65809.fb2 Гражданская война, террор и бандитизм (Систематизация социологии и социальная динамика) - читать онлайн бесплатно полную версию книги . Страница 66

Гражданская война, террор и бандитизм (Систематизация социологии и социальная динамика) - читать онлайн бесплатно полную версию книги . Страница 66

looked covetously at Czechoslovakia, where about 3,000,000 people

in the Sudeten area were of German origin. It became known in May

1938 that Hitler and his generals were drawing up a plan for the

occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks were relying on

military assistance from France, with which they had an alliance.

The U.S.S.R. also had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, and it

indicated willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain

if they decided to come to Czechoslovakia's defense, but the

Soviet Union and its potential services were ignored throughout

the crisis.

As Hitler continued to make inflammatory speeches demanding that

Germans in Czechoslovakia be reunited with their homeland, war

seemed imminent. Neither France nor Britain felt prepared to

defend Czechoslovakia, however, and both were anxious to avoid a

military confrontation with Germany at almost any cost. In

mid-September, Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister,

offered to go to Hitler's retreat at Berchtesgaden to discuss the

situation personally with the F?hrer. Hitler agreed to take no

military action without further discussion, and Chamberlain agreed

to try to persuade his cabinet and the French to accept the

results of a plebiscite in the Sudetenland. The French premier,

?douard Daladier, and his foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, then

went to London, where a joint proposal was prepared stipulating

that all areas with a population that was more than 50 percent

Sudeten German be returned to Germany. The Czechoslovaks were not

consulted. The Czechoslovak government initially rejected the

proposal but was forced to accept it reluctantly on September 21.

On September 22 Chamberlain again flew to Germany and met Hitler

at Godesberg, where he was dismayed to learn that Hitler had

stiffened his demands: he now wanted the Sudetenland occupied by

the German army and the Czechoslovaks evacuated from the area by

September 28. Chamberlain agreed to submit the new proposal to the

Czechoslovaks, who rejected it, as did the British cabinet and the

French. On the 24th the French ordered a partial mobilization: the

Czechoslovaks had ordered a general mobilization one day earlier.

In a last-minute effort to avoid war, Chamberlain then proposed

that a four-power conference be convened immediately to settle the

dispute. Hitler agreed, and on September 29, Hitler, Chamberlain,

Daladier, and the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini met in

Munich, where Mussolini introduced a written plan that was

accepted by all as the Munich agreement. (Many years later it was

discovered that the so-called Italian plan had been prepared in

the German Foreign Office.) It was almost identical to the

Godesberg proposal: the German army was to complete the occupation

of the Sudetenland by October 10, and an international commission

would decide the future of other disputed areas. Czechoslovakia

was informed by Britain and France that it could either resist

Germany alone or submit to the prescribed annexations. The

Czechoslovak government chose to submit.

Before leaving Munich, Chamberlain and Hitler signed a paper