’s interview with Jerome Martin, August 26, 2005; Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, pp. 73–
75, 82.
14 “We just walked away”: Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, p. 74.
14 “We started from nothing”: Ibid., p. 82.
14 SAC floundered: Ibid., pp. 73–78; and Jerome Martin interview, August 26, 2005. For a deeper discussion of SAC’s postwar troubles, see Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).
14 But by 1948: A good introduction to the Berlin Crisis and the early Cold War can be found in John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), chap. 3.
15 On October 19, 1948: Lloyd, A Cold War Legacy, p. 666.
15 The situation shocked him: Curtis LeMay, U.S. Air Force Oral History Interview, March 9, 1971 (AFHRA); Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, pp. 78–84; Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 271–
276; LeMay, Mission with LeMay, pp. 429–447; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 58–63.
15 “We had to be ready”: Curtis LeMay, U.S. Air Force Oral History Interview, March 9, 1971, p.
29 (AFHRA).
15 LeMay sprang into action: LeMay’s transformation of SAC is discussed in Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 59–63; Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, pp. 78–84; Karen Salisbury,
“Defense: Bombers at the Ready,” Newsweek, April 18, 1949, pp. 24–26.
15 Power was not well liked: Coffey, Iron Eagle, p. 276; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp.
81–82.
16 “My goal”: Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, p. 84.
16 he had created a religion: LeMay explains his theories on deterrence in his autobiography, Mission with LeMay, as well the oral histories he recorded for the Air Force. In Strategic Air Warfare, p. 97, Kohn and Harahan recorded a telling exchange between LeMay and Kohn: KOHN: Was it difficult because it was peacetime, or was there no sense of peacetime in SAC… LEMAY: It was wartime.
17 The year 1952 began the golden age: A detailed discussion of SAC’s rise to power can be found in Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, chaps. 3 and 4. For Eisenhower’s views on nuclear war, see Gaddis, The Cold War, pp. 66–68. For an overview of Americans’ attitudes toward nuclear weapons in the 1950s, see Allan M. Winkler, Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 3.
17 Eisenhower’s philosophy led to a windfall: Statistics in this paragraph come from Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 67, and Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 676, 677, 681.
17 “SAC was still the big daddy”: Jerome Martin interview, August 26, 2005.
18 SAC hosted a classified briefing: Moore’s memo is in David Alan Rosenberg, “A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours’: Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954–1955,” International Security 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 25–28. The Sunday Punch is described in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon
&Schuster, 1983), p. 204, and Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 108.
18. The concept of alert time: Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 97–110.
19 LeMay had flown to Washington: Information on the 1956 “bomber gap” hearings comes from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 156–160; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 78–79; and The New York Times’ coverage of the hearings.
19 Worrisome intelligence had trickled in: Information on the 1955 Soviet airshow comes from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 156; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 78; and “Bison vs. B-52,” The New York Times, May 6, 1956, The Week in Review, p. 1.
20 The Soviets had only ten Bisons: Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), p. 375.
20 The budget already included $16.9 billion: “On Arms and Aid,” The New York Times, Week in Review, May 13, 1956, p. 1.
21 “Curt LeMay thinks only of SAC”: “Defense under Fire,” Time, May 14, 1956.
21 To counter the threat: Henry M. Narducci, Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program: A Brief History (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1988), pp. 1–4; Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 244–245; J. C. Hopkins and Sheldon A.
Goldberg, The Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986 (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1986), p. 65. An earlier alert operation occurred in February 1955, but the first true proof-of-concept test for ground alert was Operation TRY OUT, from November 1956 to March 1957. A description of life on ground alert can be found in “On Continuous Alert,” The New York Times Magazine, December 8, 1957, pp. 10–11.
21 the Soviets launchedSputnik: Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Berkley Books, 2001). The Johnson quote appears on p. 117. See also Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 135–136. An example of press reaction to ground alert in the wake of Sputnik is Richard Witkin, “S.A.C. Operating New Alert Program: Aims to Get Third of Bomber Force Airborne within 15 Minutes after Attack,” The New York Times, November 11, 1957, p. 12.
22 SAC began testing another program: Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986, p. 74.
22 “Any Soviet surprise attack”: Hanson W. Baldwin, “Ready or Not? President Upheld on Plan Not to Keep Bombers Constantly in Air on Alert,” The New York Times, March 8, 1959.
22 Airborne alert was ready to go: John D. Morris, “Soviet ICBM Held Able to Pinpoint 5,000-Mile Target,” The New York Times, January 31, 1959, p. 1; Power, quoted in Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, p. 83.
22 “futile and disastrous”: Jack Raymond, “President Sees Dangers in Full Mobilization Now,” The New York Times, March 5, 1959, p. 1.
22 Eventually the two sides reached a compromise: “Some B-52’s in Air around the Clock: S.A.C. Begins Training for Possible Establishment of an Airborne Alert,” The New York Times, January 19, 1961, p. 12; Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, p. 101; Narducci, Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program, pp. 46; “SAC’s Deadly Daily Dozen,” Time, March 17, 1961, p. 19.
22 the exact number remained classified: Airborne alert rates can now be found in Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, p. 681.
22 SAC named the program “Chrome Dome”: A map of the Chrome Dome routes in 1966 appears in Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 1993), p. 194. Despite many interviews with SAC airmen, the author never discovered a definitive genesis of the name.
22 Power refused to confirm or deny: “Some B-52’s in Air around the Clock,” The New York Times, January 19, 1961, p. 12; The Strategic Air Command Alert Force: History and Philosophy (Briefing) (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1988), p. 10.
23 LeMay had moved on: Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 666–667. Stats on SAC in 1957 come from ibid., pp. 676–677, 681.
23 Power carried the torch: A good overview of Power’s views can be found in “Power Airs SAC Deterrent Capability,” Aviation Week, April 20, 1959, pp. 66 ff.
23 But as missiles grew more sophisticated: Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, pp. 104–105. For further reading on McNamara’s relations with SAC, see Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), chaps. 6–9.
23 “backbone of SAC’s deterrent strength”:The Mission of SAC: SAC Film Report no. 2 (U.S. Air Force, 1961).
24 At midmorning on January 17, 1966: The account of the accident comes from two major sources: author’s interviews with Wendorf, Rooney, and Messinger; and Report of Major Aircraft Accident.
24 The lower compartment, where Rooney sat: The author toured a B-52 at Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005, and interviewed six airmen with B-52 experience: Mo Wiley, “Monty” Moncrief, Eric DePriest, Stephen Miracle, Harry Bender, and Glynn Breuer. Bender also demonstrated a midair refueling in a B-52 simulator. Additional details of B-52 culture came from retired airmen Max Kennedy and Donald Chase, interviewed by the author on August 25, 2005.
25 Messinger was about to attempt: Background on midair refueling comes from Mike May, “Gas Stations in the Sky,” Invention &Technology 19, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 10–19, and Dennis Casey and Bud Baker, Fuel Aloft: A Brief History of Aerial Refueling, undated (AFHRA). For additional information on the importance of midair refueling to SAC, see Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, pp. 104–108.
26 and they remain so today: In 2008, the Air Force awarded a contract for the next generation of aerial refueling tankers to the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and the U.S.-based Northrop Grumman. Boeing and the U.S. Government Accountability Office challenged the decision, and the Pentagon decided to recompete the $35 billion contract. As of this writing, the KC-135 and its flying boom remain the state of the art, though some planes use a probe-and-drogue system.
26 The boom is an aluminum tube: The description of a KC-135 refueling a B-52 comes from two sources: author’s visit to Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005, and author’s flight on a KC-135 refueling mission on July 29, 2005. During the refueling flight, boom operator Glen Starkweather answered many questions about the process; the boomer jokes come from him.
28 “It was a dog”: Larry Messinger interview, October 19, 2004.
28. “First you tell the plane to turn”: Harry Bender interview, August 23, 2005.
29 Pilots usually refer to the B-52: The background on the B-52 comes from the author’s visit to Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005; author’s visit to the Strategic Air and Space Museum on August 25, 2005; and interviews with airmen with B-52 experience. Statistics on the number of B-52s in SAC’s inventory can be found in Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, p. 677.
29 The G model: Information on the B-52G can be found at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-52g.
29 B-52 pilots injected 10,000 pounds of water: The background on water augmentation comes from the author’s visit to Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005.
30 Rooney and Wendorf suspect that fatigue failure: In one famous example, the horizontal stabilizer snapped off a B-52 during severe turbulence. The plane landed successfully. See “Something Missing,” Aerospace Safety, April 1964, pp. 4–7. The fatigue failure problem is also discussed at www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-52g.
31 The one surviving member: To the best of the author’s knowledge, Ross C. Cox is the only living member of the accident investigation board. He refused several requests for an interview.
31 Buchanan, in the lower compartment: Buchanan’s story comes from author’s interviews with Mike Rooney and SAC Historical Study #109: Sixteenth Air Force Operation Recovery, 17 January–7 April, 1966 (History and Research Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, U.S. Department of the Air Force, 1968), vol. 1, pp. 13–14.
34 about eight miles from land: Different accounts place Messinger between five and fifteen miles from shore. “Eight miles” comes from SAC Historical Study #109, p. 15.
35 The survivors stayed: The chronology of the survivors’ movements is from SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 14–16.
35 At 7:05 a.m. Washington time: Letter, Bill Moyers to Flora Lewis, August 11, 1966 (LBJ).
37 Manolo González Navarro believed in fate: Manolo González’s story comes from author’s interview with Manolo and Dolores González, February 24, 2007, and “Operación Flecha Rota: Accidente nuclear de Palomares (Almería),” directed by José Herrera Plaza, 2007. Some additional information about Manolo and Dolores is in Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 26–29.
38 Fiery debris rained onto Palomares: Additional information about the debris shower can be found in Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 41–42, and Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 22–28.
38 Palomares sat on the southeastern coast: The description of Palomares in 1966 comes from author’s interview with Manolo and Dolores González, February 24, 2007; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 14–22; author’s visit to the area, February 24–27, 2007.
40 Wendorf’s bomber had not been alone:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 5–10.
40 The two planes had planned to switch:Report of Major Aircraft Accident, Wendorf’s statement, p. 2.
41 the Morón Command Post radioed:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 8–10.
41 The tanker, after finishing the refueling: Ibid., p. 20.
41. Morón reported the incident to SAC: Ibid., p. 9.
42 the phone rang on the desk: Joe Ramirez’s recollections of the first twenty-four hours and his personal background are from author’s interviews with Ramirez, January 27, 2007, and April 27, 2007.
44 About twenty minutes before 2 p.m.:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 67–69. The times noted in the SAC Historical Study are “Zulu” time, or Greenwich Mean Time. The local time in Palomares was Zulu plus 1 hour.
44 He was a steady, capable leader: The characterization of Wilson comes from author’s interviews with several men who served under him, including Walter Vornbrock on April 23, 2007, and Ralph Jenkins on March 14, 2007.
44 Wilson also had a unique link: Coffey, Iron Eagle, pp. 148–149.
45 he learned that three: Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 71; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 79–81.
46 “This miracle is too big”: Quoted in “An H-bomb Is Missing and the Hunt Goes On,” Newsweek, March 7, 1966, p. 57.
46 Night had fallen by then: Additional details on the first night’s fruitless search can be found in Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 75–76.
46 A sergeant named Raymond Howe: The story of finding bomb number one comes from Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 78–79, and Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 74–75.
47 The bomb was torpedo-shaped: The description of the Mark 28 comes from Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988), pp. 149–154, and James A. Gibson, Nuclear Weapons of the United States: An Illustrated History (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Publishing, 1996), pp. 99–100. Additional information can be found in Chuck Hansen, Swords of Armageddon, vol. 6: Gravity Bomb Histories (Sunnyvale, Calif.: Chukelea Publications).
The Palomares weapons were Mark 28RI (Retarded Internal). There is disagreement as to whether the bomb was eleven or twelve feet long, perhaps because the bomb could be configured in different ways.
47 It had a nine-inch gash: The condition of bomb number one is from SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 32–33, and Cable, DASA to RUECW/CNO, January 21, 1966, #51711 (LBJ).
47 The “H” in “H-bomb”: The background on nuclear bombs comes from Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 116–117 and pp. 247–248; Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 11–25; Jack Dennis, ed., The Nuclear Almanac: Confronting the Atom in War and Peace (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1984), chap. 10. The author has converted metric weights and measures to English units.
49 “without splattering the beer”: Quoted in Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 117.
50 “Fission bombs”: Ibid., p. 511.
50 The exact inner workings: The explanation of a fusion bomb comes from Chuck Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 21–25, and Howard Morland, “The H-Bomb Secret,” The Progressive, November 1979, pp. 3–12. Andy Karam provided additional comments in his e-mail to the author, September 9, 2007.
51 The charred remains:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 18–19; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 81–82; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 76.
52 General Wilson and his entourage: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 82; author’s interview with Joe Ramirez, January 27, 2007.
52 thirty-eight guardias civiles:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 18, 71.
52 Wilson had sent a message: Ibid., pp. 76, 81; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 75; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 82.
53 When Wilson’s message arrived in Torrejón:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 81; author’s interviews with Robert Finkel, April 4, 2007, and Phil Durbin, March 15, 2007.
53 Ramirez and a handful of others: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 83; Joe Ramirez interview, January 27, 2007.
53 By 7:30 a.m.:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 75.
53 The small teams moved out: Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 82.
54 helicopters arrived from Morón: Ibid., pp. 82, 84; SAC Historical Study #109, p. 22.
54 Ramirez and others went to look: Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 84; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 85–86; author’s interview with Joe Ramirez, January 27, 2007.
54 Bomb number two was in bad shape: The condition of bomb number two is from SAC
Historical Study #109, pp. 33–34; Cable, DASA to RUECW/CNO, January 21, 1966, #51711; and a photograph of the bomb obtained from NNSA through FOIA.
55 If he had looked up: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 89.
55. Bomb number three lay in a plowed field: The story of the discovery of bomb number three is in Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 88–89; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 50–51, 84–85;
“Special Report: Lost and Found, One H-Bomb,” CBS News, March 22, 1966.
56 “I knew it was a bomb”: “Special Report: Lost and Found, One H-Bomb.” 56 According to some accounts: “An H-Bomb Is Missing and the Hunt Goes On,” p. 57.
56 The bomb lay in its crater: The condition of bomb number three is from SAC Historical Study
#109, pp. 34–35; Cable, DASA to RUECW/CNO, January 21, 1966, #51711; and a photograph of the bomb obtained from NNSA through FOIA.
56 A situation report was sent: Memo, ATSD (AE) to Secretary of Defense et al. “Situation Report, B-52/KC-135 Accident, 17 January 1966,” January 18, 1966.
58 On the morning of the accident: Duke’s actions on the morning of the accident come from author’s interview with Joseph Smith, January 23, 2007, and Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 60–63. See also Angier Biddle Duke, “Address to American Management Association,” January 17, 1966, and Angier Biddle Duke, “Remarks of Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke on ‘CBS Special Report,’” March 16, 1966 (both in Angier Biddle Duke Papers, Box 18, Duke).
59 If America had to choose: The background on Duke comes from author’s interviews with Robin Duke, June 7, 2007; George Landau, January 22, 2007; and Joseph Smith, January 23, 2007. Print sources include Current Biography 23, no. 2 (February 1962), p. 7; Marguerite Higgins, “He Takes the Starch Out of Protocol,” The Saturday Evening Post, September 29, 1962, pp. 24–25; E. J. Kahn, “Good Manners and Common Sense,” The New Yorker, August 15, 1964, pp. 34 ff; “New Diplomatic Hand,” Newsweek, January 11, 1965, pp. 27–28. Also see Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, conducted by James David Barber, John TePaske, and Taylor Cole, October 24, 1990 (Duke Living History Program, Box 1, Duke). A Duke family genealogy can be found at http://library.duke.edu/uarchives/history/duke_familyndx.html.
62 “tobacco-rich playboy”: “New Diplomatic Hand,” Newsweek, January 11, 1965, p. 27.
62 “He has dedicated more sewers”: Quoted in Current Biography 23, no. 2 (February 1962), p. 8.
62 “I’m lost”: E. J. Kahn, “Good Manners and Common Sense,” The New Yorker, August 15, 1964, p. 35.
63 “When I got there”: Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, part II, p. 7.
63 There was only one reason: The background on the importance of the Spanish bases comes from author’s interviews with George Landau, January 22, 2007, and Joseph Smith, January 23, 2007. Cable #1552 from the Embassy in Madrid, February 14, 1964 (LBJ), notes, “GOS attributes great importance to military relationship with US and would be most reluctant to liquidate present arrangements. However… It is psychologically very important to Spain that they stand up against us on some issue.”
63 The Air Force operated three bases: Information on the U.S. military presence in Spain comes from Harry R. Fletcher, Air Force Bases, vol. 2: Air Bases outside the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, Center for Air Force History, 1993), pp. 187 ff; and Arthur P. Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West: Ally and Liability (New York: Harper &Brothers, 1961), pp. 56–64.
63 Zaragosa in northeastern Spain: Zaragosa was reduced to “modified caretaker status” on January 1, 1966, and reassigned to USAFE on April 15, 1966. It returned to active status on February 19, 1970, when Wheelus Air Base in Libya closed. Fletcher, Air Force Bases, p. 201.
64 Generalissimo Francisco Franco: The description of Franco comes from Michael Streeter, Franco (London: Haus Publishing, 2005), and Jean Grugel and Tim Rees, Franco’s Spain (London: Arnold Publishers, 1997). For further reading on the Spanish Civil War, see Hugh Thomas’s classic text The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper &Row, 1961).
64 “the most uncharismatic dictator”: Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, part II, p. 10.
65 The Allies worked hard: Spain’s relations with the West during World War II and in the postwar years is described in detail in Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West, chaps. 1 and 2. See also R. Richard Rubottom and J. Carter Murphy, Spain and the United States since World War II (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984).
65 “Henceforth” said one historian: Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West, p. 11.
66 “more weight was given”: Ibid., p. 32.
66 In July 1947, he told a reporter: Paraphrased in ibid., pp. 35–36.
66 “I don’t like Franco”: Quoted in Streeter, Franco, p. 106.
66 “The strategic advantages”: Quoted in Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West, p. 40.
67 American military officials: In Spain and the Defense of the West, p. 39, Whitaker argues that the push for Spanish bases came from the U.S. Navy. But Corey Ford and James Perkins, in “Our Key SAC Bases in Spain and How We Got Them,” Reader’s Digest, August 1958, pp. 23–26, say the impetus came from SAC.
67 “a bitter pill”: Quoted in Whitaker, Spain and the Defense of the West, p. 50.
67 President Eisenhower visited Madrid: The description of Eisenhower’s visit to Madrid comes from ibid., pp. 80–82. Also see The New York Times’ coverage of the visit: Benjamin Welles, “Franco’s Prestige High as He Awaits Eisenhower’s Visit,” December 19, 1959, p. 3; Russell Baker, “Madrid Provides Warm ‘Saludos,’” December 22, 1959, p. 8; “Texts of Franco and Eisenhower Talks,” December 22, 1959, p. 8; Benjamin Welles, “Eisenhower Is Hailed in Madrid,” December 22, 1959, p. 1; Benjamin Welles, “Eisenhower Gets Franco’s Support,” December 23, 1959, p. 11; Benjamin Welles, “Franco Aide’s Visit to Highlight Improving U.S. Ties with Spain,” December 30, 1959, p. 3.
68 Spain slowly began to climb: Details on Spain’s economic recovery come from “Spain: The Awakening Land,” Time, January 21, 1966, pp. 26–39; Bart McDowell and Albert Moldvay, “The Changing Face of Old Spain,” National Geographic, March 1965, pp. 291–341.
68 The Spanish magazine¡Hola!: Author’s reading of ¡Hola! magazine.
69 keeping a lid on the press: Bill Moyers, letter to Flora Lewis, August 11, 1966: The Spanish government “was acutely sensitive to any public statements made about the incident and the presence of nuclear weapons.”
69 On the day of the accident: The first few days of press coverage are detailed in Cable, CSAF to Joint Chiefs of Staff et al., January 19, 1966, #59032 (LBJ); SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 311–312; Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 19, 1966, #855 (LBJ); Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 19, 1966, #856 (LBJ).
70 Duke sat down to discuss: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 21, 1966, #869 (LBJ); Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 19, 1966, #855 (LBJ).
70 Although the U.S. military had stored nuclear weapons: To the best of the author’s knowledge, the United States has never publicly admitted storing nuclear weapons in Spain. However, the fact of their existence has long been accepted. See Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November-December 1999, pp. 26 ff.
70 “The subject was still very touchy”: Joseph Smith interview, August 9, 2007.
71 On January 19, a secret cable: Cable, CSAF to Joint Chiefs of Staff et al., January 19, 1966, #59032 (LBJ).
71 A young reporter: Andró del Amo’s story is told in Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 107–116, and SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 314–315.
73 Duke got wind of del Amo’s dispatch: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 19, 1966, #857 (LBJ).
73 Exercising its iron grip: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 21, 1966, #869 (LBJ).
74 the UPI article landed on Franco’s desk: The fallout over the UPI article is detailed in Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 22, 1966, #871 (LBJ).
75 “the only friend we really had”: George Landau interview, August 9, 2007.
75 Muñoz Grandes’s decree: Author’s interviews with George Landau, August 9, 2007, and Joseph Smith, January 23, 2007. See also Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 98–99, and Howard Simons, “Some Experts Fear Strategic Loss if Curbs Are Put on Nuclear Routes,” The Washington Post, February 27, 1966, p. A1.
76 Believe we must be prepared: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 22, 1966, #871 (LBJ).
CHAPTER 5: PARACHUTES
77 Joe Ramirez pushed aside: Joe Ramirez interview, January 27, 2007.
79 had found the combat mission folder:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 39–40.
79 General Wilson realized: Ibid., p. 75.
79 “Until every avenue of search”: Ibid.
79 Hundreds of searchers: Ibid., pp. 81–82, 89–90; author’s interviews with Robert Finkel, April 4, 2007, and Phil Durbin, March 15, 2007.
80 Wilson’s men got organized: The ground search is described in SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 95–98; see also author’s interviews with Walter Vornbrock, April 23, 2008, and Phil Durbin, March 15, 2007.
80 a reservoir — a piece of a bomb:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 42–43.
80 a searcher found a round metal plate: Ibid., pp. 40–42; Cable, from 16th AF Torrejón AB Spain to RUEKDA/Secretary of Defense, January, 1966, #61642 (LBJ); Randall C. Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb! Palo mares, Spain, 1966 (Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 1997), p. 54.
81 The engineers at Sandia: The background on Sandia comes from author’s interviews with William Barton, January 22, 2004, and October 23, 2006; William Caudle, January 22, 2004; Sam McAlees, October 23, 2006; William Pepper, October 21, 2006; and Rebecca Ulrich, October 24, 2006. For additional information on the history of Sandia National Laboratories, see Necah Furman, Sandia National Laboratories: The Postwar Decade (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), and Leland John son, Sandia National Laboratories: A History of Exceptional Service in the National Interest (Albuquerque, N.M.: Sandia National Laboratories, 1997).
81 he called Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: Letter, Bill Moyers to Flora Lewis, August 11, 1966. The author found no record of this conversation in the Johnson telephone archive, but not all telephone calls were recorded.
81 Word was passed to Jack Howard: Author’s interview with Jack Howard, April 3, 2007; Memo, R. C. Maydew and W R. Barton to G. A. Fowler, “Chronological Summary of Significant Events in the 9300 Participation in Broken Arrow Operation,” March 29, 1966 (Randall Maydew files, SNL).
81 Pope called Randy Maydew: Randall Maydew, oral history, conducted by Necah Furman, December 1991, p. 5 (SNL).
82 High-energy and hyperactive: The background on Randy Maydew comes primarily from author’s interview with Jean and Barbara Maydew, October 21, 2006. Additional information is from interviews with William Barton, January 22, 2004, and October 23, 2006; William Caudle, January 22, 2004; and Sam McAlees, October 23, 2006.
82 when he got the call: Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb, pp. x, 43–44, 54; Randall Maydew, oral history, conducted by Necah Furman, December 1991, p. 5 (SNL).
82 The parachute question was critical: The explanation of the Mark 28 parachute system comes from Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb, pp. 21–24; “Description of Normal Operation,” document #SAC200118830000 (NNSA, FOIA); Randall Maydew, oral history, conducted by Necah Furman, December 1991, pp. 2–3 (SNL); Gibson, Nuclear Weapons of the United States, pp. 99–100.
82 Sandia had developed this “laydown system”: Furman, Sandia National Laboratories, pp. 648–660; Johnson, Sandia National Laboratories, pp. 63–69; Randall Maydew, oral history, August 22, 1985 (SNL).
82 According to intelligence experts:National Intelligence Estimate 11-4-61: Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1961–1966, U.S. Director of Central Intelligence (RG 263, Box 16, Folder 9, NARA).
83 The three bombs found on land: There are some minor disagreements about the speed at which bombs numbers one to three hit the ground. These numbers come from Randall Maydew, oral history, conducted by Necah Furman, December 1991, p. 3 (SNL).
84 Since bomb number four’s tail plate: Randall Maydew, oral history, August 22, 1985, pp. 11–12 (SNL); Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb, pp. 53–54. Maydew’s chronology is somewhat jumbled; the tail plate was found by January 20, well before Maydew left for Spain.
84 37° 13.9′ N, 01° 42.3’ W:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 48. The author typed these coordinates into atlas.mapquest.com/maps/latlong.adp to verify that they were in the Mediterranean, closer to Africa than to Spain.
84 On January 27, General Wilson requested: Memo, Maydew and Barton to Fowler, March 29, 1966 (SNL).
84 “furnishing data to unseeing computers”:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 49.
84 ultimately generating a three-foot stack: “Vital Contributions Made by Sandia in Locating Lost Nuclear Weapon,” Sandia Lab News, April 22, 1966, pp. 4–5.
84 a forked stick: Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb, p. 52.
84 Ramirez had another lead: Ramirez’s first meeting with Simó comes from author’s interview with Joe Ramirez, January 27, 2007.
86 he found himself on the USSPinnacle: SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 45–46; Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Aircraft Salvage Operation Mediterranean (Aircraft Salvops Med). Sea Search and Recovery of an Unarmed Nuclear Weapon by Task Force 65, Interim Report (Reston, Va.: Ocean Systems, 1966), pp. 7, C2; Joe Ramirez interview, January 27, 2007.
86 The water was just over two thousand feet: The water depth was 340 fathoms, which converts to 2,041 feet. Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. 7.
86 “sharp and hazy”:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 46.
86 President Johnson sat down: President’s daily diary, January 22, 1966 (Box 5, LBJ).
87 In the film: The description of Thunderball comes from the author’s viewing of the film.
87 When Jack Howard called Alan Pope: Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb, ix.
87 And early reports noted that real Soviets: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 21, 1966, #869 (LBJ).
88 Red Moody sat in the cockpit: Author’s interview with DeWitt (hence forth “Red”) Moody, November 7, 2006; D. H. Moody, “40th Anniversary of Palomares,” Faceplate 10, no. 2 (September 2006), p. 15. The arrival of the divers in Spain and the early days of the search are chronicled in Memo, Commander Task Group 65.3 to Commander Task Force 65, “Report of In shore Search, Identification and Recovery Unit,” March 13, 1966 (NHC).
88 On January 22: Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb, pp. ix-x.
88 the CNO had established a task force:Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, 1966, p. C2.
89 Four U.S. Navy minesweepers: The ships were the USS Sagacity (MSO-469), USS Pinnacle (MSO-462), USS Skill (MSO-471), USS Nimble (MSO-459), USNS Dutton (T-AGS-22), and USS Macdonough (DLG-8). Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. C1–C2.
89 A small team of EOD divers: Author’s interviews with Oliver Andersen, January 22, 2007, and March 31, 2007, and Red Moody, November 7, 2006. Also Memo, Commander Task Group 65.3 to Commander Task Force 65, “Report of Inshore Search,” March 13, 1966 (NHC).
89 “His sole purpose in life”: Oliver Andersen interview, January 22, 2007.
90 Then Moody made an announcement: The story of Red Moody’s first visit to the Macdonough is from Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006.
90 DeWitt “Red” Moody: Red Moody’s personal history comes from author’s interviews with Moody, November 7, 2006, and July 17, 2007.
91 Admiral Guest paid a visit: Author’s interview with Red Moody, November 7, 2006; Memo, Commander Task Group 65.3 to Commander Task Force 65, “Report of Inshore Search,” March 13, 1966 (NHC).
92 He had been thrown: Admiral Guest arrived in Palomares on January 24, 1966. Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. C2.
92 Guest was a no-nonsense man: The description of Guest comes primarily from author’s interviews with Douglas Kingsbery, July 27, 2007, and Robert Kingsbery, July 19, 2007. Additional information is from U.S. Department of the Navy, Biography of Rear Admiral William S. Guest (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, undated), and author’s interviews with Red Moody, November 7, 2006, and July 17, 2007; Horace Page, April 3, 2007; and J. Bradford Mooney, March 30, 2007.
93 Guest hit the ground running:Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. 9, 11.
93 The wedge measured: Using the map shown in Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. 9, the author calculated the area of the initial search area to be 51.03 square miles. Manhattan is 22.7 square miles.
93 Oliver Andersen, left in charge: The description of the inshore searching comes primarily from author’s interviews with Oliver Andersen, January 22, 2007, and March 31, 2007.
93 The divers found a lot of debris: Memo, Commander Task Group 65.3 to Commander Task Force 65, “Report of Inshore Search,” March 13, 1966 (NHC).
94 Underwater searching is complicated: The description of a jackstay search and other EOD diving background comes from the author’s visit with the divers of EOD 6 on March 20–21, 2007, and interviews with Brad Andros and Ron Ervin during that time.
95 and there were no decent charts:Aircraft Salvops Med, pp. 17, 75.
95 One Navy captain named Lewis Melson: Author’s interview with Lewis Melson, August 23, 2006.
95 On January 27, the USSKiowaarrived: The background on the Decca hi-fix and its installation problems are from Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. 18; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, p. 24; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, February 15, 1967, vol. 4, appendix B, pp. 3–11; and SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 295, 304.
96 “like going up here in the hills”: “William S. Guest Press Conference,” April 8, 1966.
96 “throwing a needle”: Author’s interview with Gaylord White, March 3, 2007.
96 “finding a needle in a haystack”: “The Bomb Is Found,” Time, March 25, 1966, p. 77.
96 “This must be the devil’s”: Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 172.
FEBRUARY
CHAPTER 7: VILLA JARAPA
99 “The once-deserted Mediterranean coast”: Richard Oulahan, “The Case of the Missing H-Bomb,” Life, February 25, 1966, p. 106B.
99 Wilson decided that the barren:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 82.
99 Camp Wilson served as home and office: Details on Camp Wilson can be found in SAC
Historical Study #109, pp. 83–93. General Wilson’s reports to SAC and the “Red-Eye Special” are discussed on pp. 72–74.
100 Robert Finkel, the squadron commander: Robert Finkel interview, April 4, 2007.
100 Joe Ramirez, also rooming happily: Joe Ramirez interviews, January 27, 2007, and April 27, 2007.
101 they called Camp Wilson “Villa Jarapa”: Miguel Olid, “Luz sobre Palomares,” El País (Sunday supplement), April 22, 2007, p. 32.
101 the military remained tight-lipped:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 321–323; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 200–204.
101 The Navy was ordered:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 7.
101 “There are no denials”: “H-Bomb Lost in Spain,” CBS News, January 23, 1966.
101 A rumor circulated: Author’s interview with Malcolm MacKinnon, December 4, 2006.
101 “So stringent is the official secrecy”: “An H-Bomb Is Missing and the Hunt Goes On,” Newsweek, March 7, 1966, p. 55.
101 Press briefings were maddening: Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 202.
102 Even the Spanish reporters: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 165. 102 London papers reported:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 365.
102 The Sydney Sun: Ibid., p. 366.
102 Radio España Independiente: Ibid., p. 301; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 157–158. The transcripts of REI broadcasts are located at the PCE Archive in Madrid. The author read a selection of them at the archive in February 2007.
103 “It was a long”:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 80.
103 estimated that searchers covered: Walter Vornbrock interview, April 23, 2007.
103 “found they liked the outdoor life”:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 92.
103 Colonel Alton “Bud” White: White’s description of the cleanup operation comes from Flora Lewis, interview with Alton “Bud” White, undated (AFHRA).
103 they cleared about 150 tons: Ibid. says 150 tons; SAC Historical Study #109, p. 133, says 100 tons.
104 Wilson and Montel spoke to a crowd:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 292–293; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 161.
104 Speaking through a translator: The text of Wilson’s speech can be found in Memo, 16AF Torrejón AB Spain to US Embassy Spain and JUSMG Madrid Spain, February 2, 1966 (USAF, FOIA).
104 he was surprised — and a bit shocked: Flora Lewis, interview with Alton White, undated (AFHRA).
104 A team of scientists: Emilio Iranzo interview, February 16, 2007.
105 Starting at each bomb’s impact point: White’s description of the radiation mapping comes from Flora Lewis, interview with Alton White, undated (AFHRA), and SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 141–146.
105 But the PAC-1S: The problems with the PAC-1S are detailed in SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 271–277.
106 “The only way you could treat that land”: Flora Lewis, interview with Alton White, undated (AFHRA).
106 The job of chief tomato plant chopper: Robert Finkel interview, April 4, 2007, and Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 125.
106 “the Boston Tomato Party”: Robert C. Toth, “Soviet Spy Ship Watches U.S. Hunt Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1966, p. 1.
106 As a gesture of goodwill:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 156; Flora Lewis, interview with Alton White, undated (AFHRA).
106 “Anywhere you turned around”: Walter Vornbrock interview, April 23, 2007.
106 A bit farther down the beach: The description of the Navy EOD camp comes from author’s interviews with Red Moody, November 7, 2006; Denford Stevens, November 30, 2006; Gaylord White, March 3, 2007; Robert Singleton, November 27, 2006; Oliver Andersen, January 22, 2007, and March 31, 2007; Charles Detmer, December 13, 2006; Tom Ligon, November 30, 2006; and Ed Jeffords, November 27, 2006. Stevens and Singleton also supplied personal photographs. Footage of Camp Wilson can be found at NARA, 342-USAF-40730A, reel 7.
106 “The Air Force is okay”: Gaylord White interview, March 3, 2007.
107 “Leave it to divers”: Ibid.
107 On the afternoon of February 2:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 196; and Angier Biddle Duke,
“Notes Taken after First Visit to the Palomares Site,” April 5, 1968 (Duke). Duke’s notes on the trip come from this document. The April 5, 1968, date is written on a cover sheet that appears to have been attached to the notes when Duke gave them to Duke University. The notes themselves appear to have been written by Duke during the February 1966 visit or very soon afterward. The visit is also mentioned in Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 165–166.
107 Right after the accident: The account of Smith and Towell’s first visit to Palomares comes from author’s interviews with Joseph Smith, January 23, 2007, and Timothy Towell, January 5 and 8, 2007. Their visit is also discussed in Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 162–163.
107 “Just go in”: Joseph Smith interview, January 23, 2007.
107 “General Wilson was totally dismissive”: Timothy Towell interview, January 5, 2007.
107 “If you take care of sovereign people”: Timothy Towell interview, January 8, 2007.
108 Duke had already complained: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to the Department of State, January 27, 1966, #903 (LBJ). Duke’s views on openness with the press also come from the author’s interview with Robin Duke, June 7, 2007.
109 he called a press conference:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 320–321; Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 166.
109 approximately six hundred people gathered:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 299–300 (a copy of the handbill is on p. 300); Szulc, The Bombs of Palo mares, pp. 166–167; “600 Spanish March in Anti-U.S. Protest,” The New York Times, February 5, 1966, p. 8; Simons, “Some Experts Fear Strategic Loss,” p. 11.
110 Alvin and her crew had arrived:Alvin’s trip to Rota and the mechanical problems discovered there are discussed in Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 21; Memo, W. O. Rainnie to Office of Naval Research, “Quarterly Informal Letter Status Report of Contract Nonr 3834(00), Deep Submergence Research Vehicle Project, January 1, 1966 through April 9, 1966,” June 10, 1966 (WHOI). Also, author’s interviews with Arthur Bartlett, February 5, 2007, and Chester Porembski, November 17, 2006. Additional information about working at Otis Air Force Base is from author’s interview with Clyde Tyndale, November 3, 2006. Footage of Alvin at Rota can be found at NARA, 342-USAF-40730A.
111 Marvin J. McCamis, known universally as “Mac”: Personal background on McCamis comes from author’s interviews with Marvin McCamis, January 31, 2003; Arthur Bartlett, February 5, 2007; Chester Porembski, November 17, 2006; Andrew Eliason, October 4, 2006; Barrie Walden, July 25, 2006; and John Porteous, September 6, 2006. See also Victoria Kaharl, Water Baby: The Story of Alvin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 57.
112 called the crew together: Marvin McCamis interview, January 31, 2003.
112 Alvin was an experimental sub: Kaharl, Water Baby, pp. 59–62.
112 “We knew the country had a big problem”: Marvin McCamis interview, January 31, 2003.
113 it also formed a small committee: The background on TAG comes from Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 8–9; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. 5, B1, B4, B15.
113 The idea of Alvin: The background on Allyn Vine comes from Naomi Oreskes, “A Context of Motivation: U.S. Naval Oceanographic Research and the Discovery of Sea-Floor Hydrothermal Vents,” Social Studies of Science 33, no. 5 (October 2003), p. 701, and Kaharl, Water Baby, pp. 10–11, 19.
114 By the 1950s: The background on SOSUS comes from Oreskes, “A Context of Motivation,” p. 702.
114 “Manned submersibles are badly needed”: Memo, Allyn C. Vine to Paul Fye, “ASW,” October 10, 1960 (WHOI).
114 signed a contract in 1962:Alvin, originally called Seapup, was contracted from General Mills in 1962. General Mills had a Mechanical Division to build and repair the machines that mixed and cooked cereal. In 1940, the firm began building torpedo and gun parts to support the U.S. war effort.
After the war, “the government contracts kept coming,” as one historian put it. For more on the complicated history of Alvin’s purchase and construction, see Kaharl, Water Baby, chaps. 1–6.
114Alvin’scurious name: Kaharl, Water Baby, pp. 32–33.
114 On the morning of April 9, 1963: The background on the Thresher comes from the following sources: George W. Martin, “Lasting Legacies of Thresher” The Submarine Review, July 2003, pp. 77–88; George W. Martin, “The Search for Thresher” The Submarine Review, April 2003, pp. 48–58; Frank A. Andrews, “Search Operations in the Thresher Area—1964, Section I,” Naval Engineers Journal, August 1965, pp. 549–561; Frank A. Andrews, “Search Operations in the Thresher Area—1964, Section II,” Naval Engineers Journal, October 1965, pp. 769–779; Frank A. Andrews, “Searching for the Thresher” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1964, pp. 69–77; E. W. Grenfell, “USS Thresher (SSN-593), 3 August 1961–10 April 1963,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1964, pp. 37–47; and Norman Polmar, The Death of the USS Thresher: The Story behind History’s Deadliest Submarine Disaster (Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press, 1964).
115 “One of the many lessons”: Andrews, “Search Operations in the Thresher Area,” p. 550.
115 the secretary of the Navy formed a committee:Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Eighty-eighth Congress, First and Second Sessions on the Loss of the USS Thresher. June 26, 27, July 23, 1963, and July 1, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: Government Reprints Press, 2001), p. 50; author’s interview with John Craven, April 19, 2007.
115 The Stephan Committee released its report: John Peña Craven, The Silent War: The Cold War Battle beneath the Sea (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2001), p. 109; Martin, “Lasting Legacies of Thresher” pp. 85–86.
116 The Deep Submergence Systems Project: Craven, Silent War, pp. 109–111; author’s interview with John Craven, April 19, 2007.
116 Senator William Proxmire: Craven, Silent War, p. 125.
116 a conference called “Man’s Extension”: “Man’s Extension into the Sea,” Symposium Proceedings, January 11–12, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: Marine Technology Society, 1966). The Baldwin quote comes from p. 3.
117 The program called Object Location: U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Aircraft Salvage Operation Mediterranean (Aircraft Salvops Med), Lessons and Implications for the Navy (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, April 7, 1967), p. 2.
117 We had “almost nothing”: John Craven interview, April 19, 2007.
117 “No assignments had gone on”: J. Bradford (henceforth “Brad”) Mooney interview, March 30, 2007.
117 “The Navy had achieved”:Aircraft Salvops Med, Lessons and Implications for the Navy, p. 2.
118 he started jotting notes: Notebook shown to author during interview with Joe Ramirez.
119 Maydew had flown to Spain: Maydew arrived in Palomares on January 29. Memo, R. C.
Maydew and W R. Burton to G. A. Fowler, “Chronological Summary of Significant Events in the 9300 Participation in Broken Arrow Operation,” March 29, 1966, Randall Maydew files (SNL).
119 “except for that blue, blue Mediterranean”: Randall Maydew, oral history, conducted by Necah Furman, December 1991, p. 7.
119 he found that Air Force staffers: Randall C. Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb, Palomares, Spain, 1966 (Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 1997), p. 58.
119 As a navigator in a B-29: Randall C. Maydew, ed., A Kansas Farm Family (Freeman, S.Dak.: Pine Hill Press, 1992), pp. 128–129.
119 one morning, Joe Ramirez stopped by: The story of Maydew’s meeting with Simó comes from Maydew, America’s Lost H-Bomb, pp. 55–58, and author’s interview with Joe Ramirez, January 27, 2007. See also SAC Historical Study #109, p. 45; and “Staff Study by Systems Analysis Team of Search Operations,” February 7, 1966 (document no. SAC200118390000, Secret, NNSA, FOIA), pp. 11–14. “Staff Study” says the meeting took place on February 2, not February 3, as Maydew states in his book.
120 “Before I left the mayor’s office”: Randall Maydew, oral history, conducted by Necah Furman, December 1991, p. 10.
120 By the time Maydew reported: Maydew was part of a Systems Analysis Team that included experts from Sandia, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and Elgin Air Force Base, and was assisted by U.S. Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, and Los Alamos personnel. Maydew left numerous descriptions of his role in Palomares, making it possible to tell the Systems Analysis Team’s story from his point of view. The author refers to the team as “Maydew’s team” or “the ballistics experts” to avoid confusion with TAG and the other groups mentioned in the book.
120 In their calculations: The Maydew team’s conclusions are from “Staff Study of Systems Analysis Team,” February 7, 1966 (NNSA); Memo, Delmar E. Wilson to SAC (Gen. John D. Ryan), “Search Operations, Palomares, Spain,” February 13, 1966 (DOD, FOIA); SAC Historical Study #109, p. 49.
121 It is unclear whether Admiral Guest: Guest’s reaction to the Systems Analysis Team report is in Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 36–38. On page 37 it states, “Commander Task Force 65 was skeptical of the conclusions of this Sandia group and did not entirely accept their recommendations.”
121 On February 7, the USSPinnacleagain:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 38–39.
121 A few days later, Red Moody: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006.
121 “Slick Willie”: The description of Mac’s relationship with Val Wilson comes chiefly from the author’s interviews with Chester Porembski, November 17, 2006, and John Porteous, September 6, 2006.
122 Alvin was trapped on the water’s surface:Alvin’s arrival in Palomares and the storm are discussed in Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. C5; Memo, W. O. Rainnie to Office of Naval Research, “Quarterly Informal Letter,” June 10, 1966, p. 3; and Letter, Lewis Melson to Folks, February 12, 1966 (author’s collection).
122 The Plymouth Rock was a type of vessel: The description of a landing ship dock comes from the author’s visit to the USS Ashland (LSD 48) on September 29, 2006.
122 “We rushed out onto the main deck”: Letter, Lewis Melson to Folks, February 12, 1966 (author’s collection).
123 The OBSS: The description of the OBSS comes from Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 42–43; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 4, appendix B, pp. 57–62; SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 119–120; and Red Moody interview, July 17, 2007.
124 The first to arrive was Deep Jeep:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 4, appendix B, pp. 30–34; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 29; W. M. Place et al., Palomares Summary Report (Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.: Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, Technology and Analysis Directorate, 1975), p. 106.
124 Another sub, calledCubmarine: Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 4, appendix B, pp. 25–29.
124 “Alvin was decidedly mongrel”: Kaharl, Water Baby, p. 42.
124 it reminded people of a fishing lure: Ibid., p. 46.
124 “When people see it”: Ibid., p. 83.
124 At Alvin’s core: The description of Alvin comes from ibid., pp. 42–43; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 4, appendix B, pp. 12–18; Everett S. Allen, “Research Submarine Alvin,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1964, pp. 138–140. The author toured Alvin on July 2, 2007.
125 The only other sub: The description of Aluminaut comes from Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 4, appendix B, pp. 19–24; “The Aluminaut Story,” March 6, 1986; Reynolds Aluminum, “Aluminaut: The Deep Diving Aluminum Submarine,” undated. The Aluminaut is now housed at the Science Museum of Virginia in Richmond. The author toured the vessel with Art Markel on September 25, 2006.
126 “The Old Testament promises”: Reynolds Aluminum, “Aluminaut: The Deep Diving Aluminum Submarine,” p. 11.
126 During 1965, it completed diving trials: “The Aluminaut Story,” March 6, 1986, pp. 3–4 (SMV).
126 theAluminautcrew was eager: Author’s interview with Art Markel, September 25, 2006. Markel’s opinions about Aluminaut’s status are clear in his many letters to Reynolds headquarters during the mission in Spain. The letters are stored at the SMV.
126 Guest was quickly disillusioned: Author’s interviews with John Craven, April 19, 2007; George Martin, May 9, 2007; and Brad Mooney, March 30, 2007.
126 “no great shakes”: Letter, Earl Hays to Paul Fye, March 8, 1966 (WHOI). Hays’s full quote: “The Admiral here is no great shakes — sort of a scream and holler man. I think we have him convinced that we are reasonable people and are interested in doing all we can, but that we are not in the Navy and not likely to be.”
126 but their limited navigation:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 29; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. 76–77.
126 Alvin used a crude: William O. Rainnie, “Equipment and Instrumentation for the Navigation of Submersibles,” undated (DSV Alvin Records, 1949–1998 AC 18, Box 17, Folder 23: Navigation, General, WHOI), pp. 6–7.
126 the system could directAlvinto within four hundred yards: Ibid. and Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 2, part I, chap. 8, p. V4.
126 none of the surface ships on the scene: Letter, Lewis Melson to Adm. Leyton, February 15, 1966 (author’s collection).
127 Alvin’s mechanical arm: Ibid.
127 he suggested they drop: Ibid.
127 “What did he ever have to do”: John Craven interview, April 19, 2007.
CHAPTER 10: GUEST CHARTS A COURSE
128 Mooney reported to the USSBoston: Mooney’s encounter with Admiral Guest comes from Brad Mooney interview, March 30, 2007.
129 At the time of the Tonkin Gulf: The explanation of Guest’s role in the Tonkin Gulf incident comes from author’s interview with Edwin Moïse, August 16, 2007. Admiral Guest was more involved with a third, lesser-known incident on September 18, which didn’t result in any retaliation and had little bearing on the escalation of the war. For more on the incident, see Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
129 “was an extremely important mission”: Author’s interview with Douglas Kingsbery, July 27, 2007.
129 Guest was deeply affected: Robert Kingsbery interview, July 19, 2007.
129 “like a ray of sunshine”:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 35.
129 Red Moody was also impressed: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006.
130 Mooney had orders to report: E-mail from Brad Mooney to author, June 20, 2008.
130 On February 17, 1966, he laid it out: Guest’s letter to the CNO is discussed at length in Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 28–36.
130 adding paint cans, soup cans: Author’s interview with Jon Lindbergh, July 11, 2007.
130 “We enter this phase”: Quoted in Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 29.
130 Guest laid out his four search areas: Ibid., pp. 32–34.
130 the four search areas encompassed: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 159.
130 Guest’s team created a 132-square-mile grid:Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. 23.
131 he made a plan for the submersibles: Author’s interviews with Brad Mooney, March 30, 2007, and Art Markel, September 25, 2006.
131 theAluminautsonars picked up: Art Markel interview, September 25, 2006. Markel also discusses the “ship of antiquity” in Memo, Art Markel to office, “Tape 17,” recorded April 11, 1966 (SMV); Letter, Art Markel to Carrie, February 18, 1966 (SMV); and Letter, Art Markel to Louis Reynolds, February 23, 1966 (SMV).
131 He also suggested to Guest Art Markel interview, September 25, 2006.
132 On February 16, the Soviet foreign minister: “Russians Accuse U.S. in B-52 Crash,” The New York. Times, February 18, 1966, p. 4; Howard Simons, “Some Experts Fear Strategic Loss if Curbs Are Put on Nuclear Routes,” The Washington Post, February 27, 1966, p. A1; SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 297–298.
132 A week later, President Charles de Gaulle: Henry Tanner, “De Gaulle Insists on Rule of Bases of NATO in France,” The New York Times, February 22, 1966, p. 1; “Johnson Rebuffs de Gaulle Quickly in Bases Dispute,” The New York Times, March 9, 1966, p. 1.
132 Ambassador Duke received assurances: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY, March 25, 1966, #23577 (LBJ); Cable, Embassy in Madrid to SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY, March 25, 1966, #24270 (LBJ).
132 a Soviet spy ship, theLotsman: Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 46–49; Toth, “Soviet Spy Ship Watches U.S. Hunt Bomb,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1966, p. 1; author’s interviews with Gary Montalbine, August 16, 2007, and Anthony Colucci, July 31, 2007.
133 the Soviets had two advanced submersibles: In an e-mail to the author on May 25, 2007, Anatoly Sagalevitch, who ran the Soviet submersible program, wrote that Russia had two “Sever-2” submersibles that could dive to two thousand meters, but that they were used for scientific purposes only. He doesn’t recall the Soviets sending any submersibles to Palomares during the hunt for the bomb.
133 Heads would roll: In more bureaucratic language: “Overshadowing all efforts was the apprehension that the weapon might not be located at all and the Navy would be called upon to justify both the cost and its methods in the unsuccessful search.” Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 3.
133 they would need proof: Author’s interview with Henry (hereafter “Tony”) Richardson, October 31, 2006.
134 In Washington, Craven briefed the two: Author’s interviews with Tony Richardson, October 31, 2006, and Frank Andrews, November 10, 2006. Also see Craven, The Silent War, p. 169.
134 On the plane: The story of Richardson’s trip to Spain and his first meeting with Guest comes from author’s interviews with Tony Richardson, October 31, 2006, and Frank Andrews, November 10, 2006.
135 Richardson, working with the grid overlay: Author’s interviews with Tony Richardson, and e-mail, Richardson to author, September 9, 2008. Also see Red Moody interview, November 11, 2006. A detailed explanation of the mathematics behind SEP can be found in Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 2, annex I, part II, chap. 5.
135 Some on the task force had doubts: George Martin interview May 9, 2007; and Letter, John Bruce to Paul Fye, March 9, 1966 (WHOI).
136 “It’s important psychologically”: Tony Richardson interview, October 31, 2006.
136 By February 17, they had thoroughly scanned:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 20.
136 At times, Guest moved the submersibles: Author’s interviews with Rhodes Boykin, March 16, 2007, and Tony Richardson, October 31, 2007; Memo, W. O. Rainnie to Office of Naval Research, “Quarterly Informal Letter,” June 10, 1966, p. 8.
136 specific grievances began to emerge: Guest’s rebuke of Markel comes from Art Markel interview, September 25, 2006.
137 The Alvin crew had its own problems: Brad Mooney interview, March 30, 2007; Kaharl, Water Baby, pp. 67–69.
138 One Navy captain estimated: Letter, Lewis Melson to Adm. Leyton, February 25, 1966 (author’s collection).
138 “At first theThunderballaspects”: Richard Oulahan, “The Case of the Missing H-Bomb,” Life, February 25, 1966, p. 106A.
139 One Sunday morning in February: The story of Simó’s catch comes from author’s interviews with Joe Ramirez, January 27, 2007, Red Moody, November 7, 2006, and Oliver Andersen, March 31, 2007; and from Commander Task Group 65.3, memo to Commander Task Force 65, “Report of Inshore Search, Identification and Recovery Unit,” March 13, 1966 (NHC), p. 26. There is some slight disagreement on the date of this incident, but sources agree that it happened sometime around February 10, 1966.
140 A Palomares schoolteacher:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 47.
140 Searchers were ordered to mark: Ibid., p. 99.
140 General Wilson asked the Sandia engineers: Information on the Sandia drop tests (“Operation Sunday”) comes from ibid., pp. 102–105; author’s interview with William Caudle, January 22, 2004; and Memo, Robert L. McNeill to William N. Caudle, “Field Observation Operation Sunday,” February 15, 1966 (NNSA).
141 “severely restricted”: Memo, McNeill to Caudle, “Field Observation,” p. 5.
141 Maydew’s airburst theory:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 43–44.
141 Only Larry Messinger showed a positive result: Ibid., p. 44.
141 The Spanish vesselJuan de la Cosa: Ibid., p. 47.
141 Joe Ramirez also found a pharmacist: Joe Ramirez interview, January 27, 2007.
141 “This could only be considered as normal”:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 93.
CHAPTER 12: RADIOACTIVIDAD
143 Colonel White, the man in charge: Flora Lewis interview with Alton “Bud” White, undated (AFHRA), and Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 147–149.
143 Dr. Wright Langham, a plutonium expert: The background on Langham is from Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 145–147, and Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 106–111.
144 Some of the urine samples:The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 153–154; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 109–111; SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 146–148.
144 Langham next tackled crop and animal worries:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 155–156.
144 The tests, called Operation Roller Coaster: J. Newell Stannard, Radioactivity and Health, A History. Vol. 2: Environmental Aspects (Richland, Wash.: Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1988), pp. 1193–1197, 1203–1207.
144 the major plutonium hazard had vanished: Paraphrased from Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 115.
144 He had used himself: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 109.
144 “maximum permissible body burden”: Ibid., p. 110.
145 Current limits: E-mail, Andy Karam to author, December 10, 2007.
145 The maximum permissible air concentration: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p.110.
145 an amount akin to a grain of salt: E-mail, Andy Karam to author, December 10, 2007.
145 has a half-life of 24,360 years:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 137.
145 Langham calculated how much soil: The soil remediation plan is discussed in Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 115–120; Flora Lewis interview with Alton “Bud” White, undated (AFHRA); SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 160, 165–167, 171–173; and Place et al., Palomares Summary Report (Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.: Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, Technology and Analysis Directorate, January 15, 1975), pp. 64–65. Unfortunately, official records list the contamination levels in counts per minute (CPM), a measurement that varies depending on the sensitivity of the instrument.
146 there had been at least twenty-eight nuclear accidents: “Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1950–1980,” undated (NNSA, FOIA). Accident summaries are paraphrased from this document.
147 a public debate: For a historical discussion of the nuclear weapons safety issue, see Joel Larus, Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967).
147 Even President Kennedy grew worried: Larus, Nuclear Weapons Safety, pp. 32–33.
147 “When Air Force experts rushed”: Quoted in ibid., pp. 93–94.
148 Combat Crew, reflected this zeal: Examples come from the author’s reading of Combat Crew.
148 18,340 KC-135 tankers:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 288.
148 a cleanup plan called “Moist Mop”: Ibid., pp. 138–139.
149 Any men plowing, scraping: Ibid., pp. 156–157.
149 Robert Finkel, who spent: Robert Finkel interview, April 4, 2007.
149 The Navy regularly sampled the water: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006; Commander Task Group 65.3, memo to Commander Task Force 65, “Report of Inshore Search,” March 13, 1966, p. 9.
149 Gaylord White, one of the divers: Gaylord White interview, March 3, 2007.
149 Henry Engelhardt, the commander: Author’s interview with Henry “Bud” Engelhardt, May 17, 2006. Also see SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 163 and 165.
150 When Bud White’s team first mapped:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 141.
150 The Air Force maintains:Palomares Nuclear Weapons Accident: Revised Dose Evaluation Report, U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Medical Service, April 2001 (FOIA). This report states that some doses measured “unreasonably high” and suggests that more study would be needed to reconcile the data. A press release accompanying this report said that exposures were “not significant.”
150 The vegetation problem: Flora Lewis, interview with Alton “Bud” White, undated (AFHRA); SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 170, 174.
151 This left the question: The soil problem is discussed in Flora Lewis,interview with Alton “Bud” White, undated (AFHRA); author’s interview with Jack Howard, April 3, 2007; SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 179–186.
151 Spanish and American officials: The disposal of the aircraft wreckage is discussed in SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 134–136; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. C6–C7.
151 “lingering recriminations”:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 134.
152 To prepare the dirt: Ibid., p. 173.
152 with lawyers interviewing about twenty people: Ibid., p. 391.
152 The claims work was as complicated: The background on claims comes from Joe Ramirez interviews, January 27, 2007, and April 27, 2007; and SAC Historical Study #109, chapter 7.
152 when lawyers consulted the owners’ registry:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 397.
152 Four claimants: Ibid., p. 389, footnote.
155 Ambassador Duke stood: The description of Duke’s solo swim and the quotes are from “US Envoy Swims in Mediterranean,” CBS News, March 9, 1966.
156 the U.S. government had finally admitted:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 327–329; the text of the DOD press release is on p. 328. See also John W. Finney, “U.S. Concedes Loss of H-Bomb in Spain,” The New York Times, March 3, 1966, p. 1.
156 For weeks, the U.S. and Spanish governments: Arguments over the release of information are discussed in SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 324–326, and Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, pp. 202–204.
157 various government agencies began stumbling:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 329.
157 “The news is now official”: “The Missing H-Bomb,” The Boston Globe, March 4, 1966, p. 14.
157 “One U.S. official insisted”: “Swimming Party,” Newsweek, March 14, 1966, p. 59.
157 Together, Ambassador Duke and Manuel Fraga Iribarne: Sources differ over who actually came up with the idea for the swim. In an oral history, Duke said the idea was his and Fraga agreed to the plan reluctantly, thinking it undignified for a government official to splash around in bathing trunks. General Spanish opinion holds that the idea was Fraga’s and Duke finally agreed only to avoid being shown up. In recent interviews, Fraga and Robin Duke say the idea was mutual. They also said that it was mutually agreed that Robin Duke not swim, to avoid the spectacle of an ambassador’s wife in a bikini. Interestingly, a famous Spanish newsreel of the event shows only Fraga, with a brief appearance by Ambassador Duke at the very end. (This newsreel forms most Spaniards’ collective memory of the entire Palomares saga.) American papers discussed mainly Duke, with only rare mentions of Fraga. Sources: Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990 (Duke), pp. 18–20; author’s interviews with Manuel Fraga Iribarne, February 15, 2007, and Robin Duke, June 7, 2007; and Noticias NO-DO 1210 B, (Filmoteca Española), undated.
157 “If I could take my children”: Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, p. 18.
157 “aquatic diplomacy”: The Kalb quotes come from “US Envoy Swims in Mediterranean,” CBS News, March 9, 1966.
157 Something went awry: The story of the second swim comes primarily from author’s interview with Timothy Towell, January 8, 2007, and Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 204. Fraga denies this version of events, though without much vigor (interview, February 15, 2007). He says that everything went off as planned and that the two men swam together. However, Towell’s story is corroborated by Red Moody as well as footage of the second swim, which shows Duke entering the water after Fraga.
158 “The humble of Palomares”: Signs quoted in “Officials Take Cold Dip to Deny H-Bomb Hazard,” The Washington Post, March 9, 1966.
158 “It was with confidence and pleasure”: Angier Biddle Duke, radio interview with Jay Rutherfurd (Duke).
159 An Associated Press photo: Tad Szulc, “U.S. Envoy Swims Where H-Bomb Fell,” The New York Times, March 9, 1966, p. 1.
159 “We think of our diplomats”:The Dallas Morning News, March 12, 1966 (Angier Biddle Duke Papers, Palomares Scrapbook, Duke).
159 “Duke’s ‘Swim-in’”: Jay Rutherfurd, “Duke’s ‘Swim-in’ for Spanish Tourism Best Water Show since Aquacade,” Variety, March 16, 1966, p. 2.
159 “I’m glad your bathing suit”: Letter, Jack Valenti to Angier Biddle Duke, March 9, 1966 (LBJ).
160 “How happy I was”: Letter, Jacqueline Kennedy to Angier Biddle Duke, March 12, 1966 (Duke).
160 “I trust that excessive swimming”: Letter, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., to Angier Biddle Duke, March 15, 1966 (Duke).
160 “I can understand our Government’s desire”: Letter, Nathan Arrow to Angier Biddle Duke, March 11, 1966 (Duke).
161 “Feel safer already?”: “Swimming Party,” p. 59.
161 “Supposing a bomb is reported missing”: Quoted in Szulc, The Bombs of Palomares, p. 212.
161 The Moscow publicationIzvestia: SAC Historical Study #109, p. 361.
161 “For many years”: “The Missing H-Bomb,” The Boston Globe, March 4, 1966, p. 14.
161 Curtis LeMay added his two cents: “Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay on Missing Bomb,” CBS News, March 12, 1966.
162 The Navy requested:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 184–185. 162 “in line with the spirit”: Ibid., p. 185.
162 Wilson apologized: Delmar E. Wilson, speech to residents of Palomares and Villaricos, March 20, 1966 (USAF, FOIA).
163 On March 24, men moved:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 188. 163 A second team of ballistics experts: Ibid., p. 50.
163 “By 1 March”: Ibid.
163 With regard to the water search: “Addendum to SAT Study of 7 February 1966,” March 4, 1966 (NNSA); SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 51–53.
163 The Sandia engineer Bill Barton: Memo, Maydew and Barton to Fowler, “Chronological Summary,” March 29, 1966, p. 3.
163 the secretary of defense authorized:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 55.
163 Cyrus Vance created a “Search Evaluation Board”: The background on the Search Evaluation Board is from ibid., pp. 55–56, and author’s interview with Robert Sproull, May 11, 2007. The Sproull quotes are from this interview.
164 In anticipation of the next meeting:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 56.
165 On the morning of March 1: The story of Alvin’s move to search area C4 is from Marvin J.McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt for the H-Bomb,” Oceanus 31, no. 4 (Winter 1988–89), p. 24.
There is some dispute about whether McCamis sneaked Alvin into C4, as he contends, or was assigned to dive there. Navy Captain Lewis Melson said that he and others met with Guest on February 28 and proposed sending Alvin into C4, and Guest agreed to the plan (see memo from Lewis Melson, “WHOI’s OCEANUS WINTER 1988/1989 issue extract for 1 March 1966” [author’s collection]). However, the deck logs of the Fort Snelling for March 1 say that Alvin was launched to search area B29, lending credence to McCamis’s version of events. Also, such an antiauthoritarian scheme seems in character for McCamis. Long time Alvin pilot Barrie Walden said, “McCamis, in my opinion, would be more likely to try something that was a little more outrageous than another pilot, in order to get the job done during the dive.” (Author’s interview with Barrie Walden, July 25, 2006.)
165 Bill Rainnie and Val Wilson:Alvin dive log, Dive 119, March 1, 1966. Alvin’s dive logs are available at www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=11039.
165 Andrews had asked Earl Hays: Frank Andrews interview, November 10, 2006.
166 Rainnie and Wilson ventedAlvin’sballast: The description of Alvin diving comes from the author’s visit to Alvin and interviews with Robert Brown and Bruce Strickrott, July 2, 2007.
166 the visibility near the bottom: Victoria Kaharl, Water Baby: The Story of Alvin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 66; William O. Rainnie, “How We Found the Missing H-Bomb,” Popular Mechanics, August 1966, pp. 75–76.
166 In order to steer a straight line: Marvin McCamis intervew, January 31, 2003.
166 “a straight line in a snowstorm”: Ibid.
166 the bottom stretched before them: Rainnie, “How We Found the Missing H-Bomb,” p. 76.
166Alvinwas “flying a contour”: Frank Andrews interview, November 10, 2006.
167 Mac McCamis, however, had lost patience: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 24.
167 “Wait a minute, I see something”: Rainnie and Wilson’s dialogue is quoted in Kaharl, Water Baby, p. 69. The Alvin pilots regularly recorded their dives on reel-to-reel audiotape. However, the tapes of certain critical dives, including this one, are missing from the WHOI archives.
167 the pilots handed off their film: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 24.
167 “like a barrel had been dragged”: Marvin McCamis interview, January 31, 2003.
167 “To me, it looked like”: Brad Mooney interview, March 30, 2007.
167 theAlvincrew returned: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 24; deck logs of the USS Fort Snelling, March 3–7, 1966 (NARA).
167 the task force suddenly yanked: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 24; Tony Richardson interview, October 31, 2007; Memo, W. O. Rainnie to Office of Naval Research, “Quarterly Informal Letter,” June 10, 1966, p. 8; Alvin dive logs, Dive 124, March 8, 1966, and Dive 125, March 9, 1966; Deck Logs of the USS Fort Snelling, March 8–9, 1966 (NARA).
168 “My turn at surface control”: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 24.
168 made nine runs over a dummy:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 44.
168 On March 12, an OBSS: Ibid.
168 The divers had wrapped up: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006; e-mail, Moody to author, December 19, 2007.
168 Duke wrote to Jack Valenti: Letter, Angier Biddle Duke to Jack Valenti, March 14, 1966 (LBJ).
169 Tony Richardson, the baby-faced mathematician: The details of Richardson’s actions on March 15, 1966, come from Tony Richardson, diary, March 15 to April 7, 1966 (author’s collection), and Tony Richardson interview, October 31, 2007.
169 “Paco de la Bomba”: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 194.
170 His response to the Cyrus Vance committee:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, February 15, 1967, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 56–59.
170 They were supposed to get a new transponder: Ibid., pp. 53–54; author’s interview with Brad Mooney, March 30, 2007.
170 That day Mac McCamis: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 25.
170 because today was his son’s birthday: Ibid.
170 Wilson saw the track:Alvin’s discovery of the parachute on March 15 is detailed in ibid.; author’s interviews with Marvin McCamis, January 31, 2003, and Art Bartlett, February 5, 2007; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 59–60. In his interview, McCamis said the code word was “bent nail,” but Navy sources say it was “instrument panel.” 171 “We found a parachute”: Kaharl, Water Baby, p. 74. The reel-to-reel audiotape for the March 15, 1966, dive (Dive 128) is missing from the WHOI archives. However, the author viewed photographs taken by the pilots on this dive.
171 “Had a hell of a time”: Marvin McCamis interview, January 31, 2003.
171 the USSAlbanyhad arrived: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 209; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 59–60.
171 Deep below the surface: Marvin McCamis interview, January 31, 2003; Art Bartlett interview, February 5, 2007; Kaharl, Water Baby, p. 76.
172 the men discussed what to do: Art Bartlett interview, February 5, 2007.
172Alvincould remain submerged for twenty-four hours: Everett S. Allen, “Research Submarine Alvin,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1964, p. 138.
172 Mooney suggested sendingAluminautdown: Brad Mooney interview, March 30, 2007.
173 “I can fly my F4s”: George Martin interview, May 9, 2007.
173 The sub picked up a transponder: E-mail, Red Moody to author, December 14, 2007.
173 got a quick battery charge: Art Markel interview, September 25, 2006.
173 “He thought we were a bunch”: Ibid.
173 TheAlvincrew sat in the dark: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 25.
173 “It was beautiful”: Quoted in Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 208.
173 cautiously parking herself about twenty-five yards:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol.
1, part I, chap. 2, p. 66.
173Alvinsurfaced after ten hours: Ibid.
173 entered the well deck at 8:12: Deck logs of the USS Fort Snelling, March 15, 1966 (NARA).
173 TheAlvincrew sent their photographs:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 66, 69–70.
173 Mac McCamis was outraged: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 25.
173 “How do you know”: Quoted in Kaharl, Water Baby, p. 77.
173 “What else”: Ibid.
173 “In all my life”: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 25.
174 Admiral Guest wrote a situation report: Cable, CTF Sixty-five to REUCW/CNO, “Sitrep Seventy-nine,” March 16, 1966 (LBJ).
174 The other memo:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 67.
174 Robert Sproull, the chair of the Cyrus Vance committee: Robert Sproull interview, May 11, 2007.
174 That morning in Rota: E-mail, Red Moody to author, December 19, 2007.
174 That afternoon in Spain: Tony Richardson, diary, March 15 to April 7, 1966 (author’s collection); author’s interviews with Tony Richardson, October 31, 2007, and John Bruce, August 17, 2006.
175 news of the Gemini 8 space shot: John Noble Wilford, “Gemini Is Fueled for Link-up Today,” The New York Times, March 16, 1966, p. 1; John Noble Wilford, “Gemini 8 Crew Is Forced Down in Pacific after Successful Linkup with Satellite; Spacemen Picked Up after 3 Hours in Sea,” The New York Times, March 17, 1966, p. 1.
175 he sent three nuclear weapons experts: Cable, from 16ADVON Spain to RUCSC/SAC, March 17, 1966, #71560 (LBJ).
176 The man on the phone was Harry Stathos: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 212–213; SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 331–332.
177 “The undersea vessel, Alvin, made contact”: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE, March 17, 1966, #1219 (LBJ).
177 At 12:45 a.m., as reporters gathered:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 331–332.
177 “Recovery promises to be”: “Sub Finds H-Bomb off Spain: Weapon Reported Intact in Water 2500 Feet Deep,” The Washington Post, March 18, 1966, p. 1.
177 “No pictures of the bomb”: “H-Bomb Located in Sea off Spain,” The New York Times, March 18, 1966, p. 1.
178 to ensure credibility: Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, pp. 23–
24 (Duke).
178 Duke formed a committee:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 336.
178 “The fourth and final weapon”: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to SEC-STATE, March 18, 1966, #1226 (LBJ).
178 On March 16, McCamis and Wilson: “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 25; William O. Rainnie, “Alvin… and the Bomb,” Oceanus 12, no. 4 (August 1966), p. 19.
179Alvinby now had a mechanical arm: Allen, “Research Submarine Alvin,” p. 140.
180 On March 22, 1966, CBS News: “Special Report: Lost and Found, One H-Bomb,” CBS News, March 22, 1966.
181AlvinorAluminautcould carry: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006; Brad Mooney, e-mail to author, September 17, 2008. Mooney pointed out another problem: the weight of the line should not be heavier than the positive buoyancy of the sub.
181 Working with two consultants: The description of POODL comes from author’s interview with Red Moody, November 7, 2006; D. H. Moody, “40th Anniversary of Palomares,” Faceplate 10, no. 2 (September 2006), p. 18; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 4, appendix B, pp. 42–44; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. 39, D59, D61. POODL was rebuilt several times during the bomb recovery effort, so it is difficult to determine its exact specifications at the time of the first recovery attempt. When there was a discrepancy in the records, author relied on Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 4, appendix B. The height of POODL (seven feet) comes from e-mail, Red Moody to author, September 17, 2008.
182 “Oh, my God”: Author’s interview with Malcolm MacKinnon, December 4, 2006.
182 “gypsy-engineered”: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006.
182 That fear overshadowed everything:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 69.
182 the captain of theMizar: Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. C12–C13.
182 it had carried a light line: Even this light polypropylene line, hand-tended from the surface, was a struggle for Alvin to carry down to the bottom. Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 73; Memo, W.O. Rainnie to Office of Naval Research, “Quarterly Informal Letter,” June 10, 1966, p. 9; Rainnie, “How We Found the Missing H-Bomb,” Popular Mechanics, August 1966, p. 78. According to Red Moody (e-mail to author, September 17, 2008) the sub crews had never attempted such a risky maneuver before and were understandably reluctant to try.
182 the task force members tried another tactic:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 75.
182 That evening, Admiral Guest wrote: Ibid.
182 Art Markel thoughtAluminaut: Art Markel interview, September 25, 2006; Memo, Art Markel to office, “Tape 3,” recorded March 19, 1966 (SMV); Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 76.
183 Markel was excited: For example: Memo, Art Markel to office, “Tape 4,” recorded March 20, 1966; Memo, Art Markel to office, “Tape 5,” recorded March 22, 1966; Memo, Art Markel to office, “Tape 6,” recorded March 23, 1966, all at SMV.
183 to share some ofAlvin’slimelight: Memo, Art Markel to office, “Tape 3,” recorded March 19, 1966 (SMV).
183 “It is quite apparent”: Letter, Art Markel to Carrie, March 28, 1966 (SMV).
183 Markel had half a mind: Letter, Art Markel to Carrie, April 6, 1966 (SMV).
183 On March 22, theLos Angeles Times: Robert C. Toth, “H-Bomb May Slip into Deep Sea Crevice, Balk Recovery,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 1966, p. 1.
183 Duke, disturbed by such gloomy press: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to SECSTATE WASHDC, March 22, 1966, Deptel 1185 (LBJ).
183 The Air Force thought:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 320, 334–335.
183 But Guest suspected the embassy: Author’s interviews with Brad Mooney, March 30, 2007, and Robert Kingsbery, July 19, 2007.
184 he seemed as mystified: Author’s interviews with Robin Duke, June 7, 2007, and Tim Towell, January 8, 2007. See also SAC Historical Study #109, p. 335.
184Mizarhad landed the anchor and POODL:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 78–79; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. C13. See also Tad Szulc, “H-Bomb Searchers Fail Again as Sea Cable Snaps,” The New York Times, March 26, 1966, p. 9. March 23 was also the day that the diver Carl Brashear was injured in an accident aboard the USS Hoist, nearly severing his left lower leg. Brashear’s story was dramatized in the feature film Men of Honor.
184 Guest’s staff met aboard theMizar: Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 79–80; Jon Lindbergh interview, July 11, 2007.
184Mizarwould hover directly above: E-mail, Red Moody to author, December 19, 2007.
185 McCamis, still underwater inAlvin: Marvin McCamis interview, January 31, 2003.
185 Red Moody was having his own argument: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006; e-mail, Red Moody to author, December 19, 2007.
185 TheMizar’screw snagged the floating buoy: The description of the lift at tempt comes from Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 80–81, and author’s interviews with Jon Lindbergh, July 11, 2007, and Red Moody, November 7, 2006. There are some small (fifteen-minute) discrepancies in the timeline of events.
186 “Oh, boy”: Marvin McCamis interview, January 31, 2003.
186Alvinneeded a battery charge:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 81–82.
186 “The slope looked”: McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 27.
186 The pilots found: Ibid.
186 The broken line seemed:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 81.
186 The Soviet newspaperIzvestia: “Soviet Asks World Check on U.S. H-Bomb off Spain,” The New York Times, March 19, 1966, p. 7.
186 U.N. Secretary General: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 222.
187 There was still the question of logistics:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, pp. 84–85; SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 337–339.
187 Military officials hated the idea: Joseph Smith interview, January 23, 2007; Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, pp. 23–24.
187 he broke protocol and called: Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, pp. 23–24.
187 “Here we were in the ninth inning”: George Martin interview, May 9, 2007.
188 The crew of the USSAlbany: Deck logs of the USS Albany, March 29, 1966; Francis Smith, e-mails to author, February 2 and 4, 2008. Smith was a gunner’s mate on the USS Albany during the bomb search. The deck logs for the morning of March 29 say, “Commenced handling TALOS missile warheads.” TALOS was a long-range naval surface-to-air missile. It could be equipped with either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the only mention of TALOS in the Albany deck logs during the Palomares mission.
188 “Because arrangements for overflights”: Cable, State and Defense to Embassy in Madrid, March 30, 1966, Deptel 1240 (LBJ).
188 Duke responded in a secret cable: Cable, Embassy in Madrid to SEC-STATE WASHDC PRIORITY, April 1, 1966, #849 (LBJ).
189 Guest assumed that the weapon:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 82.
189 the crew found a track leading up: Ibid. and Rainnie, “How We Found the Missing H-Bomb,” p. 78.
189 theAlvinpilots began to imagine: George Martin interview, May 9, 2007; Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, pp. 223–224; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 82; Rainnie, “How We Found the Missing H-Bomb,” p. 78.
189 On the morning of April 2, Alvindove: The description of this dive comes from author’s interview with George Martin, May 9, 2007; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 86; and McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt,” p. 27.
190 Red Moody heard a buzz: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006.
193 a diver named Herman Kunz: Malcolm MacKinnon interview, December 4, 2006.
193 MacKinnon and Kunz had visited: Ibid.
194 The engineers and technicians at NOTS: The background on CURV comes mainly from author’s interviews with Robert Pace, February 6, 2007, and Larry Brady, January 18 and 31, 2007; and e-mail, Larry Brady to author, September 18, 2008. See also Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 4, appendix B, pp. 45–52; and Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 86.
195 “It looked like a python”: Larry Brady interview, January 31, 2007.
196 The CURV team set up shop: The background on the Petrel and Max Harrell is from Sanchez Goode, “Postscript to Palomares,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 94, no. 12 (December 1968), pp. 49–53.
196 The Navy dropped a dummy bomb:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 86; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, annex I, part I, chap. 2, p. 7.
196 The CURV team operated the device: Details on the CURV operations come mainly from author’s interviews with Robert Pace, February 6, 2007, and Larry Brady, January 18 and 31, 2007, and e-mail, Larry Brady to author, September 18, 2008.
196 CURV dove to 2,400 feet: Naval Ordnance Test Station, Pasadena Annex [NOTS Pasadena], AirsalopsMed/CURV Notes, 1966 (author’s collection).
197 Sketching a grapnel: Robert Pace interview, February 6, 2007; Larry Brady interview, January 31, 2007.
197Alvin, left alone with the bomb:Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. C14–C15; deck logs of the USS Fort Snelling, April 3, 1966.
197 now code-named “Robert”: Tony Richardson, diary, April 4, 1966; author’s interview with Doug Kingsbery, July 27, 2007. Brad Mooney says that additional code words were used for underwater communications. Mooney recalls using codes based on the characters from “Peanuts” and the colors of the rainbow, so that “Lucy Red” might mean that a pilot had spotted something. (Brad Mooney interview, March 30, 2007.)
197 To give CURV as much freedom: Goode, “Postscript to Palomares,” p. 52; Malcolm MacKinnon interview, December 4, 2006.
198 The machine shop had finished: Robert Pace interview, February 6, 2007.
198 The grapnel was attached: Larry Brady interview, January 31, 2007; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. 40.
198 On April 4, just before 9 a.m.: Deck logs of the USS Petrel, April 4, 1966.
198 Air Force experts had told: Larry Brady interview, January 18, 2007.
198 Around noon, CURV reached the bomb: Deck logs of the USS Petrel, April 4, 1966; NOTS Pasadena, AirsalopsMed/CURV Notes.
198 dug three tines of the grapnel: Brady says four tines; the final Navy report says three. The photographs are unclear. Larry Brady interview, January 18, 2007; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. 40.
198 Sure that the grapnel: Larry Brady interview, January 31, 2007; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. 40.
198 two guys flipped their car: Larry Brady interview, January 31, 2007.
198 “you got that parachute”: Robert Pace interview, February 6, 2007.
199 On April 5, Mac McCamis: Marvin J. McCamis, “‘Captain Hook’s’ Hunt for the H-Bomb,” Oceanus, 31, no. 4 (Winter 1988–89), p. 27; Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, p. C15.
199 “This sixty-four-foot cargo chute”: Marvin McCamis, interview, January 31, 2003.
199 “Scared him dead”: Ibid.
199 IfAlvingot trapped or tangled: The description of the Alvin emergency measures comes from the author’s visit to Alvin and interviews with Bob Brown and Bruce Strickrott on July 2, 2007.
199 Just before midnight on April 5: Deck logs of the USS Petrel, April 5, 1966; NOTS Pasadena, AirsalopsMed/CURV Notes.
199 Larry Brady twisted CURV’s second grapnel:Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, pp. 40, C15.
200 the weather turned sour: “William S. Guest Press Conference,” April 8, 1966.
200 Admiral Guest looked: Ibid.
200 Just before 9 p.m.: Deck logs of the USS Petrel, April 6, 1966.
200 Bad weather grounded CURV:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 94.
200 Around 1 a.m., CURV dove: Deck logs of the USS Petrel, April 7, 1966.
200 The control shack was crowded: The main source for this scene is Larry Brady interview, January 31, 2007. Other sources disagree on several points in this scene. Some say that Guest and his staff were in the wardroom, watching the underwater drama on closed-circuit TV, when CURV became fouled; Brady, however, remembers the scene in the CURV control shack in detail. In addition, some accounts say that the CURV team drove the vehicle into the parachute on purpose, but Brady and Robert Pace say it was an accident.
200 Guest thanked his lucky stars: “William S. Guest Press Conference,” April 8, 1966.
200 The CURV crew waited: Larry Brady interview, January 31, 2007, and Robert Pace interview, February 6, 2007.
201 The same argument flew: Sources differ slightly on how Mooney and Guest ended up in the wardroom together, but all agree that it was Mooney who convinced Guest to raise the bomb.
Author’s interviews with Brad Mooney, March 30, 2007, and Red Moody, November 7, 2006; Kaharl, Water Baby, p. 79; George Martin, e-mail to author, September 18, 2008.
201 fainted from the stress: D. H. Moody, “40th Anniversary of Palomares,” Faceplate 10, no. 2 (September 2006), p. 19; e-mail, Red Moody to author, September 19, 2008.
201 “the snake charmer”: George Martin interview, May 9, 2007.
201 “I tried to be”: Brad Mooney interview, March 30, 2007.
201 Guest sent a message:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 95.
201 The two men went over: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006; Goode, “Postscript to Palomares,” pp. 51–52.
201 Harrell designed a system: Goode, “Postscript to Palomares,” p. 51. This article also contains a diagram of Harrell’s novel rigging and control system.
201 Both lines were wound: Ibid. Also, Red Moody, e-mails to author, September 19 and 21, 2008.
201 Looking at the weather, he knew: Goode, “Postscript to Palomares,” p. 53.
202 Guest and his staff gathered: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006.
202 “tourists”: Ibid.
202 there’d be nothing left: Author’s interview with Robert Singleton, November 27, 2006.
202 At 5:50 a.m., thePetrelbegan to raise: Deck logs of the USS Petrel, April 7, 1966.
202 Guest worried most: “William S. Guest Press Conference,” April 8, 1966.
202 one scientist paced: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006.
202 looked sick to his stomach: Ibid.
202 “I’d prefer combat”: “William S. Guest Press Conference,” April 8, 1966.
202 the weapon came up so smoothly: Ibid.
202 Two of Red Moody’s divers: Ibid.; Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006; Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 95.
202 Boatswain mates rigged the lines: Goode, “Postscript to Palomares,” pp. 51–52; author’s interview with Red Moody, November 7, 2006.
202 Immediately, the EOD team: Dewitt H. Moody, memo to Commander, Naval Ordnance Systems Command, “Report of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operation (OPNAV REPORT 3571-1),” May 10, 1966 (EOD U2, Post 46, Command Files, Operational Archives, Secret, NHC), p. 2.
202 It was 8:46 a.m.: Deck logs of the USS Petrel, April 7, 1966. The entry reads, “Weapon on deck with parachute.”
203 The rough ride: The condition of weapon number four comes from Moody, memo to Commander, “Report of Explosive Ordnance Disposal,” May 10, 1966, p. 4. The author also viewed photographs of the recovered weapon at Operational Archives, NHC. The weapon casings of bombs number one and four are now housed at the National Atomic Museum in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
203 The EOD team began to render: Ibid. and S. V. Asselin, “Notes on the EOD Render Safe Procedure of Weapon #4 (W28 #45345) Near Palomares Spain March 15, 1966” (Document no. SAC200118480000, Confidential, NNSA, FOIA). See also author’s interviews with Oliver Andersen, January 22, 2007, and Red Moody, November 7, 2006, and Moody, e-mails to author, September 23 and 28, 2008. Funston’s rig is called, appropriately, a Spanish windlass.
203 there were no shouts: Author’s interviews with Oliver Andersen, January 22, 2007, and Larry Brady, January 31, 2007.
203 In the wardroom, the staff applauded: Red Moody interview, November 7, 2006.
203 “Thank God we finally did it”:Aircraft Salvops Med, Final Report, vol. 1, part I, chap. 2, p. 96.
203 Someone cut up the parachute: Author’s interviews with Oliver Andersen, January 22, 2007, and Red Moody, November 7, 2006.
203 As Brad Mooney walked: Brad Mooney interview, March 30, 2007.
204 approximately a hundred newsmen:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 344–345.
204 “under the Mediterranean sun”: “H-Bomb Recovered,” CBS News, April 8, 1966.
204 The embassy had drafted:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 343–344.
205 held a press conference: “William S. Guest Press Conference,” April 8, 1966.
205 “a nightmare of the nuclear age”: Szulc, Bombs of Palomares, p. 253.
206 “made millions of people aware”: Joel Larus, Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), p. vii.
207 After the press and VIPs left:Aircraft Salvops Med, Interim Report, July 15, 1966, p. C16; Memo, Moody to Commander, “Report of Explosive Ordnance Disposal,” May 10, 1966 (NHC), pp. 3–4; SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 60–61.
207 General Wilson had proposed:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 61.
207 the Navy loaded it: Deck logs of the USS Petrel, April 8, 1966.
207 The Air Force sent bomb number four: S. V. Asselin, memo to S. A. Moore, “Trip to Pantex, April 27 and 28, 1966,” undated (Document no. SAC200118240000, Confidential, NNSA, FOIA).
207 The engineers learned some lessons: Randall Maydew, oral history, conducted by Necah Furman, December 1991, p. 12.
208 The USNSBoycearrived:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 188; Emilio Iranzo interview, February 16, 2007.
208 The other two barrels:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 189.
208 He said he planned: Lewis, One of Our H-Bombs, p. 236.
208 the Navy billed the Air Force:SAC Historical Study #109, p. 111.
208 $10,230,744, or $126,305 per day: W. M. Place et al., Palomares Summary Report (Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.: Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency, Technology and Analysis Directorate, January 15, 1975), p. 141. Pp. 142–144 contain a detailed cost breakdown.
208 On April 7, 1967, exactly one year: George Martin, e-mail to author, September 24, 2008.
208 Tony Richardson composed a poem: Tony Richardson interview, October 31, 2007.
208 replacing topsoil, repairing ditches:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 189–190.
209 The legal staff drew up: Ibid.
209 By the end of March: Ibid., p. 86.
209 On March 20: Ibid., p. 302.
209 but a skeleton crew of lawyers: Joe Ramirez interview, April 27, 2007.
209 By September 26:SAC Historical Study #109, pp. 391, 492.
209 For his help: Place et al., Palomares Summary Report, p. 176.
209 “As testimony and admiration”: Ibid.
209 In June, he presented his own claim: Details on the Orts claim can be found in Place et al., Palomares Summary Report, pp. 176–178.
209 Simó guessed he had saved the military: “Palomares Revisited re: Atom Bomb,” CBS News, December 20, 1966.
210 In the spring and summer of 1966: The background of the diplomatic climate leading up to the base negotiations can be found in James E. Miller, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, vol. 12, Western Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), and Airgram, Embassy in Madrid to Department of State, “U.S. Policy Assessment,” May 7, 1966 (LBJ).
210 It refused: As of December 1966, the nuclear overflights were still under discussion. See Cable, Embassy in Madrid to SECSTATE, December 10, 1966, #9187 (LBJ).
210 It wanted the United States: Cable, Department of State to Embassy in Madrid, May 6, 1966 (NARA).
210 In May, The New York Timesreported: Benjamin Welles, “Spain Offers 3 Proposals on Gibraltar,” The New York Times, May 27, 1966, p. 19.
210 The base negotiations got under way: Memorandum of Conversation, November 13, 1967, “Base Negotiations” (NARA). This document is the earliest record found by the author that lists American and Spanish officials meeting for the express purpose of discussing the bases.
210 He had been lobbying hard: Memorandum for the Files, December 5, 1967, “Spanish Base Negotiations and Palomares” (NARA).
210 “The accident brought home”: Ibid.
210 On January 6, 1968, Duke was dining: The story of Duke’s return to Washington is from Angier Biddle Duke, Living History interview, October 24, 1990, pp. 20–21, and author’s interview with Robin Duke, June 7, 2007.
211 Today, the once barren coast: The description of modern Palomares comes from the author’s visit to the area, February 24–28, 2007.
212 Manolo says the town: Manolo and Dolores González interview, February 24, 2007.
212 though it refuses to say: On occasion, the U.S. government has released information about funding for a specific part of Project Indalo. For instance, a 1973 document obtained by the author states that the United States had provided approximately $250,000 in technical equipment and $25,000 a year in operating funds. (See C. R. Richmond, “Remarks on Palomares — Seven Years Later,” March 9, 1973 [NNSA, FOIA].) However, the full cost of the project has never been disclosed. The author made numerous requests for interviews with Mohandas Bhat, the DOE project officer for Palomares, and CIEMAT representatives, all of which were refused.
212 It has also tested chickens: Emilio Iranzo interview, February 16, 2007.
212 Every year, about 150 residents: The testing numbers come from the DOE Web site on Project Indalo: www.hss.energy.gov/HealthSafety/IIPP/hservices/ps_msurv.html.
212 these tests show that about 5 percent: This statistic also comes from the Project Indalo Web site (see previous reference). However, the information on plutonium ingestion was removed from the Web site when it was updated. The author has a printout of the earlier Web page in her files.
212 This is proven, they say: Ibid. and Emilio Iranzo interview, February 16, 2007.
212 Villagers who visit Madrid:Operación Flecha Rota: Accidente nucleár de Palomares (Almería), directed by José Herrera, 2007.
213 Only one small study: Pedro Martínez Pinilla et al., “Evolución de la mortalidad en Palomares antes y después del accidente nuclear de 1966,” El Médico 16, no. 1 (1987). An electronic copy of this article was given to the author by José Herrera Plaza, a documentary filmmaker in Spain, along with an English translation done for Oak Ridge National Laboratories. Herrera downloaded hundreds of Indalo documents from the DOE Web site to his home in Spain, which he generously shared with the author. The author, despite numerous attempts, was never able to download the same documents from the DOE Web site to her home in the United States.
213 the accident continues to haunt: See, e.g., Paul Geitner, “Spanish Town Struggles to Forget Its Moment on the Brink of a Nuclear Cataclysm,” The New York Times, September 12, 2008.
213 a large irrigation pool: Emilio Iranzo interview, February 16, 2007; and E. Iranzo et al., “Air Concentrations of 239Pu and 240Pu and Potential Radiation Doses to Persons Living near Pu-Contaminated Areas in Palomares, Spain,” Health Physics, April 1987, p. 460.
213 CIEMAT purchased about twenty-three acres: www.hss.energy.gov/HealthSafety/IIPP/hservices/ps_msurv.html.
213 It forbade farmers: Manolo and Dolores González interview, February 24, 2007.
213“Nowthey put a fence”: Ibid.
213 Between November 21, 2006: Rafael Méndez, “Detectada contaminación en Palomares fuera de las zonas expropiadas y valladas,” El País, July 1, 2007.
213 In April 2008, CIEMAT announced: Rafael Méndez, “España halla las zanjas radiactivas que EEUU ocultó en Palomares,” El País, April 4, 2008.
213 “small radioactive metal objects”: Ibid.
213 Though the U.S. and Spanish: See, e.g., Memo, Barrett Fountos to Tom Bell et al., “Trip Report to Spain with Accomplishments Related to Palomares Program Review,” September 23, 1998 (author’s collection). In this memo, provided to the author by José Herrera Plaza, Emilio Iranzo is noted to have said, “Important to recognize that Pu was left at the site. There were not enough drums to take all the Pu away.” Chet Richmond, an American scientist, added, “There were more drums brought in than were taken away…. Still need to clarify location of pits.” Herrera has long suspected that radioactive material was secretly buried in Spain, an assertion that seems to be supported by this memo and the recent discoveries in Palomares.
213 they widened the “contaminated” zone: Méndez, “Detectada contaminación en Palomares,” July 1, 2007. The zone was widened from 90,000 to 300,000 square meters, converted into square yards by the author.
214 Manolo is not worried: Manolo and Dolores González interview, February 24, 2007.
214 “Minisubs”: James V. Healion, “Boom on 2-Man Subs Seen,” The Washington Post, June 25, 1967.
214 In 1967 and 1968, Alvindove:Alvin history is from WHOI Web site: www.whoi.edu/page.do? pid=10737.
214 By late 1968, it had completed 307: William O. Rainnie and William I. Milwee, “How We Raised the Alvin from 5000 Feet,” Popular Mechanics, January 1970, p. 93.
214Aluminaut, meanwhile, took scientists: Author’s interview with George Tyler, September 26, 2006.
214 a freak accident: The description of Alvin’s sinking comes from Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Recovery of Deep Research Vehicle Alvin (Washington, D.C.: Naval Ship Systems Command, December 1969); Rainnie and Milwee, “How We Raised the Alvin”; and Kaharl, Water Baby, pp. 115–119.
215 was estimated to weigh about 8,800: Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Recovery of Deep Research Vehicle Alvin, p. 6.
215 “Leave that damn toy”: Kaharl, Water Baby, p. 122.
215 Salvage experts agreed: The description of Alvin’s recovery comes from Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Recovery of Deep Research Vehicle Alvin; Eugene B. Mitchell and William I. Milwee, “Recovery of Alvin—A Practical Ocean Engineering Operation,” Naval Engineers Journal, December 1969, pp. 13–22; Rainnie and Milwee, “How We Raised the Alvin”; and Kaharl, Water Baby, pp. 121–124.
215 The assignment was a coup: George Tyler interview, September 26, 2006.
215 On August 27, 1969, Aluminautsubmerged: Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Recovery of Deep Research Vehicle Alvin, p. 28.
215 Bob Canary, theAluminautpilot: The “wet noodle” quote is from Kaharl, Water Baby, p. 123.
216 He wanted to grab the controls: Ibid.
216 an account flatly denied: George Tyler interview, September 26, 2006. Tyler describes this story as “bullshit.”
216 was in remarkably good condition: Mitchell and Milwee, “Recovery of Alvin,” pp. 21–22.
Interestingly, a bologna sandwich salvaged from the sub showed no deterioration from bacteria. This accidental discovery that near-freezing temperatures and lack of oxygen aided preservation opened up new areas of scientific research. (See WHOI Web site, www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=10737.) 216 Scientists and engineers flushed: Kaharl, Water Baby, pp. 126–127.
216 government funding for deep-sea exploration: Ibid., pp. 127–128; “The Aluminaut Story,” March 6, 1986, p. 10.
216 accepting projects that embarrassed: George Tyler interview, September 26, 2006.
216 in 1971, Reynolds canceled: “The Aluminaut Story,” March 6, 1986, p. 10; Richard Pothier, “Star of Deep for Six Years, She’s to Be a Sub on Bench,” The Miami Herald, undated. The records are not entirely clear, but it appears that the sub was semiretired in 1970 and mothballed in 1971.
216 The sub is probably best known: The Alvin history is from WHOI Web site: www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=10737.
216 All that remains of the original: Author’s visit to Alvin and interviews with Bob Brown and Bruce Strickrott, July 2, 2007.
216 The sub will retire by 2015: William J. Broad, “New Sphere in Exploring the Abyss,” The New York Times, August 26, 2008, p. D1.
216 On January 21, 1968: The details of the Thule accident come from Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 1993), pp. 156–157; “Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1950–1980,” undated (NNSA, FOIA); Department of the Air Force, USAF Nuclear Safety, Special Edition: Project Crested Ice, 65 (part 2), no. 1, Jan — Feb — Mar 1970. In November 2008, the BBC revealed that the United States had secretly left nuclear components buried in the ice. See Gordon Corera, “Mystery of Lost U.S. Nuclear Bomb,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7720049.stm, posted November 10, 2008.
217 McNamara had proposed canceling: Sagan, Limits of Safety, pp. 178–179.
217 He ordered SAC to stop: “U.S. Bars H-Bombs in Airborne Alert,” The New York Times, February 29, 1968, p. 1; Sagan, Limits of Safety, pp. 193–196.
217 who were tired of cleaning up: Sagan, Limits of Safety, p. 196. Sagan includes this relevant footnote: “Civilian authorities grew increasingly exasperated with the Strategic Air Command after these accidents. For example, in one press report, an unidentified civilian official recalls that Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke found it necessary to go for a swim in the ocean at Palomares to assure the Spaniards that there was no danger and says, ‘Next time we ought to make the whole SAC command go swimming.’”
218 SAC veterans were shocked: Author’s interviews with SAC veterans, August 23 and 25, 2005.
218 In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin: Andrew E. Kramer, “Recalling Cold War, Russia Resumes Long-Range Sorties,” The New York Times, August 18, 2007.