324 Rasmussen S., Ravinkilde J. Realism and logic // Synthese, 1982, vol. 52, N. 3, p. 380.
325 Horwich P. Three Forms of Realism // Synthese, 1982, vol. 51, N. 2, p. 181-202; Merril G. Forms of Realism // Amer. Philos. Quart., 1980, vol. 17, N. 3, p. 229-235.
326 Putnam H. Why there isn't a ready-made world? // Synthese, 1982, vol. 51, N. 2, p. 163; Putnam H. Why reason can't be naturalised? // Ibid., vol. 51, N. 1, p. 4 -5.
327 Putnam H. Three Kinds of scientific Realism // Philos. Quart., 1982, vol. 32, N. 128, p. 198.
328 RescherN. Empirical inquiry. L., 1982, p. 268.
329 Worrall J. Scientific Realism and scientific Change // Philos. Quart., 1982, vol. 32, N. 128, p. 231.
330 PutnamH. Meaning and moral sciences, p. 10.
331 Putnam H. Philosophical Papers. Cambr., etc., 1975, vol. 2, p. 202.
332 См.: Порус В. Н. О философских аспектах проблемы "несоизмеримости" научных теорий // Вопросы философии, 1986, No 12, с. 57-70.
333 Putnam H. How not to talk about Meaning // Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 2. In Honor of Philipp Frank. N.Y., 1965, Note 3.
334 RosenbergJ. Coupling, retheoretizatlon and the correspondence principle // Synthese, 1980, vol. 45, N. 3, p. 351-385.
335 Stegmullerr W. Structures and dynamics of theories: some reflections on J.Sneed and Kuhn // Erkenntnis, 1975, vol. 9, N.1, p. 75-100.
336 Niiniluoto I.. The growth of theories: comments on the structuralist approach // Theory change, ancient axiomatic and Galileo's methodology. Dordrecht etc., 1981, p. 39-40
337 Sneed J. Structuralism and scientific Realism // Erkenntnis, 1983, vol. 19, N. 1-3, p. 366.
338 Fine A. And not anti-realism either // Nous, 1984, vol. 18, N. 1, p. 62.
339 Feibleman J. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, Interpreted as a System, 2 ed. Cambr. (Mass.), L., 1970, p. 483.
340 Buchler J. Charles S. Peirce's Empiricism. N. Y., 1939.
341 Reichenbach I. Experience and Prediction. Chicago, 1938, p. 30, 79.
342 Моrris Сh. Logical Positivism, Pragmatism, and Scientific Empiricism. Paris, 1937, p. 12.
343 Nagel E. Charles S. Peirce - Pioneer of Modern Empiricism // Philosophy of Science, 1940. vol. 7, ? I, p. 69.
344 См.: Goudge T. The Conflict of Naturalism and Transcendentalism in Peirce // Journal of Philosophy, 1947, vol. 44, ? 2, pp. 365-375.
345 Nagel E. Op. cit., p. 76.
346 Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge (Mass.), 1952; Fairbanks M. Ch. S. Peirce and Logical Atomism // The New Scholasticism, 1964, vol. 38, ? 2, pp. 178-188; Bernstein К. In Defence of American Philosophy // Contemporary American Philosophy. N. Y., 1970, pp. 294-301; Delaney С. Peirce's Critique of Foundationalism // Monist, 1973, vol. 57, ? 2, pp. 240- 251; Thayer I. The Revolution in Empiricism: Peirce on Scientific Knowledge and Truth // Southeren Journal of Philosophy, 1979, vol. 18, ? 4, pp. 531- 545.
347 Fairbanks М. Ch. S. Peirce and Positivism // The Modern Schoolman, 1964, vol. 41, ? 4, p. 327.
348 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers. Cambr. (Mass.), 1965, vol. 5, p. 152, fr. 257.
349 Thompson M. Peirce's Verificationist Realism // Review of Metaphysics, 1970, vol. 32, ? I, p. 81.
350 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers, vol. 6, p. 23S, fr. 349.
351 См: Transcendental Arguments and Science. Essays in Epistemology. Dordrecht etc., 1979.
352 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers, vol. 5. p. 258. fr. 402.
353 Almeder R. Peirce on Meaning // Synthese, 1979, vol. 41, ? 1, p. 2.
354 Peirce Ch. S. Op. cit., vol. 5, p. 385, fr. 545. Конечно, здесь у Ч. Пирса большая неясность: являются ли эти законы объективными, или же под законом следует понимать "привычку" (habit), вызванную у субъекта действиями с данным объектом.
355 Almeder R. Ор. cit, р. 17-20. Сам У. Куайн, однако, замечал, что "принцип прагматизма" Пирса, если отвлечься от неясной формы его изложения, имплицитно содержит все положения, какие вошли в доктрину верификационизма (Quinе W. Word and Object. Cambr. (Mass.) etc., 1960).
356 Peirce Ch. S. I?. cit, vol. 5, p. 394, fr. 565.
357 Bertilsson M. Towards a Social Reconstruction of Science Theory. Pierce's Theory of Inquiry and Beyond. Lund, 1978; Freeman Е., Sсolimovskу Н. The Search for Objectivity in Peirce and Popper // The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper, vol. 1. La Salle, 1974, pp. 464-519.
358 Almeder R. Fallibilism and the Ultimate Irreversible Opinion // Studies in Epistemology, Oxford, 1975, p. 40.
359 Ibid., p. 54.
360 Rescher N. Methodological Pragmatism. A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Oxford, 1977.
361 Quinе W. Ор. cit., р. 23.
362 Hooker М. Peirce's Conception of Truth // Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions". Dordrecht etc., 1978, pp. 131-133.
363 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers, vol. 5, p. 394, fr. 564.
364 Skagestade P. Pragmatic Realism: The Peircean Argument Reexamined // Review of Metaphysics, 1980, vol. 33, ? 3, p. 538.
365 Ibid., p. 540.
366 Freeman Е., Skolimovsky Н. Ор. cit., р. 479.
367 Peirce Ch. S. Ор. cit., vol. 5, p. 268. Fr. 407.
368 Hacking J. Imre Lakatos's Philosophy of Science // British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1979, vol. 30, ? 4, p. 386.
369 Ibid., p. 389.
370 Bertilsson M. Ор. cit., p. 131.
371 Rescher N. Peirce's Philosophy of Scienсе. Critical Studies in His Theory of Induction and Scientific Method. Notre-Dame, L., 1978.
372 Peirce Ch. S. The Collected Papers, vol. 7, p. 125, fr. 207.